Sectarianism
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Sectarianism is a debated concept. Some scholars and journalists define it as pre-existing fixed communal categories in society, and use it to explain political, cultural, or religious conflicts between groups.[1] Others conceive of sectarianism as a set of social practices where daily life is organised on the basis of communal norms and rules that individuals strategically use and transcend.[2][3] This definition highlights the co-constitutive aspect of sectarianism and people’s agency, as opposed to understanding sectarianism as being fixed and incompatible communal boundaries.[1] [2][3]
While sectarianism is often labelled as 'religious' and/or 'political', the reality of a sectarian situation is usually much more complex. In its most basic form, sectarianism has been defined as, 'the existence, within a locality, of two or more divided and actively competing communal identities, resulting in a strong sense of dualism which unremittingly transcends commonality, and is both culturally and physically manifest.'[4]
Definition
The term "sectarianism" is defined in the Oxford English Dictionary as "excessive attachment to a particular sect or party, especially in religion".
Polemics against the term "sectarianism"
Some scholars identify the problems with using the term "sectarianism" in articles.[6][7] Western mainstream media and politicians often presume "sectarianism" as ancient and long-lasting. For example, Obama in his final State of the Union address phrased the sectarian violence in the Middle East as "rooted in conflicts that dated back millennia", but many pointed out that some sectarian tensions don't even date back a decade.[8] "Sectarianism" is also too ambiguous, which makes it a slogan whose meanings are up to the observers.[7] Scholars argued that the use of term "sectarianism" has become a catch-all explanation to conflicts, which drives analytical attention away from underlying political and socioeconomic issues, lacks coherence, and is often associated with emotional negativity.[6][7] Many scholars find the term "sectarianism" problematic, and therefore three alternatives are proposed.
Alternative: Sectarianization
Hashemi and Postel and other scholars differentiate between "sectarianism" and "sectarianization".
Alternative: Sectarian as a prefix
Haddad argues "sectarianism" cannot capture sectarian relations in reality nor represent the complex expressions of sectarian identities.[7] Haddad calls for an abandonment of -ism in "sectarianism" in scholarly research as it "has overshadowed the root" and direct use of 'sectarian' as a qualifier to "direct our analytical focus towards understanding sectarian identity".[7] Sectarian identity is "simultaneously formulated along four overlapping, interconnected and mutually informing dimensions: doctrinal, subnational, national, and transnational".[7] The relevance of these factors is context-dependent and works on four layers in chorus. The multi-layered work provides more clarity and enables more accurate diagnoses of problems at certain dimensions to find more specific solutions.
Alternative: Sextarianism
In her book Sextarianism, Mikdashi emphasizes the relationship between sect, sex and sexuality. She argues that sectarianism cannot be studied in isolation, because the practice of sectarianism always goes hand in hand with the practice of sexism. For this reason she proposes the term "sextarianism". Sex, sexuality and sect together define citizenship, and, since the concept of citizenship is the basis of the modern nation-state, sextarianism therefore forms the basis for the legal bureaucratic systems of the state and thus for state power.[14]
Intersectionality in Sectarianism
The analytical framework of intersectionality in examining sectarianism has gained increasing prominence in the study of this subject. Intersectionality highlights the nature of religious, ethnic, political, and social identities in contexts marked by sectarian tensions and conflicts.[15] Acknowledging that individuals' experiences of sectarianism are shaped not only by their religious affiliation or other sectarian categories but also by other dimensions such as sex, class, and nationality among others, are essentially contributing to those experiences.[16]
Religious Dimension
Intersectionality reveals that factors like sex, ethnicity, and socioeconomic status intersect with religious identity to shape individuals' experiences of sectarianism. Authors such as Maya Mikdashi introduced the concept of 'Sextarianism', particulary showing how the role of gender is crucially influencing the individual's experience of religious sectarian differences in political sectarian systems such as in Lebanon.[14] In the case of Sectarianism in Lebanon, she highlights how Sextarian differences are decisive vectors in determining woman's experiences of power and sovereignty in a political sectarian system.
