Tatarbunary Uprising
Tatarbunary Uprising | |||||||
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A group of rebels participating in the uprising (FOCR) | |||||||
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Belligerents | |||||||
Tatarbunary Revolutionary Committee Supported by: Soviet Union |
Romanian Royal Army Romanian Danube Flotilla Romanian Gendarmerie | ||||||
Commanders and leaders | |||||||
Andrei Klyushnikov Iustin Batișcev | King Ferdinand I | ||||||
Strength | |||||||
4,000-6,000 rebels | Unknown | ||||||
Casualties and losses | |||||||
3,000 deaths overall 1,600 rebels arrested |
Part of a series on the |
Communist movement in the Kingdom of Romania |
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The Tatarbunary Uprising (
The uprising was instigated and led by communists from across the
Background
Soviet–Romanian relations
After World War I relations between Romania and Soviet Russia were tense. Since 1918 there were numerous bilateral meetings in Copenhagen, Warsaw, Genoa, and other locations but no consensus could be reached. The Soviets saw Bessarabia as an annexed province and considered the decision of union with Romania as imposed by the occupying Romanian Army. Moreover, historians from both countries intensely debated the treaty with the Soviet Rumcherod in 1918 that required withdrawal of the Romanian Army from Bessarabia but which both countries failed to respect.[9] The legitimacy of the Sfatul Țării was also brought into question, although the only contested decision was the unification act.
In December 1923, the sixth
Between March 27 and April 2, 1924 negotiations took place in
Preparations
The Soviet government assessed that, in 1924, all the conditions were met for major actions against Romania which would justify the intervention of Soviet Army. Similar actions were prepared for other countries from the
- North Zone – representing Bukovina, had the center of operation at Kamyanka (Romanian: Camenca, now Petriceni). The main goal of this force was to destroy the rail bridge connecting Cernăuți with Pașcani, thus isolating Bukovina from the rest of the country, and continue to Iași where it would link with other revolutionaries coming from Bessarabia.
- Bessarabia – had the main action zone in the south and it would advance to Galați with the help of a Soviet detachment that would cross the border at Olănești – Budachi – Tuzla. This was set to be the main action zone. Several munition deposits were prepared.
- South-East Zone – comprising Dobrudja with the main centers at Călărași – Silistra – Mânăstirea. The plan was to destroy the bridge near Feteștithat connected the province with Romania. Help would be provided by land troops from the Soviet Union.
- Banat and Hunedoara – here, the main proceedings were supported by Hungarian irredentists. The centers were Lugoj, Simeria, and Caransebeș.
- Northern Zone (.
The Soviet Union had asked not to be directly involved in the preparations. The only help would come from other Communists.[13] In preparation, arms, munitions, and explosives were smuggled in boats across the Soviet-Romanian border, mainly at night.[13][2] The plan relied on support from peasants who resented Romanian government's agricultural policy, particularly the land reform of 1921. The peasants' situation was aggravated due to a drought in summer 1924, which caused a famine in southern Bessarabia.[16]
As main leaders, the Comintern appointed Ghiță Moscu (Moscovici Gelbert), Max Goldstein, and Kalifarski (ethnic Russian and activist in the Comintern).[15][13][17] Andrei Klyushnikov, also known as Nenin, was responsible for coordinating the action, and the military commander in Bessarabia was Osip Poliakov, known as Platov.[13]
The planned action in the North Zone had the purpose of inspiring other uprisings in Galicia. The first, fourth, and fifth zones were to begin action one week after the uprisings in the second and third zones. Even though the plan was complex, no significant events took place except for Tatarbunary and in the Danube port of Kiliia (Romanian: Chilia Nouă), where the uprising was quickly silenced.[18]
Local preparations
In
Before and during the Vienna Conference a large group of Soviet agents infiltrated into Southern Bessarabia and, along with the agents from the local committees, made propaganda in favor of the plebiscite.[19] Arms were brought from the Soviet Union and main deposits were in Strumok at Ivan Robotă's house and in Nerushai totaling 3,000 grenades, 1,000 guns, 7 machine guns, 500 swords, 2 cannons, and one mortar, all Russian made.[20]
Andrei Klyushnikov or Nenin began to organize the local committees. From his house he wrote a report in which he asked for 100 swords, 600 guns, mine throwers, and bombs. Nenin encouraged the participants to be bold and to count on support of the Soviet Army once the rebellion starts.[21] Nicolai Shishman was a very well trained agent. He spoke Russian, Romanian, and Bulgarian, as well as having other skills. Using many tactics, also by offering money, he tried to win local intellectuals and personalities to the Soviet cause, as was the case with senator Iacob Belaushenco from Cahul.[22]
