Simplicius of Cilicia
Simplicius of Cilicia | |
---|---|
Born | c. 480 AD |
Died | c. 540 AD |
Notable work |
Simplicius of
Life
Little is known about Simplicius' life. Based on his education, it's likely he was born some time around 480.[2] His commentary on Aristotle's On the Heavens can be definitively dated to 538, which is the latest known definitive evidence for his life, making it likely he died some time around 540.[2]
Simplicius was a disciple of Ammonius Hermiae,[3] and Damascius,[4] and was consequently one of the last members of the Neoplatonist school. The school had its headquarters in Athens. It became the centre of the last efforts to maintain Hellenistic religion against the encroachments of Christianity. Imperial edicts enacted in the 5th century against paganism gave legal protection to pagans against personal maltreatment.[5] We know little about where Simplicius lived and taught. That he not only wrote, but taught, is proved by the address to his hearers in the commentary on the Physica Auscultatio of Aristotle,[6] as well as by the title of his commentary on the Categories. He had received his training partly in Alexandria, under Ammonius,[7] partly in Athens, as a disciple of Damascius; and it was probably in one of these two cities that he subsequently took up his abode; for, with the exception of these cities and Constantinople, it would have been difficult to find a town which possessed the collections of books he needed, and he is unlikely to have gone to Constantinople. One claim at least asserts that Simplicius went to Harran, in what is modern-day south-eastern Turkey.[8]
In the year 528 the emperor
Philosophy
One of Simplicius' main concerns was the harmonization of Platonic and Aristotelian philosophy. Simplicius, as a Neoplatonist, endeavoured to show that
In his view not only
Astronomy
Aristotle had already taken the view that mathematics, as a superordinate science, was allowed to provide axioms to a subordinate science such as astronomy and was responsible for the justification and explanation of astronomical phenomena; the superordinate science knows the causes, the subordinate only the facts. Following this principle, Aristotle used geometric definitions and insights for his cosmological explanations. Philoponus turned against his method of argumentation, believing that a mathematical argument related to physics could be invalidated by pointing to the nature of physical reality, which so limited the mathematical possibility that the argument lost its basis. Thus, mathematical principles are not fully applicable in the physical world. This view met with vehement criticism from Simplicius, who called for an unimpeded transition from physics to its mathematical principles and, conversely, an unrestricted application of mathematical principles to physics, and especially to astronomy. He considered
In astronomy, Simplicius, like Aristotle, presupposed the
Following on from Aristotle, Simplicius distinguished between the approaches of two types of natural scientists: the "physicist" (physicós), by which he meant a natural philosopher, and the "mathematician", i.e. a non-philosopher, who tries to grasp physical conditions with mathematical means. A special case of such a “mathematician” is the astronomer. Both types of researchers study the same subject, but in different ways. The "physicist" inquires into the nature of the celestial spheres and heavenly bodies, he considers them from a qualitative point of view, while the astronomer deals with quantitative points of view, relying on arithmetic and geometrical reasoning. The "physicist" asks about causal connections, the astronomer limits himself to a description that is intended to do justice to the observed phenomena without explaining them causally. Simplicius considered the natural-philosophical, "physical" approach to be the only scientifically profitable one. He believed that astronomers should not be satisfied with devising "hypotheses" – mere rules of calculation – but should use a physical theory well founded by causal argumentation as the starting point for their considerations. Only such a well-founded astronomy can provide real insights. It must be able to explain all observed phenomena, including apparent variations in the size of celestial bodies.[18]
Ontology
Aristotle said the universe is not located in one particular place. It cannot be localized, because outside of the spherical sky, which is surrounded and delimited by nothing, there is no reality. Simplicius disagreed with this view. He argued that, according to Aristotelian teaching, the circular motion of the celestial sphere was a local motion, that is, a change of place, and that this implied that the heavens were in one place.[19] Simplicius saw the reason for Aristotle's error in the inadequacy of the Aristotelian definition of the term "place". Aristotle had defined place as the boundary between an enclosure and an enclosed. In doing so, he defined it as a two-dimensional surface. Accordingly, the uninhabited heaven could have no place. Simplicius asked whether “enclosure” meant enveloping from the outside or penetrating what was contained. Both lead to a contradiction: if the enclosure penetrates the enclosed, the place is not the limit; if the place only encloses what is contained, it is only the surface of what is contained and not the latter itself in a place, which is absurd.[20]
Simplicius opposed Aristotle's concept with his own understanding of place, that place is a space (χώρα,chṓra) and a "vessel" (ὑποδοχή, hypodochḗ),
Eternity of the world