Political Dimension
In the political dimensions, the intersectional lens recognizes the intricate connections between political identities and other social categories. Political parties or other factions may exploit religious divisions for political gain, exacerbating sectarian tensions.[17] Intersectionality helps to understand how for instance political affiliations intersect with factors such as socioeconomic status and regional background, providing insights into the motivation behind political mobilization and the dynamics of power in sectarian settings.[18]
Implications for Communities
The intersectionality of sectarianism has profound implications for affected communities, particularly for individuals who belong to multiple marginalized groups such as women, migrants, and marginalized ethnicities living under sectarian systems. The recognition of these intersecting forms of discrimination and marginalization is decisive for developing inclusive strategies to promote peace, tolerance, and increased social cohesion within diverse societies.
Political sectarianism
Sectarianism in the 21st century
Sectarian tendencies in politics are visible in countries and cities associated with sectarian violence in the present, and the past.[19] Notable examples where sectarianism affects lives are street-art expression, urban planning, and sports club affiliation.[20]
United Kingdom
Across the United Kingdom, Scottish and Irish sectarian tendencies are often reflected in team-sports competitions.[21] Affiliations are regarded as a latent representation of sectarianism tendencies. (Since the early 1900s, cricket teams were established via patronage of sectarian affiliated landlords. In response to the Protestant representation of the sport, many Catholic schools founded their own Cricket schools.[22][20]) Modern day examples include tensions in sports such as football and have led to the passing of the "Offensive Behaviour at Football and Threatening Communications (Scotland) Act 2012".[23][24] Other general examples include the Gaelic sports in Ireland, established to serve as a counterweight to British traditional sports to preserve an Irish identity.[25]
Iran
World leaders have criticised the political ambitions of Iran and have condemned its involvement and support for opposition groups such as Hezbollah.[26] The political authority of the Islamic Republic of Iran has extended into neighboring countries, and has led to an increase of tensions in the region.[27]
An important figure in this process of expansion was the major general of Iran's
Authoritarian regimes
In recent years, authoritarian regimes have been particularly prone to sectarianization. This is because their key strategy of survival lies in manipulating sectarian identities to deflect demands for change and
The U.S. invasion of Iraq; the support of various Western governments for the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, which commits war crime upon war crime in Yemen and disseminates poisonous sectarian propaganda throughout the Sunni world; not to mention longstanding Western support for highly repressive dictators who manipulate sectarian fears and anxieties as a strategy of control and regime survival – the "ancient hatreds" narrative [between Sunnis and Shi’as] washes this all away and lays the blame for the regionʹs problems on supposedly trans-historical religious passions. Itʹs absurd in the extreme and an exercise in bad faith.[11]
Approaches to Study Sectarian Identities in authoritarian regimes
Scholars have adopted three approaches to study sectarian discourses: primordialism, instrumentalism, and constructivism.[5][9][34] Primordialism sees sectarian identity as rotted in biology and ingrained in history and culture.[5] Makdisi describes the process of bringing the sectarian discourses back to early Islamic history as "pervasive medievalization".[35] The centuries-old narrative is problematic as it treats sectarian identities in the Middle East as sui generis instead of modern collective identities.[7] Scholars should be cautious of sectarian essentialism and Middle East exceptionalism the primordial narrative reinforces since primordialism suggests sectarian tensions persist while theological differences do not guarantee conflicts.[7][9][35] Instrumentalism emphasizes that ruling elites manipulate identities to create violent conflicts for their interests. Instrumentalists see the Sunni-Shi'a divide as a modern invention and challenge the myths of primordial narratives since sectarian harmony have existed for centuries.[5] Constructivism is in the middle ground of primordialism and instrumentalism.
Religious sectarianism
Wherever people of different religions live in close proximity to each other, religious sectarianism can often be found in varying forms and degrees. In some areas, religious sectarians (for example Protestant and Catholic Christians) now[update] exist peacefully side by side for the most part, although these differences have resulted in violence, death, and outright warfare as recently as the 1990s. Probably the best-known example in recent times were The Troubles.
