Tôn Thất Đính

Lieutenant General Tôn Thất Đính (

A favorite of the ruling Ngô family, Đính received rapid promotions ahead of officers who were regarded as more capable. He converted to

After the coup, Đính became one of the 12 members of the Military Revolutionary Council (MRC), but this lasted only three months before a bloodless coup by General Nguyễn Khánh. Đính and his colleagues were put under house arrest by Khánh and falsely accused of promoting a neutralist plot. The subsequent military trial collapsed. The generals were convicted of "lax morality", but were eventually allowed to resume their military service, albeit in meaningless desk jobs. Following Khánh's exile by another group of generals, Đính was appointed to command the I Corps in 1966 and ordered to put down the Buddhist Uprising, but Prime Minister Nguyễn Cao Kỳ disapproved of his conciliatory policies. Kỳ launched a successful surprise attack against Đính, who fled, but was later captured and briefly imprisoned by Kỳ. After his release, Đính worked in the media and was elected to the Senate in 1967. He served in the upper house until the fall of Saigon in April 1975, when he fled Vietnam.

Early years

Đính was born in the

Despite the high regard in which the Ngô family held him, Đính had a poor reputation among his colleagues. Regarded by his peers as ambitious, vain and impulsive,[8]^[6] he was known mainly for heavily drinking in Saigon's nightclubs,^[13] and the Central Intelligence Agency labelled him a "basic opportunist".^[14] He was known for always wearing a paratrooper's uniform with a red beret at a steep angle, and being accompanied by a tall, uncommunicative Cambodian bodyguard.^[8][15] Senior Australian Army officer Ted Serong, who worked with Đính, called him "a young punk with a gun – and dangerous".^[16]

Xá Lợi Pagoda

In August 1958, Đính was made the commander of the

In August 1963, Nhu, who controlled the special forces and secret police, allowed Đính to have a hand in planning raids against Buddhist dissidents who had been organising at the Xá Lợi pagoda,^[8] Saigon's largest.^[21] The raids involved the deployment of the 5th Division into the capital.^[22] Although the execution of the raids – which left hundreds dead – was primarily the responsibility of Colonel Lê Quang Tung, the special forces head,^[23] Đính privately took responsibility,^[24] stating to a journalist, "I have defeated Henry Cabot Lodge [the US ambassador to South Vietnam]. He came here to stage a coup d'etat, but I, Tôn Thất Đính, have conquered him and saved the country."^[24] In the aftermath of the raids, Foreign Minister Vũ Văn Mẫu resigned in protest, shaved his head like a monk and sought to leave on a pilgrimage to India; Nhu ordered Đính to jail him. At the urging of another general, Đính put Mẫu under house arrest instead.^[25]

During this period, Đính told a dinner guest that he had the pleasure of dining with a great national hero. When the guest asked Đính where the hero was, Đính said "it is me" and claimed to have defeated the Americans. Đính's ego had been played upon by the Ngô brothers, who had themselves reiterated this point and paid him a large cash bonus after the pagoda raids.^[8][26] In the heady times after the attacks, Đính had a "somewhat incoherent" debate with his American advisor, claiming "he [Đình] was without doubt the greatest general officer in the ARVN, the saviour of Saigon ... and soon he would be the top military man in the country."^[27] In a press conference after the raids, Đính claimed to have saved South Vietnam from Buddhists, communists and "foreign adventurers", a euphemism for the United States.^[8][6]

After being questioned sharply, Đính quickly became angry. Ray Herndon of United Press International asked him to name the country that he was referring to, but Đính dodged the question. Herndon lampooned him by saying that a national hero should be able to identify the national enemy,^[8] and asked him to call Madame Nhu, the de facto First Lady known for her anti-American comments, to get help in identifying the hostile country in question. After several reporters derisively laughed at these comments, Đính stormed out of the conference.^[14][28][29]

Defection and coup

Embarrassed by the events at the press conference, Đính returned to the officers' mess at the

With Đính and the Ngô family's increasing focus on the political usage of the army, the military situation in III Corps deteriorated badly in the second half of 1963, as personnel were redeployed into the cities. In August, he moved a unit away from Bến Tượng, which had been portrayed as a model settlement in the Strategic Hamlet Program that was supposed to isolate peasants into fortified villages to keep the Viet Cong out. While the unit was in Saigon cracking down on the Buddhists, the VC overran Bến Tượng.^[27] A year earlier, the American media contingent had been invited to the opening ceremony of the settlement, which was supposed to be the flagship of the hamlet program.^[32] As Đính spent most of October in the capital plotting instead of inspecting the countryside, the VC began to systematically dismantle the strategic hamlets.^[27]

