Madhyamaka

Therefore, emptiness is taught in order to completely pacify all discursiveness without exception. So if the purpose of emptiness is the complete peace of all discursiveness and you just increase the web of discursiveness by thinking that the meaning of emptiness is nonexistence, you do not realize the purpose of emptiness [at all].[57]

This although some scholars (e.g., Murti) interpret emptiness as described by Nāgārjuna as a Buddhist transcendental absolute, other scholars (such as David Kalupahana) consider this claim a mistake, since then emptiness teachings could not be characterized as a middle way.^[58][59]

Madhyamaka thinkers also argue that since things have the nature of lacking true existence or own being (niḥsvabhāva), all things are mere conceptual constructs (prajñaptimatra) because they are just impermanent collections of causes and conditions.

In madhyamaka, reason and debate are understood as a means to an end (liberation), and therefore they must be founded on the wish to help oneself and others end suffering.^[66] Reason and logical arguments, however (such as those employed by classical Indian philosophers, i.e., pramana), are also seen as being empty of any true validity or reality. They serve only as conventional remedies for our delusions.^[67] Nāgārjuna's Vigrahavyāvartanī famously attacked the notion that one could establish a valid cognition or epistemic proof (pramana):

If your objects are well established through valid cognitions, tell us how you establish these valid cognitions. If you think they are established through other valid cognitions, there is an infinite regress. Then, the first one is not established, nor are the middle ones, nor the last. If these [valid cognitions] are established even without valid cognition, what you say is ruined. In that case, there is an inconsistency, And you ought to provide an argument for this distinction.^[68]

Candrakirti comments on this statement by stating that madhyamaka does not completely deny the use of pramanas conventionally, and yet ultimately they do not have a foundation:

Therefore we assert that mundane objects are known through the four kinds of authoritative cognition. They are mutually dependent: when there is authoritative cognition, there are objects of knowledge; when there are objects of knowledge, there is authoritative cognition. But neither authoritative cognition nor objects of knowledge exist inherently.^[69]

To the charge that if Nāgārjuna's arguments and words are also empty they therefore lack the power to refute anything, Nāgārjuna responds that:

My words are without nature. Therefore, my thesis is not ruined. Since there is no inconsistency, I do not have to state an argument for a distinction.^[70]

Nāgārjuna goes on:

Just as one magical creation may be annihilated by another magical creation, and one illusory person by another person produced by an illusionist, this negation is the same.^[71]

Shantideva makes the same point: "thus, when one's son dies in a dream, the conception "he does not exist" removes the thought that he does exist, but it is also delusive".^[72] In other words, madhyamaka thinkers accept that their arguments, just like all things, are not ultimately valid in some foundational sense. But one is still able to use the opponent's own reasoning apparatus in the conventional field to refute their theories and help them see their errors. This remedial deconstruction does not replace false theories of existence with other ones, but simply dissolves all views, including the very fictional system of epistemic warrants (pramanas) used to establish them.^[73] The point of madhyamaka reasoning is not to establish any abstract validity or universal truth, it is simply a pragmatic project aimed at ending delusion and suffering.^[74]

Nāgārjuna also argues that madhyamaka only negates things conventionally, since ultimately, there is nothing there to negate: "I do not negate anything and there is also nothing to be negated."^[75] Therefore, it is only from the perspective of those who cling to the existence of things that it seems as if something is being negated. In truth, madhyamaka is not annihilating something, merely elucidating that this so-called existence never existed in the first place.^[75]

Thus, madhyamaka uses language to make clear the limits of our concepts. Ultimately, reality cannot be depicted by concepts.^[10][76] According to Jay Garfield, this creates a sort of tension in madhyamaka literature, since it has use some concepts to convey its teachings.^[76]

Soteriology

For madhyamaka, the realization of emptiness is not just a satisfactory theory about the world, but a key understanding which allows one to reach liberation or nirvana. As Nāgārjuna's Mūlamadhyamakakārikā ("Root Verses on the Middle Way") puts it:

With the cessation of ignorance, formations will not arise. Moreover, the cessation of ignorance occurs through right understanding. Through the cessation of this and that, this and that will not come about. The entire mass of suffering thereby completely ceases.^[77]

The words "this" and "that" allude to the mind's profound addiction to dualism, but also and more specifically to the mind that has not yet grasped the reality of dependent origination. The insight of dependent origination – that nothing arises or happens independently, that everything is rooted in or "made of" something else, and conditioned by other things, each of which are likewise made of and conditioned by other things in the same way, so that nothing at all "is" independently – is central to the fundamental Buddhist analysis of the arising of suffering and the liberation from it. Therefore, according to Nāgārjuna, the cognitive shift which sees the nonexistence of svabhāva leads to the cessation of the first link in this chain of suffering, which then leads to the ending of the entire chain of causes and thus, of all suffering.^[77] Nāgārjuna adds:

Liberation (moksa) results from the cessation of actions (karman) and defilements (klesa). Actions and defilements result from representations (vikalpa). These [come] from false imagining (prapañca). False imagining stops in emptiness (sunyata). (18.5)

better source needed

]

Therefore, the ultimate aim of understanding emptiness is not philosophical insight as such, but the actualization of a liberated mind which does not cling to anything. To encourage this awakening, meditation on emptiness may proceed in stages, starting with the emptiness of self, of objects and of mental states,^[79] culminating in a "natural state of nonreferential freedom".^{[80][note 9]}

Moreover, the path to understanding ultimate truth is not one that negates or invalidates relative truths (especially truths about the path to awakening). Instead it is only through properly understanding and using relative truth that the ultimate can be attained, as Bhāvaviveka maintains:

In order to guide beginners a method is taught, comparable to the steps of a staircase that leads to perfect Buddhahood. Ultimate reality is only to be entered once we have understood seeming reality.^[81]

Does madhyamaka have a position?

Nāgārjuna is famous for arguing that his philosophy was not a view, and that he in fact did not take any position (paksa) or thesis (pratijña) whatsoever since this would just be another form of clinging to some form of existence.^[82][69] In his Vigrahavyāvartanī , Nāgārjuna states:

If I had any position, I thereby would be at fault. Since I have no position, I am not at fault at all. If there were anything to be observed through direct perception and the other instances [of valid cognition], it would be something to be established or rejected. However, since no such thing exists, I cannot be criticized.^[83]

Likewise in his Sixty Stanzas on Reasoning, Nāgārjuna says: "By taking any standpoint whatsoever, you will be snatched by the cunning snakes of the afflictions. Those whose minds have no standpoint will not be caught."^[84]

Randall Collins argues that for Nāgārjuna, ultimate reality is simply the idea that "no concepts are intelligible", while Ferrer emphasizes that Nāgārjuna criticized those whose mind held any "positions and beliefs", including the view of emptiness. As Nāgārjuna says: "The Victorious Ones have announced that emptiness is the relinquishing of all views. Those who are possessed of the view of emptiness are said to be incorrigible."^[85][86] Aryadeva echoes this idea in his Four Hundred Verses:

"First, one puts an end to what is not meritorious. In the middle, one puts an end to identity. Later, one puts an end to all views. Those who understand this are skilled."^[87]

Other writers, however, do seem to affirm emptiness as a specific madhyamaka thesis or view. Shantideva for example says "one cannot uphold any faultfinding in the thesis of emptiness" and Bhavaviveka's Blaze of Reasoning says: "as for our thesis, it is the emptiness of nature, because this is the nature of phenomena".^[88] Jay Garfield notes that Nāgārjuna and Candrakirti both make positive arguments, and cites both the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā ("Root Verses on the Middle Way") – "There does not exist anything that is not dependently arisen. Therefore there does not exist anything that is not empty" – and Candrakirti's commentary on it: "We assert the statement, 'Emptiness itself is a designation.'"^[69]

These positions are not really in contradiction, however, since madhyamaka can be said to have the "thesis of emptiness" only conventionally, in the context of debating or explaining it. According to Karl Brunnholzl, even though madhyamaka thinkers may express a thesis pedagogically, what they deny is that "they have any thesis that involves real existence or reference points, or any thesis that is to be defended from their own point of view".^[89]

Brunnholzl underlines that madhyamaka analysis applies to all systems of thought, ideas and concepts, including madhyamaka itself. This is because the nature of madhyamaka is "the deconstruction of any system and conceptualization whatsoever, including itself".^[90] In the Root verses on the Middle Way, Nāgārjuna illustrates this point:

By the flaw of having views about emptiness, those of little understanding are ruined, just as when incorrectly seizing a snake or mistakenly practicing an awareness-mantra.^[91]

Origins and sources

The madhyamaka school is usually considered to have been founded by

Early Buddhist Texts

It is well known that the only sutra that

This world, Kaccāna, for the most part depends on a duality – upon the notion of existence and the notion of nonexistence. But for one who sees the origin of the world as it really is with correct wisdom, there is no notion of nonexistence in regard to the world. And for one who sees the cessation of the world as it really is with correct wisdom, there is no notion of existence in regard to the world.[93]

Joseph Walser also points out that verse six of chapter 15 contains an allusion to the "Mahahatthipadopama sutta", another early sutra of the Nidanavagga, the collection which also contains the

Ruegg notes that in Candrakīrti's Prasannapadā and Madhyamakāvatāra, in addition to the Prajñāpāramitā, "we find the Akṣayamatinirdeśa, Anavataptahradāpasaṃkramaṇa, Upāliparipṛcchā, Kāśyapaparivarta, Gaganagañja, Tathāgataguhya, Daśabhūmika, Dṛḍhādhyāśaya, Dhāraṇīśvararāja, Pitāputrasamāgama, Mañjuśrīparipṛcchā, Ratnakūṭa, Ratnacūḍaparipṛcchā, Ratnamegha, Ratnākara, Laṅkāvatāra, Lalitavistara, Vimalakirtinirdesa, Śālistamba, Satyadvayāvatāra, Saddharmapuṇḍarīka, Samādhirāja (Candrapradīpa), and Hastikakṣya."^[104]

Prajñāpāramitā

Madhyamaka thought is also closely related to a number of Mahāyāna sources; traditionally, the Prajñāpāramitā sūtras are the literature most closely associated with madhyamaka – understood, at least in part, as an exegetical complement to those Sūtras. Traditional accounts also depict Nāgārjuna as retrieving some of the larger Prajñāpāramitā sūtras from the world of the Nāgas (explaining in part the etymology of his name). Prajñā or 'higher cognition' is a recurrent term in Buddhist texts, explained as a synonym of abhidharma, 'insight' (vipaśyanā) and 'analysis of the dharmas' (dharmapravicaya). Within a specifically Mahāyāna context, Prajñā figures as the most prominent in a list of Six Pāramitās ('perfections' or 'perfect masteries') that a Bodhisattva needs to cultivate in order to eventually achieve Buddhahood.

