Telangana Rebellion
Telangana Rebellion Telangana Sayudha Poratam | |||||||
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Part of the Indian independence movement | |||||||
Women rebels of Telengana rebellion | |||||||
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Belligerents | |||||||
Telangana peasants Andhra Mahasabha Communist Party of India Supported by: Congress socialists (Tirtha Group) Socialist Party of India (1948–1951) |
1946–1948: 1948–1951: Government of India Hyderabad State Durras of Hyderabad Supported by: United States | ||||||
Commanders and leaders | |||||||
Localised leadership |
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The Telangana Rebellion, natively known as Telangana Sayudha Poratam,[a] was a communist-led[1] insurrection of peasants against the princely state of Hyderabad in the region of Telangana that escalated out of agitations in 1944–46.[2]
Hyderabad was a
The revolt began on 4 July 1946, when a local peasant leader was killed in the village of Kadavendi,
The rebels established a parallel system of government composed of gram rajyams (village
The rebellion ended when the military administration set up by the Nehru government unexpectedly launched an attack on the communes immediately following the annexation of Hyderabad to fulfil assurances given by V. P. Menon to the American embassy that the communists would be eradicated, leading to an eventual call for the rebels to lay down arms issued by the Communist Party of India on 25 October 1951.
Background
Situated on the
- Kannada speaking people.
- Marathwada consisted of five districts and was populated by Marathi speaking people.
- Telangana consisted of nine districts and was populated by Telugu speaking people. It contained more than half the population of the state and covered the entire eastern half including Hyderabad city, the capital of the state.
Feudal system
The princely state of Hyderabad retained a
The feudal system was particularly harsh in the Telangana region of the state. The powerful deshmukh and jagirdar aristocracy, locally called durras, additionally functioned as money lenders and as the highest village official. The durras employed variants of the
Telangana had a higher concentration of land in the hands of a small group of landed
Communist mobilisation
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Communists had been active in the
The students' movement contributed significantly to the growth of the communist movement, disillusioned with Gandhian
Andhra Conference
In the meantime, the
The Andhra Conference, previously seen as a durra's organisation, grew in popularity among the peasants and started being referred to as the Andhra Mahasabha (AMS) in Telangana.
Agitations of 1944–46
Between 1944 and 1946, the communist movement became widespread in the Telangana countryside. The Andhra Conference controlled by communists substantially increased its membership in the districts of Nalgonda, Warangal and Karimnagar. The movement formed a class alliance between disparate caste groups, the middle peasantry with small landholdings and the rural poor and landless labourers. Numerous villages were enmeshed with communist organisations. Agrarian radicalism was heightened and a mass movement developed with a series of agrarian agitations against the durra aristocrats beginning in 1944.
Rebellion
Spontaneous uprising
The post–war economic distress and political developments played a catalytic role in a feudal system already conducive for an uprising.[16] The village level agitations against the aristocratic durra landlords escalated into an insurrection.[note 7] The influence of the communists in Nalgonda and Warangal districts had become so strong by early 1946 that the administration, including the Nizam's firmans (writs), was unable to function in large areas. The expansion of the movement in these areas was facilitated by the presence of estates with thousands of acres.[note 8] The first militant action occurred with a few instances of land seizures from the estates of durras in response to eviction of Lambadi tenant cultivators for non-compliance with additional taxation and demands of vetti forced labour. The village level communist sanghams (organisations) during the 1944–46 agitations had laid down demands for better wages, disallowance of vetti and baghela slavery, evictions, exorbitant taxation and refusal of a new mandatory post–war grain levy.[27]
