Siege of Constantinople (717–718)
Second Arab siege of Constantinople | |||||||
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Part of the Arab–Byzantine wars and the early Muslim conquests | |||||||
The second Arab siege of Constantinople, as depicted in the 14th-century Bulgarian translation of the Manasses Chronicle | |||||||
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Belligerents | |||||||
Umayyad Caliphate | |||||||
Commanders and leaders | |||||||
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Strength | |||||||
120,000 ( al-Mas'udi) )1,800 ships (Theophanes |
c. 15,000 Byzantines (estimate)[1] c. 12,000 Bulgars[2] |
The second Arab siege of Constantinople was a combined land and sea offensive in 717–718 by the Muslim Arabs of the
After wintering in the western coastlands of Asia Minor, the Arab army crossed into Thrace in early summer 717 and built siege lines to blockade the city, which was protected by the massive Theodosian Walls. The Arab fleet, which accompanied the land army and was meant to complete the city's blockade by sea, was neutralized soon after its arrival by the Byzantine navy through the use of Greek fire. This allowed Constantinople to be resupplied by sea, while the Arab army was crippled by famine and disease during the unusually hard winter that followed. In spring 718, two Arab fleets sent as reinforcements were destroyed by the Byzantines after their Christian crews defected, and an additional army sent overland through Asia Minor was ambushed and defeated. Coupled with attacks by the Bulgars on their rear, the Arabs were forced to lift the siege on 15 August 718. On its return journey, the Arab fleet was almost completely destroyed by natural disasters.
The siege's failure had wide-ranging repercussions. The rescue of Constantinople ensured the continued survival of Byzantium, while the Caliphate's strategic outlook was altered: although regular attacks on Byzantine territories continued, the goal of outright conquest was abandoned. Historians consider the siege to be one of history's most important battles, as its failure postponed the Muslim advance into
Background
Following the
Sources
The information available on the siege comes from sources composed in later dates, which are often mutually contradictory. The main Byzantine source is the extensive and detailed account of the Chronicle of Theophanes the Confessor (760–817) and secondarily the brief account in the Breviarium of Patriarch Nikephoros I of Constantinople (died 828), which shows small differences, mainly chronological, from Theophanes's version.[8] For the events of the siege, both authors appear to have used a primary account composed during the reign of Leo III the Isaurian (r. 717–741) which therefore contains a favourable depiction of the latter, while Theophanes apparently relies on an unknown biography of Leo (ignored by Nikephoros) for the events of 716. The 8th-century chronicler Theophilus of Edessa records the years leading up to the siege and the siege itself in some detail, paying particular attention to the diplomacy between Maslama and Leo III.[9] The Arab sources, mainly the 11th-century Kitab al-'Uyun and the more concise narrative in the History of the Prophets and Kings by al-Tabari (838–923), rely on primary accounts by early 9th-century Arab writers, but are more confused and contain several legendary elements. The Syriac language accounts are based on Agapius of Hierapolis (died 942), who likely drew from the same primary source as Theophanes, but are far briefer.[10]
Opening stages of the campaign
The Arab successes opened the way for a second assault on Constantinople, an undertaking already initiated under Caliph al-Walid I (r. 705–715). Following his death, his brother and successor Sulayman (r. 715–717) took up the project with increased vigour, according to Arab accounts because of a prophecy that a Caliph bearing the name of a prophet would capture Constantinople; Sulayman (Solomon) was the only member of the Umayyad family to bear such a name. According to Syriac sources, the new Caliph swore "to not stop fighting against Constantinople before having exhausted the country of the Arabs or to have taken the city".[11] The Umayyad forces began assembling at the plain of Dabiq north of Aleppo, under the direct supervision of the Caliph. As Sulayman was too sick to campaign himself, however, he entrusted command to his brother Maslama ibn Abd al-Malik.[12] The operation against Constantinople came at a time when the Umayyad empire was undergoing a period of continuous expansion to the east and west. Muslim armies advanced into Transoxiana, India, and the Visigothic Kingdom of Hispania.[13]
Arab preparations, especially the construction of a large fleet, did not go unnoticed by the worried Byzantines. Emperor
In these conditions of near-civil war, the Arabs began their carefully prepared advance. In September 715, the vanguard, under general Sulayman ibn Mu'ad, marched over Cilicia into Asia Minor, taking the strategic fortress of Loulon on its way. They wintered at Afik, an unidentified location near the western exit of the Cilician Gates. In early 716, Sulayman's army continued into central Asia Minor. The Umayyad fleet under Umar ibn Hubayra cruised along the Cilician coast, while Maslama ibn Abd al-Malik awaited developments with the main army in Syria.[20]