Plan begins
Revolt starts
The first incident occurred at noon on September 11 when an armed group composed of 30 individuals, transported by boats, attacked the village of
After this incident, several leaders were arrested and it appears that Nenin decided to accelerate operations. On the evening of 15 September he convened a meeting at the house of Chirilă Nazarenko in Tatarbunary. Participants were Iustin Batischcev, Nechita Lisovoi, Kolţov, Leonte Ţurcan and Alexei Pavlenco. They all agreed on the plan, that would begin that night, and some of them brought arms and munitions from Strumok.[22]
The revolt was resumed more strongly in
During that night, out of Nenin's orders, two main groups were formed that took control of the villages near
Romanian reaction
In order to suppress the rebellion, the Romanian government sent artillery troops of the Romanian Army Third Corps and a marine unit. The first units arrived from Cetatea Albă in the evening of 16 September and engaged the rebels at the bridge between Tatarbunary and Bîlolîssia, mortally injuring Ivan Bejanovici. Meanwhile, Nenin went to Strumok where he deposited arms and munition at Andrei Stantenco's house, one of the leaders of the rebellion. The Romanian Army coming from the west already engaged Strumok.[2]
Nenin withdrew to Tatarbunary in the early hours of 17 September. Fighting continued around the village all day long until they retreated South to Nerushai where they would be supported by Leonte Ţurcan, who had a large stock of concealed weapons.[2]
In the early hours of September 18, Romanian troops stormed Tatarbunary, the center of the rebellion, by shelling the village. Unable to hold his positions, Nenin ordered the withdrawal to Desantne. Then he tried to reach the Black Sea beach line at a place called Volcioc, near Prymors'ke (Romanian: Jibrieni), but the rebels were intercepted by a border patrol composed of 20 soldiers. The skirmish lasted until the rebels ran out of ammunition after which they were captured and disarmed. A larger army detachment caught the remaining groups, capturing 120 rebels.[2]
Meanwhile, the leaders of the revolt, Nenin and Iustin Batischcev, fled by car which they later abandoned beyond Desantne. They hid in a corn field, but Batischcev left Nenin while he slept, taking with him 336,500 lei,[30] representing the remaining money robbed from the people of Tatarbunary. He was later caught by the army. After waking up alone and found no money, Nenin ran towards the Black Sea marshes, but was surprised by a gendarme who mortally wounded him.[2]
The
Aftermath
The revolt was suppressed by the Romanian Army's Third Corps after three days of fighting in which 1,600 people were arrested and 3,000 died,
"Trial of the 500"
The trial took place from August 24 to December 2, 1925, at the Military Court of Third Army Corps. Most of the initial 1600 arrested were freed but 489 of them would be prosecuted, only 9 of them being Romanians. It was nicknamed by the press "Trial of the 500". Defense was ensured by 8 Romanian lawyers, including Iacob Pistiner and Constantin Costa-Foru who wrote about the arrested and criticized the Romanian authorities. Because the defendants did not speak Romanian the hearings were made with the help of translators so the trial lasted very long.[33] The government's dossier presented at the trial contained about 70,000 pages and the verdict 180. All this and the unusual number of persons prosecuted made the trial last 103 days.[2]
During the trial, Parfentie Voronovski, one of the participants, said that
On December 3, 1925, the War Council of Third Army Corps convicted 85 (none of them Romanians) out of 287 persons brought to trial. Iustin Batishcev was sentenced to life forced labor (eventually reduced to 16 years), the most severe penalty, Nichita Lisovoi and Leonte Ţurcan to 15 years forced labor, another three to 10 years and 20 others to 5 years in prison. The remaining received convictions of 1 to 3 years in prison. Also, each of the 85 convicts were to pay 1,000 lei representing legal charges.[33]
Press reaction
The trial attracted
In the national newspapers the subject was presented in two different forms, both being critic to the uprising, except for the communist press. The pro-liberal and pro-government view emphasizes the danger of
Different views
Authorities of the Kingdom of Romania saw the incident as a mere terrorist action backed by the Soviet Union, that tried to destabilise the situation inside the country and prepared for a Red Army incursion.[36] The rebellion was also condemned by the country's non-communist
In Tatar Bunar, the Third International's agents provocateurs were involved, who, toying with the lives of Bessarabian peasants, wanted to prove to Europe that Bessarabians are in favour of the non-existent and ridiculous «Moldavian Republic».