Plotting a fake coup

By mid-October, Diệm and Nhu knew of the coup plans, but did not know that Đính was firmly among them, although they were wary of him.^[31] Nhu then decided to outwit the generals with a counter-plot. The generals heard of this and decided to counteract him.^[33] The other generals were still suspicious of Đính, fearing he would betray them. Having discovered that Nhu was trying to use him to trap them and unsure of his true loyalties, they promised to make him interior minister and offered other rewards if he helped to overthrow the Ngô brothers.^[34]

As part of the generals' plot, Đính sent Colonel Nguyễn Hữu Có, his deputy corps commander, to Mỹ Tho to talk to the 7th Division commander, Colonel Bùi Đình Đạm, and two regimental commanders subordinate to Đạm, and the chief of Mỹ Tho province.^[28] Exhorting them to join the coup, Có stated that all the generals were in the plot except the strongly loyalist Huỳnh Văn Cao, and that Đính would soon join.^[28] According to one account, Đính had intended that loyalists would report Có's activities to Diệm and Nhu so that it would give him an opportunity to orchestrate a stunt to ingratiate himself with the palace.^[34]

Nhu's agents soon reported Có's activities to the palace. When the Ngô brothers confronted Đính with what occurred in Mỹ Tho, Đính feigned astonishment at his deputy's behavior, crying and vowing to have Có killed.^[28][35] Nhu opposed this and stated that he wanted to keep Có alive to catch the plotters and tried to use Đính to this end.^[28] Nhu ordered Đính and Tung, both of whom took their orders directly from the palace instead of the ARVN command,^[36] to plan a fake coup against the government. One objective was to trick dissidents into joining the false uprising so that they could be identified and eliminated.^[37] Another aim of the public relations stunt was to give a false impression of the strength of the regime.^[31]

Codenamed

Đính was put in charge of the fake coup and was allowed the additional control of the 7th Division based in Mỹ Tho, which was previously assigned to Diệm loyalist Cao, who commanded the IV Corps in the Mekong Delta. The reassignment of the 7th Division gave Đính and his III Corps complete encirclement of Saigon, and would prevent Cao from storming the capital to save Diệm as he had done during the coup attempt in 1960.^{[6][12][28][41]}

Nhu and Tung, however, were unaware that Đính was part of the real coup plot. Đính told Tung that the fake coup needed to employ an overwhelming amount of force. He said that tanks were required "because armour is dangerous". In an attempt to outwit Tung, Đính claimed fresh troops were needed,^[34] opining, "If we move reserves into the city, the Americans will be angry. They'll complain that we're not fighting the war. So we must camouflage our plan by sending the special forces out to the country. That will deceive them."^[34] The loyalists were unaware that Đính's real intention was to engulf Saigon with his rebel divisions and lock Tung's men in the countryside where they could not defend the president.^[39] Tung and the palace agreed to send all four Saigon-based special forces companies out of the capital on October 29.^[34]

Not trusting Có, Diệm put a Catholic loyalist, Colonel Lâm Văn Phát, in command of the 7th Division on October 31.^[28] According to tradition, Phát had to pay the corps commander a courtesy visit before assuming control. Đính refused to see Phát and told him to come back on Friday at 14:00, by which time the coup had already been scheduled to start. In the meantime, Đính had Đôn sign a counter-order transferring command of the 7th Division to Có. The next day, Có took the division's incumbent officers prisoner and used the unit to block loyalists from storming the capital from the south.^[28]

Diệm's downfall

On November 1, 1963, the coup went ahead with Cao's troops isolated in the far south and Tung's forces outside Saigon, unable to rescue Diệm from the rebel encirclement.^[6] Tung was called to the JGS headquarters at Tân Sơn Nhứt Air Base under the pretense of a routine meeting and was seized and executed. Attempts by Diệm and Nhu to make contact with Đính were blocked by other generals, who claimed that Đính was elsewhere. This led the Ngô brothers to think that Đính had been captured, still unaware that he had rebelled. The following morning, Đính was allowed to have the final word with Diệm before the brothers were arrested, allowing him to prove his loyalty to the rebel cause. Đính subsequently shouted obscenities at the Ngô brothers.^[28]

Đính alleged that Nhu's contacts with the communists and threats to make a peace deal with

Đính was reported to have celebrated his new positions by making conspicuous appearances at Saigon nightclubs and dancing, having lifted Madame Nhu's bans on such activities. He reportedly kissed the bar dancers and ordered champagne for all present. Đính's brash behavior caused public relations problems for the junta. In interviews with The Washington Post and The New York Times, he claimed that he took a leading role in the coup because "we would have lost the war under Diệm" and saying that he participated "not for personal ambition, but for the population, the people and to get rid of Nhu". He claimed to have been the "specialist ... [who] gave the orders in only thirty minutes", keeping the plans "all in his head".^[51] In an exclusive interview with Herndon, he said "You are the one who started it all, who drove me into making the coup. You are the hero of the revolution."^[29] This was a reference to Herndon's sarcastic reference to Đính as a "great national hero" after the general took credit for the pagoda raids.^[29] He also courted controversy with anti-American remarks, stating "On August 21, I was governor of Saigon and loyal to Diem; on November 1, I was governor of Saigon and fighting Diem; maybe in the future I'll be governor of Saigon and fighting against the Americans."^[51]

