Suwałki Gap
54°12′N 23°24′E / 54.2°N 23.4°E
The Suwałki Gap, also known as the Suwałki corridor
The border between Poland and Lithuania in the area of the Suwałki Gap was formed after the
As the Baltic states and Poland eventually joined NATO, this narrow border stretch between Poland and Lithuania became a vulnerability for the military bloc because, if a hypothetical military conflict were to erupt between Russia and Belarus on one side and NATO on the other, capturing the 65 km (40 mi)-long strip of land between Russia's
Both Russia and the
Background
The Suwałki Gap is a sparsely populated region in the north-eastern corner of Poland, in
Poland and Lithuania both
Following
Civilian interests
Russian corridor
The first time a special corridor between Kaliningrad and Belarus (planned to go via Poland) was discussed was during a 1990 meeting between Yuri Shemonov, a senior official in Kaliningrad Oblast, and Nikolai Ryzhkov and Mikhail Gorbachev, Premier and President of the Soviet Union, respectively. While Ryzhkov was supportive of the idea, Gorbachev vetoed the proposal, urging the other two men to "stop spreading panic".[12]
After the Soviet Union fell apart, Kaliningrad was cut off from Russia, thus the Russians sought to secure a land transit route from the exclave to mainland Russia through Belarus. After some initial preparations, including signing a treaty which obliged Poland and Russia to open a
Top Polish government officials rejected the proposal.
The topic returned in 2001–2002 when Poland and Lithuania were negotiating accession to the European Union. Russian citizens in Kaliningrad were facing the prospect of having to use passports and apply for visas to cross the border of the new EU member states, which sparked outrage in the Russian press. Therefore, Russia suggested that the European Commission grant a right to a 12-hour free transit for the citizens of the oblast through special corridors in Poland and Lithuania, but this proposal was rejected.[22] Another proposal, with sealed trains, also failed to gain traction; it was ultimately agreed to introduce special permits for Russian citizens travelling to/from Kaliningrad Oblast for transit through Lithuania (but not Poland),[19] known as Facilitated Rail Transit Document (FRTD) and a Facilitated Transit Document (FTD) for rail and road trips, respectively.[23]
Kaliningrad Oblast has since been generally supplied by freight trains transiting through Lithuania. However, on 17 June 2022, in retaliation for Russia's invasion of Ukraine, Lithuania started blocking supplies of
EU economic infrastructure
The Suwałki Gap hosts several critical corridors because it is the only land route between the Baltic states and the rest of the European Union and NATO.
A strategic communication artery, known in the
The
The
The Suwałki Gap is an important constraint on civilian airspace since the
Military considerations
History
Long before the Suwałki Gap became of concern to NATO, several army battles or operations occurred on the terrain. For example, during Napoleon's war in Russia, part of his army, which crossed into the country from the Duchy of Warsaw, used the Suwałki Gap as a launching pad for the invasion and, by the beginning of 1813, when the remnants of his army retreated, it crossed the gap from Kaunas towards Warsaw. Both battles of the Masurian Lakes during World War I passed or were directly waged on the territory. During the invasion of Poland, which started World War II, most of the action skirted the area, while in 1944, the Red Army simply advanced into East Prussia and no major battle occurred in the area.[6]
Poland and Lithuania joined the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in 1999 and 2004, respectively. On the one hand, this meant that the Kaliningrad exclave was surrounded by NATO states, but on the other, this created a choke point for the military alliance as all troops supplied by land must pass through the Suwałki Gap. In the event of its capture, the Baltic states would be surrounded by Russia, Russian-controlled territories, and Belarus, a Russian ally.[41] Even if Belarus or Russia are not physically present in the corridor, it is narrow enough for the short-range rockets stationed in either country to target any military supplies coming through the corridor, while alternative routes of delivery, i.e. by sea or air, are also threatened by the anti-air and anti-ship missiles stationed in Kaliningrad Oblast.[42][43] Due to its strategic importance for NATO and the Baltic states, it has been described as one of NATO's hot spots,[2] its "Achilles' heel"[44] and dubbed the modern version of the Fulda Gap.[45][46][47][48]
Initially, this vulnerability was of relatively little concern as, throughout most of the 1990s, Russia was stuck in a deep depression, which necessitated large-scale cuts to the country's military budget.[17] Even though the army was of significant size, it was poorly equipped and had low military capabilities.[49] Additionally, Russia–NATO relations were more cordial then, as Russia was not openly hostile to NATO, which was affirmed while signing the 1997 Founding Act, and it was thought that Russia would eventually become a pacifist democracy, decreasing its military and nuclear presence.[50][c] NATO's commitment not to build any permanent bases beyond the Oder river therefore seemed reasonable.[45]
Escalation of tensions
The qualitative and quantitative improvement in armaments started with the rule of Vladimir Putin.[49] Short-range (500 km [310 mi]) Iskander missiles, capable of carrying nuclear warheads, were installed in 2018.[52][53] Additional installations were deployed in the late 2010s, including more area denial weapons, such as K-300P Bastion-P and P-800 Oniks anti-ship missiles and S-400 anti-air missiles.[54][55][43]
In general, the importance of the corridor among the Western nations is said to have been initially underestimated due to the fact that Western countries sought to normalise relations with Russia.