The Arabs hoped that the disunity among the Byzantines would play to their advantage. Maslama had already established contact with Leo the Isaurian. French scholar Rodolphe Guilland theorized that Leo offered to become a vassal of the Caliphate, although the Byzantine general intended to use the Arabs for his own purposes. In turn, Maslama supported Leo hoping to maximize confusion and weaken the Empire, easing his own task of taking Constantinople.[21]
Sulayman's first objective was the strategically important fortress of Amorium, which the Arabs intended to use as a base the following winter. Amorium had been left defenceless in the turmoil of the civil war and would have easily fallen, but the Arabs chose to bolster Leo's position as a counterweight to Theodosius. They offered the city terms of surrender if its inhabitants would acknowledge Leo as emperor. The fortress capitulated, but still did not open its gates to the Arabs. Leo came to the vicinity with a handful of soldiers and executed a series of ruses and negotiations to garrison 800 men in the town. The Arab army, thwarted in its objective and with supplies running low, withdrew. Leo escaped to Pisidia and, in summer, supported by Artabasdos, was proclaimed and crowned as Byzantine emperor, openly challenging Theodosius.[22][23]
Leo's success at Amorium was fortunately timed, since Maslama with the main Arab army had in the meantime crossed the
Opposing forces
From the outset, the Arabs prepared for a major assault on Constantinople. The late 8th-century Syriac
Whatever the true numbers, the attackers were considerably more numerous than the defenders; according to Treadgold, the Arab host may have outnumbered the entire Byzantine army.[28] Little is known on the detailed composition of the Arab force, but it appears that it mostly consisted of, and was led by, Syrians and Jazirans of the elite ahl al-Sham ('People of Syria'), the main pillar of the Umayyad regime and veterans of the struggle against Byzantium.[29] Alongside Maslama, Umar ibn Hubayra, Sulayman ibn Mu'ad, and Bakhtari ibn al-Hasan are mentioned as his lieutenants by Theophanes and Agapius of Hierapolis, while the later Kitab al-'Uyun replaces Bakhtari with Abdallah al-Battal.[30]
Although the siege consumed a large part of the Caliphate's manpower and resources,
Siege
In early summer, Maslama ordered his fleet to join him and with his army crossed the
The Arab fleet under Sulayman (often confused with the Caliph himself in the medieval sources) arrived on 1 September, anchoring at first near the
The Arab army was well-provisioned, with Arab accounts reporting high mounds of supplies piled up in their camp, and had even brought along wheat to sow and harvest the next year. The failure of the Arab navy to blockade the city, however, meant that the Byzantines too could ferry in provisions. In addition, the Arab army had already devastated the Thracian countryside during its march and could not rely on it for foraging. The Arab fleet and the second Arab army, which operated in the Asian suburbs of Constantinople, were able to bring in limited supplies to Maslama's army.[37] As the siege drew into winter, negotiations opened between the two sides, extensively reported by Arab sources but ignored by Byzantine historians. According to the Arab accounts, Leo continued to play a double game with the Arabs. One version claims that he tricked Maslama into handing over most of his grain supplies, while another claims that the Arab general was persuaded to burn them altogether, so as to show the inhabitants of the city that they faced an imminent assault and induce them to surrender.[38] The winter of 718 was extremely harsh; snow covered the ground for over three months. As the supplies in the Arab camp ran out, a terrible famine broke out: the soldiers ate their horses, camels, and other livestock, and the bark, leaves and roots of trees. They swept the snow of the fields they had sown to eat the green shoots, and reportedly resorted to cannibalism and eating the dung of each other and their animals.[39] Consequently, the Arab army was ravaged by epidemics; with great exaggeration, the Lombard historian Paul the Deacon put the number of their dead of hunger and disease at 300,000.[40]
The Arab situation looked set to improve in spring when the new Caliph,
Constantinople could now be easily resupplied by sea and the city's fishermen went back to work, as the Arab fleet did not sail again. Still suffering from hunger and pestilence, the Arabs also lost a major battle against the Bulgars, who killed, according to Theophanes, 22,000 men. The sources are divided on the details of the Bulgar participation in the siege: Theophanes and al-Tabari report that the Bulgars attacked the Arab encampment (likely because of their treaty with Leo), while according to the Syriac Chronicle of 846, it was the Arabs who strayed into Bulgar territory, seeking provisions. Michael the Syrian on the other hand mentions that the Bulgars participated in the siege from the beginning, with attacks against the Arabs as they marched through Thrace towards Constantinople, and subsequently on their encampment.[43] According to some modern interpretations of the original sources, the first Bulgar victory may have been against a separate Arab army under Ukhaida that ranged as far as Stara Zagora, followed by an attack against the Arabs in Thrace. The Bulgars continued harassing the Arab encampments for the duration of the siege.[44]