Madhyamaka offers conceptual tools to analyze all possible elements of existence, allowing the practitioner to elicit through reasoning and contemplation the type of view that the Sūtras express more authoritatively (being considered word of the Buddha) but less explicitly (not offering corroborative arguments). The vast Prajñāpāramitā literature emphasizes the development of higher cognition in the context of the Bodhisattva path; thematically, its focus on the emptiness of all dharmas is closely related to the madhyamaka approach. Allusions to the prajñaparamita sutras can be found in Nagarjuna's work. One example is in the opening stanza of the MMK, which seem to allude to the following statement found in two prajñaparamita texts:

And how does he wisely know conditioned co-production? He wisely knows it as neither production, nor stopping, neither cut off nor eternal, neither single nor manifold, neither coming nor going away, as the appeasement of all futile discoursings, and as bliss.^[105]

The first stanza of Nagarjuna's MMK meanwhile, state:

I pay homage to the Fully Enlightened One whose true, venerable words teach dependent-origination to be the blissful pacification of all mental proliferation, neither production, nor stopping, neither cut off nor eternal, neither single nor manifold, neither coming, nor going away.^[105]

Pyrrhonism

Because of the high degree of similarity between madhyamaka and Pyrrhonism,^[106] Thomas McEvilley^[107] and Matthew Neale^[108][109] suspect that Nāgārjuna was influenced by Greek Pyrrhonist texts imported into India. Pyrrho of Elis (c. 360 – c. 270 BCE), who is credited with founding this school of skeptical philosophy, was himself influenced by Buddhist philosophy^[110] during his stay in India with Alexander the Great's army.

Indian madhyamaka

Nāgārjuna

As Jan Westerhoff notes, while

Numerous texts are attributed to him, but it is at least agreed by some scholars that what is called the "Yukti" (analytical) corpus is the core of his philosophical work. These texts are the "Root verses on the Middle way" (Mūlamadhyamakakārikā, MMK), the "Sixty Stanzas on Reasoning" (Yuktiṣāṣṭika), the "Dispeller of Objections" (Vigrahavyāvartanī), the "Treatise on Pulverization" (Vaidalyaprakaraṇa) and the "Precious Garland" (Ratnāvalī).^[112] However, even the attribution of each one of these has been question by some modern scholars, except for the MMK which is by definition seen as his major work.^[112]

Nāgārjuna's main goal is often seen by scholars as refuting the

Because of his philosophical work, Nāgārjuna is seen by some modern interpreters as restoring the Middle Way of the Buddha, which had become challenged by absolutist metaphysical tendencies in certain philosophical quarters.^[117][114]

Classical madhyamaka figures

Rāhulabhadra was an early madhyamika, sometimes said to be either a teacher of Nagarjuna or his contemporary and follower. He is most famous for his verses in praise of the Prajñāpāramitā (Skt. Prajñāpāramitāstotra) and Chinese sources maintain that he also composed a commentary on the MMK which was translated by Paramartha.^[118]

Nāgārjuna's pupil

There are also two commentaries on the MMK which may be by Āryadeva, the Akutobhaya (which has also been regarded as an auto-commentary by Nagarjuna) as well as a commentary which survives only in Chinese (as part of the Chung-Lun, "Middle treatise", Taisho 1564) attributed to a certain "Ch'ing-mu" (aka Pin-lo-chieh, which some scholars have also identified as possibly being Aryadeva).^[121] However, Brian C. Bocking, a translator of the Chung-Lung, also states that it is likely the author of this commentary was a certain Vimalāksa, who was Kumarajiva's old Vinaya-master from Kucha.^[122]

An influential commentator on Nāgārjuna was Buddhapālita (470–550) who has been interpreted as developing the prāsaṅgika approach to Nāgārjuna's works in his Madhyamakavṛtti (now only extant in Tibetan) which follows the orthodox Madhyamaka method by critiquing essentialism mainly through reductio ad absurdum arguments.^[123] Like Nāgārjuna, Buddhapālita's main philosophical method is to show how all philosophical positions are ultimately untenable and self-contradictory, a style of argumentation called prasanga.^[123]

Buddhapālita's method is often contrasted with that of Bhāvaviveka (c. 500 – c. 578), who argued in his Prajñāpadīpa (Lamp of Wisdom) for the use of logical arguments using the pramana based epistemology of Indian logicians like Dignāga. In what would become a source of much future debate, Bhāvaviveka criticized Buddhapālita for not putting madhyamaka arguments into proper "autonomous syllogisms" (svatantra).^[124] Bhāvaviveka argued that mādhyamika's should always put forth syllogistic arguments to prove the truth of the madhyamaka thesis. Instead of just criticizing other's arguments, a tactic called vitaṇḍā (attacking) which was seen in bad form in Indian philosophical circles, Bhāvaviveka held that madhyamikas must positively prove their position using sources of knowledge (pramanas) agreeable to all parties.^[125] He argued that the position of a madhyamaka was simply that phenomena are devoid of an inherent nature.^[123] This approach has been labeled the svātantrika style of madhyamaka by Tibetan philosophers and commentators.

Another influential commentator, Candrakīrti (c. 600–650), sought to defend Buddhapālita and critique Bhāvaviveka's position (and Dignāga) that one must construct independent (svatantra) arguments to positively prove the madhyamaka thesis, on the grounds this contains a subtle essentialist commitment.^[123] He argued that madhyamikas do not have to argue by svantantra, but can merely show the untenable consequences (prasaṅga) of all philosophical positions put forth by their adversary.^[126] Furthermore, for Candrakīrti, there is a problem with assuming that the madhyamika and the essentialist opponent can begin with the same shared premises that are required for this kind of syllogistic reasoning because the essentialist and the madhyamaka do not share a basic understanding of what it means for things to exist in the first place.^[127]

A later svātantrika figure is Avalokitavrata (seventh century), who composed a tika (sub-commentary) on Bhāvaviveka's Prajñāpadīpa and who mentions important figures of the era such as Dharmakirti and Candrakīrti.^[128]

Another commentator on Nagarjuna is Bhikshu Vaśitva (Zizai) who composed a commentary on Nagarjuna's Bodhisaṃbhāra that survives in a translation by Dharmagupta in the Chinese canon.^[129]

A lesser known treatise on the six paramitas associated with the madhyamaka school is Ārya Śūra's Pāramitāsamāsa, unlikely to be the same author as that of the Garland of Jatakas.[132]

Other lesser known madhyamikas include Devasarman (fifth to sixth centuries) and Gunamati (the fifth to sixth centuries) both of whom wrote commentaries on the MMK that exist only in Tibetan fragments.^[133]

Yogācāra-madhyamaka

According to Ruegg, possibly the earliest figure to work with the two schools was Vimuktisena (early sixth century), a commentator on the Abhisamayalamkara and also is reported to have been a pupil of Bhāvaviveka as well as Vasubandhu.^[134]

The seventh and eighth centuries saw a synthesis of the Buddhist

Like the classical madhyamaka, yogācāra-madhyamaka approaches ultimate truth through the prasaṅga method of showing absurd consequences. However, when speaking of conventional reality they also make positive assertions and autonomous arguments like Bhāvaviveka and Dharmakīrti. Śāntarakṣita also subsumed the yogācāra system into his presentation of the conventional, accepting their idealism on a conventional level as a preparation for the ultimate truth of madhyamaka.[123]^[135]

In his Madhyamakālaṃkāra (verses 92–93), Śāntarakṣita says:

By relying on the Mind Only (cittamatra), know that external entities do not exist. And by relying on this [madhyamaka] system, know that no self at all exists, even in that [mind]. Therefore, due to holding the reins of logic as one rides the chariots of the two systems, one attains [the path of] the actual Mahayanist.^[136]

Śāntarakṣita and his student Kamalaśīla (known for his text on self development and meditation, the Bhavanakrama) were influential in the initial spread of madhyamaka Buddhism to Tibet.^{[note 13]} Haribhadra, another important figure of this school, wrote an influential commentary on the Abhisamayalamkara.

Vajrayana madhyamaka

The madhyamaka philosophy continued to be of major importance during the period of Indian Buddhism when the tantric Vajrayana Buddhism rose to prominence. One of the central Vajrayana madhyamaka philosophers was Arya Nagarjuna (also known as the "tantric Nagarjuna", 7th–8th centuries) who may be the author of the Bodhicittavivarana as well as a commentator on the Guhyasamāja Tantra.^[137] Other figures in his lineage include Nagabodhi, Vajrabodhi, Aryadeva-pada and Candrakirti-pada.

