Somalia affair
The Somalia affair was a 1993 Canadian military
Eventually a public inquiry was called. Despite being cut short by the government, resulting in a public backlash, the Somalia Inquiry exposed problems in the Canadian Forces. The affair led to the disbanding of Canada's elite Canadian Airborne Regiment, greatly damaging the morale of the Canadian Forces. It also led to the immediate reduction of Canadian military spending by nearly 25% from the time of the killing to the inquiry.[3][4]
Background
In 1992, Somalia was in the middle of both famine and a civil war. The country was under domination by warlords, following the collapse of Siad Barre's government. Relief supplies were frequently stolen by armed gangs, who would hold the goods hostage for the loyalty of the population. As a result, the United Nations requested armed peacekeepers to assist the relief operations.[citation needed]
In the summer of 1992, Prime Minister
Contributing to the US-led coalition and taking part in the UN force to Somalia seemed to align with Canadian foreign policy and fit Mulroney's vision for peacekeeping, as he was the "principal driver behind Canada's decision to commit itself to the Somalia mission".[5]
Canada was one of the nations that agreed to send forces. Canadian forces, under the name
It was decided that the
Canadian Airborne Regiment
We promised them peacekeepers, and ... we sent them thugs.[8]
Only recently[when?] deemed a light infantry battalion, some leaders expressed concern that the Somalia mission did not fit the Regiment's mandate or abilities. The Airborne consisted of multiple sub-units drawn from each of Canada's regular infantry regiments. Later, LCol. Kenward suggested that the line regiments had offloaded some of their "bad apples" into the CAR. LCol. Morneault, the commanding officer of the CAR, declared the "rogue commando" unit unfit for service abroad and sought to have it remain in Canada. Instead, he was relieved of his command and replaced by Lieutenant Colonel Carol Mathieu.[9]
There had been recurring discipline problems, and an ongoing investigation into their base of
Footage depicting racist actions of Cpl. McKay and Pte. Brocklebank was later brought forward by
Mike Abel, the only Canadian to die in the Somali operation, was allegedly a member of the Ku Klux Klan; colleagues disputed the evidence that racist literature had been found in his belongings, and asserted that it just floated around the camp and everybody read it.[17][18]
Airborne in Somalia
The CAR was deployed in December 1992 as part of the
One of the Dragoons' first tasks, under command of Sgt. Donald Hobbs, was rebuilding a bridge that had been destroyed on the Chinese Highway linking Belet Huen and Matabaan. The loss of the bridge meant the only way around was through a partially cleared
On January 2, Canadian forces seized an AK-47 from a local Somali who returned the following day with a machete to threaten the troops to give him back his gun; a warning shot was fired and ricocheted, hitting him in the foot. He left, refusing medical care.[20] Also in January 1993, Lt.-Col. Carol Mathieu gave verbal orders allowing Canadian soldiers to shoot at thieves under certain conditions.[7] On January 29, suspected bandits were found congregating on a roadway and as Canadian forces approached them, they began to flee. Warning shots were fired into the air to halt them, leading to a retaliatory shot from a Somali, and returned fire from the Canadian troops.[20]
On February 10, they fired on a crowd approaching a
On February 17, a demonstration of 50–300 Somalis crowded together on the Bailey bridge over the Shebelle River, and when some began throwing rocks at the Canadian Forces, soldiers fired two shotgun blasts, killing one Somali and injuring two others. A later investigation cleared the shooters of any wrongdoing; noting they were justified in their response.[7][15][20][21]
By the end of the mission, no Canadian troops had been killed or wounded by enemy forces, the sole casualties arising when a soldier shot himself in the arm while cleaning his sidearm on January 11,[20] and when MCpl. Tony Smith negligently discharged his rifle, fatally wounding Cpl. Abel on May 3, 1993.[22]
March 4 killing
On March 4, two unarmed Somalis were shot in the back,
After
Rainville enlisted Cpl. Ben Klick of the
It was noted that Sabrie had been carrying a ceremonial dagger in his clothing.