Like Aristotle, Simplicius believed that the spatial extent of the universe was finite. He defended the Aristotelian doctrine of the eternity and indestructibility of the cosmos against the position of John Philoponus, who, as a Christian, accepted creation as the temporal beginning and a future end of the world and justified his view philosophically. One of Philoponus' arguments was that if the world has no beginning in time, an infinite number of days must already have passed. But if the number of days that make up the past is infinite, the present day could never have been reached, for that would have ended a succession of infinitely many days. On the other hand, Simplicius argued that the past years, since they belonged to the past, no longer existed; it is therefore not a matter of traversing a set of infinitely many real – not just potential – existing units, which Aristotle ruled out. Within the framework of the Aristotelian system, which only allows potential infinity, Philoponus' argument is compelling from today's perspective. However, the question remains open as to whether the possibility of an infinite past is logically excluded even outside of Aristotelian understanding of infinity. This is still a matter of controversy.[24]
Cosmology
The Neoplatonists were resolute representatives of a
Following the traditional belief of the Neoplatonists, Simplicius assigned no real reality to what is bad (kakón). It is only a "deprivation", a deprivation of the good. There is no “nature of evil”. In reality, everything bad can be explained as a lack of good. Simplicius opposed the Manichaean dualism with the Platonic conviction, shared by Aristotle, that all striving is aimed at something really or supposedly good. No one willingly wants something bad as such. According to this understanding, when one strives for an apparent good and acquires an evil along with it, one arrives at something bad and harmful because one either does not recognize its badness or accepts it for the sake of the good goal. Thus, every action that leads to something bad as a result can be explained by the fact that the person doing the action wanted to achieve something good and useful, but went astray and missed what was actually intended. Wrong decisions and wickedness in a person are therefore only the result of a lack of insight, not of an evil nature in him. Even if there were something inherently bad, it would act for its own benefit, that is, for something good. This is even presupposed in the world view of the Manichaeans, as Simplicius reproached them: According to their myth, the kingdom of evil strives in the fight against good to gain some benefit from it; so, according to Simplicius, it actually wants something good, although it is said to be absolutely bad. Thus, absolute evil seeks that which is contrary to its own nature. This assumption was absurd for Simplicius.[27]
From the point of view of Simplicius, the error of the Manichaeans also goes back to a legitimate concern: They raised the bad to an independent principle so that they didn't have to trace it back to God. So they wanted to avoid attributing the cause of evil to the absolutely good deity. In doing so, however, they “fell into the fire while fleeing the smoke”; the apparent way out has become their undoing, because they have taken up a nonsensical position. According to them, good has voluntarily exposed itself to the influence of the opposing power in battle and has suffered losses in the process. This is absurd according to Simplicius' argument: if the good were to behave in this way, it would be unreasonable and incapable and therefore bad. A truly absolute good cannot enter into a fight at all; it is beyond the reach of anything bad. The Manichaean idea of a struggle between two original principles presupposes that one principle attacks the other, that is, penetrates into its area. But this is impossible with principles which are by their very nature absolutely opposed to each other, for in contact with the other one would either have to change its nature or be annihilated. Both are excluded by definition. Moreover, Simplicius accused the Manichaeans of taking away from man the realm of what fell within his competence because it relieved him of the responsibility for his ethical decisions and oaths. If an eternal, powerful principle of evil is the cause of evil, then it is also the cause of human error. A person's bad actions can then no longer be traced back to himself, because in this case he is exposed to an overpowering influence and his self-determination is revoked. [28]
Psychology
In Simplicius' or doctrine of the soul (psyche), he distinguished three types of souls:[29]
- the "first" souls whose abodes are above the lunar sphere in the realm of imperishable bodies. They never descend to earth and know no evil. Since they follow their own nature unhindered, they are exclusively focused on the imperishable good. Therefore, they cannot make wrong decisions. There are no impulses in them that relate to material and transitory things.
- the souls that come from the world of the immortal, but descend to earth and inhabit human bodies there. They occupy an intermediate position between the divine world of pure being and the animal and vegetable world of pure becoming, and have access to both realms. Through their descent, they come into contact with the bad. Losing their exclusive focus on good, they must figure out what is good for them and make decisions prone to error. This can result in them receiving a disposition contrary to their good nature. However, they are able to turn to the good through spiritual effort and thus to realize what is natural for them. Ascending to their homeland beyond the lunar sphere, they are freed from all evils.