The siege had clearly failed, and Caliph Umar sent orders to Maslama to retreat. After thirteen months of siege, on 15 August 718, the Arabs departed. The date coincided with the feast of the
Aftermath
The expedition's failure weakened the Umayyad state. As historian
Besides this, the Byzantines failed to exploit their success in launching attacks of their own against the Arabs. In 720, after a hiatus of two years, Arab raids against Byzantium resumed, although now they were no longer directed at conquest, but rather seeking booty. The Arab attacks would intensify again over the next two decades, until the major Byzantine victory at the Battle of Akroinon in 740. Coupled with military defeats on the other fronts of the overextended Caliphate, and the internal instability which culminated in the Abbasid Revolution, the age of Arab expansion came to an end.[51]
Historical assessment and impact
The second Arab siege of Constantinople was far more dangerous for Byzantium than the first as, unlike the loose blockade of 674–678, the Arabs launched a direct, well-planned attack on the Byzantine capital, and tried to cut off the city completely from land and sea.[31] The siege represented a final effort by the Caliphate to "cut off the head" of the Byzantine Empire, after which the remaining provinces, especially in Asia Minor, would be easy to capture.[52] The reasons for the Arab failure were chiefly logistical, as they were operating too far from their Syrian bases, but the superiority of the Byzantine navy through the use of Greek fire, the strength of Constantinople's fortifications, and the skill of Leo III in deception and negotiations also played important roles.[53]
The failure of the Arab siege led to a profound change in the nature of warfare between Byzantium and the Caliphate. The Muslim goal of conquest of Constantinople was effectively abandoned, and the frontier between the two empires stabilized along the line of the Taurus and Antitaurus Mountains, over which both sides continued to launch regular raids and counter-raids. In this incessant border warfare, frontier towns and fortresses changed hands frequently, but the general outline of the border remained unaltered for over two centuries, until the Byzantine conquests of the 10th century.[54] The eastern fleets of the Caliphate entered a century-long decline; only the Ifriqiyan fleets maintained regular raids on Byzantine Sicily, until they too subsided after 752.[55] Indeed, with the exception of the advance of the Abbasid army under Harun al-Rashid up to Chrysopolis in 782, no other Arab army would ever come within sight of the Byzantine capital again.[56] Consequently, on the Muslim side the raids themselves eventually acquired an almost ritual character, and were valued mostly as a demonstration of the continuing jihad and sponsored by the Caliph as a symbol of his role as the leader of the Muslim community.[57]
The outcome of the siege was of considerable
Cultural impact
Among Arabs, the 717–718 siege became the most famous of their expeditions against Byzantium. Several accounts survive, but most were composed at later dates and are semi-fictional and contradictory. In legend, the defeat was transformed into a victory: Maslama departed only after symbolically entering the Byzantine capital on his horse accompanied by thirty riders, where Leo received him with honour and led him to the
Later Muslim and Byzantine tradition also ascribed the building of Constantinople's first mosque, near the city's praetorium, to Maslama. In reality, the mosque near the praetorium was probably erected in about 860, as a result of an Arab embassy in that year.[64] Ottoman tradition also ascribed the building of the Arap Mosque (located outside Constantinople proper in Galata) to Maslama, although it erroneously dated this to around 686, probably confusing Maslama's attack with the first Arab siege in the 670s.[65] The passing of the Arab army also left traces at Abydos, where "Maslama's Well" and a mosque attributed to him were still known in the 10th century.[56]
Eventually, following their repeated failures before Constantinople, and the continued resilience of the Byzantine state, the Muslims began to project the fall of Constantinople to the distant future. Thus the city's fall came to be regarded as one of the signs of the arrival of the
References
Footnotes
^ a: Theophanes the Confessor gives the date as 15 August, but modern scholars believe that this is probably meant to mirror the Arabs' departure date in the next year. Patriarch Nikephoros I on the other hand explicitly records the duration of the siege as 13 months, implying that it began on 15 July.[68]
^ b: According to the historian Hugh N. Kennedy, based on the numbers found in the contemporary army registers (diwans), the total manpower available to the Umayyad Caliphate c. 700 ranged between 250,000 and 300,000 men, spread throughout the various provinces. It is unclear, however, what portion of this number could actually be fielded for any particular campaign, and does not account for surplus manpower that could be mobilized in exceptional circumstances.[69]
Citations
- ^ a b Decker 2013, p. 207.