One major incident on 4 July 1946 marked the beginning of the rebellion; a procession of over 1,000 peasants was fired at by the men of Vishnur Deshmukh in Kadavendi village of Warangal district,[note 9] Doddi Komarayya who was the leader of the local sangham was killed and a number of others severely wounded. The group proceeded to and set fire to the residence of the deshmukh before they were dispersed by the arrival of a contingent of armed police.[28][27] In the following days, 200 acres of land in a neighbouring village were seized from the deshmukh's estate and redistributed by the peasants. The incident sparked a spontaneous movement where groups of villagers would go from one village to another, people would drop out and return to their village after coming some distance, while others from the villages they passed through would take their place and keep the movement going. In each village, they formed drawn out congregations upon their arrival to discuss prevalent local issues and relations with the durra of their area.[28] By the end of July, around 300–400 villages in the districts of Warangal, Nalgonda and Khammam experienced militant action by peasants against the local estates and officials.[note 10] In August 1946, the press wing of the Communist Party of India announced that the villages were under the control of the peasants and launched a national campaign to rally support for the rebellion, publicising the demands of the peasantry and highlighting the feudal exploitation and brutality.[27]
Peasants continuously resisted extortive action from officials and other agents, and refused to perform vetti labour. Small landholders refused to hand over paddy crops for the required levy, and landless labourers and tenants continued to occupy lands from which they had been evicted.[29] The durras sent their private militias to prevent the seizure of their lands, but they were few in number and too poorly armed to contain mass unrest.[30] Unable to control the villages, the durras started fleeing to safer regions, resorted to litigation, and relied on the state police and their private militias to suppress the rebellious peasants.[27][30] The villages adopted a strategy of active defense in response to violent attacks by private militias and the state police. Village level organisations developed a signals network to inform other villages of the position of approaching state security forces and villagers adopted the tactic of gathering en masse armed with slingshots, stones and sticks to ward off reconnaissance units and smaller raiding parties.[25] The rebels had neither the firearms nor the training to use them. The durras, their agents and local officials became fearful of visiting their own estates or jurisdictions which were known to be established strongholds of the communist rebels without paying "protection taxes" themselves.[27]
The Andhra Conference was banned in October 1946 and the police had begun arresting communists and sympathisers throughout the state. Hundreds of Communist Party activists were arrested, and the number of police units assigned to the rebellious regions was increased exponentially.[25][29] The frequency of raids increased through 1946, but during their attempts at arresting communist activists known to the police, crowds of hundreds would gather to obstruct them. The administration started assigning units of the Hyderabad State Forces to assist the police.[25] Some of the villages formed ad hoc volunteer forces for defense.[29] On 16 and 17 November, military personnel killed three villagers and wounded eight others in two raids on the villages of Patha Suryapet and Devarupal. On 27 November, in retaliation for the killing, a police convoy escorting arrested communist activists was ambushed successfully; four police personnel were killed, and the prisoners released.[25]
Following the ambush, the police and military forces began attempting to arrest entire villages and by December, the Suryapet prison alone was holding 600 prisoners. The military crackdown increased in December, resulting in even-heightened militancy; the sangham earlier known as chitti sangham due to their distribution of chittis (receipts), common after the enrolment fee for AMS was reduced, started being known as the lathi sangham for their distribution of lathis (heavy sticks or batons) in this period.[25] By the end of 1946, the police had reported 156 cases of assault by peasants and four major police–peasant battles had occurred, but neither the actions of the military, the police nor the private militias were able to dislodge the communists. Most of the confrontations occurred in the Suryapet and Jangaon taluqas of Nalgonda district; pockets in Khammam, Karimnagar, Nalgonda and Warangal districts had fallen under rebel control,[29] while 4,000 army troops were deployed in Nalgonda district.[31]
The military, equipped with modern firearms, made it much harder for the rebels to operate and the movement became more clandestine in the presence of military camps near their villages; the Andhra communists in the Madras Presidency initiated dialogue with the rebels in preparation for open warfare with the Hyderabad State. Meanwhile, the military camps were withdrawn in January 1947 after a period of absence of any visible disturbances.[32] Despite some instances of armed confrontations, the peasants uprising was spasmodic in their actions and lacked any systemically planned offensives in the initial period. It had begun as a spontaneous upsurge where the organised Andhra Mahasabha and Communist Party acted primarily in an auxiliary capacity.[29]