- the souls of animals and plants that only know their earthly habitat. In their activities they are always directed towards the physical to which they are related. Since animals lack reason, they are at the mercy of their unreasonable desires. But that's not bad for them, it's natural for them. They follow the urge to preserve life; so they too have something good as their goal. Their way of experiencing evil is graded: in lower animals it is a purely bodily experience, similar to plants; in some higher animals the experience of evils approaches that of man.
The interest that Simplicius brought to the theory of the soul and the question of what was bad was – as with all Neoplatonists – practical. He was concerned with the utilization of the knowledge gained from understanding the soul for application to an ethical lifestyle. According to Simplicius' understanding, man is never helplessly at the mercy of evil; he can always choose the good that corresponds to his natural disposition. Moreover, the area in which bad actually occurs is narrowly limited. Impairments affecting the body do not count as bad in the strict sense, and the presence or absence of material goods is immaterial. Processes of material decay are just as necessary as processes of emergence and make sense within the framework of the world order. The interplay of composition and dissolution of bodies is not in itself a bad thing; if you look at it from a higher perspective and see the whole, it becomes necessary. The only really bad things are bad mental attitudes, because what matters is the immortal soul, not the mortal body. Thus genuine evil does not exist in the nature surrounding man, nor in his circumstances, but only in his soul, and there it can be eliminated through knowledge and a philosophical way of life. In addition, physical imperfections are also limited to a relatively small part of the cosmos. They only occur in the earthly realm, for it is only there that the processes of arising, changing, and passing away take place that allow physical deficiencies to occur. According to the world view of the pagan philosophers of the time, Simplicius believed that becoming and passing away only take place in the "sublunar" space – below the moon. He regarded the entire sky above the lunar sphere as a perfect region, to which everything bad was alien.[30]
Writings
His surviving works are commentaries on Aristotle's On the Heavens, Physics, and Categories, as well as a commentary upon the Enchiridion of Epictetus. There is also a commentary on Aristotle's On the Soul that has been transmitted under his name, but many scholars consider it to be stylistically inferior and lacking in the breadth of historical information usually used by Simplicius, suggesting that it was written by Priscian of Lydia,[31] However, other scholars have defended it as an authentic work of Simplicius.[32]
The On the Heavens commentary was written before that on the Physics, and probably not in Alexandria, since he mentions in it an astronomical observation made during his stay in that city by Ammonius.[33] Simplicius wrote his commentary on the Physics after the death of Damascius, and therefore after his return from Persia.[34] When it was that he wrote his explanations of the Categories, whether before or after those on the above-mentioned Aristotelian treatises, it is impossible to ascertain. Besides these commentaries of Simplicius which have been preserved, the De Anima commentary mentions explanations on the metaphysical books, and an epitome of the Physics of Theophrastus.[35]
Commentary on the Enchridion of Epictetus
The distinction between "what is up to us" (ta eph' hēmín), and everything else was the basis of Epictetus's ethical program. According to Simplicius, the goal of the Encheiridion is to make the soul so free that it will fear nothing, let nothing make it, and be overwhelmed by nothing beneath it. In this way it reaches the natural state that is intended for it within the framework of the world order. In this sense, Simiplicus stated at the beginning of his Epictetus commentary that the Enchiridion is aimed at readers who not only want to take note of the content, but are also willing to be moved by the words and who will implement the advice in their lives. For Simplicius, this goal was also the guiding principle of his own work as a commentator. He wanted to bring Epictetus's stoic guide to a philosophical life closer to his readers who were influenced by the Platonic-Aristotelian way of thinking. In doing so, he attached particular importance to offering reasons and to making the meaning and use of Epictetus's rules and admonitions understandable.[36]Epictetus demanded full concentration on one's own area of responsibility, which is essential and which must be recognized at all times. Simplicius saw his task as a commentator as helping the reader to better understand what "is up to us," and placed great emphasis on the distinction between what is within our power and responsibility and what is beyond his control. In his commentary, Simplicius was concerned with the matters about which the soul can make free decisions, which he considered the primary determinant of whether a good life is good and a bad life is bad. When the soul acts according to its own nature, it is free and able to make a self-determined and beneficial choice. The soul then decides according to a criterion that lies within itself and corresponds to its good nature. In contrast to inanimate bodies, the soul moves itself, and is therefore the cause of its own movements and activities. Therefore, in its own strength it can turn to the one and good that is its source and then act accordingly. This requires that it makes itself independent of the movements that are initiated from outside. But even opinions and activities of the soul that are stimulated or influenced from outside are not to be regarded as something alien, but as something of one's own, because it is the soul itself that has made what comes from outside its own; it is then their own movement. All of the soul's impulses come from within itself, as opposed to external influences.[37] Simplicius addressed objections that may be raised against this concept. He grappled with deterministic and fatalistic ideas according to which “what is up to us” does not exist at all because human action is determined by coincidences or necessities and not by free will.[38]
