Social choice theory
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Social choice theory or social choice is a branch of economics that analyzes mechanisms and procedures for collective decisions.[1] Social choice incorporates insights from welfare economics, mathematics, and political science to find the best ways to combine individual opinions, preferences, or beliefs into a single coherent measure of well-being.
Whereas decision theory is concerned with individuals making choices based on their preferences, social choice theory is concerned with how to translate the preferences of individuals into the preferences of a group. A non-theoretical example of a collective decision is enacting a law or set of laws under a constitution. Another example is voting, where individual preferences over candidates are collected to elect a person that best represents the group's preferences.[2]
It is
History
The earliest work on social choice theory comes from the writings of the Marquis de Condorcet, who formulated several key results including his jury theorem and his example showing the impossibility of majority rule. His work was prefigured by Ramon Llull's 1299 manuscript Ars Electionis (The Art of Elections), which discussed many of the same concepts, but was lost until being rediscovered in the early 21st century.[4]
Key results
Arrow's impossibility theorem
Arrow's impossibility theorem is a key result showing that
Condorcet cycles
Condorcet's example demonstrates that democracy cannot be thought of as being the same as simple majority rule or majoritarianism; otherwise, it will be self-contradictory when 3 or more options are available. Majority rule can create cycles that violate the transitive property: Attempting to use majority rule as a social choice function creates situations where we have A better than B and B better than C, but C is still better than A.
This contrasts with May's theorem, which shows that simple majority is the optimal voting mechanism when there are only 2 outcomes, and only ordinal preferences are allowed.
Harsanyi's theorem
Harsanyi's utilitarian theorem shows that if individuals have preferences that are
Manipulation theorems
Gibbard's theorem provides limitations on the ability of any voting rule to elicit honest , showing that no voting rule is strategyproof (i.e. does not depend on other voters' choices) for elections with 3 or more outcomes.
The Gibbard–Satterthwaite theorem proves a stronger result for ranked-choice voting systems, showing that no such voting rule can be sincere (i.e. free of reversed preferences).
Median voter theorem
Mechanism design
The field of mechanism design, a subset of social choice theory, deals with the identification of rules that preserve while incentivizing agents to honestly reveal their preferences. One particularly important result is the revelation principle, which is almost a reversal of Gibbard's theorem: for any given social choice function, there exists a mechanism that obtains the same results but incentivizes participants to be completely honest.
Because mechanism design drops some of the assumptions made by voting theory, it is possible to design mechanisms for social choice to accomplish "impossible" tasks. For example, by allowing agents to compensate each other for losses with transfers, the Vickrey–Clarke–Groves (VCG) mechanism can achieve the "impossible" according to Gibbard's theorem: the mechanism ensures honest behavior from participants, while still achieving a Pareto efficient outcome. As a result, the VCG mechanism can be considered a "better" way to make decisions than democratic voting when monetary transfers are available.
Others
The Campbell-Kelley theorem states that, if there exists a Condorcet winner, then selecting that winner is the unique resolvable, neutral, anonymous, and non-manipulable voting rule.[2][further explanation needed]
Interpersonal utility comparison
Social choice theory is the study of theoretical and practical methods to aggregate or combine individual preferences into a collective social welfare function. The field generally assumes that individuals have
In one perspective, following Jeremy Bentham, utilitarians have argued that preferences and utility functions of individuals are interpersonally comparable and may therefore be added together to arrive at a measure of aggregate utility. Utilitarian ethics call for maximizing this aggregate.
In contrast many twentieth century economists, following
Apologists of the interpersonal comparison of utility have argued that Robbins claimed too much. John Harsanyi agrees that full comparability of mental states such as utility is not practically possible, but believes human beings can make some interpersonal comparisons of utility because they have similar backgrounds, cultural experiences, and psychology. Amartya Sen (1970, p. 99) argues that even if interpersonal comparisons of utility are imperfect, we can still say that (despite being positive for Nero) the Great Fire of Rome had a negative overall value.[citation needed] Harsanyi and Sen thus argue that at least partial comparability of utility is possible, and social choice theory proceeds under that assumption.
Relationship to public choice theory
Despite the similar names, "public choice" and "social choice" are two distinct fields, though the two are closely related.The Journal of Economic Literature classification codes place Social Choice under Microeconomics at JEL D71 (with Clubs, Committees, and Associations) whereas most Public Choice subcategories are in JEL D72 (Economic Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior).
Empirical research
Since Arrow, social choice theory has been characterized by being predominantly
Rules
Let be a set of possible 'states of the world' or 'alternatives'. Society wishes to choose a single state from . For example, in a
Let be a finite set, representing a collection of individuals. For each , let be a utility function, describing the amount of happiness an individual i derives from each possible state.
A social choice rule is a mechanism which uses the data to select some element(s) from which are 'best' for society. The question of what 'best' means is a common question in social choice theory. The following rules are most common:
- Benthamite welfare– aims to maximize the sum of utilities.
- Rawlsian welfare– aims to maximize the smallest utility.