Later figures include Bodhibhadra (c. 1000), a

Madhyamaka philosophy obtained a central position in all the main Tibetan Buddhist schools, all whom consider themselves to be madhyamikas. Madhyamaka thought has been categorized in various ways in India and Tibet.^{[note 14]}

Early transmission

Influential early figures who are important in the transmission of madhyamaka to Tibet include the yogacara-madhyamika Śāntarakṣita (725–788), and his students Haribhadra and Kamalashila (740–795) as well as the later Kadampa figures of Atisha (982–1054) and his pupil Dromtön (1005–1064) who taught madhyamaka by using the works of Bhāviveka and Candrakīrti.^[139][140]

The early transmission of Buddhism to Tibet saw these two main strands of philosophical views in debate with each other. The first was the camp which defended the yogacara-madhyamaka interpretation (and thus, svatantrika) centered on the works of the scholars of the Sangphu monastery founded by Ngog Loden Sherab (1059–1109) and also includes Chapa Chokyi Senge (1109–1169).^[141]

The second camp was those who championed the work of Candrakirti over the yogacara-madhyamaka interpretation, and included Sangphu monk Patsab Nyima Drag (b. 1055) and Jayananda (fl 12th century).^[141] According to John Dunne, it was the madhyamaka interpretation and the works of Candrakirti which became dominant over time in Tibet.^[141]

Another very influential figure from this early period is Mabja Jangchub Tsöndrü (d. 1185), who wrote an important commentary on Nagarjuna's Mūlamadhyamakakārikā. Mabja was a student of both the Dharmakirtian Chapa and the Candrakirti scholar Patsab and his work shows an attempt to steer a middle course between their views. Mabja affirms the conventional usefulness of Buddhist pramāṇa, but also accepts Candrakirti's prasangika views.^[142] Mabja's Madhyamaka scholarship was very influential on later Tibetan Madhyamikas such as Longchenpa, Tsongkhapa, Gorampa, and Mikyö Dorje.^[142]

Prāsaṅgika and Svātantrika interpretations

In

The svātantrika states that conventional phenomena are understood to have a conventional essential existence, but without an ultimately existing essence. In this way they believe they are able to make positive or "autonomous" assertions using syllogistic logic because they are able to share a subject that is established as appearing in common – the proponent and opponent use the same kind of valid cognition to establish it. The name comes from this quality of being able to use autonomous arguments in debate.[144]

In contrast, the central technique avowed by the

Although presented as a divide in doctrine, the major difference between svātantrika and prasangika may be between two style of reasoning and arguing, while the division itself is exclusively Tibetan. Tibetan scholars were aware of alternative madhyamaka sub-classifications, but later Tibetan doxography emphasizes the nomenclature of prāsaṅgika versus svātantrika. No conclusive evidence can show the existence of an Indian antecedent, and it is not certain to what degree individual writers in Indian and Tibetan discussion held each of these views and if they held a view generally or only in particular instances. Both Prāsaṅgikas and Svātantrikas cited material in the āgamas in support of their arguments.^[146]

Further Tibetan philosophical developments began in response to the works of the scholar

Basing himself on the Indian Tathāgatagarbha sūtras as his main sources, Dolpopa described the Buddha Nature as:

[N]on-material emptiness, emptiness that is far from an annihilatory emptiness, great emptiness that is the ultimate pristine wisdom of superiors ...Buddha earlier than all Buddhas, ... causeless original Buddha.^[153]

This "great emptiness" i.e. the tathāgatagarbha is said to be filled with eternal powers and virtues:

[P]ermanent, stable, eternal, everlasting. Not compounded by causes and conditions, the matrix-of-one-gone-thus is intrinsically endowed with ultimate buddha qualities of body, speech, and mind such as the ten powers; it is not something that did not exist before and is newly produced; it is self-arisen.'^[154]

The Jonang position came to be known as [[Rangtong and shentong|"emptiness of other" (gzhan stong, shentong)]], because it held that the ultimate truth was positive reality that was not empty of its own nature, only empty of what it was other than itself.

Alternative interpretations of the shentong view is also taught outside of Jonang. Some

The Gelug school was founded in the beginning of the 15th century by Je Tsongkhapa (1357–1419).^[157] Tsongkhapa's conception of emptiness draws mainly from the works of "prāsaṅgika" Indian thinkers like Buddhapalita, Candrakirti, and Shantideva and he argued that only their interpretation of Nagarjuna was ultimately correct. According to José I. Cabezón, Tsongkhapa also argued that the ultimate truth or emptiness was "an absolute negation (med dgag)—the negation of inherent existence—and that nothing was exempt from being empty, including emptiness itself."^[155]

Tsongkhapa also maintained that the ultimate truth could be understood conceptually, an understanding which could later be transformed into a non-conceptual one. This conceptual understanding could only be done through the use of madhyamika reasoning, which he also sought to unify with the logical theories of Dharmakirti.^[155] Because of Tsongkhapa's view of emptiness as an absolute negation, he strongly attacked the other empty views of Dolpopa in his works. Tsongkhapa major work on madhyamaka is his commentary on the MMK called "Ocean of Reasoning".^[158]

According to Thupten Jinpa, Tsongkhapa's "doctrine of the object of negation" is one of his most innovative but also controversial ideas. Tsongkhapa pointed out that if one wants to steer a middle course between the extremes of "over-negation" (straying into nihilism) and "under-negation" (and thus reification), it is important to have a clear concept of exactly what is being negated in Madhyamaka analysis (termed "the object of negation").^[159][160]

According to Jay Garfield and Sonam Thakchoe, for Tsongkhapa, there are two aspects of the object of negation: "erroneous apprehension" ( phyin ci log gi ‘dzin pa) and "the existence of intrinsic nature thereby apprehended" (des bzung ba’i rang bzhin yod pa). The second aspect is an erroneously reified fiction which does not exist even conventionally. This is the fundamental object of negation for Tsongkhapa "since the reified object must first be negated in order to eliminate the erroneous subjective state".^[161]

Tsongkhapa's understanding of the object of negation (Tib. dgag bya) is subtle, and he describes one aspect of it as an "innate apprehension of self-existence". Thupten Jinpa glosses this as a belief that we have that leads us to "perceive things and events as possessing some kind of intrinsic existence and identity". Tsongkhapa's madhyamaka therefore, does not deny the conventional existence of things per se, but merely rejects our way of experiencing things as existing in an essentialist way, which are false projections or imputations.^[159] This is the root of ignorance, which for Tsongkhapa is an "active defiling agency" (Sk. kleśāvaraṇa) which projects a false sense of reality onto objects.^[159]

As Garfield and Thakchoe note, Tsongkhapa's view allows him to "preserve a robust sense of the reality of the conventional world in the context of emptiness and to provide an analysis of the relation between emptiness and conventional reality that makes clear sense of the identity of the two truths".^[162] Because conventional existence (or 'mere appearance') as an interdependent phenomenon devoid of inherent existence is not negated (khegs pa) or "rationally undermined" in his analysis, Tsongkhapa's approach was criticized by other Tibetan madhyamikas who preferred an anti-realist interpretation of madhyamaka.^[163]

Following Candrakirti, Tsongkhapa also rejected the yogacara view of mind only, and instead defended the conventional existence of external objects even though ultimately they are mere "thought constructions" (Tib. rtog pas btags tsam) of a deluded mind.^[160] Tsongkhapa also followed Candrakirti in rejecting svātantra ("autonomous") reasoning, arguing that it was enough to show the unwelcome consequences (prasaṅga) of essentialist positions.^[160]

Gelug scholarship has generally maintained and defended Tsongkhapa's positions up until the present day, even if there are lively debates considering issues of interpretation. Jamyang Sheba, Changkya Rölpé Dorjé, Gendun Chopel and the 14th Dalai Lama are some of the most influential modern figures in Gelug madhyamaka.

Sakya madhyamaka

The Sakya school has generally held a classic prāsaṅgika position following Candrakirti closely, though with significant differences from the Gelug. Sakya scholars of Madhyamika, such as Rendawa Shyönnu Lodrö (1349–1412) and Rongtön Sheja Kunrig (1367–1450) were early critics of the "other empty" view.^[164]

According to Cabezón, Gorampa called his version of madhyamaka "the middle way qua freedom from extremes" (mtha' bral dbu ma) or "middle way qua freedom from proliferations" (spros bral kyi dbu ma) and claimed that the ultimate truth was ineffable, beyond predication or concept.[166] Cabezón states that Gorampa's interpretation of madhyamaka is "committed to a more literal reading of the Indian sources than either Dolpopa's or Tsongkhapa's, which is to say that it tends to take the Indian texts at face value."^[167] For Gorampa, emptiness is not just the absence of inherent existence, but it is the absence of the four extremes in all phenomena i.e. existence, nonexistence, both and neither (see: catuskoti), without any further qualification.^[168]

In other words, conventional truths are also an object of negation, because as Gorampa states "they are not found at all when subjected to ultimate rational analysis".^[169] Hence, Gorampa's madhyamaka negates existence itself or existence without qualifications, while for Tsongkhapa, the object of negation is "inherent existence", "intrinsic existence" or "intrinsic nature".^[168]

In his Elimination of Erroneous Views (Lta ba ngan sel), Gorampa argues that madhyamaka ultimately negates "all false appearances", which means anything that appears to our mind (i.e. all conventional phenomena). Since all appearances are conceptually produced illusions, they must cease when conceptual reification is brought to an end by insight. This is the "ultimate freedom from conceptual fabrication" (don dam spros bral). To reach this, madhyamikas must negate "the reality of appearances".^[162] In other words, all conventional realities are fabrications and since awakening requires transcending all fabrication (spros bral), conventional reality must be negated.^[170] Thus, for Gorampa, all conventional knowledge is dualistic, being based on a false distinction between subject and object.^[171] Therefore, for Gorampa, madhyamaka analyzes all supposedly real phenomena and concludes through that analysis "that those things do not exist and so that so-called conventional reality is entirely nonexistent".^[169]

Regarding the Ultimate truth, Gorampa saw this as being divided into two parts:^[168]

• The emptiness that is reached by rational analysis (this is actually only an analogue, and not the real thing).
• The emptiness that yogis fathom by means of their own individual gnosis (prajña). This is the real ultimate truth, which is reached by negating the previous rational understanding of emptiness.

Unlike most orthodox Sakyas, the philosopher Sakya Chokden, a contemporary of Gorampa, also promoted a form of shentong as being complementary to rangtong. He saw shentong as useful for meditative practice, while rangtong as useful for cutting through views.^[172]

Comparison of the views of Tsongkhapa and Gorampa

As Garfield and Thakchoe note, for Tsongkhapa, conventional truth is "a kind of truth", "a way of being real" and "a kind of existence" while for Gorampa, the conventional is "entirely false", "unreal", "a kind of nonexistence" and "truth only from the perspective of fools".^[173]

Jay L. Garfield and Sonam Thakchoe outline the different competing models of Gorampa and Tsongkhapa as follows:^[174]

[Gorampa's]: The object of negation is the conventional phenomenon itself. Let us see how that plays out in an account of the status of conventional truth. Since ultimate truth—emptiness—is an external negation, and since an external negation eliminates its object while leaving nothing behind, when we say that a person is empty, we eliminate the person, leaving nothing else behind. To be sure, we must, as mādhyamikas, in agreement with ordinary persons, admit that the person exists conventionally despite not existing ultimately. But, if emptiness eliminates the person, that conventional existence is a complete illusion: The ultimate emptiness of the person shows that the person simply does not exist. It is no more actual than Santa Claus, the protestations of ordinary people and small children to the contrary notwithstanding.

