Schmerber v. California
Schmerber v. California | |
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Case history | |
Prior | Certiorari to the Appellate Department of the Superior Court of California, County of Los Angeles |
Holding | |
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Court membership | |
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Case opinions | |
Majority | Brennan, joined by Clark, Harlan, Stewart, White |
Concurrence | Harlan, joined by Stewart |
Dissent | Warren |
Dissent | Black, joined by Douglas |
Dissent | Douglas |
Dissent | Fortas |
Laws applied | |
XIV |
Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966), was a landmark[1] United States Supreme Court case in which the Court clarified the application of the Fourth Amendment's protection against warrantless searches and the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination for searches that intrude into the human body. Until Schmerber, the Supreme Court had not yet clarified whether state police officers must procure a search warrant before taking blood samples from criminal suspects. Likewise, the Court had not yet clarified whether blood evidence taken against the wishes of a criminal suspect may be used against that suspect in the course of a criminal prosecution.[fn 1]
In a 5–4 opinion, the Court held that forced extraction and analysis of a blood sample is not compelled testimony; therefore, it does not violate the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination.
In the years following the Court's decision in Schmerber, many legal scholars feared the ruling would be used to limit
Background
Warrantless searches of the human body
In the 1950s, the
Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule
Until the twentieth century, courts would admit evidence at trial even if it was seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment.
Arrest and prosecution
On the night of November 12, 1964, Armando Schmerber and a passenger were driving home after drinking at a tavern and bowling alley in the
Arguments before the Court
"I think it follows if this Court holds that it's proper to withdraw the blood that is certainly just as proper to inject the
Nalline if we're looking at the welfare of society and how we want to keep narcoticusers off the street."
—Thomas M. McGurrin, counsel for Armando Schmerber, during oral argument at the Supreme Court of the United States[33]
Schmerber submitted an appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States, which granted certiorari on January 17, 1966.
Opinion of the Court
In his majority opinion,
Justice Harlan's concurrence
In his concurring opinion, Justice John Marshall Harlan II agreed that the involuntary blood sample did not implicate involuntary testimonial compulsion, but wrote separately to emphasize his opinion that the case before the Court "in no way implicates the Fifth Amendment."[42] Additionally, Justice Harlan cited to his dissent in Miranda v. Arizona where he argued against a broad expansion of the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. Justice Harlan disagreed with the Court's ruling in Miranda and even stated that the case "represents poor constitutional law and entails harmful consequences for the country at large."[43]
Dissenting opinions
All four dissenting Justices wrote separate dissenting opinions in Schmerber.
Subsequent developments
In the 1970s and 1980s, the Supreme Court revisited questions about the constitutionality of involuntary bodily intrusions in several key cases. In 1973, the Court ruled in Cupp v. Murphy that the police were permitted to extract a tissue sample from underneath a suspect's fingernails to recover "evanescent" physical evidence.[48] The suspect in Cupp was suspected of strangling his wife and voluntarily went to a police station to answer questions.[49] Officers noticed bloodstains under the suspect's fingernails and detained him, but did not place him under arrest.[49] Against the suspect's wishes, the police scraped out a tissue sample from under his fingernails to retrieve the evidence.[49] The biological material found under the suspect's fingernails was later found to have come from the victim.[49] Citing Schmerber, the Court held that this warrantless search was justified under the exigent circumstances exemption of the Fourth Amendment because the search was necessary to preserve the “highly evanescent evidence” under the defendant's fingernails.[50]
Twelve years later, the Court again revisited the topic of involuntary bodily intrusions in Winston v. Lee, where the Court held that the State of Virginia could not force an individual to undergo surgery to extract a bullet that may be evidence of a crime.[51] The Court applied its previous holding in Schmerber to conclude that the surgery would constitute an unreasonable search under the Fourth Amendment and that a crucial factor for evaluating any bodily intrusion "is the extent to which the procedure may threaten the safety or health of the individual."[52] Writing for the Court's majority, Justice Brennan concluded that forcing a patient to undergo major surgery intrudes too far upon individual privacy rights and that surgical intrusions "can only be characterized as severe."[53]
In 1989, the Court ruled in Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ Association that warrantless blood tests of railroad employees were reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.[54] The Court reaffirmed that the “compelled intrusio[n] into the body for blood to be analyzed for alcohol content” is a search under the Fourth Amendment,[55] but that warrantless blood tests of railroad employees were necessary to "prevent accidents and casualties in railroad operations that result from impairment of employees by alcohol or drugs.”[56] The Court also concluded that when individuals “participate in an industry that is regulated pervasively to ensure safety,” these individuals “have a reduced expectation of privacy.”[57] Because these employees had a "diminished expectation of privacy," the warrantless blood tests were permissible.[58] Justice Thurgood Marshall and Justice Brennan wrote a dissenting opinion in which they argued that this case was distinguishable from Schmerber because "no such exigency prevents railroad officials from securing a warrant before chemically testing the samples they obtain."[59]
