Serbia in the Yugoslav Wars

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Operation Corridor
(July 1992)
Monument to the victims of the Yugoslav Wars in Belgrade

International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) has established that Milošević was in control of Serb forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia during the wars which were fought there from 1991 to 1995.[1][2][3][4][5][6]

Accused of supporting Serb rebels in Croatia and Bosnia, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was suspended from most international organisations and institutions, and

economic and political sanctions were imposed,[5] which resulted in an economic disaster and massive emigration from the country. The NATO bombing of Yugoslavia during the Kosovo War significantly damaged the country's infrastructure and economy. After the Yugoslav Wars, Serbia became home to the highest number of refugees and internally displaced persons
in Europe.

Various judicial proceedings at the ICTY have investigated the different levels of responsibility of the

war crimes
that were committed by ethnic Serbs who lived in other republics of the former Yugoslavia, while the government of Serbia was tasked with apprehending numerous ethnic Serb fugitives for the Tribunal, with which it largely complied. Milošević became the first sitting head of state to be charged with war crimes.

Following Milošević's rise to power and the outbreak of the Yugoslav Wars, numerous anti-war movements developed in Serbia. It is estimated that between 50,000 and 200,000 people deserted from the Yugoslav People's Army, while between 100,000 and 150,000 people emigrated from Serbia after refusing to participate in the war. Milošević regime's propaganda played a significant role in the wars.

After the defeat of Milošević's party at the

the 1996-97 anti-government protests, and the boycott of the 1997 election by the opposition due to irregular election conditions, the wide opposition alliance won the 2000 election. That led to the overthrow of Slobodan Milošević, resulting in the admission of the FR Yugoslavia United Nations membership, the arrest of Milošević and extradition to stand trial
for war crimes.

Background

Map of the frontlines, late 1993.

The 1990 survey conducted among Yugoslav citizens showed that ethnic animosity existed on a small scale.[7] Compared to the results from 25 years before, Serbia was one of the republic with the smallest increase in ethnic distance, which stayed at medium. There was significant increase of ethnic distance among Serbs and Montenegrins toward Croats and Slovenes and vice versa.[8] Of all respondents, 71% of Serbs said that their affiliation with Yugoslavia is very important to them.[9]

Milošević used a rigid control of the media to organize a propaganda campaign in which the thesis that Serbs were the victims and the need for readjust Yugoslavia to redress the alleged bias against Serbia. This then was then followed by Milošević's

Yugoslavia's collective presidency.[citation needed
]

The Constitution of Yugoslavia (1974 Constitution), in its Basic Principles, in the very beginning, stated "The peoples of Yugoslavia, starting from the right of every nation to self-determination, including the right to secession,...". The opinion of the Serb leadership of that time was that the internal borders of Yugoslavia were provisional. The basis for this statement was derived from the Constitution of Yugoslavia. President

Slovenia and Croatia declared independence on 25 June 1991. Both were internationally recognized on 15 January 1992. Bosnia and Herzegovina declared independence on 5 March 1992. It was internationally recognized on 22 May 1992 by the United Nations. With the collapse of the

Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
as a sole successor state of SFR Yugoslavia, on 27 April 1992. It remained unrecognized during the conflict.

Serb media under Milošević

The Serbian media during the Milošević era was known to espouse

Serb nationalism while promoting xenophobia toward the other ethnicities in Yugoslavia. Ethnic Albanians were commonly characterised in the media as anti-Yugoslav counter-revolutionaries, rapists, and a threat to the Serb nation.[11] When war erupted in Croatia, Politika promoted Serb nationalism, hostility towards Croatia, and violence.[12]

On 5 June 1991, Politika ekspres ran a piece titled "Serbs must get weapons". On 25 June 1991 and 3 July 1991, Politika began to openly promote partitioning Croatia, and prominently quoted Jovan Marjanović of the Serbian Renewal Movement, who said "The [Yugoslav] Army must come into Croatia and occupy the line Benkovac-Karlovac-Pakrac-Baranja".[12] On 25 June 1991, Politika reminded Serbs about the atrocities perpetrated by the Croatian fascist Ustaše against Serbs during World War II; "Jasenovac [an Ustaše concentration camp in World War II] mustn't be forgotten".[12]