[Tsongkhapa's]: The object of negation is not the conventional phenomenon itself but instead the intrinsic nature or intrinsic existence of the conventional phenomenon. The consequences of taking the object of negation this way are very different. On this account, when we say that the person does not exist ultimately, what is eliminated by its ultimate emptiness is its intrinsic existence. No other intrinsic identity is projected in the place of that which was undermined by emptiness, even emptiness or conventional reality. But the person is not thereby eliminated. Its conventional existence is therefore, on this account, simply its existence devoid of intrinsic identity as an interdependent phenomenon. On this view, conventional reality is no illusion; it is the actual mode of existence of actual things.

According to Garfield and Thakchoe each of these "radically distinct views" on the nature of the two truths "has scriptural support, and indeed each view can be supported by citations from different passages of the same text or even slightly different contextual interpretations of the same passage".^[175]

Kagyu

In the Kagyu tradition, there is a broad field of opinion on the nature of emptiness, with some holding the "other empty" (shentong) view while others holding different positions. One influential Kagyu thinker was Rangjung Dorje, 3rd Karmapa Lama. His view synthesized madhyamaka and yogacara perspectives. According to Karl Brunnholzl, regarding his position in the rangtong-shentong debate he "can be said to regard these two as not being mutually exclusive and to combine them in a creative synthesis".^[176] However, Rangjung Dorje never uses these terms in any of his works and thus any claims to him being a promoter of shentong or otherwise is a later interpretation.^[177]

Several Kagyu figures disagree with the view that shentong is a form of madhyamaka. According to Brunnholzl,

Mikyö Dorje also argues that the language of other emptiness does not appear in any of the sutras or the treatises of the Indian masters. He attacks the view of Dolpopa as being against the sutras of ultimate meaning which state that all phenomena are emptiness as well as being against the treatises of the Indian masters.^[179] Mikyö Dorje rejects both perspectives of rangtong and shentong as true descriptions of ultimate reality, which he sees as being "the utter peace of all discursiveness regarding being empty and not being empty".^[180]

One of the most influential Kagyu philosophers in recent times was Jamgön Kongtrul Lodrö Taye (1813–1899) who advocated a system of shentong madhyamaka and held that primordial wisdom was "never empty of its own nature and it is there all the time".^[181][182]

The modern Kagyu teacher Khenpo Tsultrim (1934–), in his Progressive Stages of Meditation on Emptiness, presents five stages of meditation, which he relates to five tenet systems.^[183] He holds the "Shentong Madhyamaka" as the highest view, above prasangika. He sees this as a meditation on Paramarthasatya ("Absolute Reality"),^{[184][note 15]} Buddhajnana,^{[note 16]} which is beyond concepts, and described by terms as "truly existing".^[186] This approach helps "to overcome certain residual subtle concepts",^[186] and "the habit – fostered on the earlier stages of the path – of negating whatever experience arises in his/her mind."^[187] It destroys false concepts, as does prasangika, but it also alerts the practitioner "to the presence of a dynamic, positive Reality that is to be experienced once the conceptual mind is defeated."^[187]

Nyingma

In the

According to Sonam Thakchoe, the ultimate truth in the Nyingma tradition, following Longchenpa, is that "reality which transcends any mode of thinking and speech, one that unmistakenly appears to the nonerroneous cognitive processes of the exalted and awakened beings" and this is said to be "inexpressible beyond words and thoughts" as well as the reality that is the "transcendence of all elaborations.^[188]

The most influential modern Nyingma scholar is

This ultimate truth is associated with the Dzogchen concept of Rigpa. While it might seem that this system conflicts with the traditional madhyamaka interpretation, for Mipham this is not so. For while the traditional model which sees emptiness and ultimate truth as a negation is referring to the analysis of experience, the second Dzogchen influenced model refers to the experience of unity in meditation.^[189] Douglas Duckworth sees Mipham's work as an attempt to bring together the two main Mahayana philosophical systems of yogacara and madhyamaka, as well as shentong and rangtong into a coherent system in which both are seen as being of definitive meaning.^[190]

Regarding the svatantrika prasangika debate,

Sānlùn school

Sānlùn figures like Kumārajīva's pupil Sengzhao (384–414), and the later Jizang (549–623) were influential in restoring a more orthodox and non-essentialist interpretation of emptiness to Chinese Buddhism. Yin Shun (1906–2005) is one modern figure aligned with Sānlùn.

Sengzhao is often seen as the founder of Sānlùn. He was influenced not just by Indian madhyamaka and Mahayana sutras like the Vimalakirti, but also by Taoist works and he widely quotes the Lao-tzu and the Chuang-tzu and uses terminology of the Neo-Daoist "Mystery Learning" (xuanxue 玄学) tradition while maintaining a uniquely Buddhist philosophical view.^[192][193] In his essay "The Emptiness of the Non-Absolute" (buzhenkong, 不眞空), Sengzhao points out that the nature of phenomena cannot be taken as being either existent or inexistent:

Hence, there are indeed reasons why myriad dharmas are inexistent and cannot be taken as existent; there are reasons why [myriad dharmas] are not inexistent and cannot be taken as inexistent. Why? If we would say that they exist, their existent is not real; if we would say that they don't exist, their phenomenal forms have taken shape. Having forms and shapes, they are not inexistent. Being not real, they are not truly existent. Hence the meaning of bu zhen kong [not really empty, 不眞空] is made manifest.^[194]

Sengzhao saw the central problem in understanding emptiness as the discriminatory activity of prapañca. According to Sengzhao, delusion arises through a dependent relationship between phenomenal things, naming, thought and reification and correct understanding lies outside of words and concepts. Thus, while emptiness is the lack of intrinsic self in all things, this emptiness is not itself an absolute and cannot be grasped by the conceptual mind, it can be only be realized through non-conceptual wisdom (prajña).^[195]

Jizang (549–623) was another central figure in Chinese madhyamaka who wrote numerous commentaries on Nagarjuna and Aryadeva and is considered to be the leading representative of the school.^[196] Jizang called his method "deconstructing what is misleading and revealing what is corrective". He insisted that one must never settle on any particular viewpoint or perspective but constantly reexamine one's formulations to avoid reifications of thought and behavior.^[196] In his commentary on the MMK, Jizang's method and understanding of emptiness can be seen:

The abhidharma thinkers regard the four holy truths as true. The Satyasiddhi regards merely the truth of cessation of suffering, i.e., the principle of emptiness and equality, as true. The southern Mahāyāna tradition regards the principle that refutes truths as true, and the northern [Mahāyāna tradition] regards thatness [suchness] and prajñā as true... Examining these all together, if there is a single [true] principle, it is an eternal view, which is false. If there is no principle at all, it is an evil view, which is also false. Being both existent and non-existent consists of the eternal and nihilistic views altogether. Being neither existent nor nonexistent is a foolish view. One replete with these four phrases has all [wrong] views. One without these four phrases has a severe nihilistic view. Now that [one] does not know how to name what a mind has nothing to rely upon and is free from conceptual construction, [he] foists "thatness" [suchness] upon it, one attains sainthood of the three vehicles... Being deluded in regard to thatness [suchness], one falls into the six realms of disturbed life and death.^[197]

In one of his early treatises called "The Meaning of the two Truths" (Erdiyi), Jizang, expounds the steps to realize the nature of the ultimate truth of emptiness as follows:

In the first step, one recognises reality of the phenomena on the conventional level, but assumes their non-reality on the ultimate level. In the second step, one becomes aware of Being or Non-Being on the conventional level and negates both at the ultimate level. In the third step, one either asserts or negates Being and Non-Being on the conventional level, neither confi rming nor rejecting them on the ultimate level. Hence, there is ultimately no assertion or negation anymore; therefore, on the conventional level, one becomes free to accept or reject anything.^[198]

In the modern era, there has been a revival of mādhyamaka in Chinese Buddhism. A major figure in this revival is the scholar monk Yin Shun (1906–2005).^[199] Yin Shun emphasized the study of Indian Buddhist sources as primary and his books on mādhyamaka had a profound influence on modern Chinese madhyamika scholarship.^[200] He argued that the works of Nagarjuna were "the inheritance of the conceptualisation of dependent arising as proposed in the Agamas" and he thus based his mādhyamaka interpretations on the Agamas rather than on Chinese scriptures and commentaries.^[201] He saw the writings of Nagarjuna as the correct Buddhadharma while considering the writings of the Sānlùn school as being corrupted due to their synthesizing of the Tathagata-garbha doctrine into madhyamaka.^[202]

Many modern Chinese mādhyamaka scholars such as Li Zhifu, Yang Huinan and Lan Jifu have been students of Yin Shun.^[203]

Chán

The Chán/Zen-tradition emulated madhyamaka-thought via the San-lun Buddhists, influencing its supposedly "illogical" way of communicating "absolute truth".^[10] The madhyamika of Sengzhao for example, influenced the views of the Chan patriarch Shen Hui (670–762), a critical figure in the development of Chan, as can be seen by his "Illuminating the Essential Doctrine" (Hsie Tsung Chi). This text emphasizes that true emptiness or Suchness cannot be known through thought since it is free from thought (wu-nien):^[204]

Thus we come to realize that both selves and things are, in their essence, empty, and existence and non-existence both disappear.

Mind is fundamentally non-action; the way is truly no-thought (wu-nien).

There is no thought, no reflection, no seeking, no attainment, no this, no that, no coming, no going.