- ^ Estimate based on primary sources, Stoyanov 2019, pp. 723–724.
- ^ Lilie 1976, pp. 81–82, 97–106.
- ^ Blankinship 1994, p. 31; Haldon 1990, p. 72; Lilie 1976, pp. 107–120.
- ^ Haldon 1990, p. 80; Lilie 1976, pp. 120–122, 139–140.
- ^ Blankinship 1994, p. 31; Lilie 1976, p. 140; Treadgold 1997, pp. 345–346.
- ^ Treadgold 1997, p. 345.
- ^ Brooks 1899, pp. 19–20.
- ^ Mango & Scott 1997, pp. lxxxviil–xxxviii.
- ^ Brooks 1899, pp. 19–20, Guilland 1959, pp. 115–116
- ^ Brooks 1899, pp. 20–21; El-Cheikh 2004, p. 65; Guilland 1959, p. 110; Lilie 1976, p. 122; Treadgold 1997, p. 344.
- ^ Guilland 1959, pp. 110–111.
- ^ Hawting 2000, p. 73.
- ^ Mango & Scott 1997, p. 534; Lilie 1976, pp. 122–123; Treadgold 1997, pp. 343–344.
- ^ Mango & Scott 1997, p. 537 (Note #5).
- ^ Lilie 1976, p. 123 (Note #62).
- ^ Haldon 1990, p. 80; Mango & Scott 1997, pp. 535–536; Lilie 1976, pp. 123–124; Treadgold 1997, p. 344.
- ^ Haldon 1990, pp. 80, 82; Mango & Scott 1997, p. 536; Treadgold 1997, pp. 344–345.
- ^ Lilie 1976, p. 124; Treadgold 1997, p. 345.
- ^ Guilland 1959, p. 111; Mango & Scott 1997, p. 538; Lilie 1976, pp. 123–125.
- ^ Guilland 1959, pp. 118–119; Lilie 1976, p. 125.
- ^ Mango & Scott 1997, pp. 538–539; Lilie 1976, pp. 125–126; Treadgold 1997, p. 345.
- ^ For a detailed examination of Leo's negotiations with the Arabs before Amorium in Byzantine and Arab sources, cf. Guilland 1959, pp. 112–113, 124–126.
- ^ Guilland 1959, p. 125; Mango & Scott 1997, pp. 539–540; Lilie 1976, pp. 126–127.
- ^ Guilland 1959, pp. 113–114; Mango & Scott 1997, pp. 540–541; Lilie 1976, p. 127; Treadgold 1997, p. 345.
- ^ Haldon 1990, pp. 82–83; Mango & Scott 1997, pp. 540, 545; Lilie 1976, pp. 127–128; Treadgold 1997, p. 345.
- ^ Guilland 1959, p. 110; Kaegi 2008, pp. 384–385; Treadgold 1997, p. 938 (Note #1).
- ^ Treadgold 1997, p. 346.
- ^ Guilland 1959, p. 110; Kennedy 2001, p. 47.
- ^ Canard 1926, pp. 91–92; Guilland 1959, p. 111.
- ^ a b Lilie 1976, p. 132.
- ^ Lilie 1976, p. 125.
- ^ Treadgold 1997, p. 347.
- ^ Brooks 1899, p. 23; Mango & Scott 1997, p. 545; Lilie 1976, p. 128; Treadgold 1997, p. 347.
- ^ Guilland 1959, p. 119; Mango & Scott 1997, p. 545; Lilie 1976, pp. 128–129; Treadgold 1997, p. 347.