An Air Force flight surgeon, Major Barry Armstrong, examined the body and judged the death "suspicious", suggesting that Arush had been lying prone on the ground when he was killed.[7] He also noted that the amount of omentum which had passed through the first wounds suggested the 29-year-old Arush had been breathing for at least 2 or 3 minutes before the final gunshots to his head were fired.[24]
After the examination, Arush's body was then used for medical practice for soldiers, demonstrating how to stab a tracheotomy into a wounded man's throat to allow him to breathe, and then used to demonstrate the proper preparation of a body for transportation. The body was then returned to the body bag, and sent into the local hospital, where Dr. Xelen released it to Arush's family the same evening.[7][20] For the next two weeks, Colonel Allan Wells approached Vice-Admiral Larry Murray to send military police to Somalia to investigate the shooting, but was rebuffed.[7] When the Chief of Defence Staff, Admiral John Rogers Anderson, visited the military base on March 8–9, he visited the wounded Somali recovering in the Canadian hospital.[7]
The event would not have been reported, except that
At the subsequent inquiry, Klick defended Rainville, heavily criticising his commanding officer, Lieutenant-Colonel Carol Mathieu, and testified that
Torture and death of Shidane Arone
On March 16, 1993, Captain Michael Sox found 16-year-old Shidane Abukar Arone hiding in a
At 21:00, Sgt. Mark Boland replaced
At 22:00,
Matchee and Brown, both members of 2 Commando, then proceeded to beat Arone.
Estimates have ranged that 15–80 other soldiers could hear or observe the beating, but did not intervene.[15][26] Corporal MacDonald, acting as duty signaller that night, was asked by Sgt. Major Mills about "a long dragged out howl" heard from the vicinity of the bunker, but MacDonald refused to stop playing with his Game Boy to investigate. Later, Matchee came by to borrow a cigarette from MacDonald and mentioned that "now the black man would fear the Indian as he did the white man", and MacDonald went outside to check on Arone's status. (Matchee was a Saskatchewan Cree.) He saw Matchee hitting him in the face with the baton, and reported that the prisoner was "getting a good shit-kicking" to Sgt. Perry Gresty, before retiring to bed for the night.[15]
Arone fell unconscious after several hours of beatings, after shouting "Canada! Canada! Canada!" as his last words.[26] When Brown mentioned the event to Sergeant J. K. Hillier, the non-commissioned member noted there "would be trouble" if the prisoner died, and went to check on the youth who he found had no pulse, and base medics confirmed that the boy was dead.[15] It was later discovered that Arone had burn marks on his penis.[27]
Response
Jim Day, a reporter with the
The Canadian military seems to have blind confidence in mefloquine, even though it carries warnings that those with judgment jobs, like neurosurgeons or airline pilots, shouldn't use it. But it is apparently safe for young men with loaded weapons. Does that make sense?
The debate over what led to the events came at a politically sensitive time in Canada, as the Minister of National Defence Kim Campbell was in the midst of a Progressive Conservative Party of Canada leadership campaign to become Prime Minister.[12] Matters were made worse when Campbell tried to dismiss the allegations of racism in the Canadian military by referring to it as "youthful folly" and suggesting that it was commonplace.[12] Criticism also focused on the fact that it took five weeks to order a high-level investigation into the events in Somalia.
Some, including
Legal proceedings
Once again, history repeats itself; only the lower ranks have been made to account for the marked failures of their leaders
— Somalia Inquiry Report, page 1910
A death in custody automatically triggered an investigation, and two days later Matchee and Brown were arrested and charged and
Matchee later attempted to hang himself in his cell; the attempt failed but caused massive brain damage, making him unfit to stand trial.