Shen Hui also states that true emptiness is not nothing, but it is a "Subtle Existence" (miao-yu), which is just "Great Prajña."^[204]

Western Buddhism

Thich Nhat Hanh

The yogacara school was the other major Mahayana philosophical school (darsana) in India and its complex relationship with madhyamaka changed over time. The Saṃdhinirmocana sūtra, perhaps the earliest Yogacara text, proclaims itself as being above the doctrine of emptiness taught in other sutras. According to Paul Williams, the Saṃdhinirmocana claims that other sutras that teach emptiness as well as madhyamika teachings on emptiness are merely skillful means and thus are not definitive (unlike the final teachings in the Saṃdhinirmocana).^[206]

As Mark Siderits points out, yogacara authors like Asanga were careful to point out that the doctrine of emptiness required interpretation in lieu of their three natures theory which posits an inexpressible ultimate that is the object of a Buddha's cognition.^[207] Asanga also argued that one cannot say that all things are empty unless there are things to be seen as either empty or non-empty in the first place.^[208]

In the Bodhisattvabhumi's Tattvartha chapter, Asanga attacks the view which states "the truth is that all is just conceptual fictions" by stating:

As for their view, due to the absence of the thing itself which serves as basis of the concept, conceptual fictions must all likewise absolutely not exist. How then will it be true that all is just conceptual fictions? Through this conception on their part, reality, conceptual fiction, and the two together are all denied. Because they deny both conceptual fiction and reality, they should be considered the nihilist-in-chief.^[209]

Asanga also critiqued madhyamaka because he held that it could lead to a laxity in the following of ethical precepts as well as for being "imaginatively constructed views that are arrived at only through reasoning".^[209] He further states:

How, again, is emptiness wrongly conceptualized? Some ascetics and Brahmins do not acknowledge that [viz. intrinsic nature] of which something is empty. Nor do they acknowledge that which is empty [viz. things and dharmas]. It is in this way that emptiness is said to be wrongly conceived. For what reason? Because that of which it is empty is non-existent, but that which is empty is existent— it is thus that emptiness is possible. What will be empty of what, where, when everything is unreal? This thing's being devoid of that is not [then] possible. Thus emptiness is wrongly conceptualized in this case.

Asanga also wrote that:

if nothing is real, there cannot be any ideas (prajñapti). Someone who holds this view is a nihilist, with whom one should not speak or share living quarters. This person falls into a bad rebirth and takes others with him.^[210]

Vasubandhu also states that emptiness does not mean that things have no intrinsic nature, but that this nature is "inexpressible and only to be apprehended by a kind of cognition that transcends the subject-object duality".^[207]

Thus early yogacarins were engaged in a project to reinterpret the radical madhyamaka view of emptiness. Later yogacarins like

However, yogacara authors also commented on madhyamaka texts. As noted by Garfield, "Asaṅga, Sthiramati, and Guṇamati composed commentaries on the foundational text of madhyamaka, Nāgārjuna's Mūlamadhyamakakārikā."[215] An MMK commentary by the Indian Yogacara philosopher Sthiramati also survives in Chinese translation, the Commentary on the Mahāyāna Madhyamaka (Dasheng zhongguan shilun 大乘中觀釋論) which comments on the text from a Yogacara point of view.^[216][217] Dharmapala also composed a commentary on the Four-Hundred Verses (Catuḥśataka) of Āryadeva, the Commentary on the Four-Hundred Verses (Dasheng guang bailun shilun 大乘廣百論 釋論; T1571, in 10 fascicles).^[218] This shows that yogacara authors did not necessarily see their project as a rejection of Nagarjuna's Madhyamaka, but as an expansion of its insights.^[215]

Advaita Vedanta

Several modern scholars have argued that the early

Richard King notes that the fourth prakarana of the Gaudapadiyakarika promotes several Mahayana Buddhist ideas, such as a middle way free from extremes, not being attached to dharmas and it even references beings called "Buddhas". King notes that this could be an attempt to either reach a rapprochement with Buddhists or to woo Buddhists over to Vedanta.^[229] However, King adds that "from a Madhyamaka perspective, the Gaudapadiyakarika's acceptance of an unchanging Absolute supporting the world of appearances is a mistaken form of eternalism, despite Gaudapadian protestations to the contrary."^[229]

Shankara (early 8th century), a later Advaitin, directly dismissed madhyamaka as irrational and nihilistic, stating that it was a kind of nihilism that held that "absolutely nothing exists" and that this view:^{[227][230][231]}

is contradicted by all means of right knowledge and requires no special refutation. For this apparent world, whose existence is guaranteed by all means of knowledge, cannot be denied, unless some one should find out some new truth (based on which he could impugn its existence) – for a general principle is proved by the absence of contrary instances.

This critique was upheld by most post Shankara Advaitins. However this did not prevent later

Modern scholars such as Jeffery Long have also noted that the influential Jain philosopher Kundakunda (2nd CE century CE or later) also adopted a theory of two truths, possibly under the influence of Nagarjuna.^[232] According to W. J. Johnson he also adopts other Buddhist terms like prajña under the influence of Nagarjuna, though he applies the term to knowledge of the Self (jiva), which is also the ultimate perspective (niścayanaya), which is distinguished from the worldly perspective (vyavahāranaya).^[233]

The Jain philosopher Haribhadra also mentions madhyamaka. In both the Yogabindu and the Yogadrstisamuccaya, Haribhadra singles out Nagarjuna's claim that samsara and nirvana are not different for criticism, labeling the view a "fantasy".^[234]

Taoism

It is well known that medieval Chinese Taoism was influenced by Mahayana Buddhism. One particular school, the Chongxuan (重玄, "Twofold Mystery") founded by Cheng Xuanying (fl.632–650), was particularly involved in borrowing and adapting madhyamaka concepts like emptiness, the two truths and the catuskoti into their Taoist philosophical system.^[193]

Modern scholarship

As noted by Ruegg, Western scholarship has given a broad variety of interpretations of madhyamaka, including: "

Modern interpreters differ among themselves about the correct way to read it as least as much as canonical interpreters. Nagarjuna has been read as an idealist (Murti 1960), a nihilist (Wood 1994), a skeptic (Garfield 1995), a pragmatist (Kalupahana 1986), and as a mystic (Streng 1967). He has been regarded as a critic of logic (Inada 1970), as a defender of classical logic (Hayes 1994), and as a pioneer of paraconsistent logic (Garfield and Priest 2003).[236]

These interpretations "reflect almost as much about the viewpoints of the scholars involved as do they reflect the content of Nāgārjuna's concepts".^[237]

According to Andrew Tuck, the Western study of Nagarjuna's madhyamaka can be divided into three phases:^[238]

1. The Kantian phase, exemplified by Theodore Stcherbatsky's "The Conception of Buddhist Nirvāna" (1927) who argued that Nagarjuna divides the world into appearance (samsara) and an absolute noumenal reality (nirvana). This is also seen in T. R. V. Murti's 1955 "The Central Philosophy of Buddhism".
2. The analytic phase, exemplified by Richard Robinson's 1957 article "Some Logical Aspects of Nāgārjuna's System", sought to explain madhyamaka using analytic philosophy's logical apparatus.
3. The post-Wittgensteinian phase, exemplified by
   Frederick Streng's "Emptiness" and Chris Gudmunsen's "Wittgenstein and Buddhism", "set out to stress similarities between Nāgārjuna and in particular the later Wittgenstein
   and his criticism of analytic philosophy."

The Sri Lankan philosopher David Kalupahana meanwhile saw madhyamaka as a response to certain essentialist philosophical tendencies which had arisen after the time of the Buddha and sees it as a restoration of the early Buddhist middle way pragmatist position.^[239][117] Among the critical voices, Richard P. Hayes (influenced by Richard Robinson's view that Nagarjuna's logic fails modern tests for validity) interprets the works of Nagarjuna as "primitive" and guilty "errors in reasoning" such as that of equivocation. Hayes states that Nagarjuna was relying on the different meanings of the word svabhava to make statements which were not logical and that his work relies on various "fallacies and tricks".^[240][241] William Magee strongly disagrees with Hayes, referring to Tsonghkhapa's interpretation of Nagarjuna to argue that Hayes misidentifies Nagarjuna's understanding of the different meanings of the term svabhava.^[242]

Many recent western scholars (such as Garfield,^[243] Napper,^[244] Hopkins,^[245]) have tended to adopt a Gelug Prāsaṅgika influenced interpretation of madhyamaka. However, American philosopher Mark Siderits is one exception, who has attempted to defend the Svātantrika position as a coherent and rational interpretation of madhyamaka.^[246]

C.W. Huntington meanwhile has been particularly critical of the modern Western attempt to read Nagarjuna "through the lens of modern

Another recent interpreter, Jan Westerhoff, argues that madhyamaka is a kind of anti-foundationalism, "which does not just deny the objective, intrinsic, and mind-independent existence of some class of objects, but rejects such existence for any kinds of objects that we could regard as the most fundamental building-blocks of the world".^[247]