Reactions
The Hyderabad State Congress was divided into two factions of moderates and leftists since 1938–39. While the left-wing members of the Andhra Conference had gravitated to the Communist Party, those in
At the onset of the rebellion, and in light of post–war negotiations between the Congress and the British administration, the Nizam of Hyderabad legalised the Hyderabad State Congress in July 1946. The three front organisations — the non-communist Andhra Conference, the Maharashtra Parishad and the
In November 1946, the two factions sent separate fact finding teams to Suryapet, led by Tirtha and J. Keshav Rao respectively. Tirtha's group searched for police atrocities while Rao's group searched for reasons to condemn the communists. Tirtha praised the actions of the communists. The leftist faction wanted to not only admonish the government for repression but also convert the party into a more militant mass movement. They were prevented from doing so by the moderates, who were adamantly opposed to any further move to the left. The working committee drafted three resolutions demanding the government end their repression in Nalgonda, lift the ban on the Communist Party and cease criticising the communists for a sectarian approach towards the Congress. The moderates were dissatisfied with it,
Communist–Left Congress alliance
In February 1947, the British administration announced the
The Congress went on satyagraha seeking the merger of Hyderabad with India and the State Congress under Tirtha launched a civil disobedience campaign. The communists joined up with Congress workers in their agitation although they held reservations over the effectiveness of Gandhian methods. Due to the organisational weakness of the Congress, most of the Congress agitation in Telangana especially in the rural areas was carried out instead by communists, the police were unable to differentiate between the two and assumed that they had entered into a league.[36] In the urban areas, communists and Congressmen held joint meetings and demonstrations which provided material benefits to the rebels in the countryside.[37] The general understanding among the communists was that the "rightist congressmen" were backed by the durras and opposed to any form of alliance with them while the "leftist congressmen" wanted an unification with the Communist Party but were too irresolute and timid to carry it forward.[36]
The communists started disassociating with the satyagraha as a consequence of incorporation of Gandhian ethics in the agitations, one key point of discontent became the symbolic cutting down of toddy trees as Gandhian ethics prohibited toddy drinking. The symbolism lay in the toddy plantations also being a major source of revenue for the state but toddy trappers who were subjected to untouchability, were a significant section of the communist activists and base of support, and relied on toddy for their livelihoods.[38] Some degree of co-ordination continued to occur especially due to increase in police repression and the agitations becoming interspersed with instances of violent confrontations. One major incident occurred in Warangal district where a crowd of 2,000 armed with spears and lathis stormed a police station and released two Congress workers who were being subjected to torture, in the process killing an inspector and injuring several policemen.[36] Another occurred within Hyderabad city when a group of agitators burned down the residences of the British Police Minister and the president of the Executive Council of Hyderabad.[39] In Nalgonda, the epicenter of the rebellion, the communists toured across the district, releasing and redistributing grains hoarded in markets and storages, burning down checkpoints on the border and the records of officials and sahukars in the villages, while raising Indian flags in those locations.[32]
Rise of Kasim Razvi
Meanwhile, the Ittehad was spreading sectarian propaganda and attempting to promote fanaticism among Muslims, along with the
Hindu–Muslim tensions and
Escalation and territorial expansion
The crisis of authority in Hyderabad had enabled the influence of the rebels in the countryside to expand rapidly. They set up a parallel administration composed of gram rajyams (village communes) in the areas that came under their control.
Volunteer squads called dalams were organised by the communes. They were joined en masse by villagers frustrated with police, military and razakar atrocities, particularly in the districts of Nalgonda, Warangal and Kammam which were communist strongholds.