Serbian state media during the wars featured controversial reportage that villainized the other ethnic factions. In one such program, a Croatian Serb woman denounced the old "communist policy" in Croatia, claiming that under it "[t]he majority of Serbs would be assimilated in ten years",[13] while another interviewee stated "Where Serbian blood was shed by Ustasha knives, there will be our boundaries."[13] Various Serbian state television reports featured Jovan Rašković,[who?] who stated the Croatian people had a "genocidal nature".[13]

The director of Radio Television of Serbia during Milošević's era, Dušan Mitević, later admitted, in a PBS documentary, that "the things that happened at state TV, warmongering, things we can admit to now: false information, biased reporting. That went directly from Milošević to the head of TV".[14]

Armed conflicts

Ruins in Vukovar in November 1991 after the JNA invasion.

During the

Yugoslav wars of the 1990s, the concept of a Greater Serbia was widely seen outside of Serbia as the motivating force for the military campaigns undertaken to form and sustain Serbian states on the territories of the breakaway Yugoslav republics of Croatia (the Republic of Serbian Krajina) and Bosnia and Herzegovina (the Republika Srpska).[15] The goal of the Republic of Serbia was to play the role of a central power left vacant by the fading federal state.[16]

Serbia's role in the Slovenian war

As early as June 1990, after the success of pro-independence forces in the referenda of Slovenia and Croatia, there was a meeting between

Yugoslav Presidency Borisav Jović where they drew a plan by which Serbia would "throw Slovenia and Croatia out of Yugoslavia" through the use of force and occupy areas of Croatia where the Serbs were majority.[17]

Milošević wanted to force a political deal with Slovene president Milan Kučan; Serbia would recognize the right of the self-determination of the Slovene nation to independence if Slovenia in turn recognized the right of self-determination of the Serb nation to remain united with Serbia.[18] Such a deal would have set a precedent for Serbs in Bosnia and Croatia to remain in one state with Serbia.[18]

Immediately after the Slovenian independence referendum, the

Territorial Defence Force (TO), was to be replaced by a centrally-directed system of defence. The republics would lose their role in defence matters, and their TOs would be disarmed and subordinated to JNA headquarters in Belgrade. The Slovenian government resisted these moves, and successfully ensured that the majority of Slovenian Territorial Defence equipment was kept out of the hands of the JNA.[citation needed
]

General Veljko Kadijević was de facto commander of Yugoslav People's Army during the

Slovenian Independence War. Kadijević advocated for a show of force that would convince the Slovenian government to back down on its declaration of independence. After some debate, Kadijević got his way.[19] The officer corps was dominated by Serbs and Montenegrins. The rank and file troops however were conscripts, many who had no strong motivation in fighting against the Slovenes. Of the soldiers of the 5th Military District, which was in action in Slovenia, about 30% were Albanians.[20] Milošević's government was not particularly concerned about Slovenia's independence, as there was no significant Serb minority in the country. On 30 June, Kadijević suggested to the Yugoslav federal presidency to resume action on Slovenia with a massive attack to break down the unexpectedly heavy resistance. But Borisav Jović, shocked the military establishment by declaring that Serbia did not support further use of force against Slovenia.[21]

Serbia's role in the Croatian war

Map of the strategic offensive plan of the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA) in Croatia, 1991. The JNA was unable to advance as far as planned due to Croatian resistance and mobilization problems.
Minister of Defence of the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA), were constitutionally under the supreme command of the president of Yugoslavia. However, in 1991, when the war in Croatia broke out, Adžić and Kadijević refused to accept the authority of president Stjepan Mesić (left), a Croat, and instead followed instructions from Milošević and Borisav Jović.[6][22][23]

Milošević believes he now has the historic opportunity to, once and for all, settle accounts with the Croats and do what Serbian politicians after World War I did not - rally all Serbs in one Serbian state.[10]

— Belgrade newspaper Borba, August 1991.