Catholic-Protestant sectarianism has also been a factor in U.S. presidential campaigns. Prior to John F. Kennedy, only one Catholic (Al Smith) had ever been a major party presidential nominee, and he had been solidly defeated largely because of claims based on his Catholicism. JFK chose to tackle the sectarian issue head-on during the West Virginia primary, but that only sufficed to win him barely enough Protestant votes to eventually win the presidency by one of the narrowest margins ever.[36]
Within Islam, there has been dilemmas at various periods between Sunnis and Shias; Shias consider Sunnis to be false, due to their refusal to accept the first caliph as Ali and accept all following descendants of him as infallible and divinely guided. Many Sunni religious leaders, including those inspired by Wahhabism and other ideologies have declared Shias to be heretics or apostates.[37]
Europe
This section possibly contains original research. (July 2016) |
Long before the Reformation, dating back to the 12th century, there has been sectarian conflict of varying intensity in Ireland. Historically, some Catholic countries once persecuted Protestants as heretics. For example, the substantial Protestant population of France (the
In some countries where the
Ireland
Protestant-Catholic sectarianism is prominent in Irish history; during the period of English (and later British) rule, Protestant settlers from Britain were "planted" in Ireland, which along with the Protestant Reformation led to increasing sectarian tensions between Irish Catholics and British Protestants. These tensions eventually boiled over into widespread violence during the Irish Rebellion of 1641. At the end of that war the lands of Catholics were confiscated with over ten million acres granted to new English owners under the Act for the Settlement of Ireland 1652.[38] The Cromwellian conquest of Ireland (1649-1653) saw a series of massacres perpetrated by the Protestant New Model Army against Catholic English royalists and Irish civilians. Sectarianism between Catholics and Protestants continued in the Kingdom of Ireland, with the Irish Rebellion of 1798 against British rule leading to more sectarian violence in the island, most infamously the Scullabogue Barn massacre, in which Protestants were burned alive in County Wexford.[39] The British response to the rebellion which included the public executions of dozens of suspected rebels in Dunlavin and Carnew, also inflamed sectarian sentiments.[citation needed]
Northern Ireland
After the
England
In June 1780 a series of riots (see the Gordon Riots) occurred in London motivated by anti-Catholic sentiment. These riots were described as being the most destructive in the history of London and resulted in approximately 300-700 deaths.[40] A long history of politically and religious motivated sectarian violence already existed in Ireland (see Irish Rebellions). The sectarian divisions related to the "Irish question" influenced local constituent politics in England.
Liverpool is an English city sometimes associated with sectarian politics. Halfway through the 19th century, Liverpool faced a wave of mass-immigration from Irish Catholics as a consequence of the Great Famine in Ireland. Most of the Irish-Catholic immigrants were unskilled workers and aligned themselves with the Labour party.[41][42] The Labour-Catholic party saw a larger political electorate in the many Liverpool-Irish, and often ran on the slogan of "Home Rule" - the independence of Ireland, to gain the support of Irish voters. During the first half of the 20th century, Liverpool politics were divided not only between Catholics and Protestants, but between two polarized groups consisting of multiple identities: Catholic-Liberal-Labour and Protestant-Conservative-Tory/Orangeists.[43][44]
From early 1900 onwards, the polarized Catholic Labour and Protestant Conservative affiliations gradually broke apart and created the opportunity for mixed alliances. The Irish National party gained its first electoral victory in 1875, and kept growing until the realization of Irish independence in 1921, after which it became less reliant on Labour support. On the Protestant side, Tory opposition in 1902 to vote in line with Protestant proposed bills indicated a split between the working class Protestants and the Tory party, which were regarded as "too distant" from its electorate.[44][45]
After the First and Second World War, religiously mixed battalions provided a counterweight to anti-Roman Catholic and anti-Protestant propaganda from either side.[46] While the IRA-bombing in 1939 (see S-Plan) somewhat increased violence between the Irish-Catholic associated Labour party and the Conservative Protestants, the German May Blitz destroyed property of more than 40.000 households.[44] Rebuilding Liverpool after the war created a new sense of community across religious lines.[47] Inter-church relations increased as a response as well, as seen through the warming up of relations between Archbishop Worlock and Anglican Bishop David Sheppard after 1976, a symbol of decreasing religious hostility.[48] The increase in education rates and the rise of trade and labour unions shifted religious affiliation to class affiliation further, which allowed Protestant and catholic affiliates under a Labour umbrella in politics. In the 1980s, class division had outgrown religious division, replacing religious sectarianism with class struggle.[44] Growing rates of non-English immigration from other parts of the Commonwealth near the 21st century also provides new political lines of division in identity affiliation.[49]
Northern Ireland has introduced a Private Day of Reflection,[50] since 2007, to mark the transition to a post-[sectarian] conflict society, an initiative of the cross-community Healing Through Remembering[51] organization and research project.