In response, the government authorised the police, the military and the razakars to indiscriminately target entire villages for harbouring sympathies for the sangham (communists) or the Congress. The attacks involved reprisals in which the entire population of some villages was killed. There was widespread use of torture against villagers and rape against women as a terror tactic. The extreme measures employed by the state forces pushed otherwise skeptical people in the peripheral areas of the rebel dominated territories to be drawn towards the communists and the rebellion.[41] In some cases, the razakars who the government was unable to control attacked the estates of the durras themselves and plundered them. Consequently, some of the durras entered into agreements with the communes to supply them with resources and abide by their governance in exchange for protection from the razakar bands.[31] The reprisals made the communes strengthen their organisation and co-ordination. The Andhra and Telangana communists set up joint revolutionary headquarters at the Mungala estate, constituting an enclave of Hyderabad State within Krishna district of Madras State.[43] By early 1948, much of Telangana was beginning to rebel in an all-out revolution as more of the rural poor and the peasantry organised themselves under the communists and took up arms against the durras and the Hyderabad State. This triggered a large-scale displacement of durras who fled to the cities, abandoning their private militias and properties. The communist influence was chipping away at the entire social hierarchy with a quasi divine Nizam at the top since the early 1940s, and had eventually enabled the mass uprising to occur.[44]
The rebels suffered from a persistent shortage of modern firearms and had to constantly rely on raids to gain more.[32] As a consequence they were severely outnumbered as the communes refused to deploy more recruits as they were unable to arm them. Despite the shortages, the rebel forces were highly motivated, being entirely composed of volunteers, increasingly ideological and antagonised by years of repression.[44] The rebels were also better adjusted to the terrain and shaped their organisation along the lines of geography and the strategic considerations of guerrilla warfare as they built it from the ground up. This made them much more effective in terms of tactics and logistics. The rebel forces were organised into two categories — garrisons consisting of village dalams who would continue their civilian lives while maintaining hidden arms, and mobile guerrilla dalams who would become full-time operatives and engage in offensives across large distances.[45] The revolutionary headquarters in Mungala became a key source of supplies, arms, literature and organisers as they were smuggled in through the border. Some demobilised war veterans also joined the communists during this period.[43]
In contrast, state forces and the paramilitary razakars lacked co-ordination; the former were demoralised as a consequence of the induction of the latter and having to serve in a subordinate role to them.[31] The rising tensions between the Dominion of India and Hyderabad State made it more difficult for the government as they had to deploy more troops at the frontiers.[46] One critical advantage the government forces had was in terms of transportation. They could use trucks, jeeps and railways to move troops quickly through the few hard bed roads and railway lines that existed in the region while the rebels were largely restricted to foot. Even captured vehicular transportation was not useful to the rebels, as they could not operate them clandestinely, nor did they possess heavy armament like artillery to engage in conventional warfare. To mitigate this advantage, the rebels dug trenches around the villages and roads were either blocked, breached or had planks with nails placed on them. The military would often respond by forcing a group of villagers to refill the trenches, shooting some of them while they worked on it. On 26–27 February, the rebels conducted a major operation with twenty simultaneous co-ordinated attacks on infrastructure targets including important telecommunication facilities, bridges and sections of railway tracks which paralysed the transportation and communication capabilities of the government forces from thereon.[47]