Name | Charge | Result |
---|---|---|
MCpl. Clayton Matchee | Unfit to stand trial following suicide attempt.[22] Matchee tried to hang himself after being arrested and suffered serious brain damage.[25] Charges against him were eventually dropped in September 2008 as his diminished mental capacity meant that he no longer posed a threat to the public.[32] | |
Pte. Kyle Brown | Convicted of manslaughter and torture. Sentenced to 5 years' imprisonment.[22] Dismissed from the army in disgrace.[22] Appeals were also dismissed.[22] Released on parole one year after conviction.[22] | |
Sgt. Mark Adam Boland | Pleaded guilty to negligent performance of duty for his role in the death of Shidane Arone, and not guilty to torture.[22] Convicted. Sentenced to 90 days' detention.[22] Deemed "willfully blind" to the beating, also demoted to private.[25] Sentence increased to 1 year's imprisonment after prosecution appealed sentence, with dismissal from the Canadian Forces.[22] | |
Major Anthony Seward | Acquitted of unlawfully causing bodily harm.[22] Found guilty of negligent performance of duty for giving instructions to abuse detainees, and sentenced to a severe reprimand.[22] Prosecution appealed for a tougher sentence.[22] Court Martial Appeal Court subsequently imposed a term of 3 months' imprisonment.[22] Defence's appeal was declined.[22] Seward was also dismissed from the Canadian Forces.[22] | |
Capt. Michael Sox | Acquitted of unlawfully causing bodily harm.[22] Convicted of negligent performance of duty.[22] A stay of proceedings was entered on the charge of an act to the prejudice of good order and discipline.[22] Sox was also demoted to lieutenant, and received a severe reprimand.[22] Appeals by both sides were dismissed.[22] | |
LCol. Joseph Carol Mathieu |
|
Acquitted.[22] The prosecution appealed the verdict, and the Appeal Court ordered a new trial.[22] Mathieu was also acquitted in the second trial.[22] |
Capt. Michel Rainville | Acquitted and later released from the CF[22] | |
Sgt. Perry Gresty |
|
Acquitted.[22] |
Pte. David Brocklebank | Acquitted on both charges.[22] Prosecution's appeal was dismissed.[22] |
McAuliffe's request for documents
In September 1995, CBC reporter Michael McAuliffe requested access to 68 Response to Query forms to supplement his earlier informal gleanings about the Canadian military operation, but the documents were altered before being released to him to make them agree with the information he had been given earlier.[7] In addition, invented financial charges were tagged onto his request, stating that it had taken 413 man-hours and subsequently would cost McAuliffe $4,080, although the documents were in fact readily available.[33][34][35]
While giving McAuliffe misinformation informally was not illegal, it was a crime under s. 67.1 of the Access to Information Act for the government to release forged documents in response to an Access to Information request.[7] The question quickly emerged of whether Chief of Defence Staff Jean Boyle had known about the altering, and if he bore responsibility for it even if he were ignorant of his underlings' doings.[7] On September 5, 1995, a clerk at the NDHQ was discovered collecting Somalia-related documents for a burn bag to be destroyed.[7] Boyle later concurred that there had been documents proving attempts to cover up details of both the March 4 and March 16 killings.[11][36]
Somalia Inquiry
Also mitigating, to a certain extent, is the fact that these individuals must be viewed as products of a system that placed great store in the "can do" attitude. The reflex to say "yes sir" rather than to question the appropriateness of a command or policy obviously runs against the grain of free and open discussion, but it is ingrained in military discipline and culture. However, leaders properly exercising command responsibility must recognise and assert not only their right, but their duty, to advise against improper actions, for failing to do so means that professionalism is lost.
— Commission of Inquiry, 1997[21]
The public outcry against Arone's death didn't occur until November 1994, when a publication ban was lifted against the 16 photographs Brown had taken of the torture session and they were widely published in Canadian media.[12]
After the 1993 Canadian federal election, the new government of Jean Chrétien's Liberal Party initiated a highly visible Somalia Inquiry in 1994 under Federal Court Judge Gilles Létourneau. Officially known as the Somalia Commission of Inquiry, its hearings were broadcast daily in both languages, nationally.
As the inquiry unfolded, home videos of initiation rites in the CAR's French-speaking commando found their way into the media. The new Minister of National Defence David Collenette argued that the videos were disgusting, demeaning and racist. With the continued accumulation of such politically damaging visibility, the Minister of National Defence advised Governor General Roméo LeBlanc to disband the Canadian Airborne Regiment in 1995.
The Chief of the Defence Staff General John de Chastelain, who had not supported the minister's disbandment order of the Airborne, resigned under a cloud.[clarification needed] His successor, Air Force General Jean Boyle was forced to resign only a few months after accepting the role when, in a gesture uncharacteristic of military tradition, he blamed his subordinates for previous wrongdoing under his command.