While the permanent military base ultimately did not appear, the military situation around the region has been steadily escalating, and deterrence tactics seem only to have increased the concentration of firepower on both sides.
The Russian forces did not leave Belarus after the 2022 exercises and
Current standing of forces
NATO and its member states
As of spring 2022, units closest to the Suwałki Gap that belong to NATO or to its member states included:
- 900 German soldiersPzH-2000 self-propelled howitzers.[74] In June 2023, Defence Minister Boris Pistorius announced that the Germans would increase their presence to 4,000 troops, but the whole brigade is only expected to come in 2027.[75] A €300 million project is going to expand the premises of the military base.[76] A subunit of the Iron Wolf brigade, the Grand Duchess Birutė Mechanized Uhlan Battalion, is stationed in Alytus, 60 km (37 mi) from the Polish-Lithuanian border. Additionally, the military base in Rūdninkai, which is 35 km (22 mi) south of Vilnius and about 125 km (78 mi) from the Suwałki Gap, was ordered to be reactivated as a matter of urgency after the Seimas passed a bill to that effect.[77] The base was reopened on 2 June 2022 and is capable of holding 3000 soldiers.[78]
- An American BWP-1 infantry fighting vehicles, Croatian M-92 rockets and Romanian air defence systems.[36][74] Brigades in both countries operate on a rotational basis. The Polish and Lithuanian host brigades signed an agreement for mutual cooperation in 2020, but, unlike with the operations with foreign forces, these are not subordinate to NATO command;[81][82]
- The 14th Anti-Tank Artillery Regiment, under Polish command, garrisoned in Suwałki and armed with Israeli Spike-LR missiles. The regiment was briefly degraded to a squadron as its equipment was outdated.[36] Some other forces in the area under Polish command include an artillery regiment in Węgorzewo, a mechanised brigade in Giżycko and an anti-air unit in Gołdap.[44]
- Up to 40,000 troops within NATO Response Force, activated on 25 February 2022 following Russia's invasion in Ukraine, which are available on short notice.[83]
In June 2022, Jens Stoltenberg, Secretary General of NATO, pledged more weapons and troops to the Baltic States, augmenting NATO's presence to a brigade in each of the Baltic states and Poland (3,000-5,000 troops in each country), while the NATO Response Force will be increased to 300,000 troops.[84]
Russia and Belarus
Kaliningrad Oblast is a very heavily militarized area subordinate to the command of the
Russia has not officially confirmed whether it has nuclear warheads in the exclave, but Iskander missiles are known to be capable of carrying such weapons.[90] In 2018, the Federation of American Scientists published photos showing a weapons storage facility northwest of Kaliningrad being upgraded in a way that enables nuclear weapons storage.[91] In addition to that, Arvydas Anušauskas, the Lithuanian minister of defence, claimed that Russia already has these in the exclave.[92][93]
Belarus's military command, while formally independent as a military command of a sovereign state, has organisationally aligned itself with the Russian command and is in many respects wholly or substantially dependent on Russian defence institutions and contractors, while persistent underinvestment in its own military and deepening ties with its eastern neighbour left the military with low offensive capabilities, with the only feasible role being that of support of the main Russian forces.[94][95] For instance, the countries share the air defence system, including its command.[96] There are relatively few units on the Belarusian side - the headquarters of the Western Operational Command (one of the two in Belarus) as well as the 6th Mechanised Brigade is in Grodno (S-300 anti-air missiles),[97] while air operations may be conducted from the military air base in Lida.[95] They have received some Russian reinforcements ahead of Zapad-2021 exercises, including more S-300 missiles in Grodno,[98] and in early 2022, when S-400 missiles were installed in Gomel Region. In May 2022, Alexander Lukashenko announced that he had bought Iskanders and S-400 missiles from the Russians.[99]
Strategy
Attack
There is broad consensus among Western military
Despite being shorter, the Polish side of the Suwałki Gap is unlikely to be used as the area of main concentration of these forces, according to these experts. A 2019 Russian paper indicated that the potential attack cutting off the Baltic states from NATO could be held north of the Suwałki Gap, in south-western Lithuania, due to better efficiencies for the Russian forces;[101][102] the same route was assumed in Zapad 2017[3][86] and Zapad 2021[103] military exercises. This is also an area of attack deemed more favourable by the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA)[6] and the Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI)[104] papers, as the terrain is flatter and less forested and thus easier for heavier troops. Faustyna Klocek was one of the few proposing that the attack would lie over Polish territory.[105]
A minority of analysts suggest that the importance of the Suwałki Gap is overblown.
