Solipsism
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Solipsism (
Varieties
There are varying degrees of solipsism that parallel the varying degrees of skepticism:
Metaphysical
Epistemological
Epistemological solipsism is the variety of idealism according to which only the directly accessible mental contents of the solipsistic philosopher can be known. The existence of an external world is regarded as an unresolvable question rather than actually false.[2] Further, one cannot also be certain as to what extent the external world exists independently of one's mind. For instance, it may be that a God-like being controls the sensations received by the mind, making it appear as if there is an external world when most of it (excluding the God-like being and oneself) is false. However, the point remains that epistemological solipsists consider this an "unresolvable" question.[2]
Methodological
Methodological solipsism is an agnostic variant of solipsism. It exists in opposition to the strict epistemological requirements for "knowledge" (e.g. the requirement that knowledge must be certain). It still entertains the points that any induction is fallible. Methodological solipsism sometimes goes even further to say that even what we perceive as the brain is actually part of the external world, for it is only through our senses that we can see or feel the mind. Only the existence of thoughts is known for certain.
Methodological solipsists do not intend to conclude that the stronger forms of solipsism are actually true. They simply emphasize that justifications of an external world must be founded on indisputable facts about their own consciousness. The methodological solipsist believes that subjective impressions (
Main points
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Mere denial of material existence, in itself, does not necessarily constitute solipsism.
Philosophers generally try to build knowledge on more than an inference or analogy. Well-known frameworks such as
The theory of solipsism also merits close examination because it relates to three widely held philosophical presuppositions, each itself fundamental and wide-ranging in importance:[4]
- One's most certain knowledge is the content of one's own mind—my thoughts, experiences, affects, etc.
- There is no conceptual or logically necessary link between mental and physical—between, for example, the occurrence of certain conscious experience or mental states and the "possession" and behavioral dispositions of a "body" of a particular kind.
- The experience of a given person is necessarily private to that person.
To expand on the second point, the conceptual problem is that the previous assumes mind or consciousness (which are attributes) can exist independent of some entity having this attribute (a capability in this case), i.e., that an attribute of an existent can exist apart from the existent itself. If one admits to the existence of an independent entity (e.g., the brain) having that attribute, the door is open to an independent reality. (See Brain in a vat)
Some philosophers hold that, while it cannot be proven that anything independent of one's mind exists, the point that solipsism makes is irrelevant. This is because, whether the world as we perceive it exists independently or not, we cannot escape this perception, hence it is best to act assuming that the world is independent of our minds. (See Falsifiability and testability below)[5]
History
Origins of solipsist thought are found in Greece and later Enlightenment thinkers such as
Gorgias
Solipsism was first recorded by the Greek
- Nothing exists.
- Even if something exists, nothing can be known about it.
- Even if something could be known about it, knowledge about it cannot be communicated to others.
Much of the point of the sophists was to show that objective knowledge was a literal impossibility.
Descartes
The foundations of solipsism are in turn the foundations of the view that the individual's understanding of any and all psychological concepts (
Berkeley
Relation to other ideas
Idealism and materialism
One of the most fundamental debates in philosophy concerns the "true" nature of the world—whether it is some ethereal plane of ideas or a reality of atomic particles and energy.
For materialists, ideas have no primary reality as essences separate from our physical existence. From a materialist perspective, ideas are social (rather than purely biological), and formed and transmitted and modified through the interactions between social organisms and their social and physical environments. This materialist perspective informs scientific methodology, insofar as that
Modern
Cartesian dualism
There is another option: the belief that both ideals and "reality" exist.
Philosophy of Schopenhauer
The World as Will and Representation is the central work of Arthur Schopenhauer. Schopenhauer saw the human will as our one window to the world behind the representation, the Kantian thing-in-itself. He believed, therefore, that we could gain knowledge about the thing-in-itself, something Kant said was impossible, since the rest of the relationship between representation and thing-in-itself could be understood by analogy as the relationship between human will and human body.
Idealism
The idealist philosopher George Berkeley argued that physical objects do not exist independently of the mind that perceives them. An item truly exists only as long as it is observed; otherwise, it is not only meaningless but simply nonexistent. Berkeley does attempt to show things can and do exist apart from the human mind and our perception, but only because there is an all-encompassing Mind in which all "ideas" are perceived – in other words, God, who observes all. Solipsism agrees that nothing exists outside of perception, but would argue that Berkeley falls prey to the egocentric predicament – he can only make his own observations, and thus cannot be truly sure that this God or other people exist to observe "reality". The solipsist would say it is better to disregard the unreliable observations of alleged other people and rely upon the immediate certainty of one's own perceptions.[18]
Rationalism
Philosophical zombie
The theory of solipsism crosses over with the theory of the philosophical zombie in that other seemingly conscious beings may actually lack true consciousness, instead they only display traits of consciousness to the observer, who may be the only conscious being there is.