On April 8, 1996, Boyle called a halt to all normal duties and announced the entire Canadian military would begin searching for documents relating to Somalia.[7]
The inquiry ran until 1997 when it was cut short by the government in the months before the 1997 election. The government was critical of the direction of the inquiry, claiming that it was far exceeding its mandate.[23] Art Eggleton, a member of Cabinet who would go on to become minister of national defence after the 1997 election, suggested that the events had happened four years earlier, and it was time to "move on".[23]
Indeed, the conduct of the new government after the Somalia affair and the search for documents now absorbed much of the inquiry's attention, as reflected in its report. The inquiry had run long over its allotted timeframe and budget. The decision to end the inquiry received visible media attention and may have contributed to the defeat of the new Defence Minister Doug Young in the 1997 election. The inquiry was never able to examine top level governmental[clarification needed] decision-making, nor did it actually examine the alleged events in Somalia.
The final report of the inquiry was a striking attack on the procedures, support and leadership of the Canadian Forces and the Ministry of Defence. Many of the top officers in the Canadian Forces were excoriated, including three separate Chiefs of the Defence Staff. The CAR had been rushed into a war zone with inadequate preparation or legal support. Enquiry observer retired Brigadier-General Dan Loomis noted that the operation had changed, in December 1992, "from a peacekeeping operation, where arms are used only in self-defence, to one where arms could be used proactively to achieve politico-military objectives ... In short the Canadian Forces were being put on active service and sent to war (as defined by Chapter 7 of the UN Charter)." Its deployment into "war" had never been debated in parliament and indeed the Canadian public had been led to believe by its government that the CAR was on a "peacekeeping" mission. After the events the leaders of the Canadian Forces had been far more concerned with self-preservation than in trying to find the truth. The inquiry report singled out Major-General Lewis MacKenzie as a major exception, as he took full responsibility for any errors he made.
Aftermath
The affair had a number of long-lasting effects. While it is difficult to separate the effects of the affair on Canadian Forces morale from those of the concurrent defence spending cut, it did exacerbate feelings of distrust towards the media and politicians among many CF members.
At the same time, public trust in the Canadian Forces suffered and recruitment became more difficult. Public revulsion provided support for the sharp cuts to military spending introduced by the government.[clarification needed] Many of the report's comments, along with the sustained media criticism of the military, led to the imposition of policies designed to ensure nothing similar to the Somalia Affair could happen again. Since the events in Somalia, Canada focused on implementing more educational requirements (including ethics, tactical, and strategic planning), oversight processes, and setting new standards and policies for senior officers.[37] Once playing an important role in the majority of UN efforts, in subsequent years Canada simply provided indirect support. Since 2001 though, spending on the Canadian Forces gradually increased and accelerated as Canada played a major role in Afghanistan. Concurrently public perception of the Canadian Forces improved dramatically as well.
In 1999, judge J. Douglas Cunningham dismissed an appeal for financial compensation by Arone's parents Abubakar Arone Rage and Dahabo Omar Samow, ruling that their use of a litigation guardian, Abdullahi Godah Barre, was inconsistent with the legal requirement, and they should have traveled to Canada to launch the suit themselves.[6][38]
Brown later co-operated on a book in which it was suggested he had been made the scapegoat for the incident, unlike the officers who had not intervened.[27]
Soldiers of other countries also faced charges of misconduct; American soldiers were involved in the deaths of three young boys in separate incidents,[39] Pakistani troops were accused of a number of civilian deaths,[39] and Belgian soldiers took photographs of themselves allegedly torturing a Somali to death.[39]
Other long-term effects on the Forces included the adoption of sensitivity training, including SHARP (Standard for Harassment and Racism Prevention) training, which became mandatory for every single member of the Forces, and was accompanied by a declaration of "zero tolerance" on racism and harassment of any kind, including hazing.