The Balkans
The civil wars in the
Africa
Over 1,000 Muslims and Christians were killed in the
Australia
Sectarianism in Australia is a historical legacy from the 18th, 19th and 20th centuries, between Catholics of mainly Celtic heritage and Protestants of mainly English descent. It has largely disappeared in the 21st century. In the late 20th and early 21st centuries, religious tensions were more centered between Muslim immigrants and non-Muslim nationalists, amid the backdrop of the
]Asia
Japan
For the violent conflict between Buddhist sects in Japan, see
Pakistan
In the last two decades, as many as 4,000 people are estimated to have died in sectarian fighting in Pakistan, 300 in 2006.
Sri Lanka
Most Muslims in Sri Lanka are Sunnis. There are a few Shia Muslims too from the relatively small trading community of Bohras. Divisiveness is not a new phenomenon to Beruwala. Sunni Muslims in the Kalutara district are split in two different sub groups. One group, known as the Alaviya sect, historically holds its annual feast at the Ketchimalai mosque located on the palm-fringed promontory adjoining the fisheries harbour in Beruwala.
It is a microcosm of the Muslim identity in many ways. The Galle Road that hugs the coast from Colombo veers inland just ahead of the town and forms the divide. On the left of the road lies China Fort, the area where some of the wealthiest among Sri Lankans Muslims live. The palatial houses with all modern conveniences could outdo if not equal those in the Colombo 7 sector. Most of the wealthy Muslims, gem dealers, even have a home in the capital, not to mention property.
Strict Wahabis believe that all those who do not practise their form of religion are heathens and enemies. There are others who say Wahabism's rigidity has led it to misinterpret and distort Islam, pointing to the Taliban as well as Osama bin Laden. What has caused concern in intelligence and security circles is the manifestation of this new phenomenon in Beruwala. It had earlier seen its emergence in the east.
Turkey
Ottoman Empire
In 1511, a pro-Shia revolt known as
Republican era (1923-)
Alevis were targeted in various massacres including 1978 Maraş massacre, 1980 Çorum massacre and 1993 Sivas massacre.
During his
Iran
Overview
Sectarianism in Iran has existed for centuries, dating back to the
Pre-1979 Revolution
Shiism has been an important factor in shaping the politics, culture and religion within Iran, long before the Iranian 1979 revolution.[65] During the Safavid dynasty Shiism was established as the official ideology.[65] The establishment of Shiism as an official government ideology opened the doors for clergies to benefit from new cultural, political and religious rights which were denied prior to the Safavid ruling.[65] During the Safavid dynasty Shiism was established as the official ideology.[65] The Safavid rule allowed greater freedom for religious leaders. By establishing Shiism as the state religion, they legitimised the religious authority. After this power establishment, religious leaders started to play a crucial role within the political system but remained socially and economically independent.[68] The monarchial power balance during the Safavid ere changed every few years, resulting in a changing limit of power of the clergies. The tensions concerning power relations of the religious authorities and the ruling power eventually played a pivotal role in the 1906 constitutional revolution which limited the power of the monarch, and increased the power of religious leaders.[69] The 1906 constitutional revolution involved both constitutionalist and anti-constitutionalist clergy leaders. Individuals such as Sayyid Jamal al-Din Va'iz were constitutionalist clergies whereas other clergies such as Mohammed Kazem Yazdi were considered anti-constitutionalist. The establishment of a Shiite government during the Safavid rule resulted in the increase of power within this religious sect. The religious power establishment increased throughout the years and resulted in fundamental changes within the Iranian society in the twentieth century, eventually leading to the establishment of the Shiite Islamic Republic of Iran in 1979.
Post-1979 Revolution: Islamic Republic of Iran
Ruhollah Khomeini and Ali Khamenei
During the Iran-Iraq war, Iran's first supreme-leader,
Iraq
Sunni
The Shia majority oppression by the Sunni minority has a long history in Iraq. After the fall of the Ottoman Empire, the British government placed a Sunni Hashemite monarchy to the Iraqi throne which suppressed various uprisings against its rule by the Christian Assyrians and Shi'ites.
Syria
Although sectarianism has been described as one of the characteristic features of the Syrian civil war, the narrative of sectarianism already had its origins in Syria's past.