Falsifiability and testability
Solipsism is not a
The method of the typical scientist is naturalist: they first assume that the external world exists and can be known. But the scientific method, in the sense of a predict-observe-modify loop, does not require the assumption of an external world. A solipsist may perform a psychological test on themselves, to discern the nature of the reality in their mind – however Deutsch uses this fact to counter-argue: "outer parts" of solipsist, behave independently so they are independent for "narrowly" defined (conscious) self.[20] A solipsist's investigations may not be proper science, however, since it would not include the co-operative and communitarian aspects of scientific inquiry that normally serve to diminish bias.
Minimalism
Solipsism is a form of
However, minimality (or parsimony) is not the only logical virtue. A common misapprehension of
In infants
Some developmental psychologists believe that infants are solipsistic, and that eventually children infer that others have experiences much like theirs and reject solipsism.[21]
Hinduism
The earliest reference to solipsism is found in the ideas in
Advaita Vedanta
One who sees everything as nothing but the Self, and the Self in everything one sees, such a seer withdraws from nothing. For the enlightened, all that exists is nothing but the Self, so how could any suffering or delusion continue for those who know this oneness?
—Ishopanishad: sloka 6, 7
The concept of the
It is mentioned in Yoga Vasistha that “…..according to them (we can safely assume that them are present Solipsists) this world is mental in nature. There is no reality other than the ideas of one’s own mind. This view is incorrect, because the world cannot be the content of an individual’s mind. If it were so, an individual would have created and destroyed the world according to his whims. This theory is called atma khyati – the pervasion of the little self (intellect). [25]Yoga Vasistha - Nirvana Prakarana - Uttarardha (Volume - 6) Page 107 by Swami Jyotirmayananda
Samkhya and Yoga
Buddhism
Some interpretations of Buddhism assert that external reality is an illusion, and sometimes this position is [mis]understood as metaphysical solipsism. Buddhist philosophy, though, generally holds that the mind and external phenomena are both equally transient, and that they arise from each other. The mind cannot exist without external phenomena, nor can external phenomena exist without the mind. This relation is known as "dependent arising" (pratityasamutpada).
The Buddha stated, "Within this fathom long body is the world, the origin of the world, the cessation of the world and the path leading to the cessation of the world".[28] Whilst not rejecting the occurrence of external phenomena, the Buddha focused on the illusion created within the mind of the perceiver by the process of ascribing permanence to impermanent phenomena, satisfaction to unsatisfying experiences, and a sense of reality to things that were effectively insubstantial.
Mahayana Buddhism also challenges the illusion of the idea that one can experience an 'objective' reality independent of individual perceiving minds.
From the standpoint of
The
In addition to this, the Bardo Thodol, Tibet's famous book of the dead, repeatedly states that all of reality is a figment of one's perception, although this occurs within the "Bardo" realm (post-mortem). For instance, within the sixth part of the section titled "The Root Verses of the Six Bardos", there appears the following line: "May I recognize whatever appeareth as being mine own thought-forms";[31] there are many lines in similar ideal.
Criticism
Solipsism as radical subjective idealism has often been criticized by famous philosophers ("solipsism can only succeed in a madhouse" — A. Schopenhauer, "solipsism is madness" — M. Gardner.)
Bertrand Russell wrote that it was "psychologically impossible" to believe, "I once received a letter from an eminent logician, Mrs. Christine Ladd-Franklin, saying that she was a solipsist, and was surprised that there were no others. Coming from a logician and a solipsist, her surprise surprised me".[32] He also argues that the logic of solipsism compels you to believe in 'solipsism of the moment' where only the presently existing moment can be said to exist.[33]
John Stuart Mill wrote that one can know of others' minds because "First, they have bodies like me, which I know in my own case, to be the antecedent condition of feelings; and because, secondly, they exhibit the acts, and outward signs, which in my own case I know by experience to be caused by feelings".[34]
See also
- Anathema
- Antiscience
- Aseity
- Alfred Binet – The mind and the brain
- Boltzmann brain
- Cartesian doubt
- Centered world
- Cognitive closure (philosophy)
- Consensus reality
- Cotard delusion– the opposite
- Dream argument
- Eliminative materialism – the idea that even aspects of one's mind may not be sure to exist
- Ethical solipsism
- Existential nihilism
- Externism
- Heinlein's World as Myth
- Henry Rollins's Solipsist
- Immaterialism
- LaVeyan Satanism
- Metaphysical nihilism
- Mind over matter
- Model-dependent realism
- Object permanence
- Objective idealism
- Open individualism
- Panpsychism
- Personal horizon
- Phaneron
- Phenomenalism
- Philosophical realism
- Postmodernism
- Post-structuralism
- Primary/secondary quality distinction– John Locke's response to solipsism
- Problem of other minds
- Protagoras of Abdera
- Qualia
- Solipsism syndrome
- Standpoint theory
- Stream of consciousness
- Subjectivity
- The Egg
- The Truman Show delusion
- Vertiginous question
References
- ^ "solipsism". Online Etymology Dictionary.