See also

Notes

References

Published references

1. ^ Williams 2000, p. 140.
2. OCLC 643092515. Archived
   from the original on 28 May 2022. Retrieved 5 July 2022.
3. ^ ^{a b} Wynne, Alexander (2015) Early Buddhist Teaching as Proto-śūnyavāda. Journal of the Oxford Centre for Buddhist Studies, 6. pp. 213-241.
4. ^ Brunnholzl 2004, p. 29-30.
5. ^
   ISBN 9780199340378
   .
6. ISBN 9780199340378. Archived
   from the original on 19 February 2019. Retrieved 30 May 2021.
7. OCLC 643092515. Archived
   from the original on 20 June 2022. Retrieved 5 July 2022.
8. ^ Brunnholzl 2004, p. 70.
9. ^ Brunnholzl 2004, p. 590.
10. ^ ^{a b c d e} Cheng 1981.
11. ^ ^{a b} Garfield 1994.
12. ^ ^{a b} Garfield 2012.
13. ^ Discourse to Katyāyana - Kātyāyanaḥ SF 168. Tripathi 1962: 167–170 (19). Translated by Jayarava. suttacentral.net
14. ^ Sanskrit: lokasamudayaṁ kātyāyana yathābhūtaṁ samyakprajñayā paśyato yā loke nāstitā sā na bhavati | lokanirodhaṁ yathābhūtaṁ samyakprajñayā paśyato yā loke ’stitā sā na bhavati | ity etāv ubhāv antāv anupagamya madhyamayā pratipadā tathāgato dharmaṁ deśayati | yad utāsmin satīdaṁ bhavaty asyotpādād idam utpadyate | yad utāvidyāpratyayāḥ saṁskārā iti pūrvavad yāvat samudayo nirodhaś ca bhavati |
15. ^ ^{a b c} Westerhoff 2009, p. 12, 25.
16. ^ Siderits, Mark, Buddhism as philosophy, p. 180.
17. ^ ^{a b} Westerhoff, Jan Christoph (10 February 2010). "Nāgārjuna". In Edward N. Zalta (ed.). The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2018 Edition). Retrieved 2021-04-02.
18. ^ Hayes 2003, p. 4.
19. ^ Westerhoff 2009, p. 30.
20. ^ Westerhoff 2009, p. 200.
21. ^ ^{a b c d e} Warder 2000, p. 361.
22. ^ Westerhoff 2009, p. 45.
23. ^ Westerhoff 2009, p. 13.
24. ^ Westerhoff 2009, p. 48.
25. ^ Warder 2000, p. 360.
26. ^ Kalupahana 1994, p. 162.
27. ^ ^{a b c} Hayes 1994, p. 317.
28. ^ Kalupahana 1994, p. 165.
29. ^ Hayes 1994, p. 316.
30. ^ Harvey 1995, p. 97.
31. ^ Kalupahana 1994, p. 165, 162.
32. ^ Tsondru 2011, p. 40–41, 322–333.
33. ^ Bronkhorst 2009, p. 146.
34. ^ ^{a b} Rje Tsong Khapa; Garfield, Jay; Geshe Ngawang Samten (translators), Ocean of Reasoning: A Great Commentary on Nagarjuna's Mulamadhyamakakarika, Oxford University Press, 2006, p. xx.
35. ^ ^{a b} Brunnholzl 2004, p. 73.
36. ^ Brunnholzl 2004, p. 80, 83.
37. ^ ^{a b c} Cowherds 2010, p. 11-13.
38. ^ Brunnholzl 2004, p. 81.
39. ^ Bronkhorst 2009, p. 149.
40. ^ Kahn, Susan (11 September 2014). "The Two Truths of Buddhism and The Emptiness of Emptiness". Emptiness Teachings. Retrieved 2021-04-02.
41. ^ ^{a b} Brunnholzl, 2004, p. 74.
42. ^ Brunnholzl 2004, p. 79.
43. ^ Tsongkhapa, Garfield, The Great Treatise on the Stages of the Path to Enlightenment (Volume 3), 2002, p. 210.
44. ^ Hayes 2003, p. 8-9.
45. ^ Williams 2002, p. 147.
46. ^ Brunnholzl 2004, p. 111.
47. ^ Brunnholzl 2004, p. 75.
48. ^ Brunnholzl 2004, p. 76.
49. ^ Brunnholzl 2004, p. 76-77.
50. ^ Brunnholzl 2004, p. 84.
51. ^ Brunnholzl 2004, p. 83-84.
52. ^ Brunnholzl 2004, p. 89.
53. ISBN 978-81-208-1592-6
    .
54. ISBN 978-81-208-0764-8., Quote: "Already in India, 'sunyata' was liable to be misunderstood as nothingness or nihil'. (...) The Sarvastivadins
    of Hinayana Buddhism viewed the madhyamika school as 'one that argues that everything is nothing. (...) It is only natural that most of the Western scholars call the prajnaparamita sutra or the doctrine of the madhyamika school nihilism since criticisms were already expressed in India. Against such criticisms, however, Nagarjuna, founder of the madhyamika school says, 'you are ignorant of the function of sunyata, the meaning of the sunyata and sunyata itself'."
55. ISBN 978-81-85636-47-4
    .
56. ^ Brunnholzl 2004, p. 212.
57. ^ ^{a b} Walser 2005, p. 239.
58. ^ Jorge Noguera Ferrer, Revisioning Transpersonal Theory: A Participatory Vision of Human Spirituality. SUNY Press, 2002, page 102-103.
59. David J. Kalupahana
    , Mulamadhyamakakarika of Nagarjuna: The Philosophy of the Middle Way. SUNY Press, 1986, pages 48-50.
60. ^ Williams 2002, p. 141.
61. ^ Williams 2000, p. 142.
62. ^ ^{a b c} Tsondru 2011, p. 56–58, 405–417.
63. ^ Williams 2002, p. 151–152.
64. ^ unclear
65. ^ ^{a b c d} Garfield 1995, p. 88 footnote.
66. ^ Brunnholzl 2004, p. 174-175.
67. ^ Brunnholzl 2004, p. 199.
68. ^ Brunnholzl 2004, p. 200.
69. ^
    doi:10.1007/s10781-008-9045-9
70. ^ Brunnholzl 2004, p. 202.
71. ^ Brunnholzl 2004, p. 203.
72. ^ Brunnholzl 2004, p. 203-204.
73. ^ Brunnholzl 2004, p. 202-203.
74. ^ Brunnholzl 2004, p. 217.
75. ^ ^{a b} Brunnholzl 2004, p. 206.
76. ^ ^{a b} Garfield 1995, p. 102.
77. ^ ^{a b} Westerhoff 2009, p. 47.
78. ^ Bronkhorst 2009, p. 148.
79. ^ Brunnholzl 2004, p. 295-310.
80. ^ Brunnholzl 2004, p. 310.
81. ^ Brunnholzl 2004, p. 108.
82. ^ Williams 2002, p. 146.
83. ^ Brunnholzl 2004, p. 218.
84. ^ Brunnholzl 2004, p. 34.
85. ^ Jorge Noguera Ferrer, Revisioning Transpersonal Theory: A Participatory Vision of Human Spirituality. SUNY Press, 2002, pages 102. The quote is from the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā.
86. ^ Randall Collins, The Sociology of Philosophies: A Global Theory of Intellectual Change. Harvard University Press, 2000, pages 221-222.
87. ^ Brunnholzl 2004, p. 172.
88. ^ Brunnholzl 2004, p. 219.
89. ^ Brunnholzl 2004, p. 221.
90. ^ Brunnholzl 2004, p. 160.
91. ^ Brunnholzl 2004, p. 209.
92. ^ Warder 2000, p. 358.
93. ^ ^{a b c d} Walser 2005, p. 185.
94. ^ Walser 2005, p. 186–187.
95. ^ Gomez 1976.
96. ^ Vetter 1988.
97. ^ Fuller 2005.
98. ^ Wynne 2007, p. 75.
99. ^ Gelongma Karma Migme Chodron (trans from French); Lamotte, Etienne (trans). The Treatise on the Great Virtue of Wisdom, Volume V (Traite de la Grande Vertu de Sagesse de Nagarjuna (Mahaprajnaparamitasastra), Tome V), pp. 52-54.
100. ^ ^{a b} Walser 2005, p. 225.
101. ^ ^{a b c} Ronkin, Noa (16 August 2010). "Abhidharma". In Edward N. Zalta (ed.). The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2018 Edition). Retrieved 2021-04-02.
102. ^ Walser 2005, p. 227.
103. ^ ^{a b} Walser 2005, p. 234.
104. ^ ^{a b c} Ruegg, David Seyfort, ''The Literature of the Madhyamaka School of Philosophy in India,'' Otto Harrassowitz Verlag, 1981, p. 7.
105. ^ ^{a b} Walser 2005, p. 170.
106. ^ Adrian Kuzminski, Pyrrhonism: How the Ancient Greeks Reinvented Buddhism 2008
107. ^ Thomas McEvilley, The Shape of Ancient Thought 2002 pp499-505
108. ^ https://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:347ed882-f7ac-4098-908f-5bb391462a6c/download_file?file_format=pdf&safe_filename=THESIS01&type_of_work=Thesis ^{[bare URL PDF]}
109. ^ Archived at Ghostarchive and the Wayback Machine: "Sextus Empiricus and Madhyamaka at Oxford's Oriental Institute". YouTube.
110. ISBN 9781400866328
     .
111. ^ Westerhoff 2009, p. 4.
112. ^ ^{a b} Westerhoff 2009, p. 5–6.
113. ^ Wasler, Joseph. Nagarjuna in Context. New York: Columibia University Press. 2005, pgs. 225-263.
114. ^ ^{a b} Kalupahana 1992, p. 120.
115. ^ Tsondru 2011, p. 66–71, 447–477.
116. ^ Williams 2002, p. 142.
117. ^ ^{a b} Kalupahana 1994.
118. ^ Ruegg 1981, p. 49, 54.
119. ^ Warder 2000, p. 368.
120. ^ ^{a b} Rizzi 1988, p. 2.
121. ^ Ruegg 1981, p. 47–48.
122. ^ Bocking B; (1995) Nagarjuna in China: A Translation of the Middle Treatise. Lewiston & Lampeter. University of Bristol Centre for Buddhist Studies Series: The Edwin Mellen Press.
123. ^ ^{a b c d e f} Hayes, Richard (6 November 2010). "Madhyamaka". In Edward N. Zalta (ed.). The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2017 Edition). Retrieved 2021-04-02.
124. ^ Newland 2009, p. 78.
125. ^ Newland 2009, p. 79.
126. ^ ^{a b} Garfield, Jay; Edelglass, William; The Oxford Handbook of World philosophy
