Tet offensive attack on US Embassy
| Attack on the US Embassy in Saigon | |||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Part of Tet offensive of the Vietnam War | |||||||
 The embassy after the attack | |||||||
| |||||||
| Belligerents | |||||||
 United States |
 Viet Cong | ||||||
| Commanders and leaders | |||||||
|
Lt Col. Gordon D. Rowe Captain Robert J. O'Brien |
Bay Tuyen † Ut Nho † | ||||||
| Units involved | |||||||
|
716th Military Police Battalion Marine Security Guard Battalion | C-10 Sapper Battalion | ||||||
| Strength | |||||||
|
Initially 3 Marine security guards 2 MPs | 19 sappers | ||||||
| Casualties and losses | |||||||
| 5 killed |
18 killed 1 captured | ||||||
History of Ho Chi Minh City |
|
|---|---|
 | |
| Attack on USNS Card (2 May 1964) | |
| 1964 Brinks Hotel bombing (24 December 1964) | |
| 1965 United States embassy bombing (30 March 1965) | |
| 1965 Saigon bombing (25 June 1965) | |
| Operation Jackstay (26 March – 6 April 1966) | |
| Operation Fairfax (November 1966 - 15 December 1967) | |
| Viet Cong attack on Tan Son Nhut Air Base (4–5 December 1966) | |
| Tet offensive battle of Cholon and Phu Tho Racetrack (31 January-11 February 1968) | |
| Tet offensive attack on Joint General Staff Compound (31 January-1 February 1968) | |
| Tet offensive attack on Tan Son Nhut Air Base (31 January 1968) | |
| Tet offensive attack on US Embassy (31 January 1968) | |
| Battle of West Saigon (5–12 May 1968) | |
| Battle of South Saigon (7–12 May 1968) | |
| Hijacking of Pan Am Flight 841 (2 July 1972) | |
| Bombing of Tan Son Nhut Air Base (28 April 1975) | |
| Operation Frequent Wind (29–30 April 1975) | |
| Fall of Saigon (30 April 1975) |
Vietnam portalThe Tet offensive attack on the US Embassy took place on the early morning of 31 January 1968 when a 19-man
Background
The United States had been providing material support to
On 15 December 1967, following the conclusion of
: 328Battle
Shortly after midnight on 31 January 1968, 19 VC
The unit set off in a small truck and a taxi towards central Saigon. As the vehicles came down Mac Dinh Chi Street with their lights off after curfew, they were spotted by a Vietnamese police guard post north of the embassy, but rather than trying to stop the vehicles, the police instead took cover. As the taxi turned from Mac Dinh Chi Street onto
Minutes later at 02:47, the VC blew a small hole in the perimeter wall on Thong Nhut Boulevard and gained access to the embassy compound. The first two VC who crawled through the hole were shot and killed by Daniel and Sebast in their guard post at the Mac Dinh Chi Street entrance. Daniel radioed "They're coming in! They're coming in! Help me! Help me!" before the radio went silent. A VC armed with an AK-47 rifle had emerged from the rear parking lot, shooting the two MPs in the back and killing them both. A second man carrying a rifle came around the building and the two men, later determined to be a pair of embassy drivers, joined the other VC soldiers on the front lawn.[5]: 329
On the chancery roof, Marine Sergeant Rudy A. Soto Jr saw the VC coming through the wall and tried to fire on them with his
When Lieutenant colonel Gordon D. Rowe, commanding the 716th MP Battalion, received the distress call from the embassy, he dispatched several jeep patrols to investigate what was happening. The first two patrols took routes that passed by the south vehicle gate of the Independence Palace which was under attack by the VC. As they came up to an unfinished high-rise building, where the VC were sheltering after their initial attack on the Palace had been repulsed, the VC inside destroyed both vehicles in turn, killing two MPs and wounding three. A third jeep patrol reached the embassy without incident, but unaware of the danger, the soldiers pulled up to the embassy's lattice-gate pedestrian entrance on Thong Nhut Boulevard and were gunned down by the VC on the embassy's front lawn, killing Sergeant Johnie B. Thomas and SP4 Owen E. Mebust.[5]: 329
In addition to the three marines, there were two Vietnamese and six American civilians inside the chancery building at the time of the attack. The Americans armed themselves with .38 revolvers, Beretta M12 submachine guns and a shotgun and waited for the VC to come inside.[4]: 12–13
Outside, in the embassy grounds, the VC were unsure of their next move as both of the sapper team's leaders, Bay Tuyen and Ut Nho, had been killed by Daniel and Sebast as they entered the embassy grounds. The VC were armed with more than 40 pounds of C-4 explosive and could easily have blasted their way into the chancery had they attempted to do so. Instead they took positions in or near the circular planters in the embassy grounds and returned fire at the growing numbers of Americans shooting at them.[4]: 23–24
At the Marine Guards' living quarters five blocks from the embassy, Captain Robert J. O'Brien organised the remaining marines of the Marine Security Guard detachment into quick reaction teams and headed to the embassy. As they approached the side gate on Mac Dinh Chi Street, they found it locked and could see VC inside the grounds, calling out to the MPs they were answered with fire from the VC and withdrew to firing positions further down the street and laid fire on the embassy gardens.[4]: 14
At around 04:00,
At 04:20, Westmoreland ordered the 716th MP Battalion to clear the embassy as their first priority. Lacking armored vehicles and helicopters, the MPs moved in more troops to cordon off the embassy.[4]: 23 The tactical situation was confused by darkness and the poor communications within the chancery and between the chancery and the MPs and marines outside the embassy compound. Harper and the other Americans inside the chancery could communicate with the outside by telephone, while Soto on the roof only had a radio.[4]: 24
Marine Corporal James C. Marshall climbed onto the roof of a small building in the Consular compound and fired on the VC in the embassy compound, until he was hit by a rocket fragment. He remained in place, firing on the VC until he was shot and killed; he was the last American killed at the embassy that day.