Following Epictetus's advice to pursue the goal uncompromisingly, Simplicius said that one should approach it seriously and not casually. Epictetus's view was that in practicing a reasonable, virtuous attitude, a moderate approach was not advisable for beginners. Rather, a student of philosophy should radically turn away from his previous questionable habits in order to concentrate fully on his goal. You should start with small things, but be consistent. Aristotle had already recommended that undesirable character traits should first be dealt with harshly; later, when the student has gained insight and developed his character well, he can soften the initial severity without becoming a victim of temptation. Although Simplicius agreed in principle to these considerations, he distanced himself from the demands of radical stoicism, which he considered unrealistic. He stated that no human being could completely eliminate his desires. He considered it harmful to proceed too quickly. According to his teaching, irrational strivings should not be suppressed or even destroyed. Rather, all that matters is that they submit to the rule of reason and thus take their proper place. Here Simplicius applied Plato's metaphor of the "inner child"[39] The "child" in the adult stands for the irrational that makes itself felt in the life of the soul. It is at the mercy of unreasonable impulses, strives unbridled for sensual pleasure and develops unnecessary fear due to false ideas. According to Platonic understanding, this child should not be killed, but taught and trained. Simplicius found that education (Paideia) is mainly "the improvement of the child in us by the educator in us".[40]
Legacy
His commentaries can be regarded as the richest in their contents of any that have come down to us concerning Aristotle. But for them, we should be without the most important fragments of the writings of the
In addition, we have to thank him for such copious quotations from the Greek commentaries from the time of Andronicus of Rhodes down to Ammonius and Damascius, that, for the Categories and the Physics, the outlines of a history of the interpretation and criticism of those books may be composed. With a correct idea of their importance, Simplicius made the most diligent use of the commentaries of Alexander of Aphrodisias and Porphyry; and although he often enough combats the views of the former, he knew how to value, as it deserved, his (in the main) sound critical sense. He has also preserved for us intelligence of several more ancient readings, which now, in part, have vanished from the manuscripts without leaving any trace, and in the paraphrastic sections of his interpretations furnishes us with valuable contributions for correcting or settling the text of Aristotle. Not less valuable are the contributions towards a knowledge of the ancient astronomical systems for which we have to thank him in his commentary on the books De Caelo. We even find in his writings some traces of a disposition for the observation of nature.[43]
While some sources mistakenly attribute the coining of the phrase πάντα ῥεῖ (panta rhei), meaning "everything flows/is in a state of flux", to Simplicius, the phrase is first found in this form in the philosophy of Heraclitus. Later on, it can be found in Simplicius' commentary on Aristotle's Physica 1313.11. Variations of it, was current in both Plato and Aristotle's writings.
Simplicius was presented as an
Middle Ages
Arabic speaking countries
In Arabic-speaking countries, Simplikios was known as Sinbilīqiyūs. At least the commentaries on the Categories and on the first book of the Elements of Euclid have been translated into Arabic; in 987 the scholar
Western and Central Europe
In the 12th century
The Latin-speaking
Byzantine Empire
The Byzantine princess Theodora Rhaulaina, a niece of Emperor
Modern
For
Simplicius' own philosophical achievement received less attention; the disdain that was widespread in the 19th and early 20th centuries for late antique Neoplatonism, which was then notorious for being too speculative, stood in the way of an unbiased assessment.[58] Eduard Zeller[59] (1903) found the commentaries to be "the work of great diligence and comprehensive erudition" and offer a "careful and mostly reasonable explanation" of the texts interpreted. However, Zeller considered Simplicius' denial of considerable contradictions between Aristotle and Plato to be completely wrong, characterizing as someone a thinker who hardly made an original philosophical achievement, but was only "the thinking editor of a given teaching that has come to its conclusion in all essential respects". Karl Praechter (1927) judged that the commentary tradition exemplified by Simplicius was one of the most attractive phenomena of late antiquity due to its “mutual complementation and tempering of Platonic and Aristotelian ways of thinking”, stressing Simplicius' "love of solid scholarship both in the philosophical and philological-literary areas as well as in the exact sciences".[60]
In the second half of the 20th century, however, research into his teachings intensified. Since then, his comprehensive synthesis of Aristotelian and Neoplatonic ideas has been recognized as an important achievement.[61][62][63]
Notes
- ^ Agathias, ii. 30; Suda, Presbeis; it is inaccurately that the Suda (Damascius) calls him a countryman of Eulamius the Phrygian.