127. ^ Newland 2009, p. 80.
128. ^ ^{a b} Ruegg 1981, p. 67.
129. ^ Bhikshu Dharmamitra (trans.). The Bodhisambhara Treatise Commentary. An Early Indian Commentary on Nagarjuna's Bodhisambhara Shastra By the Early Indian monk, Bhikshu Vasitva (ca 300-500 ce), Kalavinka press.
130. ^ Rizzi 1988, p. 5.
131. ^ Ruegg 1981, p. 85.
132. ^ Ruegg 1981, p. 119.
133. ^ Watanabe, Chikafumi (1998). "A Translation of the Madhyamakahrdayakarika with the Tarkajvala III. 137-146". Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies. 21 (1).
134. ^ Ruegg 1981, p. 88.
135. ^ Shantarakshita 2005, p. 117-122.
136. ^ Blumenthal, James, The Ornament of the Middle Way A Study of the Madhyamaka Thought of Santaraksita, Snow Lion, 2004, p. 245.
137. ^ Ruegg 1981, p. 104.
138. ^ Ruegg 1981, p. 109.
139. ^ Brunnholzl 2004, p. 51.
140. ^ Apple, James B. (2019). Jewels of the Middle Way: The Madhyamaka Legacy of Atisa and His Early Tibetan Followers, Introduction, pp 1-62. Simon and Schuster.
141. ^ ^{a b c} Dunne, John D. (2011). "Madhyamaka in India and Tibet." In Oxford Handbook of World Philosophy." Edited by J. Garfield and W. Edelglass. Oxford: Oxford University Press: 206-221.
142. ^ ^{a b} Reason and Experience in Tibetan Buddhism: Mabja Jangchub Tsöndrü and the Traditions of the Middle Way Reviewed by Adam C. Krug. Journal of Buddhist Ethics ISSN 1076-9005 http://blogs.dickinson.edu/buddhistethics Volume 22, 2015
143. ^ Brunnholzl 2004, p. 333.
144. ^ ^{a b c d} Shantarakshita 2005, p. 131-141.
145. ^ Cornu 2001, p. 138.
146. ^ Gombrich 1996, p. 27-28.
147. ^ Cornu 2001, p. 145, 150.
148. ISBN 9781559393430
     . Retrieved 2 May 2015.
149. ^ Hopkins, 2006.
150. ^ Hopkins, 2006, pp 8-15
151. ^ Brunnholzl 2009, p. 108.
152. ^ Stearns, Cyrus (1999), The Buddha from Dolpo: A Study of the Life and Thought of the Tibetan Master Dolpopa Sherab Gyaltsen, State University of New York Press, p. 82.
153. ^ Hopkins 2006, p. 14.
154. ^ Hopkins 2006, p. 8.
155. ^ ^{a b c} Cabezón & Dargyay 2013, p. 29.
156. ^ Brunnholzl 2004, p. 502.
157. ^ Snelling 1987, p. 207.
158. ^ rJe Tsong Kha Pa 2006.
159. ^ ^{a b c} Learman, Oliver (editor), Encyclopedia of Asian Philosophy, Routledge, 2001, p. 374.
160. ^ ^{a b c} Sparham, Gareth (18 July 2011). "Tsongkhapa". In Edward N. Zalta (ed.). The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2017 Edition). Retrieved 2021-04-02.
161. ^ Cowherds 2010, p. 76.
162. ^ ^{a b} Cowherds 2010, p. 82.
163. ^ Cowherds 2010, p. 77.
164. ^ Cabezón & Dargyay 2013, p. 30.
165. ^ Kassor, Constance (2 May 2011). "Gorampa [go rams pa]". In Edward N. Zalta (ed.). The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2017 Edition). Retrieved 2021-04-02.
166. ^ Cabezón & Dargyay 2013, p. 46–48.
167. ^ Cabezón & Dargyay 2013, p. 49.
168. ^ ^{a b c} Cabezón & Dargyay 2013, p. 50.
169. ^ ^{a b} Cowherds 2010, p. 84.
170. ^ Cowherds 2010, p. 86.
171. ^ Cowherds 2010, p. 83.
172. ^ Brunnholzl 2009, p. 107.
173. ^ Cowherds 2010, p. 74, 75, 87.
174. ^ Cowherds 2010, p. 75-76.
175. ^ Cowherds 2010, p. 87.
176. ^ Brunnholzl 2009, p. 99.
177. ^ Brunnholzl 2009, p. 114.
178. ^ Brunnholzl 2004, p. 446.
179. ^ Brunnholzl 2004, p. 447.
180. ^ Brunnholzl 2004, p. 448.
181. ^ Brunnholzl 2004, p. 501.
182. ^ Ringu Tulku, The Ri-me Philosophy of Jamgon Kongtrul the Great: A Study of the Buddhist Lineages of Tibet 2007, p 219.
183. ^ Hookham 1991, p. 19-26.
184. ^ Hookham 1991, p. 21.
185. ^ ^{a b c} Hookham 1991, p. 37.
186. ^ ^{a b} Hookham 1991, p. 22.
187. ^ ^{a b} Hookham 1991, p. 23.
188. ^ ^{a b} Thakchoe, Sonam (17 February 2011). "The Theory of Two Truths in Tibet". In Edward N. Zalta (ed.). The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2017 Edition). Retrieved 2021-04-02.
189. ^ Duckworth; Jamgon Mipam, His life and teachings, Pg 81.
190. ^ Duckworth, Jamgon Mipam, His life and teachings, 82.
191. ^ Arnold, Dan, Madhyamaka Buddhist Philosophy, Internet Encyclopedia of philosophy.
192. ^ Liebenthal, Walter, Chao-Lun The Treatises of Seng Chao, 1968, p. 8.
193. ^ ^{a b} Ozkan 2013.
194. ^ Ozkan 2013, p. 24.
195. ^ Dippmann, Jeffrey, Sengzhao (Seng-Chao c. 378—413 C.E.), Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
196. ^ ^{a b} Fox, Alan, Self-reflection in the Sanlun Tradition: Madhyamika as the "Deconstructive Conscience" of Buddhism, Journal of Chinese Philosophy V. 19 (1992) pp. 1-24.
197. ^ Ozkan 2013, p. 25.
198. ^ Scherer, Burkhard, Review of The Two Truths in Chinese Buddhism, Chang-Qing Shih (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 2004) (Buddhist Tradition Series. 55). Buddhist studies review
199. ^ Travagnin 2009.
200. ^ Travagnin 2009, p. 155.
201. ^ Travagnin 2009, p. 28, 65, 85.
202. ^ Travagnin 2009, p. 174.
203. ^ Travagnin 2009, p. 159.
204. ^ ^{a b} Zeuschner, Robert B., The Hsie Tsung Chi (An Early Ch'an (Zen) Buddhist Text) Journal of Chinese Philosophy V. 3 (1976) pp. 253-268.
205. ^ Thich Nhat Hanh 1988.
206. ^ Williams 2009, p. 86.
207. ^ ^{a b} Garfield & Westerhoff 2015, p. 115.
208. ^ Garfield & Westerhoff 2015, p. 116.
209. ^ ^{a b} Garfield & Westerhoff 2015, p. 117.
210. ^ Garfield & Westerhoff 2015, p. 129.
211. ^ Williams 2009, p. 88.
212. ^ Garfield & Westerhoff 2015, p. 127.
213. ^ Garfield & Westerhoff 2015, p. 131.
214. ^ Garfield & Westerhoff 2015, p. 135.
215. ^ ^{a b} Garfield & Westerhoff 2015, p. 6.
216. ^ Edelglass, William; Harter, Pierre-Julien; McClintock, Sara (2022). The Routledge Handbook of Indian Buddhist Philosophy (Routledge Handbooks in Philosophy), p. 377.
217. ^ Nguyen, Cuong Tu. "Sthiramati's Interpretation of Buddhology and Soteriology." PhD diss., pp. 33-39. Harvard University, 1990.
218. ^ Edelglass, William; Harter, Pierre-Julien; McClintock, Sara (2022). The Routledge Handbook of Indian Buddhist Philosophy (Routledge Handbooks in Philosophy), pp. 361-362.
219. ^ ^{a b} Renard 2010, p. 157.
220. ^ Comans 2000, p. 35-36.
221. ^ ^{a b} Bhattacharya 1943, p. 49.
222. ^ Renard 2010, p. 160.
223. ^ Suzuki 1999.
224. ^ Suzuki 1999, p. 123-124.
225. ^ Suzuki 1999, p. 168.
226. ^ ^{a b c} Sarma 1996, p. 127.
227. ^ ^{a b} Ben-Ami Scharfstein, A Comparative History of World Philosophy: From the Upanishads to Kant, p 380.
228. ^ ^{a b} Comans 2000, p. 36.
229. ^ ^{a b} King, Richard, Early Advaita and madhyamaka Buddhism: The case of the Gaudapadiyakarika.
230. ^ Gregory Joseph Darling, An Evaluation of the Vedāntic Critique of Buddhism p 358.
231. ^ ^{a b c} Reynolds, Eric T. On the relationship of Advaita Vedanta and Madhyamika Buddhism, 1969.
232. ^ Long, Jeffery; Jainism: An Introduction, page 66, 216.
233. ^ W. J. Johnson, Harmless Souls: Karmic Bondage and Religious Change in Early Jainism with Special Reference to Umāsvāti and Kundakunda, Motilal Banarsidass Publ., 1995, p 285.
234. ^ Chapple, Christopher Key, John Thomas Casey (Translator), Reconciling Yogas: Haribhadra's Collection of Views on Yoga With a New Translation of Haribhadra's Yogadrstisamuccaya, p. 60.
235. ^ Ruegg 1981, p. 2.
236. ^ rJe Tsong Kha Pa 2006, p. xx.
237. ^ Daye 1971, p. 77.
238. ^ Westerhoff 2009, p. 9–10.
239. ^ Kalupahana 1992.
240. ^ Hayes 2003, p. 3-5.
241. ^
     S2CID 6043097
     .
242. ^ Magee, 1999, p. 126, "Hayes is misidentifying Nagarjuna's intended meaning of svabhava. In contradistinction to Hayes' belief that Nagarjuna speaks equivocably of an identity nature and a causally independent, non-existent nature, Dzong-ka-ba feels that in chapter XV.1-2 Nagarjuna uses the term svabhava to refer to an existent emptiness nature."
243. ^ Garfield 1995.
244. ^ Napper 1989.
245. ^ Hopkins 1996.
246. ^ Siderits, Mark, Studies in Buddhist philosophy, p 38.
247. ^ Westerhoff 2009, p. 208.