South Dakota v. Neville and self-incrimination
After the Court issued its decision in Schmerber, a split of authority emerged in lower courts with regard to whether the Fifth Amendment's right against self-incrimination prohibited the use of a suspect's refusal to submit to a blood test as evidence of guilt.[61] The United States Supreme Court resolved this split in authority in South Dakota v. Neville, where the Court held that prosecutors could use a suspect's refusal to submit to a blood test as evidence of guilt, and the introduction of this evidence at trial does not violate the suspect's Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination.[62] Writing for the Court's majority, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor concluded that "the state did not directly compel respondent to refuse the test" and that a "simple blood-alcohol test is so safe, painless, and commonplace" a suspect would not feel coerced to refuse the test.[63] Justice John Paul Stevens wrote a dissenting opinion, joined by Justice Thurgood Marshall, in which he argued that the Court in Schmerber intended to adopt a broad and liberal interpretation of the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination.[64]
Missouri v. McNeely and the exigent circumstances exception
Over time, a split of authority grew among lower courts with regard to whether the Fourth Amendment's exigent circumstances exception allowed officers to always conduct warrantless blood tests on individuals suspected of driving under the influence of alcohol because evidence of alcohol was being destroyed by the body's natural metabolic processes.
Analysis
Scholars have described Schmerber v. California as a
Immediate reaction
Soon after the Court's ruling, analysts predicted that the effects of the case would be "far-reaching."
Impact
Some legal scholars have criticized the Court's ruling in Schmerber for infringing too far upon
See also
- List of United States Supreme Court cases, volume 384
- List of United States Supreme Court cases by the Warren Court
Notes
- ^ In 1957, the United States Supreme Court considered a similar case, Breithaupt v. Abram, where police officers took blood from an unconscious patient suspected of driving under the influence of alcohol.[2] The Court ultimately held that the blood sample was admissible as evidence under the theory that procuring the sample did not violate substantive due process.[3] However, at the time the Court issued its ruling in Breithaupt, the Fourth Amendment's exclusionary rule and the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination had not yet been incorporated to the states.[4]
- ^ In 1957, the California Supreme Court held in People v. Duroncelay that warrantless, involuntary blood samples taken from an individual suspected of driving under the influence of alcohol do not violate the constitution and may be admitted into evidence at trial.[31]
- ^ In his brief, Schmerber also relied upon Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963), to argue that testimonial evidence discovered as a result of an unlawful search should be excluded as "fruit of the poisonous tree."[35]
References
The citations in this Article are written in Bluebook style.
- ^ Aron Hogden, Reconciling A Split of Authority: A South Dakota Response to Recent Developments in Drunk Driving Law, 59 S.D. L. Rev. 372, 373 (2014) (describing Schmerber v. California as a "landmark case"); see also Kelsey P. Black, Undue Protection Versus Undue Punishment: Examining the Drinking & Driving Problem Across the United States, 40 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 463, 469 (2007) (describing Schmerber v. California as a "watershed case" in the nation's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence).
- ^ Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432, 439 (1957).
- ^ a b Breithaupt, 352 U.S. at 439.
- ^ See Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965); Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
- ^ Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 765 (1966).
- ^ a b c Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 770.
- ^ Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 770 ("in the present case, however, [the officer] might reasonably have believed that he was confronted with an emergency in which the delay necessary to obtain a warrant, under the circumstances, threatened the destruction of evidence") (internal quotations omitted).
- ^ Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S.Ct. 1552 (2013).
- ^ Kelsey P. Black, Undue Protection Versus Undue Punishment: Examining the Drinking & Driving Problem Across the United States, 40 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 463, 478–79 (2007).
- ^ Nita A. Farahany, Incriminating Thoughts, 64 Stan. L. Rev. 351, 355 (2012); Benjamin Holley, It's All in Your Head: Neurotechnological Lie Detection & the Fourth & Fifth Amendments, 28 Dev. Mental Health L. 1, 18 (2009); John G. New, If You Could Read My Mind: Implications of Neurological Evidence for Twenty-First Century Criminal Jurisprudence, 29 J. Legal Med. 179, 197 (2008); cf. Kiel Brennan-Marquez, A Modest Defense of Mind Reading, 15 Yale J. L. & Tech. 214 (2013) ("The modern era of self-incrimination jurisprudence began with Schmerber v. California.").