- ^ a b Baltussen 2013, p. 12-14.
- ^ Simplicius, in Phys. Ausc. f. 42, 43, etc.
- ^ Simplicius, in Phys. Ausc. f. 150, a. b., 183, b., 186, etc.
- ^ Cod. Theod. 16. tit. 10.
- ^ Simplicius, in Arist. Phys. Ausc. f. 173.
- ^ see especially Simplicius in ll. de Caelo, f. 113.
- ISBN 978-0-8014-8987-7.
- ^ 529 AD; Malalas, xviii.; comp. Theophanes, i. 276.
- ^ Damascius ap. Photius.
- ^ Procopius, Arcan. c. 26.
- ^ Agathias, ii. 30.
- ^ Simplicius, On Aristotle's Physics p. 773
- ^ Han Baltussen: Simplicius of Cilicia. In: Lloyd P. Gerson (Hrsg.): The Cambridge History of Philosophy in Late Antiquity. Band 2, Cambridge 2010, p 715–717, 720, 725; Constance Blackwell: Neo-Platonic modes of concordism versus definitions of difference. In: Stephen Clucas: Laus Platonici Philosophi. Leiden 2011, p. 322–324; Heinrich Dörrie, Matthias Baltes: Der Platonismus in der Antike. Band 3, Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt 1993, S. 248–250; Rachel Barney: Simplicius: Commentary, Harmony, and Authority. In: Antiquorum Philosophia 3, 2009, p. 101–119.
- ^ Simplicius, in Arist. de Caelo, 6, b, etc., 72; in Phys. Ausc. 257, 262, etc., 312, etc., 320.
- ^ Frans A. J. de Haas: Mathematik und Phänomene. Eine Polemik über naturwissenschaftliche Methode bei Simplikios. In: Antike Naturwissenschaft und ihre Rezeption 10, 2000, S. 107–129.
- ^ Alan C. Bowen: Simplicius on the Planets and Their Motions. Leiden 2013, pp. 14, 27–38.
- ^ Alan C. Bowen: Simplicius on the Planets and Their Motions. Leiden 2013, pp. 38–52.
- ^ Simplicius, Physics 601,26–603,22.
- ^ Simplicius, Physics 604,12–605,5.
- ^ Simplicius, Physics 608,4–5.
- ^ Simplicius, Physics 623,1–19.
- ^ On this doctrine see Gerard Verbeke: Place and space according to Aristotle and Simplicios. A philosophical topology. In: Johannes Irmscher, Reimar Müller (ed.): Aristotle as a philosopher of science. Berlin 1983, pp. 113–122, here: 118–122; Richard Sorabji: Introduction. In: James O. Urmson (translator): Simplicius: Corollaries on Place and Time. London 1992, pp. 1–10, here 1–5.
- ^ Richard Sorabji: Infinity and the Creation. In: Richard Sorabji (ed.): Philoponus and the Rejection of Aristotelian Science. London 1987, pp. 164–178; Alan C. Bowen: Simplicius on the Planets and Their Motions. Leiden 2013, pp. 11–14; Philippe Hoffmann: Simplicius' Polemics. In: Richard Sorabji (ed.): Philoponus and the Rejection of Aristotelian Science. London 1987, pp. 57–83.
- ^ Simplicios, In enchiridion 35:90–91.
- ^ Ilsetraut Hadot (ed.): Simplicius: Commentaire sur le Manuel d'Épictète. Leiden 1996, p . 140.
- ^ Christian Vogel: Stoic Ethics and Platonic Education. Heidelberg 2013, pp. 269–272.