The rebels went on a successful campaign of territorial expansion and effectively routed the government forces by mid-1948. Much of the Telangana countryside came under their control, covering the entirety of Nalgonda, Warangal, Khammam and Karimnagar districts, more than half of Medak and Adilabad districts and a significant portion of the remaining three districts of Telangana namely, Mahabubnagar, Hyderabad and Nizamabad. In Adilabad, Medak and Karimnagar, the Tirtha Group of the Congress had established some bases that defected towards the communists.[48][49] Around 16,000 square miles (41,000 km2), covering 4,000 villages, were being directly administered by communes. The rebel forces had reached a peak with 10,000 troops in garrisons and 2,000 in guerrilla forces. There were an additional three to four million active workers and non-combatant supporters of the rebel forces.[50] In August 1948, the number of razakars stood at 100,000 men even as it recruited 30,000 more in January, down from 200,000 in September 1947. They were increasingly sent by the government to engage with the communists as the rebellion expanded across Telangana, but they proved to be ineffective against them.[31][43] In turn, the razakars became the victims of torture as retribution for their past atrocities, which continued until the communes and sanghams prohibited and eventually banned such activities, declaring them to be primitive.[51]
Decline of the insurrection
In September 1948, the Dominion of India launched a military intervention for the
The Indian Army marched into Hyderabad State on 13 September and the already demoralised Hyderabad State Force, the police and the razakars surrendered within a week after minimal resistance.[58] This military intervention was perceived by the peasant communes as a positive development and not as an attack on them. The villagers believed the army was helping them defeat the Nizam's government. They launched a final parallel assault against the remaining military camps of the state forces, outposts of state agents and garrisons in durra estates, accompanied by victory celebrations.[55] The rebels came across large stores of arms and ammunition during the assault. Many of them were handed over to the army after their objectives were accomplished, as the peasants returned to their villages with the belief that the armed conflict was over.[59] The commanding officer selected for the invasion was Major General Jayanto Nath Chaudhuri, who was also a zamindar aristocrat from West Bengal.[60] He set up a military administration after the Nizam's capitulation, banned the Communist Party, and immediately launched a military offensive against the peasant communes.[56][61] The deshmukhs and officials returned as the redistributed lands were to be confiscated and granted back to their original owners.[59]
The military administration did not induct any local police personnel or civil servants, including those affiliated with the Hyderabad State Congress, who were sidelined. Vallabhbhai Patel distrusted them and justified it with the claim that they had a partisan character.
The offensive sent the peasant communes and the Communist Party into disarray, causing divisions within them.
In December 1948, the administration began a large-scale
De-escalation
The military force, with its high morale and modern equipment, had forced the Nizam and the razakar to surrender within weeks. Despite this, they were unable to suppress the poorly armed peasants for three years.[76] Nehru was concerned with the continued military rule in the state imposed by Patel; civil authorities were introduced in the state after 16 months of military administration.[77] Land reform measures such as the enactment of the Jagirdari Abolition Regulations and setting up of the Agrarian Enquiry Committee were introduced to contain the popularity of the communists. This somewhat reduced the power of the durras in the process.[78] In 1950, the Constitution of India came into force and the dominion became a republic. Fearing the loss of credibility as a democratic government and with the understanding that further repression would only popularise the communists, the Congress administration started making reconciliatory gestures towards the Communist Party from early 1951. There was increasing distrust of the Congress in the state as information from the Telangana countryside was spreading.[69] The leftist congressmen involved in the earlier agitations against the Nizam had started being harshly critical of the government, referring to brutal and unjust repression.[77] There were also ongoing student and labour agitations since 1948–49 in the urban areas.[79]
Meanwhile, Ranadive, who had become the general secretary in 1948 and adopted the policy of continuing the rebellion, was replaced by Chandra Rajeswara Rao in 1950. Opinions critical of the continuation rose through the year. Puran Chand Joshi was aggressively campaigning within the party for withdrawal of the rebellion.
On 25 October 1951, the Central Committee of the Communist Party officially declared the end of the rebellion.
Communes and guerrilla squads
Structure and organisation
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The communist peasant rebellion set up a system of governance called gram rajyams or village communes which managed all administrative and judicial functions.