Functions
A social choice function or a voting rule takes an individual's complete and transitive preferences over a set of outcomes and returns a single chosen outcome (or a set of tied outcomes). We can think of this subset as the winners of an election, and compare different social choice functions based on which axioms or mathematical properties they fulfill.[2]
See also
Notes
- ^ a b c Amartya Sen (2008). "Social Choice,". The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, 2nd Edition, Abstract & TOC.
- ^ ISBN 978-1-107-44698-4, retrieved 2021-12-24
- ^ For example, in Kenneth J. Arrow (1951). Social Choice and Individual Values, New York: Wiley, ch. II, section 2, A Notation for Preferences and Choice, and ch. III, "The Social Welfare Function".
- ISSN 1432-217X.
- ^ Walter Bossert and John A. Weymark (2008). "Social Choice (New Developments)," The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, 2nd Edition, Abstract & TOC.
- ISBN 9780444508942.
- ISBN 9780444829146.
- ^ Amartya Sen ([1987] 2008). "Justice," The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, 2nd Edition. Abstract & TOC.
Bertil Tungodden (2008). "Justice (New Perspectives)," The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, 2nd Edition. Abstract.
Louis Kaplow (2008). "Pareto Principle and Competing Principles," The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, 2nd Edition. Abstract.
Amartya K. Sen (1979 [1984]). Collective Choice and Social Welfare, New York: Elsevier, (description):
ch. 9, "Equity and Justice," pp. 131-51.
ch. 9*, "Impersonality and Collective Quasi-Orderings," pp. 152-160.
Kenneth J. Arrow (1983). Collected Papers, v. 1, Social Choice and Justice, Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, Description, contents, and chapter-preview links.
Charles Blackorby, Walter Bossert, and David Donaldson, 2002. "Utilitarianism and the Theory of Justice", in Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, edited by Kenneth J. Arrow, Amartya K. Sen, and Kotaro Suzumura, v. 1, ch. 11, pp. 543–596. Abstract. - ISBN 9780444829146.
- ^ Lionel Robbins (1932, 1935, 2nd ed.). An Essay on the Nature and Significance of Economic Science, London: Macmillan. Links for 1932 HTML and 1935 facsimile.
- S2CID 148982833.
- ^ S2CID 154862595.
- S2CID 152300013.
- JSTOR 1907651.
References
- ISBN 0-300-01364-7
- _____, (1972). "General Economic Equilibrium: Purpose, Analytic Techniques, Collective Choice", Nobel Prize Lecture, Link to text, with Section 8 on the theory and background.
- _____, (1983). Collected Papers, v. 1, Social Choice and Justice, Oxford: Blackwell ISBN 0-674-13760-4
- Arrow, Kenneth J., Amartya K. Sen, and Kotaro Suzumura, eds. (1997). Social Choice Re-Examined, 2 vol., London: Palgrave Macmillan ISBN 0-312-12741-3
- _____, eds. (2002). Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, v. 1. Chapter-preview links.
- _____, ed. (2011). Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, v. 2, Amsterdam: Elsevier. Chapter-preview links.
- Bossert, Walter and John A. Weymark (2008). "Social Choice (New Developments)," The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, 2nd Edition, London: Palgrave Macmillan Abstract.
- Dryzek, John S. and Christian List (2003). "Social Choice Theory and Deliberative Democracy: A Reconciliation," British Journal of Political Science, 33(1), pp. 1–28, https://www.jstor.org/discover/10.2307/4092266?uid=3739936&uid=2&uid=4&uid=3739256&sid=21102056001967, 2002 PDF link.
- Feldman, Allan M. and Roberto Serrano (2006). Welfare Economics and Social Choice Theory, 2nd ed., New York: Springer
- Fleurbaey, Marc (1996). Théories économiques de la justice, Paris: Economica.
- ISBN 978-0-19-929751-1.
- New Palgrave: A Dictionary of Economics, v. 2, London: Palgrave, pp. 955–58.
- ISBN 978-0-521-42458-5.
- .
- ISBN 978-0-521-72213-1.
- Robbins, Lionel (1935). An Essay on the Nature and Significance of Economic Science, 2nd ed., London: Macmillan, ch. VI
- ____, (1938). "Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility: A Comment," Economic Journal, 43(4), 635–41.
- _____, (1998). "The Possibility of Social Choice", Nobel Prize Lecture [1].
- _____, (1987). "Social Choice," The New Palgrave: A Dictionary of Economics, v. 4, London: Palgrave, pp. 382–93.
- _____, (2008). "Social Choice,". The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, 2nd Edition, London: Palgrave Abstract.
- Shoham, Yoav; Leyton-Brown, Kevin (2009). Multiagent Systems: Algorithmic, Game-Theoretic, and Logical Foundations. New York: ISBN 978-0-521-89943-7.. A comprehensive reference from a computational perspective; see Chapter 9. Downloadable free online.
- ISBN 0-521-23862-5
- ISBN 978-0-521-00883-9.
External links
- List, Christian. "Social Choice Theory". In Zalta, Edward N. (ed.). Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
- Social Choice Bibliography by J. S. Kelly Archived 2017-12-23 at the Wayback Machine
- Electowiki, a wiki covering many subjects of social choice and voting theory