In April 1991, Serbs within the

Republic of Croatia moved to secede from that territory, which itself seceded from Yugoslavia.[24]

In May 1991,

Presidency of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, but Serbia blocked his installation, so this maneuver technically left Yugoslavia without a leader.[25]

In various verdicts,

Military of Serbian Krajina (SVK) and VRS, but received pensions, salaries, benefits and promotions directly from Belgrade.[28] Although Perišić did not have effective control over the VRS, he had control of the SVK, but failed to sanction them for the Zagreb rocket attacks.[28]

Serbia's role in the Bosnian war

During the Bosnian war, it was a part of the strategic plan of the Serb leadership, which aimed to link Serb-populated areas in Bosnia and Herzegovina, in order to gain control over these areas and create a separate Serb state, from which most non-Serbs would be permanently removed. The Serb leadership was aware that its strategic plan could only be implemented by the use of force and fear, such as the commission of war crimes.[29]

The

Bosnian Serb Army was "under the overall control" of Belgrade and the Yugoslav Army, which meant that they had funded, equipped and assisted the coordination and planning of military operations.[30] The Army of Republika Srpska arose from the Yugoslav army forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina.[31] Despite sanctions, Belgrade was still the main source of soldiers, ammunition, spare parts and financial assistance for Republika Srpska until 1995.[28]

The Martyrs' Memorial Cemetery in Stari Grad for the victims of the siege of Sarajevo.
Slobodan Milošević, Alija Izetbegović and Franjo Tuđman signing the Dayton Agreement in Paris on 14 December 1995.

Milošević realized that Bosnia and Herzegovina was about to be recognized by the international community, and since Yugoslav Army troops were still located there at that time, their presence on Bosnian territory could have led to Serbia and Montenegro being accused of aggression. To avoid this, Milošević decided to move all JNA soldiers who originated from Serbia and Montenegro back into Serbia and Montenegro, and move all JNA soldiers who originated from Bosnia and Herzegovina back into Bosnia and Herzegovina.[31] Thus, every Bosnian Serb was transferred from the Yugoslav army to what became the newly created Bosnian Serb Army. Through this, the Bosnian Serb army received extensive military equipment and full funding from the FRY, because the Bosnian Serb faction could not cover the costs on its own.[32]

The Bosnian Serb Army was led by Ratko Mladić, an extremely controversial figure, who served in the Yugoslav Army during the Croatian War of Independence 1991-1992, and has been accused of committing war crimes in Bosnia.[33]

On 24 March 2016, the ICTY issued its judgement in the separate case against former Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadžić, in which it concluded that insufficient evidence had been presented in that case to find that Slobodan Milosevic "agreed with the common plan" to create territories ethnically cleansed of non-Serbs during the Bosnian War of 1992 to 1995. The judgement noted "Milošević's repeated criticism and disapproval of the policies and decisions made by Karadžić and the Bosnian Serb leadership" and, in a footnote, the "apparent discord between Karadžić and Milošević" during which Milošević "openly criticised Bosnian Serb leaders of committing 'crimes against humanity' and 'ethnic cleansing' and the war for their own purposes." Nevertheless, the court also noted that "Milošević provided assistance in the form of personnel, provisions, and arms to the Bosnian Serbs during the conflict"[34]

The

Dayton Peace Agreement.[35]

Serbia in the Kosovo war

In 1998, facing political crisis, Milošević again formed a national-unity government with the Serbian Radical Party. After 1998,

Serbian Police were in spring 1999. "in an organized manner, with significant use of state resources" conducted a broad campaign of violence against Albanian civilians in order to expel them from Kosovo and thus maintain political control of Belgrade over the province.[36][37]

By June 1999, the Yugoslav military, Serbian police and paramilitaries expelled 862,979 Albanians from Kosovo,