Đính and the leading generals in the MRC also had a secret plan to end the communist insurgency, which claimed to be independent of the government of North Vietnam. They claimed that most of them were first and foremost southern nationalists opposed to foreign military intervention and U.S. involvement and support of Diệm. The generals agreed with this viewpoint and thought that an agreement to end the war within South Vietnam was possible.^[58] The government also rebuffed American proposals to bomb North Vietnam on the grounds that such actions would cede the moral high ground, which they claimed on the basis of fighting in a purely defensive manner. However, the plans to bring the VC into the mainstream were never implemented to any degree before the government was deposed.^[59]

During his time on the MRC, Đính persistently raised eyebrows with his volatile behaviour. The Americans and his colleagues found him difficult to control. General

Đính's political stay was brief, as General

Khánh presided over their trial of Đính and his colleagues on May 28, 1964.[67]^[68] The generals were interrogated for five and a half hours, mostly about details of their coup against Diệm, rather than the original charge of promoting neutralism. As all of the officers were involved in Diệm's overthrow, the hearings did not reveal any new information. The court deliberated for over nine hours, and when it reconvened for the verdict, Khánh stated, "We ask that once you begin to serve again in the army, you do not take revenge on anybody".^[65] The tribunal then "congratulated" the generals, but found that they were of "lax morality" and unqualified to command due to a "lack of a clear political concept". They were chastised for being "inadequately aware of their heavy responsibility" and of letting "their subordinates take advantage of their positions". Đính's quartet were allowed to remain in Đà Lạt under surveillance.^[65][67]

The four generals were barred from commanding troops and offices were prepared so they could participate in "research and planning".

With the rise to power of

Kỳ disapproved of Chuan's approach and replaced Chuan with Đính. Kỳ felt Đính's aggressive attitude following the Xá Lợi Pagoda raids in 1963 indicated a willingness to suppress Buddhist dissidents. Moreover, Đính was a native of central Vietnam and would have been popular with those who thought along parochial lines.[74] Đính arrived in Huế on April 15 and, after a week, announced that he had restored Saigon's authority over the region. He proclaimed that he had regained control of the radio stations in Đà Nẵng and Huế from the dissidents, and that he had convinced the mayor of Đà Nẵng to remain loyal to Saigon. Đính announced a deal whereby the Buddhists would have regular air time in return for relinquishing control of the radio station. This move was interpreted in different ways. Some felt that Đính was attempting to gain favour with the Buddhists in anticipation of Kỳ's fall from power, while Frances FitzGerald felt it was the only sensible government action during the crisis.^[74] On April 19, clashes erupted in Quảng Ngãi between the Buddhists and the VNQDĐ (Vietnamese Nationalist Party), which supported the continuation of the anti-communist war, prompting Đính to forcibly restrain the two groups.^[75]

Soon after, Kỳ made a surprise attack to assert government control over central Vietnam. He flew out to Đà Nẵng with his own units,^[76] without consulting the Americans or officials in I Corps.^[77] At this time, Đính was pursuing a policy of reconciliation Đà Nẵng and negotiation with the dissident I Corps units, and making contact with the Struggle Movement.^[78] Kỳ decided to attack and sent his forces to overrun Đính's headquarters on May 15, forcing the latter to abandon his post and flee to the headquarters of U.S. General Lewis Walt. Fearing Kỳ's forces would kill him, Đính asked Walt for help and was flown to Huế, where the pro-Thi and pro-Buddhist elements were still in control. Đính was then formally replaced by General Cao.^[79] Walt's assistance to Đính provoked a reaction from General William Westmoreland, the commander of U.S. forces in Vietnam. Walt and Westmoreland were often in conflict, and the latter responded to his subordinate's evacuation of Đính by imploring Kỳ to attack Huế.^[76]

Kỳ's surprise attack led to conflict between the ARVN rebels and loyalists, with the American ground forces caught in the middle, effectively creating a civil war within a civil war.^[76] Kỳ eventually quelled the rebellion and briefly jailed Đính, who claimed he was incarcerated for refusing to back up Kỳ's account of the conflict with the Buddhists.^[80] Đính left the army and upon the nominal restoration of civilian rule, won election to the newly created Senate in 1967, as part of the Hoa Sen (Lotus) ticket.^[2] He was the Chairman of Senate Defence Committee and served as a senator,^[12] later serving as the leader of the Xã Hội Dân Chủ (Social Democratic) bloc.^[2] In February 1968, while serving in the Senate, Đính and fellow senator and former junta colleague Đôn founded a newspaper, Công Luan,^[3][81] while also serving as head of the Vietnamese Publishers Association.^[82]