The Andhra Mahasabha and Communist Party of India were undifferentiated by the villagers and collectively were simply known as Sangham (The Organisation), from their reference to the initial village level organisations called sanghams.[44] The porosity in membership of the Sangham was very high, anyone who supported and participated was de facto considered a member of the party which in turn made entire villages an extension of the party itself. Any villager could be elected to positions within it.[91]
The dalams (squads) were initially created for defensive purposes.[30][89] They developed into an armed force and were reorganised separately from the organisation of the communes. The garrison village squads remained within them while guerrilla squads were divided into five area groups, each with a number of zones and a commanding officer in each zone overseeing several squads.[32] The individual squads were composed of 10 combatants.[32] The revolutionary headquarters became the coordination centre for the squads.[43] The squad leaders in the early stages were usually middle peasantry with small landholding while the majority of the members were landless labourers and rural poor. The disparity existed as a consequence of much of the population being illiterate, and literacy became a requirement for effective long-distance communication. Only 10% of the population in Telangana was literate and the ones that could be found were from the middle peasantry.[44]
Social revolution
The new system of governance marked a radical shift from a feudal autocracy to a network of decentralised village democracies,
The village samitis instituted crash course education schemes, literacy programs, prohibited forced marriages, and legalised and introduced programs to destigmatise divorces and widow remarriages. Caste distinctions broke down during the rebellion as the villagers and especially the squad members were necessitated into working together. One of the most significant impacts of the rebellion was a change in the relations between sexes. The workforce participation of women increased substantially and prevalent domestic gender norms were questioned. In the early stages, women had begun serving in auxiliary roles for the squads. They eventually began to be recruited in the squads themselves despite the abundance of male and female volunteers. Discriminatory attitudes persisted to an extent with a harsher reception to mistakes made by women. Beliefs in gods, demons and superstitions also declined in the population during this period.[48]
The early onset of the land seizures marked the beginning of the land redistribution process.[30] The task of managing land distribution was taken over by the samitis;[89] land revenues were abolished.[93] The communes also introduced regulations on interest rates, guarantees on repayments and price control measures.[94] The period was marked by exhilaration among the peasantry. The rebels no longer had to pay exorbitant rents, taxes or repay debts. They had gained land through redistribution instead, and were able to feed themselves two meals a day for the first time in their lives.[92]
The lands of jagirdars and deshmukhs were the primary targets for redistribution, but government owned wastelands and forest lands also came under the redistribution scheme.[94] Lands acquired by durras through coercion and lands worked by evicted tenants were readily granted to the evicted cultivators.[93] The ceiling of land ownership was progressively reduced over time and ceiling surplus lands were redistributed. Initially set at 500 acres, it was reduced to 200 acres and eventually after pressure from the majority of the peasantry was reduced to 100 dry acres and 10 wet acres. Over one million acres of land were redistributed by 1948.[94][95]
Contrary to expectations, the land redistribution program resulted in an expansion of agricultural production in spite of the ongoing conflict with the state. The grains produced were hidden in scattered storage deposits in the fields. The communes were still dependent on the external market to sell the produce and had to bribe middlemen to market goods from the rebel villages.[94]
Medical support
The medical facilities of the rebels in Telangana were poor, and preventative measures were emphasised. The city of Bezawada (Vijayawada) served as the primary source of medical support for the rebellion. Doctors sympathetic to the rebellion arranged a special ward in the Vijayawada General Hospital to treat injured combatants. They also supplied the rebellion with first aid kits and anti-venom against snake bites. Two doctors from the city joined the rebels to provide paramedic training to squad members. The paramedics trained in ad hoc facilities by the doctors, were able to contain a cholera outbreak in villages near Bhongir during the rebellion by emphasising on disinfection of drinking water with the use of coal and lime.[48]
Legacy
No official account of the attempted suppression of the rebellion, was released to the public even 70 years later.
