Siamese revolution of 1932
Siamese revolution of 1932 | |||||||
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Part of the Interwar Period | |||||||
Scene of a declaration of Siam as a democratic nation on 24 June 1932 | |||||||
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Belligerents | |||||||
People's Party (Khana Ratsadon) |
Monarchy of Siam Supreme Council of State | ||||||
Commanders and leaders | |||||||
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The Siamese revolution of 1932 or Siamese coup d'état of 1932 (
King
Background
Absolute monarchy
Since 1782, the Kingdom of Siam had been ruled by the Chakri dynasty. After 1868, King Chulalongkorn (Rama V) reformed a medieval kingdom into a centralizing state of absolute monarchy. The monarchy started to make royal and nobility hierarchy, the Sakdina, to be the most critical aspect of Siam political system.[1] Towards 1880, Chulalongkorn asked of Europe an initiation into modern culture and showed a decided preference for England's Anglo-Saxons culture.[2] In 1910s, King Vajiravudh (Rama VI) sought to legitimise absolutism through Thai nationalism, using Western approach,[3] by appointing more able commoners to the government.[4] A commoner involvement disappointed the aristocracy and nobility.[5] Rama VI carried out unpopular policies that lowered the influence of the royal family.[6]
Mismanagement of Rama VI
During the reign of
In 1912, a
Rise of the Western-educated "commoner" elites
Western education became popular in the reign of Rama V.
Prelude
The "Promoters"
In February 1927, in a hotel on the
When the Promoters eventually returned to Siam by the end of the 1920s, they quietly expanded their lists of contacts and party membership, mostly using a personal relationship.
Four Musketeers
Modernized attempt of Rama VII
Prince
Discontent from the economic crisis
In 1930, as
Constitution denied by Rama VII
Meanwhile, the King put his efforts into the drafting of a constitution, with the help of two princes and an American foreign policy advisor,
On 6 April 1932, the King opened
Plan leak
Despite their precautions, word of the plan's existence eventually
Coup
Bangkok seizure
While King Prajadhipok was residing out of Bangkok, at about 04:00 on the morning of 24 June 1932, Phraya Phahon, Phraya Songsuradet, and Phra Phrasasphithayayut were already carrying out their part of the plan.[27] Phraya Phahon and some supporters gathered near the Ananta Samakhom Throne Hall waiting for the signal,[28] while Phraya Songsuradet went with a couple of the conspirators to the barracks of the First Cavalry Regiment of the Royal Guards, where most of the armoured vehicles in Bangkok were kept. On arrival, Phraya Songsuradet reprimanded the officer in charge of the barracks for sleeping while there was a Chinese uprising taking place elsewhere in the city—all the while opening the gates of the barracks and mobilising the troops. The ruse worked, and through all the confusion and panic, Phraya Prasan was able to arrest the commander of the regiment and place him in custody. Plaek Phibunsongkhram was ordered to guard him. Armoured vehicles, including some tanks, were commandeered and ordered to head toward the Ananta Samakhom Throne Hall, including Phraya Ritthi. Having been told weeks before that a military exercise was happening, other troops in the vicinity of Bangkok joined the plotters, thus unknowingly participating in a revolution.[28] Units loyal to the monarch shut themselves in their barracks.[29]
By the time the infantry and cavalry arrived in the
In truth,
The Khana Ratsadon forced the princes to sign a document proclaiming their commitment to peace and to avoidance of any bloodshed. The coup elicited almost no response from the populace, and the day-to-day life of the people returned to normal even before the end of the day. The rest of the country was also similarly disaffected,[33] prompting The Times in London to report that the revolution merely was "a simple re-adjustment".[34]
By the evening of 24 June, the
Khana Ratsadon manifesto
Most of the military and civil administrations offered little resistance. Accustomed to taking orders and with all lines of communication shut down, they were unable to act. The next stage of the revolution was left to the civilian side of the party. Pridi Banomyong, its leader, with the help of his supporters, blanketed the capital in the Khana Ratsadon's propaganda leaflets, pamphlets, and radio broadcasts, all supporting the revolution.[30] The text of the manifesto of the Khana Ratsadon, written by Pridi, criticised the monarch in harsh terms:
All the People,