Some have suggested that Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) Commissioner Joseph Philip Robert Murray was slated to be replaced, until Boyle was removed – making it difficult for the Prime Minister to simultaneously replace the head of the armed forces and the head of the federal police.[40]
Peacekeeping and humanitarian intervention in the wake of the Somalia affair
The notion of peacekeeping seems to be deeply embedded in Canadian culture and a distinguishing feature that Canadians feel sets their foreign policy apart from the likes of the United States. The Somalia commission wrote in 1997 that "Canada's foreign policy with respect to peacekeeping has been consistent since Canadians embraced peacekeeping in the late 1950s".[41] Since the Suez Crisis, Canadian foreign policy has fit a peacekeeping rubric. Americans, however, were seen to fight wars, but Canadians pictured themselves as working for peace.[41] Canada never had a reputation for starting wars but instead was seen to come to the aid of war-torn countries.
The Somalia affair came as such as surprise to the Canadian public as no one would have thought Canada's golden reputation for international peacekeeping could be tarnished. The Somalia Affair and the ensuing commission of inquiry has become the subject of intense criticism and has given rise to a great deal of comparative theoretical work on humanitarian intervention and peacekeeping. In her book Sherene Razack asks if it was just a case of "a few bad apples" in the Canadian forces, or if the Somalia affair speaks to a larger issue on the complex nature of peacekeeping and humanitarian intervention.[42] Thomas Weiss comments that the failures in Somalia have led to this concept of "Somalia syndrome": "multilateral interventions to thwart starvation, genocide, the forced movement of peoples, and massive violations of fundamental rights are no longer politically or operationally feasible”.[43] Peacekeepers are more likely to be involved in peace enforcement in more warlike conditions as unlike traditional peacekeeping; there is not always consent from all the conflicting parties.[42] Such was the case in Somalia as the men were hypervigilant with a sense of fear and frustration as they were trained for combat yet charged with providing humanitarian aid.[42] Faced with this strong Somali opposition and resentment and yet being responsible for providing aid meant that Canadian peacekeepers "increasingly could not find meaning in their activities".[attribution needed][42] A "Somalia syndrome" sentiment lingered in the international community after the failures in the war-torn country. Weiss, however, reminds us not to take Somalia out of context or draw upon the wrong lessons leading to isolationism or eschewing necessary humanitarian intervention. The debacle in Somalia would be so paralyzing that it would lead to an unwillingness from the international community to respond to future problems, like the Rwandan genocide. The United States under the Clinton administration would need to rethink its foreign policies and the rest of the world just did not want another Somalia affair.[43]
The Somalia affair thus had a direct impact on how the international community made foreign policy with a crippling "Somalia syndrome" that led to the sense of caution in intervening in the Rwanda genocide and in the Balkans.
See also
- Bystander effect
- Command responsibility
- List of Canadian military operations
- List of Canadian peacekeeping missions
- Operation Deliverance
References
- ^ Foot, Richard (2 August 2019). "Canadian Peacekeepers in Somalia". www.thecanadianencyclopedia.ca. Historica Canada.
- ISBN 978-1-135-16956-5. Retrieved 2024-02-27.
- ^ a b c Winslow, Donna. The Parliamentary Inquiry into the Canadian Peace Mission in Somalia. PCAF Workshop, Brussels, July 12–14, 2002. Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces.
- ISBN 1-895722-37-3. Archived from the original(PDF) on 2013-12-17.
- ^ a b c d e f Dawson, Grant. Here is Hell: Canada's Engagement in Somalia. (UBC Press, 2007), pp. 7, 11, 40
- ^ a b Swanenburg, Marten. "Accountability of Peace Support Operations", p. 265
- ^ ISBN 9780771026843.
- ^ Noakes, Taylor C. (2020-07-03). "Opinion: We disbanded the Canadian Airborne Regiment 25 years ago. Now, it's the RCMP's turn". The Globe and Mail. Retrieved 2023-10-15.
- ^ Fisher, Luke. Maclean's, "Airborne's Hazing Exposed", January 30, 1995
- ^ ISBN 978-1-58826-296-7.
- ^ a b Bercuson, David Significant Incident: Canada's Army, the Airborne, & the Murder in Somalia 1997
- ^ a b c d Armstrong, Martha. "A Tale of Two Videos: Media Event, Moral Panic and the Canadian Airborne Regiment" [Masters' thesis at McGill University], December 1997
- ^ In the video, McKay says "we ain't killed enough niggers yet" (Armstrong, 1997).