Iain Bonomy concluded that "deliberate actions of these forces during the campaign provoked the departure of at least 700,000 ethnic Albanians from Kosovo in the short period from late March to early June 1999".[36]

Religious objects were also damaged or destroyed. Of the 498 mosques in Kosovo that were in active use, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) documented that 225 mosques sustained damage or destruction by the Yugoslav Serb army.[40] In all, eighteen months of the Yugoslav Serb counterinsurgency campaign between 1998-1999 within Kosovo resulted in 225 or a third out of a total of 600 mosques being damaged, vandalised, or destroyed.[41][42] During the war, Islamic architectural heritage posed for Yugoslav Serb paramilitary and military forces as Albanian patrimony with destruction of non-Serbian architectural and cultural heritage being a methodical and planned component of ethnic cleansing in Kosovo.[42][43]

War crimes

Numerous

systematic rape, crimes against humanity. The International Court of Justice, cleared the Republic of Serbia of direct involvement in genocide, but found that it had failed to prevent mass killings, rapes, and ethnic cleansing.[44]

The war crimes were usually carried out on ethnic and religious grounds and were primarily directed against civilians (

Bosniaks). Several United Nations bodies have judged that the aim of these war crimes in various wars was to create an ethnically pure Serbian state, or "Greater Serbia", encompassing Serbia as well as the Serb-populated areas in former Yugoslavia.[10][15]

After the wars in the 1990s, many senior military and political leaders were convicted of war crimes; Radovan Karadžić was arrested in Belgrade in 2008, was tried and found guilty of war crimes in March 2016, and sentenced to 40 years in prison (the sentence was increased in 2019 to life imprisonment upon the rejection of his appeal). Others, including Ratko Mladić and Goran Hadžić, were not apprehended by Serbian authorities until 2011.

All parties involved in the conflict have committed "grave breaches" of the Geneva Conventions and other violations of international humanitarian law. These violations include the killing of civilians, rape, torture, and the deliberate destruction of civilian property, including cultural and religious property, such as churches and mosques. But, there are significant qualitative differences. Most of the violations were committed by Serbs against Bosnian Muslims.[10]

— Final report of the United Nations Commission of Experts

Hadžić died while awaiting trial in July 2016. Mladić received life imprisonment.

Serbian paramilitary forces and volunteer units.[46]

Croatian War

Shelling of Karlovac, a town situated directly at the front during the war

The Tribunal claimed that around 170,000

Republic of Croatia
.

There were also prison camps, where several hundred Croatian prisoners of war and civilians were kept by Serbian authorities such as the

Sremska Mitrovica camp, Stajićevo camp and Velepromet camp which was located on the southern outskirts of the city of Vukovar, Croatia
.

According to the

Republic of Serbia and Montenegro (now Serbia) for torture and abuse in the camps.[50]

In 1990s, during the

persecution of Croats in Serbia during Yugoslav Wars
was organized and participated in the expulsion of the Croats in some places in Vojvodina.

According to Croatia's lawsuit against Yugoslavia (later the Republic of Serbia) in front of the

In its verdict against

military of Serbian Krajina
acted as an extension to Serbia's military.

In particular, the Trial Chamber considered the evidence pertaining to Serbian President Milošević's control and influence over

SVK forces and Serbia/FRY's funding, arming and supplying of the Krajina Serbs. Based on the above evidence, the Trial Chamber finds that Serbia/FRY had overall control of the SVK. Recalling the agreement of all the parties that Croatia and Serbia were engaged more broadly in hostilities around the beginning of the Indictment period, the Trial Chamber further finds that the armed conflict that existed at the outset of the Indictment period was international. If it was not already an international armed conflict in 1991, then it became one based on the SVK acting on behalf of Serbia/FRY.

— ICTY in its verdict against Ante Gotovina[52]

Bosnian War

Srebrenica Massacre
unfolded.

Serbian paramilitary forces and

Army of the Republika Srpska committed numerous war crimes against Bosnian civilian population during the Bosnian War
.

