Siege of Saïo
Siege of Saïo | |||||||||
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Part of the East African Campaign of World War II | |||||||||
Belgian officers with captured Italian artillery, following the battle | |||||||||
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Belligerents | |||||||||
British Empire South Africa | |||||||||
Commanders and leaders | |||||||||
Strength | |||||||||
Belgium: c. 3,000 troops 2,000 porters British Empire: 1 battalion Ethiopian Empire: Unknown number of resistance fighters South Africa: 3 aircraft |
7,000–8,000 troops Unknown number of aircraft | ||||||||
Casualties and losses | |||||||||
Belgium: 462 dead |
c. 1,200 dead 6,454 captured | ||||||||
The siege of Saïo or battle of Saïo took place during the
In the first months of 1941, British and
At the end of the month General Auguste Gilliaert took charge of the Belgian force. He was instructed by the British to attack when an opportunity presented itself. On 3 July, he assaulted the base of Saïo Mountain and in the afternoon Gazzera sued for peace. On 6 July, the Belgians formally accepted the surrender of Gazzera, eight of his generals and over 6,000 Italian soldiers.
Background
Africa Orientale Italiana
On 9 May 1936, the Italian dictator Benito Mussolini proclaimed the colony of Africa Orientale Italiana (AOI, Italian East Africa), formed from Ethiopia (after the Italian victory in the Second Italo-Ethiopian War, fought 3 October 1935 – May 1936) and the existing Italian possessions of Italian Eritrea and Italian Somaliland.[1] On 10 June 1940, Mussolini declared war on Britain and France, which made Italian military forces in Libya a threat to Egypt and those in Italian East Africa a danger to the British and French colonies in East Africa. Italian belligerence also closed the Mediterranean to Allied merchant ships and endangered British supply routes along the coast of East Africa, the Gulf of Aden, Red Sea and the Suez Canal.[a] Egypt, the Suez Canal, French Somaliland and British Somaliland were also vulnerable to an attack from Italian East Africa but the rearmament plans of the Comando Supremo (Italian General Staff) were not due to mature until 1942; in 1940 the Italian armed forces were not ready for military operations against a comparable power.[3]
Prelude
Regio Esercito
Aosta had the
British plans
In August 1939,
The Frontier Battalion of the Sudan Defence Force (SDF), set up in May 1940, was joined at Khartoum by the 2nd Ethiopian and 4th Eritrean battalions, raised from émigré volunteers in Kenya. Operational Centres consisting of an officer, five NCOs and several picked Ethiopians were formed and trained in guerrilla warfare, to provide leadership cadres and £1 million was set aside to finance their operations. Major
Belgian plans
At the conclusion of the
Meanwhile, Ryckmans and Lieutenant General
East African Campaign
Following the declaration of war against France and
The expeditionary force attacked three days later in conjunction with troops of the
Siege
On 25 March, the Belgo-Congolese battalion and the two companies of the 2/6 KAR occupied Gambela.
Actions at Bortai Brook
The Italians mined the 40 mi (64 km)-long Saïo–Gambela road that led to the Saïo Plateau 4,000 ft (1,200 m) above the surrounding area. The Belgians began slowly advancing but encountered Italians at the Bortai Brook, which ran perpendicular to the road.[24] The Belgians were strengthened by the arrival of a Stokes mortar company and another battalion. Numbering at 1,600 soldiers and 600 non-combatant porters, they lacked the strength to seize the plateau. With the Italians receiving reinforcements of troops retreating from the east, the Belgians decided to keep the initiative to disguise their small numbers.[25]
Three days of cold weather and rain preceded the offensive.