As dawn broke on the morning of 31 January, the hole that the VC had blown in the wall to gain access to the embassy compound was located. At the same time, MPs had finally managed to shoot the locks off the front gate on Thong Nhut Boulevard and rammed the gates open with a jeep. The MPs and marines charged through the open gate into the embassy grounds, while a second team stormed the rear parking lot. Within a few minutes, they had killed all of the few surviving VC, as most of them were already dead or dying in the embassy garden from the prolonged firefight. At the same time, a helicopter carrying troops from the 101st Airborne Division landed on the roof and proceeded to sweep the chancery building, finding no VC inside.[4]: 29–30
In his villa, Colonel Jacobson heard movement downstairs; he threw down his grenade and called out to the MPs in the grounds to throw him up a weapon. The MPs threw up an M1911 Colt pistol and a gas mask to Jacobson, CS gas grenades were then thrown by the MPs through the ground floor windows and Jacobson proceeded to shoot a wounded VC as he came upstairs.
By 09:00, the embassy was declared secure. At 09:15 General Westmoreland and his security detail arrived by car to inspect the embassy while Ambassador Bunker ordered the building reopened for business later that afternoon.[5]: 330
Aftermath
Of the 19 VC that attacked the building, 18 had been killed and one was captured. US losses were four MPs and one marine killed.[5]: 330
The first news reports of the embassy attack were sent by the
While the embassy attack (like much of the Tet offensive) was tactically insignificant, it had a profound political and psychological impact. The United States had been fighting in Vietnam for over two and a half years [citation needed], 20,000 Americans had been killed and despite the presence of nearly 500,000 U.S. troops in Vietnam, the Viet Cong had managed to penetrate the US Embassy.[7]
On 4 November 1968, Ambassador Bunker presented a scroll of appreciation to Lieutenant Colonel Tyler H. Fletcher, Commanding Officer of the 716th MP Battalion, for their role in defending the embassy. Ambassador Bunker also dedicated a plaque in the chancery lobby commemorating the four MPs and one marine who died defending the embassy.[3]
On 17 March 1969, the 716th MP Battalion and attached units were awarded the Presidential Unit Citation for their actions in the defense of Saigon from 31 January to 10 February 1968.[8]
See also
- Tet offensive battle of Cholon and Phu Tho Racetrack
- Tet offensive attack on Joint General Staff Compound
References
- ^ ISBN 9780062405661.
- ^ ISBN 0939526069.
- ^ a b History of the 716th Military Police Battalion Archived 25 May 2010 at the Wayback Machine
- ^ ISBN 0801867037.
- ^ ISBN 9780160942808. Archived from the original on March 25, 2023..
This article incorporates text from this source, which is in the public domain - ^ a b Robert J. O'Brien (2009). "The Attack on the American Embassy during Tet, 1968: Factors that turned a tactical victory into a political defeat" (PDF). U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. Archived (PDF) from the original on January 26, 2021. Retrieved 27 June 2018.
- ^ ISBN 9781522995258. Archived from the original on September 11, 2015.. This article incorporates text from this source, which is in the public domain
- ^ "Lineage and Honors Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment 716th Military Police Battalion (Saigon Warriors)". Department of the Army. 7 September 2016. Archived from the original on June 12, 2010. Retrieved 2 February 2023. This article incorporates text from this source, which is in the public domain.