- ^ a b "Philosophical Dictionary:Solipsism". Archived from the original on 3 January 2017. Retrieved 8 April 2017.
- ^ Wood, Ledger (1962). Dictionary of Philosophy. Totowa, NJ: Littlefield, Adams, and Company. p. 295.
- ^ a b Thornton, Stephen P. (24 October 2004). "Solipsism and the Problem of Other Minds". Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
- TheGuardian.com. Archived from the originalon 5 June 2016. Retrieved 8 April 2017.
- ISBN 978-0-19-881721-5. Retrieved 19 January 2023.
- ISBN 978-1-107-09338-6. Retrieved 19 January 2023.
- ISBN 978-0-415-18709-1.
- LCCN 2008053026.
- ^ a b Herbermann, Charles, ed. (1913). Catholic Encyclopedia. New York: Robert Appleton Company. .
- ^ Herbermann, Charles, ed. (1913). Catholic Encyclopedia. New York: Robert Appleton Company. .
- ^ Loflin, Lewis. "Notes on Neoplatonism and the relation to Christianity and Gnosticism".
- ^ "German Idealism". Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 16 April 2001.
- ^ DePoe, John M. "A Defense of Dualism". New Dualism Archive.
- ^ Herbermann, Charles, ed. (1913). Catholic Encyclopedia. New York: Robert Appleton Company. .
- ^ Calef, Scott (9 June 2005). "Dualism and Mind". Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
- ^ Thornton, Stephen P. (24 October 2004). "Solipsism and the Problem of Other Minds". Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
- ^ Khashaba, D.R. (28 July 2002). "Subjectivism and Solipsism". Philosophy Pathways (37).
- ISBN 0-415-13556-7.
- ^ a b Deutsch, David. (1997) Fabric of Reality
- ISBN 9780262560566. Retrieved 22 October 2008.
infant solipsism.
- ISBN 978-0-7914-2513-8
- ^ Krishnananda, (Swami). The Brihadaranyaka Upanishad. Divine Life Society, Rishikesh. P. 248.
- ISBN 0-226-61855-2.
- S2CID 170761905.
- ^ Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy, London, George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1971 edition, Volume II, p. 342.
- ISBN 81-7023-746-7.
- ^ "Rohitassa Sutta: To Rohitassa". www.accesstoinsight.org. Retrieved 14 April 2018.
- ^ Chandrakirti, Guide to the Middle Way 6:71cd, translation in Ocean of Nectar: Wisdom and Compassion in Mahayana Buddhism, London: Tharpa Publications, p. 253.
- ISBN 978-94-017-6322-6.
- ^ "The Tibetan Book of the Dead Or the After-Death Experiences on the Bardo Plane" (PDF). Translated by Lāma Kazi Dawa-Samdup. holybooks.com.
- ^ Russell, B. (1948). Human Knowledge: Its Scope and Limits. New York: Simon and Schuster. p. 180.
- ^ Jager, Ronald (2014). The Development of Bertrand Russell's Philosophy. Taylor & Francis. p. 408.
- ^ Avramides, Anita (24 January 2024). Other Minds. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Further reading
- Khashaba, D.R. (28 July 2002). "Subjectivism and Solipsism". Philosophy Pathways (37).
- Peake, Anthony (2006). Is There Life After Death?. Arcturus–Foulsham (Europe), Chartwell Books (US). ISBN 0-7858-2162-7. This book presents an intriguing and scientifically based updating of solipsism involving the latest findings in quantum physics, neurology and consciousness studies.
- Popper, K.R.; Eccles, J.C. (1977). The Self and Its Brain. Heidelberg, Germany: Springer-Verlag. ISBN 0-387-08307-3.
- ISBN 0-7546-1210-4.
- Russell, Bertrand (1995) [1921]. The Analysis of Mind. London: Routledge. ISBN 0-415-09097-0.
- von Schubert Soldern, Richard (1982). Über Transcendenz des Objects und Subjects. Leipzig.
{{cite book}}
: CS1 maint: location missing publisher (link) - Thornton, Stephen P. (24 October 2004). "Solipsism and the Problem of Other Minds". In Fieser, James; Dowden, Bradley (eds.). Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
- ISBN 0-631-19064-3.
- Wood, Ledger (1962). "Solipsism". In Runes (ed.). Dictionary of Philosophy. Totowa, NJ: Littlefield, Adams, and Company. p. 295.
- Nagai, Hitoshi (1996). Philosophy for Kids!,『〈子ども〉のための哲学』. Tokyo, Japan: Kodansha.
- Runes, Dagobert D., ed. (1962). Dictionary of Philosophy. Totowa, NJ: Littlefield, Adams, and Company.
- Neilson, W.A.; Knott, T.A.; Carhart, P.W., eds. (1950). Webster's New International Dictionary of the English Language (Second, Unabridged ed.). Springfield, MA: G. & C. Merriam Company.
- Mish, Frederick C., ed. (1983). Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary. Springfield, MA: Merriam–Webster.