A few peasants in a few isolated communes could not chase away the gendarmes [...] were it not for a few agents provocateurs assuring them that the revolution had begun throughout Bessarabia or that the red armies had entered or were about to enter.[37]
The view was shared by the American scholar Charles Upson Clark, according to whom:
[...] the Tatar-Bunar rebellion was simply the most striking example of a Communist raid, engineered from without [...] and not a local revolution against intolerable conditions due to Roumanian oppression, as it was represented to be by the Socialist press everywhere.[2]
Dutch professor Wim P. van Meurs, in his book dedicated to Bessarabia, considers the uprising as clearly instigated by communist agitators from across the Dniester and remarks that it was too well timed between the failure of the Vienna Conference and the proclamation of the Moldavian Autonomous Republic, moreover, for the Kremlin not to be involved.[38]
Ukrainian and Russian authors consider that main factors contributing to the uprising were of social-economic nature – economic crisis in Romania, the agricultural policy in 1921, the drought and famine of 1923/1924 and harsh administration. Moldovan historian Ludmila Rotari claims that the Ukrainian and Russian populations, main participants, were on a greater social-economic scale compared to the Romanian population that was on the lowest scale and with the German and Bulgarian ones, comprising the richest populations.[39] Also, during the uprising, the slogans used by the rebels were not of social but of political nature, like: Long live the Soviet Power!, Long live Soviet Bessarabia!, We ask for the unification with Soviet Ukraine!.[40] Ever since unification Bessarabia has been under martial law, because of numerous Soviet subversive actions, with censorship and all other forms of interference with normal life and with Romanian Government officials that were overzealous or incompetent, both military and civil. Corruption also played an important part, sometimes even interfering with national security.[2]
Long-term consequences
Many participants of the uprising took refuge across the
Another event following the uprising was the de facto banning of the Romanian Communist Party by the third Mârzescu Law while the second had banned it de jure. The law was approved by the Parliament on 17 December and it came into force two days later thus leading to the arrests of almost all the communist party members, most of them being non-Romanians.