During the
Some of the initial assessments were grim about the prospect of the Baltic states. In 2016, the
There appears to be strong support for Russia's invasion of the area among the Russians. A March 2022 survey by a Ukrainian pollster, which was concealing its identity while soliciting answers and which was asking questions using the Russian government-preferred rhetoric, reported that a large majority of Russians could support an invasion of another country should the "special military operation", as Russia officially calls the invasion of Ukraine, succeed, and that the most support for that invasion (three-quarters of those who did not abstain from an answer, and almost half of all respondents) would be against Poland, followed by the Baltic states.[115][116]
Defence
While the Suwałki Gap is a choke point, military analysts suggest that the fact that the region has abundant thick forests, streams and lakes means that the landscape facilitates defence against an invading force.[2][3][44] Additionally, the soil in the area makes it very hard to operate under rainy conditions as off-road areas or roads without a hard surface become impassable mud.[2] The Center for European Policy Analysis paper points out that the hilly and more forested terrain of the Polish part of the Suwałki Gap favours actions on the defensive side, such as ambushes and holding entrenched positions;[6] at the same time, low density of roads that are largely not designed for carrying heavy cargo means that the few that remain available for the military may be easily blocked.[44] The natural defences largely eliminate the need for additional military fortifications, and some of them, such as the one in Bakałarzewo, have been converted to private museums.[44] On the other hand, this also means that once Russia is in possession of the corridor, which could happen if NATO reinforcements arrive late, it will be very hard to eject the Russians from the area.[117] These reports say that the conditions are unfavourable for heavy equipment, particularly in bad weather, though John R. Deni of the Strategic Studies Institute argued the terrain was generally fine for a tank offensive.[118]
The current Polish military doctrine under Mariusz Błaszczak, the Polish Minister of Defence (MoD), is to concentrate the units close to the Russian and Belarusian borders in order to wage a defensive campaign in a similar way to the one Poland was conducting in September 1939.[119] There were two war games made to verify the scenario. In the first one, made in 2019, the US Marine Corps War College modelled a hypothetical scenario of World War III.[120] The other one, codenamed Zima-20, was conducted by the Polish War Studies Academy on MoD's request in 2020. Most of its assumptions remain confidential,[121] but it is known that they include units with yet-to-be-delivered upgraded equipment that try to endure 22 days of defence against an invading force and, similarly to the American model, the military activities start in the Suwałki Gap and Poland tries to defend Eastern Poland at all cost.[122] Both results were catastrophic: in the American simulation, Polish units would incur about 60,000 casualties in the first day of war, and NATO and Russia would fare a battle that would prove very bloody to both sides, losing about half of the participating forces within 72 hours.[120] Zima-20's results, which are interpreted with some dose of caution, showed that by day 4 of the invasion, the Russians already advanced to the Vistula river and fighting in Warsaw was underway, while by day 5, the Polish ports were rendered unusable for reinforcements or occupied, the Navy and the Air Force were obliterated despite NATO's assistance,[121] while the Polish units dispatched close to the border could lose as much as 60-80% of personnel and materiel.[123][d]
Very few locals are expected to endorse an invasion, in contrast to what happened in Crimea in 2014, as the influence of the Russians in the area is not significant;[7] that said, Daniel Michalski's survey found that the region's local population is inadequately prepared for a hypothetical military conflict and that the area has next to no civilians immediately ready to engage in combat.[125] Regional tensions are such that some tourists are afraid to go there, though Andrzej Sęk and retired Col. Kazimierz Kuczyński say that such fears are likely unfounded as Russia's resources are being expended in Ukraine.[126] Additionally, the Russians may want to use the historic tensions between Poland and Lithuania to set them against each other.[110]
Proposed solutions
NATO's military doctrine assumes that its member states would have to hold the invasion for as long as NATO needs to send reinforcements to the attacked states, and in the meantime, NATO would operate on the terrain using tripwire forces dispatched in the area.[6] There is no consensus, however, about the right kind of forces and their mode of deployment near the Suwałki Gap that would best fit the doctrine, though the predominant thought goes that that at least some forces or money to improve infrastructure should be sent to Poland.[58]