Ottoman rule
The hostilities that took place in 1850 in Aleppo and subsequently in 1860 in Damascus, had many causes and reflected long-standing tensions. However, scholars have claimed that the eruptions of violence can also be partly attributed to the modernizing reforms, the Tanzimat, taking place within the Ottoman Empire, who had been ruling Syria since 1516.[78][79] The Tanzimat reforms attempted to bring about equality between Muslims and non-Muslims living in the Ottoman Empire. These reforms, combined with European interference on behalf of the Ottoman Christians, caused the non-Muslims to gain privileges and influence.[80]
In the silk trade business, European powers formed ties with local sects. They usually opted for a sect that adhered to a religion similar to the one in their home countries, thus not Muslims.[81] These developments caused new social classes to emerge, consisting of mainly Christians, Druzes and Jews. These social classes stripped the previously existing Muslim classes of their privileges. The involvement of another foreign power, though this time non-European, also had its influence on communal relations in Syria. Ibrahim Pasha of Egypt ruled Syria between 1831 and 1840. His divide-and-rule strategy contributed to the hostilities between the Druze and Maronite community, by arming the Maronite Christians. However, it is noteworthy to mention that different sects did not fight the others out of religious motives, nor did Ibrahim Pasha aim to disrupt society among communal lines.[82] This can also be illustrated by the unification of Druzes and Maronites in their revolts to oust Ibrahim Pasha in 1840. This shows the fluidity of communal alliances and animosities and the different, at times non-religious, reasons that may underline sectarianism.[citation needed]
After Ottoman rule
Before the fall of the Ottoman Empire and the
During the period 1961–1980, Syria was not necessarily exclusively ruled by the Alawite sect, but due to efforts of the Sunni Muslim extremist opponents of the Ba’th regime in Syria, it was perceived as such. The Ba’ath regime was being dominated by the Alawite community, as well as were other institutions of power.[86] As a result of this, the regime was considered to be sectarian, which caused the Alawite community to cluster together, as they feared for their position.[86] This period is actually contradictory as Hafez al-Assad tried to create a Syrian Arab nationalism, but the regime was still regarded as sectarian and sectarian identities were reproduced and politicized.[87]
Sectarian tensions that later gave rise to the Syrian civil war, had already appeared in society due to events preceding 1970. For example, President Hafez al-Assad's involvement in the
Syrian Civil War
As of 2015, the majority of the Syrian population consisted of Sunni Muslims, namely two-thirds of the population, which can be found throughout the country. The Alawites are the second largest group, which make up around 10 percent of the population.[90] This makes them a ruling minority. The Alawites were originally settled in the highlands of Northwest Syria, but since the twentieth century have spread to places like Latakia, Homs and Damascus.[91] Other groups that can be found in Syria are Christians, among which the Maronite Christians, Druzes and Twelver Shias. Although sectarian identities played a role in the unfolding of events of the Syrian Civil War, the importance of tribal and kinship relationships should not be underestimated, as they can be used to obtain and maintain power and loyalty.[85]
At the start of the protests against President Basher al-Assad in March 2011, there was no sectarian nature or approach involved. The opposition had national, inclusive goals and spoke in the name of a collective Syria, although the protesters being mainly Sunni Muslims.[92] This changed after the protests and the following civil war began to be portrayed in sectarian terms by the regime, as a result of which people started to mobilize along ethnic lines.[93] However, this does not mean that the conflict is solely or primarily a sectarian conflict, as there were also socio-economic factors at play. These socio-economic factors were mainly the result of Basher al-Assad's mismanaged economic restructuring.[94] The conflict has therefore been described as being semi-sectarian, making sectarianism a factor at play in the civil war, but certainly does not stand alone in causing the war and has varied in importance throughout time and place.[95]
In addition to local forces, the role of external actors in the conflict in general as well as the sectarian aspect of the conflict should not be overlooked. Although foreign regimes were first in support of the Free Syrian Army, they eventually ended up supporting sectarian militias with money and arms. However, it has to be said that their sectarian nature did not only attract these flows of support, but they also adopted a more sectarian and Islamic appearance in order to attract this support.[96]
Yemen
Introduction
In Yemen, there have been many clashes between
Historically, divisions in Yemen along religious lines (
Ottoman era, 1849–1918
Sectarianism reached the region once known as