Notes
- ^ Frunză, p. 70; Otu, p. 39
- ^ a b c d e f g h i Clark
- ^ Michael Bruchis, Nations – nationalities - people: a study of the nationalities policy of the Communist Party in Soviet Moldavia, East European Monographs, 1984, p .147
- ^ Meurs, p. 77
- ^ Giuseppe Motta, Un rapporto difficile: Romania e Stati Uniti nel periodo interbellico, FrancoAngeli, Milano, 2006, pg. 55
- ^ Frunză, p.71; Ripa; Troncotă, p.19
- ^ Michael Bruchis, The Republic of Moldavia: from the collapse of the Soviet empire to the restoration of the Russian empire, East European Monographs, 1996, p. 21
- Hoover Press, 2000. p. 52
- ^ Marcel Mitrasca, Moldova: a Romanian province under Russian rule, p. 38
- ^ Rotari, p. 154
- ^ Otu, p. 38-39; Ripa
- ^ Scurtu, p. 295
- ^ a b c d e f Scurtu, p. 296-297
- ^ Otu, p. 39; Ripa; Troncotă, p. 19
- ^ a b Mircea Musat. România dupa Marea Unire Editura Stiintifica si Enciclopedica, 1986. p. 781-782
- ^ Rotari, p. 252
- ^ Ion Oprea, Romania si imperiul rus: 1924–1947 Editura Albatros, 2003, p. 25
- ^ Rotari, p. 234
- ^ a b Rotari, p. 239
- ^ Rotari, p. 258
- ^ a b Rotari, p. 240
- ^ a b Rotari, p. 241
- ^ Scurtu, p. 297, Rotari, p. 241
- ^ Enciclopedia Sovietica Moldoveneasca, vol. 6, Chisinau, 1976, p. 352
- ^ Scurtu, p. 297
- ^ Scurtu, p. 298
- ^ Otu, p.40
- ^ Rotari, p. 244
- ^ Clark; Otu, p. 39-40
- ^ Rotari, p. 259
- ^ Rotari, p. 245
- ^ a b Rotari, p. 238
- ^ a b c Rotari, p. 246
- ^ Cermotan; Clark
- ^ History Magazine Chronos, nr. 1, 2010
- ^ Clark; Frunză, p.70-71; Troncotă, p.19; Veiga, p.115
- ^ Moscovici, in Frunză, p.71
- ^ Meurs, pp. 77, 292
- ^ Rotari, p. 249
- ^ Rotari, p. 262
- ^ Rotari, p.247
References
- Cemortan, Leonid (2000). "Drama intelectualilor basarabeni de stinga". Revista Sud-Est. 3 (41). Archived from the original on 21 July 2011.
- Clark, Charles Upson (1927). "The Tatar-Bunar Episode". Bessarabia Russia and Roumania on the Black Sea. New York: Dodd, Mead & Company.
- Frunză, Victor (1990). Istoria stalinismului în România. București: Humanitas. ISBN 9732801778.
- Meurs, Wim P. van (1994). The Bessarabian question in communist historiography : nationalist and communist politics and history-writing. New York: East European Monographs. ISBN 0880332840.
- Otu, Petre (1998). "1924: România întregită — pace cu Sovietele, dar... Război cu Internaţionala a III-a". Dosarele Istoriei. 10 (26).
- Ripa, George D. (2004). "Septembrie 1924 - Bolşevicii încearcă să recupereze Basarabia". No. 1 December 2004. Jurnalul Național. Archived from the original on 4 March 2016.
- Rotari, Ludmila (2004). Mișcarea subversivă din Basarabia în anii 1918-1924. București: Editura Enciclopedică. ISBN 9734504908.
- Scurtu, Ioan, ed. (2003). Istoria Basarabiei de la începuturi până în 2003 (Ed. a 3-a, rev. și adăugită ed.). București: Editura Institutului Cultural Român. ISBN 9735773775.
- Troncotă, Cristian (2000). "Siguranţa şi spectrul revoluţiei comuniste". Dosarele Istoriei. 4 (44).
- Veiga, Francisco (1993). Istoria Gărzii de Fier, 1919-1941 : mistica ultranaționalismului. București: Humanitas. ISBN 9732803924.
External links
- (in Russian) Alexander Junco. Tatarbunary Uprising in Bessababia
- (in Romanian) Speech related to the events in Tatarbunary, held by Under-secretary for Internal Affairs Gheorghe Tătărescu in 1926, Part I, Part II
- (in Romanian) Revista Chronos, Conferinţa româno-sovietică de la Viena, 1924
- (in Romanian) Revista Chronos, Evenimentele de la Tatar-Bunar reflectate în presa vremii.
- (in Romanian) Doina Otelita, Problema Basarabiei in evolutia Raporturilor Romano-Sovietice: 1918-1924
- (in Romanian) Valeria Bălescu, Tatar-Bunar, diversiune comunistă pentru cucerirea Basarabiei
- (in Romanian) Pavel Moraru, Siguranţa Română în Basarabia Interbelică