- ^ a b See, e.g., John A. Scanlan, Jr., Playing the Drug-Testing Game: College Athletes, Regulatory Institutions, & the Structures of Constitutional Argument, 62 Ind. L.J. 863, 907 (1987); Commonwealth v. Brennan, 386 Mass. 772, 776-77 (1982) (discussing impacts of the Court's ruling in Schmerber on "the breathalyzer test").
- ^ Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 166 (1952).
- ^ Rochin, 342 U.S. at 166.
- ^ Rochin, 342 U.S. at 172–73.
- ^ Breithaupt, 352 U.S. at 433–39.
- ^ Breithaupt, 352 U.S. at 433.
- ^ Breithaupt, 352 U.S. at 438.
- ^ See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 394–96 (1914).
- ^ Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 338 U.S. 25 (1949); Weeks, 232 U.S. at 394–96.
- ^ Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
- ^ E. John Wherry, Jr., Vampire or Dinosaur: A Time to Revisit Schmerber v. California?, 19 Am. J. Trial Advoc. 503, 510 (1996) ("[The] Rochin decision applied the exclusionary rule to state courts for the first time, but only where conscience-shocking due process issues were present.").
- ^ E. John Wherry, Jr., Vampire or Dinosaur: A Time to Revisit Schmerber v. California?, 19 Am. J. Trial Advoc. 503, 510 (1996) ("State courts were left to fashion their own remedies for Fourth Amendment violations.").
- ^ People v. Cahan, 44 Cal. 2d 434, 445 (1955) ("evidence obtained in violation of the constitutional guarantees is inadmissible").
- ^ Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); see also E. John Wherry, Jr., Vampire or Dinosaur: A Time to Revisit Schmerber v. California?, 19 Am. J. Trial Advoc. 503, 510 (1996) ("A closely divided United States Supreme Court, relying heavily upon Cahan, voted five to four to adopt the prophylactic exclusionary rule in the landmark decision of Mapp v. Ohio.").
- ^ Schmerber 384 U.S. at 758 n.2; see also Oyez Project, Schmerber v. California.
- ^ Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 758 n.2 (1966).
- ^ Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 758–59.
- ^ Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 758.
- ^ a b Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 759.
- ^ Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 758–59; see also California Vehicle Code § 23102(a).
- ^ People v. Duroncelay, 48 Cal.2d 766 (1957).
- ^ Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 759, 759 n.3.
- ^ a b Oyez Project, Schmerber v. California.
- ^ Schmerber v. California, 382 U.S. 971 (1966).
- ^ a b Brief for Petitioner, Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (U.S., 1966).
- ^ a b c Brief for Respondent, Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (U.S., 1966).
- ^ Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 767.
- ^ Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 765.
- ^ Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 769–70.
- ^ Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 771–72.
- ^ Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 772.
- ^ Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 772 (Harlan, J., concurring).
- ^ Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 504 (1966).
- ^ a b Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 779 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
- ^ Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 772 (Warren, C.J., dissenting) (citing Breithaupt, 352 U.S. at 442 (Warren, C.J., dissenting)).
- ^ a b Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 778 (Black, J., dissenting).
- ^ Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 779 (Fortas, J., dissenting).
- ^ Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291, 296 (1973).
- ^ a b c d Cupp, 412 U.S. at 292.
- ^ Cupp, 412 U.S. at 296.
- ^ Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 767 (1985).
- ^ Winston, 470 U.S. at 761, 762–63.
- ^ Winston, 470 U.S. at 766.
- ^ Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 624 (1989).
- ^ Skinner, 489 U.S. at 616 (internal quotations omitted).
- ^ Skinner, 489 U.S. at 620–21 (citing 49 CFR § 219.1(a) (1987)).
- ^ Skinner, 489 U.S. at 627.
- ^ Skinner, 489 U.S. at 628.
- ^ Skinner, 489 U.S. at 642 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
- ^ South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553, 570 (1983) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("[T]his Court's opinion in Schmerber v. California [citations] had assumed that the Fifth Amendment should be construed as broadly as the more liberal state language.").
- ^ Neville, 459 U.S. at 558 ("we granted certiorari to resolve the conflict").
- ^ Neville, 459 U.S. at 561–62.
- ^ Neville, 459 U.S. at 562–63.
- ^ Neville, 459 U.S. at 570 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
- ^ McNeely, 133 S. Ct. at 1558 (discussing split of authority).
- ^ McNeely, 133 S. Ct. at 1575 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
- ^ McNeely, 133 S.Ct. at 1552 (2013) ("[w]e granted certiorari to resolve a split of authority on the question").