See also
References
Notes
- ^ Telugu : తెలంగాణ సాయుధ పోరాటం romanised : Telaṅgāṇa sāyudha pōrāṭaṁ
- revenue farmers.[8]
- ^ The first communist connection likely established between Veerlapadu village (Nandigama taluq) in Krishna district and Allinagaram village (Madhira taluq) in Warangal district.[17]
- ^ The first communist units were formed in 1940 after Devulapalli Venkateswara Rao, Pervaelli Venkataramanaiah, Sarvadevabhatla Ramanadham, Chirravuri Lakshminarasaiah established contact with Chandra Rajeswara Rao.[17]
- ^ Naya Abad developed around the newspapers Rayyat edited by Mandumulu Narsing Rao and Payyam edited by Khaji Abdul Gafoor.[17]
- ^ The Muslim supremacist organisation of Majlis-e-Ittehadul Muslimeen and reactionary Hindu nationalist organisations like the Hindu Mahasabha and the Arya Samaj were influential in the city of Hyderabad.[16]
- ^ The left-wing faction within the AMS was led by Ravi Narayan Reddy, Baddam Yella Reddy and Arutla Ramachandra Reddy.[17]
- ^ The agitations of 1944–1946 were located primarily in Nalgonda district on the estates of jagirdars and deshmukhs of the largest landholdings.[27]
- ^ 550 estates with over 500 acres of land owned 60 to 70% of the total cultivatable land in Nalgonda, Warangal and Mahbubnagar districts.[13]
- ^ Vishnur Deshmukh had an estate of 40,000 acres covering over 40 villages.[13]
- ^ The initial militant actions of 1946 were sometimes carried out without approval from sangham leaders.[27]
- ^ The socialists of Maharashtra Parishad led agitation around 1944, similar to that of the Telangana communists, gaining a mass following in Marathawada.[33]
- ^ The leader of the Marathawada socialists, Swami Ramananda Tirtha became embroidered in a controversy when their internal correspondences with Mahatma Gandhi on the communist question were released verbatim by the Communist Party. Tirtha was widely assumed to have leaked it himself.[34]
- ^ K.R. Vaidya, a moderate veteran was insulted that the younger committee had not accepted his recommendations and distributed a letter condemning Govind Das Shroff and the Marathawada leftists for being overtly sympathetic to the communists.[34]
- Gopaliah Subbukrishna Melkote and Digambarrao Govindrao Bindu.[41]
Citations
- JSTOR 3516269.
- ISBN 978-81-7596-825-7, retrieved 1 November 2023
- ^ Leonard 2003, pp. 365–367.
- ^ Elliott 1974, p. 28.
- ^ Elliott 1974, p. 32.
- ^ Dhanagare 1983, p. 183.
- ^ a b c d Dhanagare 1983, pp. 180–184.
- ^ a b Gupta 1984a, p. 4.
- ^ Gupta 1984a, pp. 4–5.
- ^ a b c Gupta 1984a, p. 5.
- ^ a b c Dhanagare 1983, pp. 184–186.
- ^ Shankar 2016, p. 488.
- ^ a b c Sundarayya 1973a, pp. 8–13.
- ^ a b c Dhanagare 1983, pp. 186–189.
- ^ Chatterjee 2005, pp. 137–154.
- ^ a b c d e f g h i j k Dhanagare 1983, pp. 189–193.
- ^ a b c d e f g Thirumali 1996, pp. 164–168.
- ^ a b c Thirumali 1996, pp. 168–174.
- ^ Benichou 2000, pp. 164–165.
- ^ Benichou 2000, pp. 128–131.
- ^ Benichou 2000, pp. 164–166.
- ^ a b c d Thirumali 1996, pp. 174–177.
- ^ Benichou 2000, pp. 147–153.
- ^ Roosa 2001, p. 63.
- ^ a b c d e f g h Roosa 2001, pp. 66–68.
- ^ Ram 1973, p. 1026.
- ^ a b c d e f g Dhanagare 1983, pp. 193–194.
- ^ a b Dhanagare 1974, pp. 120–121.
- ^ a b c d e Dhanagare 1983, pp. 194–195.
- ^ a b c d e f Gupta 1984a, p. 14.
- ^ a b c d e f g h i Elliott 1974, pp. 43–45.
- ^ a b c d e f g Gupta 1984a, p. 15.
- ^ a b Roosa 2001, pp. 61–66.
- ^ a b c d e f Roosa 2001, pp. 68–73.
- ^ a b c Dhanagare 1983, pp. 195–196.
- ^ a b c d Roosa 2001, pp. 73–75.
- ^ Pavier 1981, pp. 111–112.
- ^ a b c Dhanagare 1983, pp. 196–197.
- ^ Elliott 1974, p. 42.
- ^ a b Elliott 1974, pp. 41–43.
- ^ a b c d e Roosa 2001, pp. 75–76.
- ^ Ralhan 1997, p. 82.
- ^ a b c d e f Dhanagare 1983, pp. 197–198.
- ^ a b c d Roosa 2001, pp. 76–77.