There were several concentration and prison camps in Bosnia, run by Bosnian Serbs such as the Omarska camp, Keraterm camp, Manjača camp, Trnopolje camp, Uzamnica camp and Vilina Vlas.

The International Court of Justice confirmed the ICTY judgment that the Srebrenica massacre was genocide:

The Court concludes that the acts committed at Srebrenica falling within Article II (a) and (b) of the Convention were committed with the specific intent to destroy in part the group of the Muslims of Bosnia and Herzegovina as such; and accordingly that these were acts of genocide, committed by members of the VRS in and around Srebrenica from about 13 July 1995.[53]

It cleared Republic of Serbia of direct involvement in

Srebrenica genocide.[54]

Kosovo War

In the spring of 1999, the

Serbian police and the Yugoslav Army were "in an organized manner, with significant use of state resources" conducting a broad campaign of violence against Albanian civilians in order to expel them from Kosovo and thus maintain political control of Belgrade over the province.[36]

According to the legally binding verdict of the

NATO bombing of Yugoslavia 24 March 1999, systematically attacked villages with Albanian population, abused, robbed and killed civilians, ordering them to go to Albania or Montenegro, burning their houses and by destroying their property.[55] Within the campaign of violence, Albanians were mass expelled from their homes, murdered, sexually assaulted, and their religious buildings destroyed. Serbian forces committed numerous war crimes during the implementation of "joint criminal enterprise" whose aim was to "through the use of violence and terror, force a significant number of Kosovo Albanians to leave their homes, across the border, the state government to retain control over Kosovo".[36] Ethnic cleansing of the Albanian population is performed by the following model: first the army surrounded a place, then followed the shelling, then the police entered the village, and often with them and the army, and then crimes occurs (murders, rapes, beatings, expulsions ... ).[55]

Presiding Judge

Iain Bonomy was imposing sentence said, "deliberate actions of these forces during the campaign provoked the departure of at least 700,000 ethnic Albanians from Kosovo in the short period from late March to early June 1999."[36]

The following is an incomplete list of massacres attributed to Serb forces:

Goran Stoparić, an ex-member of the Special Anti-terrorist Unit (SAJ), speculating about motives behind the Podujevo massacre, stated:

In my opinion, the only motive was the fact that the victims were Albanians, and perhaps because of some hidden immaturity or sickness of mind on their part. They would probably have killed them had they been Bosnians or Croats. But it is certain that they were killed because they were not Serbs.[71]

War crime trials

International trials

Vojislav Šešelj

The

Željko Ražnatović) were accused of war crimes committed in Bosnia and Croatia. According to Prosecution, those leaders participated in a joint criminal enterprise aimed to established "Greater Serbia" from the disintegrating Yugoslavia.[15]

The prosecution's argument that [...] the allegations made in the three indictments [Croatia, Bosnia, and Kosovo] were all part of a

common scheme, strategy or plan on the part of the accused [Slobodan Milošević] to create a "Greater Serbia", a centralised Serbian state encompassing the Serb-populated areas of Croatia and Bosnia and all of Kosovo, and that this plan was to be achieved by forcibly removing non-Serbs from large geographical areas through the commission of the crime charged in the indictments. Although the events in Kosovo were separated from those in Croatia and Bosnia by more than three years, they were, the prosecution claimed, no more than a continuation of that plan, and they could only be understood completely by reference to what had happened in Croatia and Bosnia.[15]

Vlastimir Đorđević

Complicity in a joint criminal enterprise also included "Serbian forces", that includes the

Serbian paramilitary forces and volunteer units.[46]

Slobodan Milošević, along with

Milošević died in detention before he could be sentenced.