On April 29, a day before the fall of Saigon, Đính left for the US, initially settling in Virginia, before relocating to Garden Grove and then Westminster, in the Little Saigon area of Orange County, California.^[1] In 1998, Đính claimed he felt remorse for the deposal and assassinations of the Ngô brothers, and also claimed he had opposed their policies of religious discrimination against Buddhists, which had fomented national disunity and the eventual Communist victory.^[83] In 1998, his memoirs 20 Năm Binh Nghiệp – Hồi Ký của Tôn Thất Đính (Vietnamese: 20 Years in the Military – The Memoirs of Tôn Thất Đính) were published, but they were not launched for another 15 years until June 2013 at an event in Santa Ana that commemorated with the 50th anniversary of the self-immolation of Thích Quảng Đức during the Buddhist crisis. Đính gave the keynote address at the event, which was organized and attended by several senior members of the Vietnamese American Buddhist sangha.^[84]

He died at Kindred Hospital Santa Ana on November 21, 2013, where he had been treated for several weeks, and his funeral was conducted in accordance with Buddhist tradition.^[1]

Notes

References

• Blair, Anne E. (1995). Lodge in Vietnam: A Patriot Abroad. New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press.
  ISBN 0-300-06226-5
  .
• Blair, Anne E. (2001). There to the Bitter End: Ted Serong in Vietnam. Crows Nest, New South Wales: Allen & Unwin.
  ISBN 1-86508-468-9
  .
• Catton, Philip E. (2002). Diem's Final Failure: Prelude to America's War in Vietnam. Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas.
  ISBN 0-7006-1220-3
  .
• Gibbons, William Conrad (1995). The U.S. Government and the Vietnam war: Executive and Legislative Roles and Relationships. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
  ISBN 0-691-00635-0
  .
• ISBN 978-0-7425-6007-9
  .
• ISBN 0-525-24210-4
  .
• Hatcher, Patrick Lloyd (1990). The Suicide of an Elite: American Internationalists and Vietnam. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press.
  ISBN 0-8047-1736-2
  .
• Hickey, Gerald Cannon (2002). Window on a War: An Anthropologist in the Vietnam Conflict. Lubbock, Texas: Texas Tech University Press.
  ISBN 0-89672-490-5
  .
• Isaacs, Arnold R. (1983). Without Honor: Defeat in Vietnam and Cambodia. Baltimore, Maryland: Johns Hopkins University Press.
  ISBN 0-8018-3060-5
  .
• Jacobs, Seth (2006). Cold War Mandarin: Ngo Dinh Diem and the Origins of America's War in Vietnam, 1950–1963. Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield.
  ISBN 0-7425-4447-8
  .
• Jones, Howard (2003). Death of a Generation: How the Assassinations of Diem and JFK Prolonged the Vietnam War. New York City: Oxford University Press.
  ISBN 0-19-505286-2
  .
• JSTOR 2757066
  .
• ISBN 0-670-84218-4
  .
• ISBN 0-684-81202-9
  .
• Lent, John A. (1971). The Asian Newspapers' Reluctant Revolution. Iowa State University Press.
  ISBN 0-8138-1335-2
  .
• ISBN 0-521-86911-0
  .
• ISBN 0-06-015640-6.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link
  )
• ISBN 0-8129-2633-1
  .
• Shaplen, Robert (1966). The Lost Revolution: Vietnam 1945–1965. London: André Deutsch.
• ISBN 0-679-72414-1
  .
• Toczek, David M. (2001). The Battle of Ap Bac, Vietnam: They Did Everything But Learn From It. Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Publishing Group.
  ISBN 0-313-31675-9
  .
• Topmiller, Robert J. (2006). The Lotus Unleashed: The Buddhist Peace Movement in South Vietnam, 1964–1966. Lexington, Kentucky: University Press of Kentucky.
  ISBN 0-8131-9166-1
  .
• Tucker, Spencer C. (2000). Encyclopedia of the Vietnam War: A Political, Social and Military History. Santa Barbara, California: ABC-CLIO.
  ISBN 1-57607-040-9
  .
• Wright, Jackie Bong (2002). Autumn Cloud: From Vietnamese War Widow to American Activist. Herndon, Virginia: Capital Books.
  ISBN 1-931868-20-4
  .

• Funeral of General Ton That Dinh on
  YouTube