- ^ Guilland 1959, pp. 119–120; Mango & Scott 1997, pp. 545–546; Lilie 1976, p. 128; Treadgold 1997, p. 347.
- ^ Lilie 1976, p. 129; Treadgold 1997, p. 347.
- ^ Brooks 1899, pp. 24–28, 30; Lilie 1976, p. 129.
- ^ Stewart, Michael E. (2018). "A Furious Storm fell upon them: The Arab Siege of Constantinople, 717- 718', Medieval Warfare Magazine, VIII. 5". Academia. p. 32. Retrieved 13 December 2023.
- ^ Brooks 1899, pp. 28–29; Guilland 1959, pp. 122–123; Mango & Scott 1997, p. 546; Lilie 1976, pp. 129–130; Treadgold 1997, p. 347.
- ^ Guilland 1959, p. 121; Mango & Scott 1997, pp. 546, 548; Lilie 1976, p. 130; Treadgold 1997, pp. 347–348.
- ^ Guilland 1959, p. 122;Mango & Scott 1997, p. 546; Lilie 1976, pp. 130–131; Treadgold 1997, p. 348.
- ^ Canard 1926, pp. 90–91; Guilland 1959, pp. 122, 123; Mango & Scott 1997, p. 546; Lilie 1976, p. 131.
- ^ Stoyanov 2019, pp. 723–724.
- ^ Mango & Scott 1997, p. 550; Treadgold 1997, p. 349.
- ^ Haldon 1990, p. 83.
- ^ Lewis 2002, p. 79.
- ^ Blankinship 1994, pp. 33–34; Lilie 1976, pp. 132–133; Treadgold 1997, p. 349.
- ^ Blankinship 1994, p. 287 (Note #133); Lilie 1976, p. 133; Treadgold 1997, p. 349.
- ^ Treadgold 1997, pp. 347, 348.
- ^ Blankinship 1994, pp. 34–35, 117–236; Haldon 1990, p. 84; Kaegi 2008, pp. 385–386; Lilie 1976, pp. 143–144.
- ^ Lilie 1976, pp. 140–141.
- ^ Blankinship 1994, p. 105; Kaegi 2008, p. 385; Lilie 1976, p. 141; Treadgold 1997, p. 349.
- ^ Blankinship 1994, pp. 104–106; Haldon 1990, pp. 83–84; El-Cheikh 2004, pp. 83–84; Toynbee 1973, pp. 107–109.
- ^ Eickhoff 1966, pp. 35–39.
- ^ a b Mordtmann 1986, p. 533.
- ^ El-Cheikh 2004, pp. 83–84; Kennedy 2001, pp. 105–106.
- ^ Eickhoff 1966, p. 35.
- ^ Davis 2001, p. 99.
- ^ Guilland 1959, p. 129.
- ^ Crompton 1997, pp. 27–28; Davis 2001, pp. 99–102; Fuller 1987, pp. 335ff.; Regan 2002, pp. 44–45; Tucker 2010, pp. 94–97.
- ^ Canard 1926, pp. 99–102; El-Cheikh 2004, pp. 63–64; Guilland 1959, pp. 130–131.
- ^ Canard 1926, pp. 112–121; Guilland 1959, pp. 131–132.
- ^ Canard 1926, pp. 94–99; El-Cheikh 2004, p. 64; Guilland 1959, pp. 132–133; Hasluck 1929, p. 720.
- ^ Canard 1926, p. 99; Hasluck 1929, pp. 718–720; Mordtmann 1986, p. 533.
- ^ Canard 1926, pp. 104–112; El-Cheikh 2004, pp. 65–70; Hawting 2000, p. 73.
- ^ Brandes 2007, pp. 65–91.
- ^ Mango & Scott 1997, p. 548 (Note #16); Guilland 1959, pp. 116–118.
- ^ Kennedy 2001, pp. 19–21
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Further reading
- Radic, Radivoj (18 August 2008). "Two Arabian sieges of Constantinople (674–678; 717/718)". Encyclopedia of the Hellenic World, Constantinople. Athens, Greece: Foundation of the Hellenic World. Archived from the original on 27 November 2018. Retrieved 14 July 2012.
- Sheppard, Si (2020). Constantinople AD 717–18: The Crucible of History. Oxford: Osprey Publishing. ISBN 978-1472836922. Archivedfrom the original on 15 August 2021. Retrieved 7 November 2020.
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