- ^ Heidelberg 2013, p. 267 f.; Ilsetraut Hadot (ed.): "Simplicius: Commentaire sur le Manuel d'Épictète." Leiden 1996, pp. 118–128, 140–144; Ilsetraut Hadot: The Refutation of Manichaeism in Simplicius' Commentary on the Epictetus. In: Archive for the History of Philosophy 51, 1969, pp. 31–57, here: 35–45, 54–56.
- ^ See Christian Vogel for this classification: Stoic Ethics and Platonic Education. Heidelberg 2013, pp. 107–111, 273 f.; Ilsetraut Hadot (ed.): Simplicius: Commentaire sur le Manuel d'Épictète. Leiden 1996, pp. 84–86, 91 f.
- ^ Christian Vogel: Stoic Ethics and Platonic Education. Heidelberg 2013, p. 177 f., 185–190 , 216 f., 272 f.; Ian Mueller (translator): Simplicius: On Aristotle, On the Heavens 1.3–4. London 2011, pp. 2, 7; Ilsetraut Hadot (ed.): Simplicius: Commentaire sur le Manuel d'Épictète. Leiden 1996, p. 91.
- ^ Steel C., in Priscian, On Theophrastus on Sense-Perception and Simplicius' On Aristotle's On the Soul 2.5–12., Cornell University Press, 1997. See Bryn Mawr Classical Review 1999.10.18
- .
- ^ Simplicius, de Caelo, f. 113.
- ^ Simplicius, in Arist. Phys. Ausc. f. 184, etc.
- ^ Simplicius, in Arist. de Anima, 38.
- ^ Christian Vogel: Stoische Ethik und platonische Bildung. Heidelberg 2013, p 81–89, 360–365.
- ^ Christian Vogel: Stoische Ethik und platonische Bildung. Heidelberg 2013, p. 96–124.
- ^ Christian Vogel: Stoische Ethik und platonische Bildung. Heidelberg 2013, p. 111–120.
- ^ Plato, Phaedo 77e.
- ^ Simplicius, In enchiridion Epictetus 249,70 f. Christian Vogel: Stoische Ethik und platonische Bildung. Heidelberg 2013, pp. 124–129, 137–141, 161–164, 200–202.
- ^ Simplicius, in Phys. Ausc. f. 31.
- ^ Simplicius, in Arist. de Caelo, 79, b.
- ^ Simplicius, Comm. in Phys. Ausc. 173, 176; de Anima, 35, b. 36.
- ^ a b Baltussen 2013, p. 3.
- ^ Helmut Gätje: Simplikios in the Arabic tradition. In: Islam. Journal of History and Culture of the Islamic Orient 59, 1982, pp. 6–31.
- ^ Michael Chase: The Medieval Posterity of Simplicius' Commentary on the Categories: Thomas Aquinas and al-Fārābī. In: Lloyd A. Newton: Medieval Commentaries on Aristotle's Categories. Leiden 2008, pp. 9–29, here: 11 f., 17–19.
- ^ Michael Chase: Simplicius' response to Philoponus' attacks on Aristotle's Physics 8.1. In: István Bodnár and others. (Translator): Simplicius: On Aristotle, Physics 8.1–5. London 2014, pp. 1–16, here: 10–12.
- ^ Critical edition of the Latin text of Gerhard's translation: Paul M. J. E. Tummers (ed.): The Latin translation of Anaritius' Commentary on Euclid's Elements of Geometry Books I-IV. Nijmegen 1994 (Book I: pp. 1–72).
- ^ For Albert's commentary, the authenticity of which has been disputed, see Anthony Lo Bello : The Commentary of Albertus Magnus on Book I of Euclid's Elements of Geometry. Boston/Leiden 2003, pp. XIV-XXIII.
- ^ Fernand Bossier: Traductions latines et influences du commentaire In De caelo en Occident (XIIIe–XIVe s.). In: Ilsetraut Hadot (ed.): Simplicius. Sa vie, son œuvre, sa survie." Berlin 1987, pp. 289–325, here: 289–293
- ^ Michael Chase: The Medieval Posterity of Simplicius' Commentary on the Categories: Thomas Aquinas and al-Fārābī. In: Lloyd A. Newton: Medieval Commentaries on Aristotle's Categories. Leiden 2008, pp. 9–29, here: 11, 13–17; Adriaan Pattin (ed.): Simplicius: Commentaire sur les Catégories d'Aristote. Traduction de Guillaume de Moerbeke. Volume 1, Louvain 1971, pp. XVIII-XXIII.