Web references

1. ^ Emptiness. Buddhist and Beyond
2. ^ "The Non-Buddhist". Archived from the original on 2018-12-01. Retrieved 2015-05-11.
3. ^ Emptiness teachings
4. ^ Review of Richard Rorty's "Philosophy and Social Hope"
5. ^ Patrick jennings (2014), Tsongkhapa: In Praise of Relativity; The Essence of Eloquence Archived 2015-05-18 at the Wayback Machine
6. ^ emptiness.co, Review of Kenneth J. Gergen's "An Invitation to Social Construction"
7. ^ Susan Kahn, The Two Truths of Buddhism and The Emptiness of Emptiness.
8. ^ emptiness.co, Coming from the Advaitic/Awareness Teachings? Special Pointers
9. ^ "Sanskrit Dictionary for Spoken Sanskrit, Anutpāda". Archived from the original on 2013-05-30. Retrieved 2019-01-03.

Sources

• Arena, Leonardo Vittorio (2012), Nonsense as the Meaning, ebook
• Arnold, Dan (2010). Nāgārjuna's 'Middle Way': A Non-Eliminative Understanding of Selflessness. In:Revue Internationale de Philosophie vol. 64, no.253: 367-395
• Bhattacharya, Vidhushekhara (1943), Gauḍapādakārikā, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass
• Bronkhorst, Johannes (2009), Buddhist Teaching in India, Wisdom Publications
• Brunnholzl, Karl (2004), Center of the Sunlit Sky: Madhyamaka in the Kagyu Tradition, Snow Lion Publications
• Brunnholzl, Karl (2009). Luminous Heart: The Third Karmapa on Consciousness, Wisdom, and Buddha Nature. Shambhala Publications.
  ISBN 9781559399142
  .
• Cabezón, José Ignacio; Dargyay, Lobsang (2013). Freedom from Extremes: Gorampa's "Distinguishing the Views" and the Polemics of Emptiness. Simon and Schuster.
  ISBN 9780861718573
  .
• Cheng, Hsueh-Li (1981), "The Roots of Zen Buddhism", Journal of Chinese Philosophy, 8 (4): 451–478,
  doi:10.1111/j.1540-6253.1981.tb00267.x
• Comans, Michael (2000), The Method of Early Advaita Vedānta: A Study of Gauḍapāda, Śaṅkara, Sureśvara, and Padmapāda, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass
• Cornu, Philippe (2001), "Nawoord", Schijn en werkelijkheid. De twee waarheden in de vier boeddhistische leerstelsels, KunchabPublicaties
• Cowherds (2010). Moonshadows: Conventional Truth in Buddhist Philosophy. Oxford University Press.
  ISBN 9780199826506
  .
• Daye, Douglas D. (1971), Major Schools of the Mahayana: Madhyamaka. In:Charles S. Prebisch, Buddhism, A Modern Perspective. Pages 76-96.,
  ISBN 978-0-271-01195-0
• Fuller, Paul (2005), The Notion of Diṭṭhi in Theravāda Buddhism: The Point of View (PDF), Routledge, archived from the original (PDF) on 2014-12-02
• Garfield, Jay L. (1994), "Dependent Arising and the Emptiness of Emptiness: Why Did Nāgārjuna Start with Causation?", Philosophy East & West, 44 (2): 219–250,
  S2CID 51932733
• Garfield, Jay L. (1995), The Fundamental Wisdom of the Middle Way, Oxford: Oxford University Press
• Garfield, Jay L. (2012), Madhyamaka is Not Nihilism (PDF), Smith College, University of Melbourne
• Garfield, Jay L.; Westerhoff, Jan (2015). Madhyamaka and Yogacara: Allies Or Rivals?. Oxford University Press.
  ISBN 9780190231293
  .
• Gombrich, Richard (1996), Theravada Buddhism. A Social History from Ancient Benares to Modern Colombo, Routledge
• Gomez, Luis O. (1976), "Proto-Mādhyamika in the Pāli canon", Philosophy East and West, 26 (2): 137–165,
  JSTOR 1398186, archived from the original
  on 2016-03-03, retrieved 2015-12-06
• Harvey, Peter (1995), An introduction to Buddhism. Teachings, history and practices, Cambridge University Press
• Hayes, Richard P. (1994), Nagarjuna's appeal. In: Journal of Indian Philosophy 22: 299-378
• Hayes, Richard P. (2003), Nagarjuna: Master of Paradox, Mystic or Perpetrator of Fallacies? (PDF)
• ISBN 978-0791403587
• Hopkins, Jeffrey (1996), Meditation on Emptiness, Wisdom Publications,
  ISBN 9780861711109
• Hopkins, Jeffrey (2006), Mountain Doctrine: Tibet's Fundamental Treatise on Other-Emptiness and the Buddha Matrix, London: Snow Lion
• Kalupahana, David J. (1992), The Principles of Buddhist Psychology, Delhi: ri Satguru Publications
• Kalupahana, David J. (1994), A History of Buddhist philosophy, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass Publishers Private Limited
• Loy, David (2006), Second Buddha : Nagarjuna - Buddhism's Greatest Philosopher. In: Winter 2006 edition of Tricycle : The Buddhist Review
• Magee, William (1999), The Nature of Things. Emptiness and Essence in the Geluk World, Ithaca, New York: Snow Lion
• Napper, Elizabeth (1989), Dependent-Arising and Emptiness,
  ISBN 0-86171-057-6
• Newland, Guy (2009). Introduction to Emptiness: As Taught in Tsong-kha-pa's Great Treatise on the Stages of the Path. Snow Lion.
  ISBN 9781559393324
  .
• Ng, Yu-kwan (1990), Chih-i and Madhyamika, Hamilton, Ontario: dissertation, McMaster University, p. 1, archived from the original on February 3, 2014
• Ozkan, Cuma (2013). A comparative analysis: Buddhist Madhyamaka and Daoist Chongxuan (twofold mystery) in the early Tang (618-720) (MA). University of Iowa.
  doi:10.17077/etd.o9rxrm2t
  .
• Renard, Philip (2010), Non-Dualisme. De directe bevrijdingsweg, Cothen: Uitgeverij Juwelenschip
• Rizzi, Cesare (1988), Candrakirti, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass Publishers Private Limited
• Ruegg, D. Seyfort (1981), The literature of the Madhyamaka school of philosophy in India (A History of Indian literature), Harrassowitz,
  ISBN 978-3-447-02204-0
• Sarma, Chandradhar (1996), The Advaita Tradition in Indian Philosophy, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass
• ISBN 1-59030-241-9
• Snelling, John (1987), The Buddhist handbook. A Complete Guide to Buddhist Teaching and Practice, London: Century Paperbacks
• Suzuki, Daisetz Teitarō
  (1999), Studies in the Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass
• Thich Nhat Hanh (1988), The Heart of Understanding: Commentaries on the Prajnaparamita Heart Sutra
• Travagnin, Stefania (2009). The Madhyamika Dimension of Yin Shun. A restatement of the school of Nagarjuna in 20th century Chinese Buddhism (PDF) (PhD). University of London.
• Tsondru, Mabja (2011). Ornament of Reason: The Great Commentary To Nagarjuna's Root Of The Middle Way. Shambhala Publications.
  ISBN 9781559397421
  .
• Tsongkhapa, Lobsang Dragpa (1993). Kapstein, Matthew (ed.). Ocean of Eloquence: Tsong kha pa's Commentary on the Yogacara Doctrine of Mind (in Tibetan and English). Translated by Sparham, Gareth. in collaboration with Shotaro Iida (1་ ed.). Albany, NY: State University of New York.
  ISBN 0791414795
  . Retrieved 18 December 2012.
• Tsong Khapa (2002), The great treatise on the stages of the path to enlightenment: Volume 3, Snow Lion Publications,
  ISBN 1-55939-166-9
• rJe Tsong Kha Pa (2006), Ocean of Reasoning, translated by Garfield, Jay L.; Samten, Ngawang, Oxford: Oxford University Press,
  ISBN 978-0-19-514733-9
• Vetter, Tilmann (1988), The Ideas and Meditative Practices of Early Buddhism (PDF), BRILL,
  ISBN 90-04-08959-4
• Walser, Joseph (2005). Nagarjuna in Context: Mahayana Buddhism and Early Indian Culture. Columbia University Press.
  ISBN 9780231506236
  .
• Warder, A. K. (2000), Indian Buddhism, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass Publishers
• Westerhoff, Jan (2009). Nagarjuna's Madhyamaka: A Philosophical Introduction. Oxford University Press.
  ISBN 9780199705115
  .
• ISBN 9780415207003
  .
• ISBN 9781134623259
  .
• Williams, Paul (2009). Mahāyāna Buddhism: The Doctrinal Foundations. Routledge.
  ISBN 9780415356534
  .
• Wynne, Alexander (2007), The Origin of Buddhist Meditation, Routledge

Further reading

• Della Santina, Peter (1986), Madhyamaka Schools in India, New Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass
• Harris, Ian Charles (1991), The Continuity of Madhyamaka and Yogacara in Indian Mahayana Buddhism, New York: E. J.Brill
• His Holiness the Fourteenth Dalai Lama (Tenzin Gyatso) (2009), The Middle Way: Faith Grounded in Reason, Boston: Wisdom Publications
• Huntington, C. W., Jr. (1989). The Emptiness of Emptiness: An Introduction to Early Madhyamika. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press
• Jones, Richard H. (2014), Nagarjuna: Buddhism's Most Important Philosopher, New York: Jackson Square Books
• Jones, Richard H. (2012), Indian Madhyamaka Buddhist Philosophy After Nagarjuna, 2 vols., New York: Jackson Square Books
• Narain, Harsh. The Mādhyamika mind. Motilal Banarsidass Publishers, 1997.

External links

Wikimedia Commons has media related to Madhyamaka.

• The Mādhyamika or the Śūnyavāda school, Surendranath Dasgupta, 1940
• "Madhyamaka Buddhism". Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
• "Nagarjuna". Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
• Thinking in Buddhism: Nagarjuna's Middle Way
• thezensite: articles on Nagarjuna
• Introduction to the Middle Way A contemporary commentary based on the teachings of Dzongsar Khyentse Rinpoche
• Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: Madhyamaka
• Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: Nagarjuna