Among the analysts that took into account the Suwałki Gap vulnerability in their reports or opinion pieces, the majority argued that some form of permanent U.S. military presence in Poland should exist, and most of the reports agreed that the NATO (or American) units should be as mobile as practically possible.[127] The Warsaw Institute argued that while it would be costly to maintain, the military base proposed by Poland in 2018 would be an effective deterrent for Russia and would ensure quick dispatches of U.S. forces to the Suwałki Gap if needed.[128] Hunzeker and Lanoszka say that fears over the bottleneck are exaggerated, as are fears over Russian war against NATO, and they conclude that nothing should constrain the Alliance from attacking Kaliningrad Oblast or Belarus if the latter engages in the conflict, too.[129] They advocate for a permanent presence of U.S. military but with units dispersed all over Poland instead of one big military base, and crafted in a way that avoids as much Russian rebuke as possible.[130] Lanoszka separately suggests troops dispatched to Russian-minority areas in Estonia and Latvia instead, as he believes Russia is more likely to make a limited incursion on these areas.[107] Another report, by the Strategic Studies Institute (SSI), also suggested a permanent presence of one brigade of NATO troops in each of the Baltic states.[131] Hodges et al., writing for CEPA, in principle supported an increased permanent presence of U.S. forces (including a divisional headquarters) but also said that NATO forces must be more mobile so that Russian troops have no chance to avoid the tripwire units. The report also recommended that more effort should be put into improving transport capabilities and reducing red tape between NATO's member states, noting that defending the Suwałki Gap is a much different challenge from that of the Cold War-era Fulda Gap.[6] John R. Deni of the SSI echoed CEPA paper's arguments and argued that since Russia deployed a large contingent of Russian troops together with modern arms in Belarus just prior to the beginning of the full-scale war in Ukraine, NATO should disregard the 1997 Founding Act and start a dramatic increase of armaments and troop numbers near the Suwałki Gap and in the Baltic states.[118]
Some experts argued the opposite, i.e. that increased NATO presence may be detrimental for NATO. Nikolai Sokov of the
In fiction
The Suwałki Gap, while of relatively recent interest, has already gained some interest in literature. A fictitious account of a Russia–NATO war, where one of the
A crime fiction novel called Suwalki Gap, authored by René Antoine Fayette in German, was published in 2017.[136]
See also
Other NATO vulnerabilities:
Explanatory notes
- ^ The term "Suwałki corridor" (korytarz suwalski) may refer both to the Suwałki Gap and the road link between Kaliningrad Oblast and (Russian ally) Belarus that was proposed by Russians in the 1990s
- ^ Also known in other languages as: Polish: przesmyk suwalski or korytarz suwalski; Lithuanian: Suvalkų koridorius or Suvalkų tarpas; Belarusian: сувалкскі калідор, romanized: suvalkskі kalidor and Russian: сувалкский коридор, romanized: suvalkskiy koridor
- ^ The Founding Act is not a ratified treaty and therefore is not legally binding.[51]
- ^ The government officials initially did not comment on the revelations of the secret war game, though Błaszczak later denied that the exercises were unsuccessful and said that the Polish Armed Forces were capable of withholding a potential offensive.[124]
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Further reading
- Bębenek, Bogusław; Maj, Julian; Maksimczuk, Aleksander; Sęk, Andrzej; Soroka, Paweł; Wiszniewska, Marta (2020). Przesmyk suwalski w warunkach kryzysu i wojny : aspekty obronne i administracyjne : konferencja naukowa, Suwałki, 9-10 maja 2019 roku [Suwałki Gap in the conditions of crisis and war: defense and administrative aspects: scientific conference, Suwałki, May 9–10, 2019] (in Polish). Suwałki: Wydawnictwo Uczelniane Państwowej Wyższej Szkoły Zawodowej w Suwałkach. OCLC 1241633779.
- Birnbaum, Michael (24 June 2018). "If they needed to fend off war with Russia, U.S. military leaders worry they might not get there in time". The Washington Post.
- Rynning, Sten; Schmitt, Olivier; Theussen, Amelie (2 March 2021). War Time: Temporality and the Decline of Western Military Power. Brookings Institution Press. ISBN 978-0-8157-3895-4.
- Sirutavičius, Vladas; Stanytė - Toločkienė, Inga (18 July 2003). "Strategic Importance of Kaliningrad Oblast of the Russian Federation". ISSN 1648-8024.
- Szymanowski, Karol (2017). "Air Defense in a Specific Environment of the Suwalki Isthmus". S2CID 210787561.
- Veebel, Viljar (4 May 2019). "Why it would be strategically rational for Russia to escalate in Kaliningrad and the Suwalki corridor". Comparative Strategy. 38 (3): 182–197.
- Zverev, Yury (2021). "Possible Directions of NATO Military Operations Against the Kaliningrad Region of the Russian Federation (Based on Materials from Open Publications)". S2CID 244319068.