- ^ Fernand Bossier: Traductions latines et influences du commentaire In De caelo en Occident (XIIIe –XIVe s.). In: Ilsetraut Hadot (ed.): Simplicius. Sa vie, son œuvre, sa survie." Berlin 1987, pp. 289–325, here: 308–320
- ^ Adriaan Pattin (ed.): Simplicius: Commentaire sur les Catégories d'Aristote. Traduction de Guillaume de Moerbeke. Volume 1, Louvain 1971, p. XXI.
- ^ Dieter Harlfinger: Some aspects of the handwritten tradition of the physics commentary of Simplicius. In: Ilsetraut Hadot (ed.): Simplicius. Sa vie, son œuvre, sa survie. Berlin 1987, pp. 267–286, here: 267 f.
- ^ François Masai: Pléthon et le platonisme de Mistra. Paris 1956, p. 183 f.
- ^ Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel: Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie I (= Werke. Band 18). Frankfurt 1986, p 191.
- ^ Ulrich von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff u. a.: Die griechische und lateinische Literatur und Sprache. 3., verbesserte Auflage, Leipzig/Berlin 1912,p 283.
- ^ Han Baltussen: Simplicius of Cilicia. In: Lloyd P. Gerson (Hrsg.): The Cambridge History of Philosophy in Late Antiquity. Band 2, Cambridge 2010, S. 711–732, hier: 714, 731 f.
- ^ Eduard Zeller: Die Philosophie der Griechen in ihrer geschichtlichen Entwicklung. p 910–914.
- Paulys Realencyclopädie der classischen Altertumswissenschaft. Band 3 A/1, Stuttgart 1927, Sp. 204–213, hier: 205, 212.
- ^ Richard Sorabji: Simplicius: Prime matter as extension. In: Ilsetraut Hadot (Hrsg.): Simplicius. Sa vie, son œuvre, sa survie. Berlin 1987, S. 148–165, hier: 153–155.
- ^ Albrecht Dihle: Die griechische und lateinische Literatur der Kaiserzeit. München 1989, S. 503.
- ^ Jens Halfwassen: Plotin und der Neuplatonismus. München 2004, S. 163.
Bibliography
Works in English translation
On Aristotle's Categories
- Simplicius: On Aristotle, Categories 1–4, translated by Michael Chase (2003). Cornell University Press: ISBN 0-7156-3197-7
- Simplicius: On Aristotle, Categories 5–6, translated by Frans A.J. de Haas and Barrie Fleet (2001). Cornell University Press: ISBN 0-7156-3037-7
- Simplicius: On Aristotle, Categories 7–8, translated by Barrie Fleet (2002). Cornell University Press: ISBN 0-7156-3038-5
- Simplicius: On Aristotle, Categories 9–15, translated by ISBN 0-7156-2900-X
On Aristotle's On the Heavens
- Simplicius: On Aristotle, On the Heavens 1.1–4, translated by Robert J. Hankinson (2001). Cornell University Press: ISBN 0-7156-3070-9
- Simplicius: On Aristotle, On the Heavens 1.3–4, translated by Ian Mueller (2011). Duckworth, London: ISBN 0-7156-4063-1
- Simplicius: On Aristotle, On the Heavens 1.5–9, translated by Robert J. Hankinson (2004). Cornell University Press: ISBN 0-7156-3231-0
- Simplicius: On Aristotle, On the Heavens 1.10–12, translated by Robert J. Hankinson (2006). Cornell University Press: ISBN 0-7156-3232-9
- Simplicius: On Aristotle, On the Heavens 2.1–9, translated by Ian Mueller (2004). Cornell University Press: ISBN 0-7156-3200-0
- Simplicius: On Aristotle, On the Heavens 2.10–14, translated by Ian Mueller (2005). Cornell University Press: ISBN 0-7156-3342-2
- Simplicius: On Aristotle, On the Heavens 3.1–7, translated by Ian Mueller (2009). Duckworth, London: ISBN 0-7156-3843-2
- Simplicius: On Aristotle, On the Heavens 3.7–4.6, translated by Ian Mueller (2009). Duckworth, London: ISBN 0-7156-3844-0
On Aristotle's Physics
- Simplicius: On Aristotle, Physics 1.1–2, translated by Stephen Menn (2022). Bloomsbury, New York: ISBN 9781350285682
- Simplicius: On Aristotle, Physics 1.3–4, translated by Pamela M. Huby and C. C. W. Taylor (2011). Duckworth, London: ISBN 0-7156-3921-8
- Simplicius: On Aristotle, Physics 1.5–9, translated by Han Baltussen (2011). Duckworth, London: ISBN 0-7156-3857-2