- ^ Pavier 1981, pp. 115–116.
- ^ Dhanagare 1983, p. 197.
- ^ Gupta 1984a, pp. 15–16.
- ^ a b c Gupta 1984a, p. 16.
- ^ Dhanagare 1983, p. 182.
- ^ Dhanagare 1983, pp. 197–199.
- ^ a b Dhanagare 1983, pp. 198–199.
- ^ a b Roosa 2001, pp. 79–80.
- ^ a b c Guha 1976, p. 41.
- ^ a b Dhanagare 1983, pp. 199–200.
- ^ a b c Roosa 2001, p. 80.
- ^ a b c Dhanagare 1983, p. 200.
- ^ Gupta 1984a, p. 18.
- ^ Dhanagare 1983, p. 199.
- ^ a b c d Gupta 1984a, p. 19.
- ^ Barua 2003, pp. 51–52.
- ^ Gerlach & Six 2020, p. 131.
- ^ Roosa 2001, pp. 82–83.
- ^ a b Gupta 1984a, pp. 19–20.
- ^ a b Roosa 2001, p. 81.
- ^ a b c Gerlach & Six 2020, p. 132.
- ^ Gray 2015, p. 403.
- ^ Guha 1976, pp. 41–42.
- ^ Gerlach & Six 2020, p. 133.
- ^ a b c d Dhanagare 1983, p. 203.
- ^ Gupta 1984a, pp. 18–21.
- ^ Roosa 2001, pp. 81–82.
- ^ Dhanagare 1983, pp. 203–204.
- ^ Roosa 2001, p. 82.
- ^ Gupta 1984a, p. 20.
- ^ Dhanagare 1983, pp. 202–204.
- ^ a b Elliott 1974, p. 45.
- ^ a b Roosa 2001, p. 83.
- ^ Dhanagare 1983, pp. 200–201.
- ^ Gupta 1984a, p. 22.
- ^ Roosa 2001, pp. 84–86.
- ^ Roosa 2001, pp. 85–86.
- ^ Gupta 1984a, pp. 21–22.
- ^ Gupta 1984a, p. 21.
- ^ Ram 1973, pp. 1029–1030.
- ^ a b Ram 1973, p. 1030.
- ^ Banerjee 2006, p. 3840.
- ^ Mantena 2014, pp. 350–355.
- ^ a b Gupta 1984b, p. 22.
- ^ a b c d Dhanagare 1974, pp. 123–124.
- ^ Dhanagare 1983, pp. 205–206.
- ^ Roosa 2001, pp. 77–78.
- ^ a b Roosa 2001, p. 77.
- ^ a b Dhanagare 1983, p. 198.
- ^ a b c d Gupta 1984a, p. 17.
- ^ Dhanagare 1974, p. 117.
- ^ Ram 1973, pp. 1031–1032.
- ^ a b Dhanagare 1983, p. 207.
- ^ Elliott 1974, p. 46.
- ^ Ravikumar, Aruna (14 September 2019). "The Yoke of Oppression". The Hans India. Archived from the original on 20 August 2021. Retrieved 20 August 2021.
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Further reading
- Bandyopadhyay, Sekhar (2004). From Plassey to Partition: A History of Modern India. ISBN 978-81-250-2596-2.
- Balagopal, K. (1983). "Telangana Movement Revisited". Economic and Political Weekly. 18 (18): 709–712. .
- Benbabaali, Dalel (2016). "From the peasant armed struggle to the Telangana State: changes and continuities in a South Indian region's uprisings". Contemporary South Asia. 24 (2). S2CID 152251545.
- Motta, S.; Nilsen, A. Gunvald, eds. (2011). Social Movements in the Global South: Dispossession, Development and Resistance. ISBN 978-0-230-30204-4.
- SAGE Journals.
- Purushotham, Sunil (2021). From Raj to Republic: Sovereignty, Violence, and Democracy in India. ISBN 978-1-5036-1455-0.
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- ISBN 978-0-87395-441-9.