During the ensuing stalemate, the Belgians studied the Italians' tactics; they would post pairs of snipers and artillery spotters in trees guarded at the bases by infantry squads. Their
Belgian supply difficulties
By May, Belgian numbers had risen to 2,500 men, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Leopold Dronkers-Martens. The rainy season had begun, turning the main road from Sudan into mud, cutting off their communications and supplies. The Baro and
Renewed Belgian offensives
The Belgo-Congolese situation remained difficult until early June, when the Baro and Sobat rivers rose enough for reinforcements from the Congo to reach them. They then decided to try to sever the Italian supply line between Saïo and Mogi, another town upon the plateau. To hold the line near Bortai Brook, the Belgians could only spare around 250 men for an attack.[28] It was hoped that cutting the Italians off would allow the British, stalled in their advance at Gidami, to move south and encircle Saïo. On 9 June the Belgian force attacked Mogi, their flank covered by the arrival of a new battalion from the Congo. The Italian garrison, numbering around 300 men, held off the assault. Believing that the town could only be taken at a heavy cost, the Belgians instead fortified their positions around Mogi and sent patrols to ambush the road by which Saïo was being supplied.[22]
At the regular front, Lieutenant Colonel Dronkers-Martens ordered his troops to increase their patrol activities upon the Saïo Plateau, to make the Italians believe that they were facing superior forces.
Final assault and Italian surrender
Major General Auguste Gilliaert arrived from the Congo before the end of the month.[29] On 27 June Lieutenant General William Platt, advancing with British forces from Sudan, ordered the Belgians to attack the Italian positions if an opportunity presented itself and Gilliaert immediately undertook preparations for an offensive.[21] The plans for taking Mogi were abandoned and the Belgians were to concentrate their efforts against Saïo, so all but 50 of the soldiers besieging Mogi were redeployed.[29][32]
I based our chances of success upon continuously keeping aggressive activity along Bortai Brook against Mogi and applying Kitchener's maxim that you can try anything against an enemy who refuses to budge himself.
— Gilliaert[26]
Believing the British pursuit to be closer than it actually was, Gazzera ordered the bridge over the Indina River 40 mi (64 km) east of Saïo to be blown, thereby trapping his forces. Though still outnumbered, the Belgians decided to carry on with their offensive.[26] On 2 July, they forced their way over Bortai Brook.[23] At dawn the next day, the Belgian advance posts opened fire on Saïo and half an hour later, the Belgian artillery went into action. The Italians responded with heavy counter-battery fire.[26] A Belgian battalion advanced upon Italian machine gun nests on the two hills that had been occupied since April. The reserve battalion covered their left flank and Gilliaert dispatched the third battalion under Van der Meersch to the right flank down a goat path that had been mapped by patrols over a fortnight.[26] Two artillery batteries gave them covering fire.[33] The Belgians captured the hills and the Italians, being flanked on their left side by Van der Meersch's troops, were unable to make it back to their fortifications atop Saïo mountain. With the Saïo-Gambela road under artillery fire, they retired to the plains to their right.[26] Meanwhile, the 2/6th KAR launched an attack on the Saïo-Yubdo road, continuing throughout the next day with success.[23]
The Italians were under the impression that they were facing three Belgian divisions with South African reinforcements.
Aftermath
Analysis
With Gazzera's surrender,
George Weller of the Chicago Daily News travelled to the front and interviewed participants in the Belgo-Congolese expedition. He then wrote several articles about the campaign and wired them back to the United States from Léopoldville. The Belgian government reproduced his reporting in a pamphlet that was subsequently distributed, but it received little attention.[37]
Casualties
The Belgo-Congolese force lost 462 men during the conflict, 80 per cent of them to disease and it was estimated that the Italians lost three times as many. A total of 6,454 Italian troops were taken prisoner, including Gazzera, eight other generals and 3,500 Askari, along with 20 artillery pieces, 200 machine guns, 250 trucks and 500 mules.[33] Though only numbering about 3,000 soldiers and 2,000 porters, the Belgo-Congolese force had to manage 15,000 prisoners in the former Galla-Sidamo Governorate after the campaign.[32]
Commemoration
In 1943, a three-sided pyramid was erected in Faradje, Belgian Congo to commemorate the actions of the Congolese in Ethiopia. Each face of the pyramid was inscribed with the name of each place where an engagement took place, including Saïo. Many locations throughout the country—presently the Democratic Republic of the Congo—are named after the battle.[38]
Notes
Footnotes
- ^ Playfair 1957, p. 2.