When this king succeeded his elder brother, people at first had hoped that he would govern protectively. But… the king maintains his power above the law as before. He appoints court relatives and toadies without merit or knowledge to important positions without listening to the voice of the people. He allows officials to use the power of their office dishonestly… he elevates those of royal blood to have special rights more than the people. He governs without principle. The country's affairs are left to the mercy of fate, as can be seen from the depression of the economy and hardships… the government of the king has treated the people as slaves… it can be seen that from the taxes that are squeezed from the people, the king carries off many millions for personal use… The People's Party has no wish to snatch the throne. Hence it invites this king to retain the position. But he must be under the law of the constitution for the governing the country, and cannot do anything independently without the approval of the assembly of the people's representatives… If the king replies with a refusal or does not reply within the time set… it will be regarded as treason to the nation, and it will be necessary for the country to have a republican form of government.[36]
The tone of the manifesto differed greatly from that of the telegram sent to the King signed by the three full colonels and musketeers: Phraya Phahon, Phraya Songsuradet, and Phraya Ritthi. The telegram stated, using royal language (Rachasap: ราชาศัพท์), that if the King did not wish to remain as a monarch under a constitution, the party was willing to replace him with another royal prince. Despite the language, the telegram warned the monarch in strong terms that if any member of the Khana Ratsadon was hurt, the princes in custody would suffer.[37]
Royalty reaction
Before the arrival of the Musketeers' telegram, the King was aware of ongoing events in Bangkok. He was playing golf at the summer villa's course with
King Prajadhipok returned to Bangkok on 26 June. His first action was to grant a royal audience to the Khana Ratsadon. As the members entered the room, the King rose and greeted them by saying: "I rise in honour of the Khana Ratsadon". It was a significant gesture, as in Siamese culture the king always remains seated when their subjects offer homage, not the reverse. This led to Pridi apologising for defaming him in the manifesto. Subsequently, all known copies were pulled from circulation. The King responded to this act by affixing his royal seal on a document exonerating all members of the Khana Ratsadon for the coup.[34] The Khana Ratsadon then released all their hostages with the exception of Prince Paribatra, whom they considered too powerful. They asked him to leave the country instead. He later left for Java, never to return and died in Bandung in 1944. Other princes went into voluntary exile in other Southeast Asian countries, and some others in Europe.[39]
The coup took place in an era when most of the population was kept out of politics and the political sphere was the domain of military and bureaucratic elites.[40][page needed] Handley suggests that there was the refusal of both Rama VI and VII, and aristocracy to share power with the new "commoner" elites, forced the "commoner" elites and some high-ranking nobility to support the Promoters' bid to seize power through military force.[41] The resulting unhappiness at the status quo due to the awareness of the ideals of Western democracy, nationalism, and communism, coupled with the mismanagement by the absolute monarchy and the deteriorating economic conditions caused by the Great Depression, triggered the 1932 revolution. The onus of the outbreak of the 1932 revolution from this perspective thus lies with the disgruntled commoner elites. who wanted radical change and were generally unwilling to compromise with the monarchy and the aristocracy, in particular with Rama VII, who was supposedly in favour of a constitutional monarchy.[citation needed]
First constitution of Thailand
In the immediate aftermath of the revolution, Prajadhipok and the Khana Ratsadon immediately set about granting the Siamese people their
"Democracy" for Siam was to be given to the people in three installments. First, assembly members were to be appointed by the Four Musketeers. They would exercise power on behalf of the people, and their first session was to last six months. Second, a period when the mostly ignorant populace would learn about democracy and elections; the assembly would then be changed to be composed of half-appointed members by the Musketeers, and the other half through indirect representation. These candidates must, of course, have been examined by the Khana Ratsadon before any election. Third, the charter stated that full democratic representation in the assembly could only be achieved at the end of ten years or when more than half of the populace had gone through primary education, whichever was achieved first.[44]
The first session of the People's Assembly convened in the Ananta Samakhom Throne Hall on 28 June 1932.[45] The charter however did not last long. By the end of the year a new more moderate permanent constitution[46] would be signed, on 10 December. This constitution eventually gave back to the monarchy many powers it had lost in the previous charter, and the monarchy was once again held "sacred and inviolable". The Assembly of People's Representatives was expanded to include 156 members, 78 elected and 78 appointed. The democratic restrictions were removed and the government scheduled Siam's first election in October 1933.[47]
Aftermath
Despite his lofty ideals and Western education, Pridi's version of democracy faced the same dilemma that Prajadhipok's version did: the notion simply that the country, especially the rural populace was not yet ready for it.