- Simplicius: On Aristotle, Physics 2, translated by Barrie Fleet (1997). Cornell University Press: ISBN 0-7156-2732-5
- Simplicius: On Aristotle, Physics 3, translated by James O. Urmson (2002). Cornell University Press: ISBN 0-7156-3067-9
- Simplicius: On Aristotle, Physics 4.1–5, 10–14, translated by James O. Urmson (1992). Cornell University Press: ISBN 0-7156-2434-2
- Simplicius: On Aristotle, Physics 5, translated by James O. Urmson (1997). Cornell University Press: ISBN 0-7156-2765-1
- Simplicius: On Aristotle, Physics 6, translated by David Konstan (1989). Cornell University Press: ISBN 0-7156-2217-X
- Simplicius: On Aristotle, Physics 7, translated by Charles Hagen (1994). Cornell University Press: ISBN 0-7156-2485-7
- Simplicius: On Aristotle, Physics 8.1–5, translated by I. Bodmar, M. Chase, M. Share (2012). Bloomsbury, New York: ISBN 9781472539175
- Simplicius: On Aristotle, Physics 8.6–10, translated by Richard McKirahan (2001). Cornell University Press: ISBN 0-7156-3039-3
On Aristotle's On the Soul
- Simplicius: On Aristotle, On the Soul 1.1–2.4, translated by James O. Urmson (1995). Cornell University Press: ISBN 0-7156-2614-0
- Priscian: On Theophrastus on Sense-Perception, with "Simplicius": On Aristotle, On the Soul 2.5–12, translated by Carlos Steel (1997). Cornell University Press: ISBN 0-7156-2752-X
- "Simplicius": On Aristotle, On the Soul 3.1–5, translated by Henry J. Blumenthal (2000). Cornell University Press: ISBN 0-7156-2896-8
On Epictetus's Handbook
- Simplicius: On Epictetus, Handbook 1–26, translated by ISBN 0-7156-3068-7
- Simplicius: On Epictetus, Handbook 27–53, translated by Tad Brennan and Charles Brittain (2002). Cornell University Press: ISBN 0-7156-3069-5
Other works
- Simplicius: Corollaries on Place and Time, translated by James O. Urmson (1992). Cornell University Press: ISBN 0-7156-2252-8
- Philoponus: Corollaries on Place and Void, with Simplicius: Against Philoponus On the Eternity of the World, translated by David Furley and Christian Wildberg (1991). Cornell University Press: ISBN 0-7156-2250-1
- Philoponus: On Aristotle, Physics 5–8, with Simplicius: On Aristotle on the Void, translated by Paul Lettinck and J. O. Urmson (1994). Cornell University Press: ISBN 0-7156-2493-8
Secondary sources
- This article incorporates text from a publication now in the public domain: Smith, William, ed. (1870). "Simplicius". Dictionary of Greek and Roman Biography and Mythology.
- ISBN 0-415-05079-0.
- Baltussen, Han (12 December 2013). Philosophy and Exegesis in Simplicius: The Methodology of a Commentator. A&C Black. ISBN 978-1-4725-2145-3.
- Ilsetraut Hadot (ed.), Simplicius, sa vie, son œuvre, sa survie. Actes du Colloque international de Paris (28 septembre - 1 octobre 1985) / organised by the Centre de recherche sur les œuvres et la pensée de Simplicius (RCP 739-CNRS), Berlin & New York, Walter de Gruyter, 1987, X-406 p. ISBN 3-11-010924-7
- Ilsetraut Hadot: The life and work of Simplicius in Greek and Arabic sources. In: Richard Sorabji (Ed.): Aristotle Transformed. Duckworth, London 1990, pp. 275–303. ISBN 0-7156-2254-4
- Helmig, Christoph. "Simplicius". In Zalta, Edward N. (ed.). Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
- Falcon, Andrea. "Commentators on Aristotle". In Zalta, Edward N. (ed.). Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
External links
- Simplicius, Commentary on the Enchiridion of Epictetus, translated by George Stanhope, 1722
- Extract from Taylor's translation of Aristotle's Physics with Simplicius' Commentary
- Greek text of Simplicius' Commentary on the Enchiridion of Epictetus (Simplicii Commentarius in Enchiridion Epicteti) on archive.org.