- ^ Playfair 1957, pp. 6–7, 69.
- ^ Playfair 1957, pp. 38–40.
- ^ Playfair 1957, p. 93.
- ^ a b Playfair 1957, p. 166.
- ^ Barker 1971, p. 155.
- ^ Playfair 1957, p. 403.
- ^ Playfair 1957, pp. 404–405.
- ^ a b Veranneman 2014, p. 83
- ^ a b c Weller 1942, p. 4
- ^ a b Veranneman 2014, p. 84
- ^ a b Weller 1942, p. 5
- ^ Weller 1942, p. 8
- ^ a b c Weller 1942, p. 6
- ^ a b c d e Moyse-Bartlett 2012, p. 533
- ^ a b Orpen 1968, p. 274
- ^ Weller 1942, p. 10
- ^ Weller 1942, p. 12
- ^ a b c d Weller 1942, p. 24
- ^ Weller 1942, p. 14
- ^ a b c d e Playfair 1956, p. 311
- ^ a b c Weller 1942, p. 19
- ^ a b c d e Platt 1946, p. 3552
- ^ Weller 1942, p. 15
- ^ a b c d Weller 1942, p. 16
- ^ a b c d e f g h Weller 1942, p. 21
- ^ a b c Weller 1942, p. 17
- ^ a b Weller 1942, p. 18
- ^ a b c Weller 1942, p. 20
- ^ Playfair 1956, p. 310
- ^ Orpen 1968, p. 320
- ^ a b c d Weller 1942, p. 22
- ^ a b c Veranneman 2014, p. 85
- ^ Orpen 1968, p. 321
- ^ MOI 1941, p. 136.
- ^ Weller 1942, p. 23
- ^ Connell 2010, pp. 146–147.
- ^ Boneza 2014.
Bibliography
Books
- Barker, A. J. (1971). Rape of Ethiopia, 1936. London: Ballantine Books. ISBN 978-0-345-02462-6.
- Moyse-Bartlett, H. (2012). The King's African Rifles. Vol. II. Luton: Andrews UK. ISBN 978-1-78150-663-9. Archivedfrom the original on 2023-07-06. Retrieved 2017-01-01.
- Orpen, N. (1968). East African and Abyssinian Campaigns. South African Forces, World War II. Vol. I (online ed.). Cape Town, SA: Purnell. from the original on 10 February 2017. Retrieved 2 January 2017.
- from the original on 28 September 2018. Retrieved 3 September 2015.
- Playfair, Major-General I. S. O.; et al. (1956). Butler, J. R. M. (ed.). The Mediterranean and Middle East: The Germans come to the help of their Ally (1941). History of the Second World War, United Kingdom Military Series. Vol. II. HMSO. ISBN 978-1-84574-066-5. Archivedfrom the original on 2020-06-01. Retrieved 2018-10-21.
- The Abyssinian Campaign. Miscellaneous Publications. Vol. I. from the original on 6 July 2023. Retrieved 4 October 2017.
- Veranneman, Jean-Michel (2014). Belgium in the Second World War (illus. ed.). Barnsley: Pen and Sword. ISBN 978-1-78337-607-0. Archivedfrom the original on 2023-07-06. Retrieved 2016-10-19.
- from the original on 4 May 2019. Retrieved 3 March 2016 – via Hyperwar.
Journals
- Connell, Dan (2010). "Reviewed Work: Weller's War: A Legendary Foreign Correspondent's Saga of World War II on Five Continents by George Weller, Anthony Weller". African Studies Review. LIII (3): 146–148. S2CID 141800345.
Newspapers
- from the original on 16 March 2017. Retrieved 10 March 2017.
Websites
- Boneza, Raïs Neza (7 June 2014). "Connecting the Dot: Congo and World War II: One of the Other Forgotten Commemorations". Trondheim: Kimpavita Press & Publishers. Archived from the original on 12 March 2017. Retrieved 10 March 2017.