In late 1932, the King wrote to his nephew Prince
Legacy
Public perception and discourse over the 1932 revolution has fluctuated over time. With the revival of the role of the monarchy initiated by the government of Sarit Thanarat in the 1960s, the state began downplaying the significance of 1932. Public observation of 24 June as National Day was abandoned in favour of King Bhumibol's birthday on 5 December. The events were glossed over by school textbooks, while views describing the actions of the People's Party as premature, and the idea that Vajiravudh and Prajadhipok had been making their own preparations for giving democracy to the people when ready were popularized.[52]
References
- ^ Mektrairat 2010, p. 33-34.
- ^ Lapomarede 1934, p. 251-252.
- ^ Mead (2004)
- ^ Vella, Walter Francis; Vella, Dorothy B (1974). Chaiyo!: King Vajiravudh and the development of Thai nationalism. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press. pp. 126–175.
- ^ a b Stowe (1991), p. 4
- ^ Mead (2004), pp. 85–92
- ^ a b c Handley (2006), p. 37
- ^ Mead 2004, p. 155.
- ^ Stowe 1991.
- ^ Mead (2004), pp. 66–69
- ^ Mead 2004, pp. 126–153.
- ^ Stowe (1991), pp. 9–11
- ^ Stowe (1991), pp. 9–22
- ^ a b c d e Stowe (1991), p. 12
- ^ Baker & Phongpaichit (2005), p. 116
- ^ a b Mektrairat 2010, p. 298.
- ^ a b Stowe (1991), p. 13
- ^ Stowe (1991), p. 14
- ^ a b c Stowe (1991), p. 15
- ^ Landon (1939), pp. 20–27
- ^ Stowe (1991)
- ^ a b c Stowe (1991), p. 2
- ^ a b Stowe (1991), p. 1
- ^ Sivisanvaja & Stevens 1932.
- ^ a b Stowe (1991), p. 5
- ^ a b c d Stowe (1991), p. 16
- ^ Mektrairat 2010, p. 304.
- ^ a b c Stowe (1991), p. 17
- ^ a b Chakrabongse (1957), p. 160
- ^ a b c d Stowe (1991), p. 18
- ^ Chakrabongse (1957), p. 159
- ^ Mektrairat 2010, p. 306.
- ^ a b c Stowe (1991), p. 20
- ^ a b Stowe (1991), p. 22
- ^ Stowe (1991), p. 21
- ^ Banomyong 2000, Part II Chapter 7.
- ^ a b Stowe (1991), p. 19
- ^ a b Chakrabongse (1957), p. 161
- ^ Baker & Phongpaichit (2005), p. 119
- ^ Stowe (1991)
- ^ Handley (2006), pp. 35–43
- ^ Stowe (1991), p. 25
- ^ Banomyong 2000, Part II Chapter 8.
- ^ a b c Stowe (1991), p. 26
- ^ a b Stowe (1991), p. 27
- ^ Stowe (1991), p. 33
- ^ Stowe (1991), p. 34
- ^ Chakrabongse (1957), p. 162
- ^ "ย้อนรอย 'เค้าโครงเศรษฐกิจ' แผนพัฒนาเศรษฐกิจฉบับแรกที่ไม่ได้ใช้ของปรีดี พนมยงค์" [Pridi's "Draft National Economic Plan"]. prachatai.com (in Thai). 2020.