- ^ McNeely, 133 S. Ct. at 1558, 1568.
- ^ McNeely, 133 S. Ct. at 1559.
- ^ McNeely, 133 S. Ct. at 1556.
- ^ Aron Hogden, Reconciling A Split of Authority: A South Dakota Response to Recent Developments in Drunk Driving Law, 59 S.D. L. Rev. 372, 373 (2014) (describing Schmerber v. California as a "landmark case"); Michael A. Sabino & Anthony Michael Sabino, Warrantless Blood Tests, Drunk Driving, & "Exigent Circumstances": Preserving the Liberty Guarantee of the Fourth Amendment While Evolving the Exceptions to the Warrant Requirement, 34 Rev. Litig. 27, 68 (2015) (same); Floralynn Einesman, Vampires Among Us – Does A Grand Jury Subpoena for Blood Violate the Fourth Amendment?, 22 Am. J. Crim. L. 327, 328 (1995) (same); H. Richard Uviller, Self-Incrimination by Inference: Constitutional Restrictions on the Evidentiary Use of A Suspect's Refusal to Submit to A Search, 81 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 37, 76 (1990) (discussing "Justice Brennan's landmark pronouncement in Schmerber v. California").
- ^ Kelsey P. Black, Undue Protection Versus Undue Punishment: Examining the Drinking & Driving Problem Across the United States, 40 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 463, 469 (2007).
- ^ John D. Castiglione, Human Dignity Under the Fourth Amendment, 2008 Wis. L. Rev. 655, 682 (2008).
- ^ Akhil Reed Amar & Renee B. Lettow, Fifth Amendment First Principles: The Self-Incrimination Clause, 93 Mich. L. Rev. 857, 885 (1995).
- ^ Anne Marie Schubert, Compelled Consent to Release of Foreign Records-Taking the Fifth: Doe v. United States, 23 U.S.F. L. Rev. 291, 297 (1989).
- ^ Wendell J. Willmore, The Implications of Schmerber v. California, 9 A.F.L. Rev. 26, 27 (1967).
- ^ Intrusive Border Searches – Is Judicial Control Desirable?, 115 U. Pa. L. Rev. 276, 283 (1966).
- ^ See, e.g., Wendell J. Willmore, The Implications of Schmerber v. California, 9 A.F.L. Rev. 26, 26 (1967).
- ^ Charles L. Berry, Constitutional Law Compulsory Blood Tests Do Not Violate Fifth Amendment Privilege Against Self-Incrimination or Fourth Amendment Prohibition Against Unreasonable Search & Seizure: Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 44 Tex. L. Rev. 1616, 1621 (1966).
- ^ Stephen J. Friedman, Mr. Justice Brennan: The First Decade, 80 Harv. L. Rev. 7, 11 (1966).
- ^ Charles T. Newton, Jr., The Mere Evidence Rule: Doctrine or Dogma?, 45 Tex. L. Rev. 526, 552 (1967).
- ^ See, e.g., Kelsey P. Black, Undue Protection Versus Undue Punishment: Examining the Drinking & Driving Problem Across the United States, 40 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 463, 478–79 (2007); E. John Wherry, Jr., Vampire or Dinosaur: A Time to Revisit Schmerber v. California?, 19 Am. J. Trial Advoc. 503 (1996).
- ^ E. John Wherry, Jr., Vampire or Dinosaur: A Time to Revisit Schmerber v. California?, 19 Am. J. Trial Advoc. 503, 540 (1996).
- ^ Blake A. Bailey, et al., Criminal Law – Lee v. Winston: Court-Ordered Surgery & the Fourth Amendment-A New Analysis of Reasonableness?, 60 Notre Dame L. Rev. 149, 152 (1984).
- ^ Nita A. Farahany, Incriminating Thoughts, 64 Stan. L. Rev. 351, 355 (2012); cf. Kiel Brennan-Marquez, A Modest Defense of Mind Reading, 15 Yale J. L. & Tech. 214 (2013).
- ^ Anthropotelemetry: Dr. Schwitzgebel's Machine, 80 Harv. L. Rev. 403, 409 (1966).
- ^ Benjamin Holley, It's All in Your Head: Neurotechnological Lie Detection & the Fourth & Fifth Amendments, 28 Dev. Mental Health L. 1, 18 (2009).
- ^ John G. New, If You Could Read My Mind: Implications of Neurological Evidence for Twenty-First Century Criminal Jurisprudence, 29 J. Legal Med. 179, 197 (2008).
External links
- Works related to Schmerber v. California at Wikisource
- Text of Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966) is available from: Findlaw Justia Library of Congress Oyez (oral argument audio)