The Court pronounced the following verdict for

  • Milan Milutinović, former President of the Republic of Serbia and Yugoslav Foreign Minister, acquitted.
  • Nikola Šainović, Yugoslav Deputy Prime Minister, guilty on all counts, sentenced to 22 years in prison.
  • Dragoljub Ojdanić, Chief of General Staff of the VJ, guilty of two counts, sentenced to 15 years in prison.
  • Nebojša Pavković, commander of Third Army, guilty on all counts, sentenced to 22 years in prison.
  • Vladimir Lazarević, commander of the Pristina Corps VJ, guilty of two counts, sentenced to 15 years in prison.
  • Sreten Lukić, Chief of Staff of the Serbian police, guilty on all counts, sentenced to 22 years in prison.

Šainović, Pavković and Lukić were convicted as members of the joint criminal enterprise, while others are convicted of aiding and abetting crimes.[36]

Domestic trials

The democratic leadership of Serbia recognized the need to investigate Serbian war crimes after the fall of Milošević, and a special war crimes tribunal was founded in Belgrade in 2003, after the

Parliament of Serbia passed the Law on Organization and Competence of State Bodies in the Proceedings Against War Crimes Perpetrators.[74]

Since then, the special prosecutor has prosecuted and the court has convicted several individuals for instances of war crimes, also committed under the command of the Serbian Ministry of Internal Affairs and other state agencies.[75][76][77]

Post-war developments

Bosnian War

Despite the ICTY finding, confirmed by the ICJ, a range of alternative views of the Srebrenica massacre exist, most of which argue that fewer than 8,000 were killed. The denial of the figure points out that fewer names were listed, that some were not even killed in that area and had died in previous years, in some cases people turned out to be alive, etc. Sonja Biserko of the Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia notes:

Denial of the

Srebrenica genocide takes many forms. The methods range from the brutal to the deceitful. Denial is present most strongly in political discourse, in the media, in the sphere of law, and in the educational system.[78]

According to Human Rights Watch, the ultra-nationalist Serbian Radical Party "launched an aggressive campaign to prove that Muslims had committed crimes against thousands of Serbs in the area", which "was intended to diminish the significance of the July 1995 crime".[79] The ICTY Office of the Prosecutor noted that the number of Serb deaths in the region alleged by the Serbian authorities had increased from 1400 to 3500, a figure the Prosecutor stated "[does] not reflect the reality".[80] Personal details were only available for 624 victims.[80] The validity of labeling some of the casualties as "victims" is also contested[80] — studies have found a significant majority of military casualties as compared to civilian casualties.[81]

Kosovo War

The Serbian police denied perpetrating the

NATO bombing in Kosovo 1999,[84] but the Court latter found that Serbian state conducted systematic campaign of terror and violence against Kosovo Albanians in order to expel them from Kosovo.[36][85]

Domestic situation

Many

expulsions in Hrtkovci for which Vojislav Šešelj was charged by the ICTY.[86]

The high number of casualties incurred in the

federal parliament in Belgrade. Many Serbs did not identify with the Croatian Serb cause and were unwilling to see their lives, or those of their children, sacrificed at Vukovar.[87]

Following the end of Yugoslav Wars, Serbian war crimes court sparked controversy on at least four occasions after issuing indictments and arrest warrants against non-Serbs that were later found to be lacking substance. These indictments against foreign citizens of Serbia are perceived by some as key to redressing the "aggressor-victim" balance in the wars.[88]

  • Hasan Morina - a Kosovo Albanian, accused by the prosecutor's office of war crimes against Serbs, was acquitted of all charges by a court and released from detention.[89]
  • Ejup Ganić - Bosniak member of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina during the Bosnian War. On 1 March 2010, Ganić was arrested on Heathrow Airport in London after Serbian judicial authorities issued an extradition warrant against him for alleged war crimes against Serbs. Judge Timothy Workman, however, decided that Ganić should be immediately released because Serbia's request lacked "any serious evidence". In his decision, he also said that Serbia's request "[was] being used for political purposes, and as such amounts to an abuse of the process of this court".[90]
  • Tihomir Purda - a former Croat soldier who defended
    Sremska Mitrovica camps, and forced to sign a statement admitting the crimes. Purda denied any wrongdoing and told the judges in Bosnia that his confession in Serbia was obtained under torture.[91] After Deputy war crimes prosecutor Bruno Vekarić subsequently interviewed 44 witnesses both in Serbia and Croatia, the investigation did not find a single witness who burdened Purda. The indictment against him was dropped in March.[92]
  • Jovan Divjak - a Bosnian general of ethnic Serb descent; on 3 March 2011, he was detained in Vienna because Serbia issued an extradition warrant against him for alleged war crimes against Serbs in the 1992 Yugoslav People's Army column incident in Sarajevo.[93][94] After an almost four month review of evidence, the Austrian authorities rejected Serbia's extradition request due to lack of proof. He too was released and returned to Sarajevo on 29 July 2011.[95]