- ^ Lapomarede 1934, p. 257-258.
- ^ Stowe (1991), p. 75
- ^ Mark, Eugene (29 June 2017). "Time to Truly Understand Thailand's 1932 Revolution". The Diplomat. Retrieved 16 October 2020.
Bibliography
- Baker, Christopher; Phongpaichit, Pasuk (2005). A History of Thailand. United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press. ISBN 0-521-81615-7.
- ISBN 978-974-7551-35-8.
- Batson, Benjamin A. (1984). The End of Absolute Monarchy in Siam. Singapore: Oxford University Press.
- Chakrabongse, HRH Chula, Prince of Thailand (1957). Twain Have Met: An Eastern Prince Came West. United Kingdom: G.T. Foulis & Co.
{{cite book}}
: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link) - Coast, John (1953). Some Aspects of Siamese Politics. New York: Institute of Pacific Relations.
- Handley, Paul M. (2006). The King Never Smiles: A Biography of Thailand's Bhumibol Adulyadej. New Haven and London: Yale University Press.
- Keyes, Charles. (1987). Thailand: Buddhist Kingdom as Modern Nation-State. Boulder: Westview Press.
- Kobkua, Suwannathat-Pian (1995). Thailand's Durable Premier: Phibun through Three Decades 1932–1957. Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press.
- Kruger, Rayne (1964). The Devil's Discus. Great Britain: Cassel & Company Ltd.
- Landon, Kenneth Perry (1939). Thailand in Transition: A brief survey of Cultural Trends in the five years since the Revolution of 1932. Chicago, Illinois: The University of Chicago Press.
- Lapomarede, Baron de (1934). "The Setting of the Siamese Revolution" (PDF). Pacific Affairs. 7 (3): 251–259. JSTOR 2750737.
- Mektrairat, Nakarin (2010). Siamese revolution of 1932 (การปฏิวัติสยาม พ.ศ. 2475) (in Thai) (5 ed.). Samesky (ฟ้าเดียวกัน). ISBN 9786169023869.
- Mead, Kullada Kesboonchoo (2004). The Rise and Decline of Thai Absolutism. United Kingdom: Routledge Curzon. ISBN 0-415-29725-7.
- Moerman, Michel (1965). "Ethnic identification in a complex civilisation: who are the Lue?". The American Anthropologist. New Series. 67 (5): 1215–1230. .
- Reynolds, Craig J. (1994). Thai Radical Discourse: The Real Face of Thai Feudalism Today. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
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ignored (help) - Reynolds, Craig J. (2006). "Feudalism as a Trope for the Past". Seditious Histories: Contesting Thai and Southeast Asian Pasts. Seattle: University of Washington Press. ISBN 9789971693350.
- Steinberg, D. J., ed. (1971). In Search of Southeast Asia. Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press.
- Sivisanvaja, Phraya; Stevens, Raymond Bartlett (1932). "An Outline of Change in the Form of the Government (Rama VII's Constitution)" (PDF). Archived from the original (PDF) on 5 October 2011.)
{{cite journal}}
: Cite journal requires|journal=
(help - Stowe, Judith (1991). Siam Becomes Thailand: A Story of Intrigue. United Kingdom: C. Hurst & Co. ISBN 0-8248-1394-4.
- Winichakul, Thongchai (c. 1994). Siam Mapped: a history of the geo-body of a nation. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press.
- JSTOR 2658942.
- Van Praagh, David (1996). Thailand's Struggle for Democracy: The Life and Times of M. R. Seni Pramoj. New York: Holmes & Meier. ISBN 9780841913219.
- Vella, Walter F. (1978). Chaiyo!: King Vajiravudh and the development of Thai Nationalism. Honolulu: The University Press of Hawaii.
- Wyatt, David K. (2003). Thailand: A Short History. New Haven: Yale University Press.
External links
- Thai Revolution of 1932 Archived 16 September 2012 at the Wayback Machine
- Undermining the 1932 Revolution Archived 3 March 2016 at the Wayback Machine