Following the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, the divide between Shafi’is and Zaydis changed with the establishment of the
Unification period, 1918–1990
Before the 1990
Conflicting
Contemporary Sunni-Shia rivalry
According to
Tribes and political movements
Members of Hashid's
Ali Abdullah Saleh's reign
Following the
Saudi Arabia
Sectarianism in Saudi Arabia is exemplified through the tensions with its Shi’ite population, who constitute up to 15% of the Saudi population.[121] This includes the anti-Shi’ite policies and persecution of the Shi’ites by the Saudi government.[122] According to Human Rights Watch, Shi’ites face marginalisation socially, politically, religiously, legally and economically, whilst facing discrimination in education and in the workplace.[123] This history dates back to 1744, with the establishment of a coalition between the House of Saud and the Wahhabis, who equate Shi’ism with polytheism.[124] Over the course of the twentieth century clashes and tensions unfolded between the Shi’ites and the Saudi regime, including the 1979 Qatif Uprising and the repercussions of the 1987 Makkah Incident.[124][125] Though relations underwent a détente in the 1990s and the early 2000s, tensions rose again after the 2003 US-led election of Iraq (owing to a broader rise of Shi’ism in the region) and peaked during the Arab Spring.[121] Sectarianism in Saudi Arabia has attracted widespread attention by Human Rights groups, including Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International, especially after the execution of Shi'ite cleric Nimr al-Nimr in 2016, who was active in the 2011 domestic protests.[126] Despite Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman's reforms, Shi’ites continue to face discrimination today.[127][128]
Lebanon
Sectarianism in Lebanon has been formalized and legalized within state and non-state institutions and is inscribed in its constitution. Lebanon recognizes 18 different sects, mainly within Muslim and Christian worlds. The foundations of sectarianism in Lebanon date back to the mid-19th century during Ottoman rule. It was subsequently reinforced with the creation of the Republic of Lebanon in 1920 and its 1926 constitution and in the National Pact of 1943. In 1990, with the Taif Agreement, the constitution was revised but did not structurally change aspects relating to political sectarianism.[129] The dynamic nature of sectarianism in Lebanon has prompted some historians and authors to refer to it as "the sectarian state par excellence" because it is a mixture of religious communities and their myriad sub-divisions, with a constitutional and political order to match.[130] Yet, the reality on the ground has been more complex than such a conclusion, because as Nadya Sbaiti has shown in her research, in the aftermath of the First World War, the “need of shaping a collective future that paralleled shifting conceptions of the newly territorialized nation-state of Lebanon”[18] was clearly present. “Over the course of the Mandate, educational practitioners and the wide range of schools that proliferated helped shape the epistemological infrastructure en route to creating this entity. By ‘epistemological infrastructure’, one means the cast array of ideas that become validated as truths and convincing explanations.”[131] In other words, contrary to the colonial sectarian education system, “students, parents, and teachers created educational content through curricula, and educational practices so as to produce new ‘communities of knowledge’. These communities of knowledge, connected as they were by worlds of ideas and networks of knowledge, often transcended confessional, sociopolitical, and even at times regional subjectivities.”[131]
See also
- Collective narcissism
- Communalism (South Asia)
- Cybersectarianism
- Ethnic cleansing
- Exclusivism
- Group conflict
- Identity politics
- Identitarianism
- Ingroups and outgroups
- Jingoism
- Narcissism of small differences
- Partisanship
- Pillarization
- Religious segregation
- Sect
- Sectarian violence
- Supremacism
- Tribalism
- Xenophobia
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{{cite book}}
: CS1 maint: location missing publisher (link - ISSN 0305-750X.
- ^ "Shia cleric among 47 executed by Saudi Arabia in a single day". www.amnesty.org. 2 January 2016. Retrieved 12 May 2021.
- ^ "Saudi Arabia's "Reforms" Don't Include Tolerance of Shia Community". Human Rights Watch. 21 September 2018. Retrieved 12 May 2021.
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- ^ Bahout, Joseph (18 November 2013). "Sectarianism in Lebanon and Syria: The Dynamics of Mutual Spill-Over". United States Institute of Peace.
- ^ Hirst, David (2011). Beware of Small States: Lebanon, Battleground of the Middle East. Nation Books. p. 2.
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Further reading
- Sectarianism in Syria (Survey Study), The Day After, 2016.
- Middle East sectarianism explained: the narcissism of small differences Victor Argo 13 April 2015 Your Middle East
- Bryan R. Wilson, The Social Dimensions of Sectarianism: Sects and New Religious Movements in Contemporary Society, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1990