- ^ Leyton-Brown, David. Canadian Annual Review of Politics and Public Affairs, 199. p. 120
- ^ a b c d e f g h i j k l m n Sherene Razack. Dark Threats and White Knights: The Somalia Affair, Peacekeeping and the New Imperialism. 2004
- ^ Burke, Carol. "Camp All-American, Hanoi Jane and the High and Tight", p. 60
- ^ a b c Ogle, James & Darnell Bass. "What Manner of Man", pp. 144, 163
- ^ Taylor, Scott R. Esprit de Corps, "Mysterious, suspicious and preventable deaths in the Canadian forces", July 1, 1997
- ^ Schmidl, Erwin A. "Peace Operations Between War and Peace". p. 95
- ^ a b c d e f g h i j k l m n Report of the Somalia Commission Inquiry, Good Works: CJFS in Somalia Archived 2011-03-23 at the Wayback Machine
- ^ a b Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia, "Dishonoured Legacy: The Lessons of the Somalia Affair", pp. 953 & Vol. I, pp. 296.
- ^ a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p q r s t u v w x y z aa ab ac ad ae af ag ah ai aj ak al am an ao ap aq ar Somalia Inquiry, The Courts Martial Archived 2011-06-09 at the Wayback Machine
- ^ The National, Somalia debacle a high-level cover-up, July 2, 1997
- ^ , 1998
- ^ a b c "Torture by Army Peacekeepers in Somalia Shocks Canada (Published 1994)". The New York Times. Archived from the original on 2023-06-15.
- ^ a b c d Coulon, Jocelyn. "Soldiers of Diplomacy", University of Toronto Press, p. 94
- ^ a b c Worthington, Peter. Scapegoat: How the Army Betrayed Kyle Brown, p. 112
- ^ Sjolander, Claire Turenne. Feminist Perspectives on Canadian Foreign Policy, 2003. p. 81
- ^ Dawson, Grant. "Here is Hell", 2006. p. 157
- ^ Born, Hans. The Double Democratic Deficit, p. 94
- ^ Worthington, Peter. Edmonton Sun, "Did we poison our Somalia soldiers?", January 3, 1998
- ^ Canada.com, Torture, murder charges dropped against ex-soldier Matchee
- ^ Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia, Document Book 103, tabs 12 & 13.
- ^ Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia, Testimony of Lt. Brayman, transcript pp. 12947-12948 & 13079-13080
- ^ Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia, Testimony of Nancy Fournier, Transcript pp. 12048–12050
- ^ Coombs, Howard. The Insubordinate and the Noncompliant. p. 423
- ^ Bercuson, David J. "Up from the Ashes: The Re-Professionalization of the Canadian Forces After the Somalia Affair". Canadian Military Journal. 9 (3).
- ^ Scott, Craig. "Torture as Tort", p. 33
- ^ a b c Bedont, Barbara. "The Lack of Accountability for Peacekeepers' Crimes", part of Gender, Conflict and Peacekeeping. p. 86
- ^ Palango, Paul. The Last Guardians: The Crisis in the RCMP, 1998
- ^ a b Whitworth, Sandra. Men, Militarism, and UN Peacekeeping: A Gendered Analysis. (Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2004), p. 91
- ^ a b c d Razack, Sherene. Dark Threats and White Knights: The Somalia Affair, Peacekeeping, and the New Imperialism. (University of Toronto Press, 2004), 29; 30; 116
- ^ a b Weiss, Thomas. "Overcoming the Somalia Syndrome – "Operation Rekindle Hope?". (Lynne Reinner Publishers, 1995), 171; 173; 179
Further reading
- Grant Dawson (2007). "Here is hell": Canada's engagement in Somalia. UBC Press. ISBN 978-0-7748-1297-9.
- Sherene Razack (2004). Dark threats and white knights: the Somalia Affair, peacekeeping, and the new imperialism. University of Toronto Press. ISBN 978-0-8020-8663-1.
External links
- Final Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia: Government of Canada Publications (PDF links), Text archive