In Serbia, many people deny war crimes imputed to Serbia or the Serb people.[96] Some public figures who are known for speaking openly about crimes committed by Serbs are labeled as a "traitors".[96]

PTSD in diaspora

A study conducted in the

Posttraumatic stress disorder, found symptoms of PTSD in 26.3% of Serbian children due to war-related stress or during the Kosovo conflict.[97]

Displaced Serbs after the wars

An elderly Croatian Serb refugee after the Operation Storm
Kosovo Serbs refugees

At the conclusion of the wars in Bosnia and Croatia, numerous Serbs relocated to Serbia and Montenegro. By 1996, Serbia and Montenegro hosted about 300,000 registered refugees from Croatia and 250,000 from Bosnia and Herzegovina, while an additional 15,000 persons from Macedonia and Slovenia were also registered as refugees. The UNHCR registered 566,000 refugees from Croatia and Bosnia in Serbia and Montenegro. During the first half of 1996, more than 40,000 Bosnian Serbs arrived in the FRY. About three quarters had left suburbs of Sarajevo that were to fall under the control of the Bosnian Federation.[98] Following the Kosovo war, 200,000 to 245,000 Serb, Roma, Ashkali and Egyptian people fled into Serbia proper or within Kosovo,[99] fearing revenge, and due to severe violence and terrorist attacks against mostly Serbian civilians after the war[100] amounting to about 700,000 displaced or refugees in that country.[101] One out of every eleven people was either a refugees or displacee in Serbia by 1999. This made that country became home to highest number of refugees and internally displaced persons in Europe.[102][103][104]

Anti-war movement

Following the rise of nationalism and political tensions after Slobodan Milošević came to power, as well as the outbreaks of the Yugoslav Wars, numerous anti-war movements developed in Serbia.[105][106][107][108] The anti-war protests in Belgrade were held mostly because of opposition the Siege of Vukovar, Siege of Dubrovnik and Siege of Sarajevo,[105][107] while protesters demanded the referendum on a declaration of war and disruption of military conscription.[109][110][111]

More than 50,000 people participated in many protests, and more than 150,000 people took part in the most massive protest called "The Black Ribbon March" in solidarity with people in Sarajevo.[112][106] It is estimated that between 50,000 and 200,000 people deserted from the Yugoslav People's Army, while between 100,000 and 150,000 people emigrated from Serbia refusing to participate in the war.[109][107]

According to professor Renaud De la Brosse, senior lecturer at the University of Reims and a witness called by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), it is surprising how great the resistance to Milošević's propaganda was among Serbs, given that and the lack of access to alternative news.[113] Political scientists Orli Fridman described that not enough attention was given to anti-war activism among scholars studying the breakup of Yugoslavia and the wars, as well as that independent media and anti-war groups from Serbia did not attract the international attention.[106]

Downfall of Slobodan Milošević

After the defeat Milošević's party at the

anti-government protests took place and the opposition boycotted the following 1997 Serbian general election.[114] The wide opposition alliance won the 2000 Yugoslavian general election, which led to the overthrow of Slobodan Milošević. That resulted in the withdrawn of international sanctions and admission of the FR Yugoslavia United Nations membership.[115] In June 2001, the reformist government of Zoran Đinđić arrested Milošević and extradited him over to the ICTY, where the war crimes trial begins.[116]

Military groups reported of committing war crimes

References

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