Thomas S. Power
Thomas S. Power | |
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Army Distinguished Service Medal Silver Star Legion of Merit (2) Distinguished Flying Cross Bronze Star Medal Air Medal (2) |
This article possibly contains original research. "Cold War and Strategic Air Command" may contain original research and conclusions of the author. (June 2023) ) |
General Thomas Sarsfield Power (June 18, 1905 – December 6, 1970) was a United States Air Force officer who served as commander in chief of the Strategic Air Command from 1957-1964. He was an active military flier for more than 30 years.
Early career
Thomas Sarsfield Power was born in New York City in 1905,[2] a child of Irish immigrants. His parents were Thomas Stack Power, a dried goods salesman, and Mary Amelia Power (née Rice), who had arrived in the United States in 1900. His parents were from wealthy farming stock but the best land and its livestock was destined for others in Tipperary, Ireland.
Power attended Barnard Preparatory School in New York and entered the United States Army Air Corps flying school February 17, 1928. Upon graduation and receiving his rating, he was commissioned a second lieutenant in the Army Air Corps on February 28, 1929.[3]
His early service included assignments at most of the famed Air Corps fields of the day –
World War II
After the era of slow promotions during the inter-war years of the 1930s, Power experienced the rapid rise in rank common to many officers of the pre-war Air Corps during World War II, becoming a major in March 1941, a lieutenant colonel in January 1942, and a full colonel in June 1943 eight days after his 38th birthday.
Power initially performed staff duties to September 1943 at
After returning to the United States in August 1944, Power was named commander of the
On August 1, 1945, General Carl Spaatz, then commander of the United States Strategic Air Forces in the Pacific, moved Power up on his staff as deputy chief of staff for operations (A-3). He served in this capacity during the atomic bomb attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
Cold War and Strategic Air Command
This section possibly contains original research. (July 2014) |
During
When General LeMay was named vice chief of staff of the Air Force in 1957, Power became commander in chief of SAC and was promoted to four-star rank.
Power was the architect of the Operation Chrome Dome airborne alert program of SAC that ensured that a proportion of the nuclear-armed strategic bombers were always aloft so as to survive a first strike.[5]
When
Restraint? Why are you so concerned with saving their lives? The whole idea is to kill the bastards. At the end of the war if there are two Americans and one Russian left alive, we win![6]
Professor William Kaufmann from the RAND Corporation, losing his patience, noted: "Well, you'd better make sure that they're a man and a woman." At that point, Power stalked out of the room. The briefing was over.[7] Having been briefed by another famous member of the RAND Corporation, Herman Kahn, on the genetic effects of nuclear weapons, Power replied: "You know, it's not yet been proved to me that two heads aren't better than one."[8]
On October 24, 1962, during the
Raymond Garthoff, who was a participant in the crisis, noted that:
...the Soviet political and military leaders must have been puzzled and alarmed at this flaunting of the American strategic superiority, so great that the United States could afford to ignore normal operational security in order to drive home the extent of its power. Equally extraordinary, and not known in Moscow, was that this remarkable display of American power was unauthorized by and unknown to the President, the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the JCS, and the EXCOMM as they so carefully calibrated and controlled action in the intensifying confrontation. The decision for this bold action was taken by General Thomas Powers [sic], commander-in-chief of SAC, on his own initiative. He had been ordered to go on full alert, and he did so. No one had told him how to do it, and he decided to 'rub it in.'
Garthoff gives as his source:
I was first told about this action soon after the crisis by Major General (then Colonel) George J. Keegan Jr., then SAC chief of intelligence, who was present when General Powers [sic] gave the order and it was executed.
The question becomes a bit murkier when new material uncovered by Stanford's Prof. Scott Sagan led him to write:
In addition, it is revealing that on October 24, shortly after DEFCON 2 was declared, General Power also sent the following special message to all SAC wings, in a clear (uncoded) voice transmission, emphasizing the need for safety and caution in the dangerous operation:
This is General Power speaking. I am addressing you for the purpose of reemphasizing the seriousness of the situation the nation faces. We are in an advanced state of readiness to meet any emergencies, and I feel that we are well prepared. I expect each of you to maintain strict security and use calm judgement during this tense period. Our plans are well prepared and are being executed smoothly. If there are any questions concerning instructions which by the nature of the situation deviates from the normal, use the telephone for clarification. Review your plans for further action to insure that there will be no mistakes or confusion. I expect you to cut out all nonessentials and put yourself in a maximum readiness condition. If you are not sure what you should do in any situation, and if time permits, get in touch with us here.
Although Power has been widely criticized for revealing the readiness status of U.S. strategic forces in an uncoded transmission (which was reportedly picked up by Soviet intelligence services), the message's major purpose appears to have been to encourage subordinate SAC officers to place priority on "calm judgment" and the prevention of mistakes in the crisis.[45] Such signs of leaders concerns for safety should have had a positive impact in reducing the risk of accidents.
Footnote 45: Earlier assessments, my own included, were critical of Power's decision to send this message in the clear. See Raymond L. Garthoff, Reflections on the Cuban Missile Crisis, revised ed. (Washington DC: Brookings Institution, 1989), p. 62; … and Sagan, "Nuclear Alerts and Crisis Management," page 108. My earlier views on this matter were based on the recollections of the SAC officer involved in the incident [probably the same man quoted by Garthoff in his book]. They changed after I saw the full declassified message printed above. It is also important to note here that DEFCON increases apparently were routinely transmitted in unclassified messages in the clear to federal agencies until 1972… It is likely therefore that the Soviet Union would have immediately picked up DEFCON increases, even without Power's actions.
However, evidence to the contrary (i.e., that Power was trying to do an end run[citation needed] as stated by Garthoff and, earlier, by Sagan) is contained in SAC's history of the Cuban crisis. Pages 94–95 of that document state
General Power sought to have the DOD's position [of withholding information about SAC's state of maximum readiness] modified in order to strengthen the nation's current and future security in dealing with incidents of a similar nature. With this objective in mind, he proposed on 2 November that four major SAC activities in support of the Cuban quarantine be publicly released … Advised of DOD's disapproval, on 7 November General Power requested the Secretary of Defense to release the information … As General Power stated: "Therefore, from a deterrent point of view, I believe it to the national advantage that the high degree of readiness of this command be made known, within the bounds of security, to all members of the Communist Bloc, and particularly, the Soviet Union." In spite of the CINCSAC's strong appeal, the Secretary of Defense never replied to his letter. However, portions of the CINCSAC's proposals … were included in a November DOD news release after the Cuban crisis ended.
Some accounts incorrectly state that General Power went to DEFCON 2 without authorization. As noted by Michael Dobbs in One Minute to Midnight (page 96):
Contrary to some later accounts, Pentagon records show that Power was acting on presidential authority when he took his forces to DEFCON-2. But his decision to address his commanders over open communications channels was unauthorized and highly unusual.
Like his
Death and legacy
Power retired from the Air Force on November 30, 1964 and died of a heart attack December 6, 1970. He was a rated
LeMay described Power, his protégé, as a sadist. Sagan quoted a subordinate commander of Power as describing him as "A hard, cruel individual ... I used to worry about General Power. I used to worry that General Power was not stable".[10]
Awards and recognition
General Power was awarded the
- Air Force Command Pilot Badge
- Missileman Badge
- Air Force Distinguished Service Medal
- Army Distinguished Service Medal
- Silver Star
- Legion of Merit with oak leaf cluster
- Distinguished Flying Cross
- Bronze Star
- Air Medal
- Air Force Commendation Medalwith oak leaf cluster
- French Croix de Guerrewith Palm.
See also
References
- ^ "Gen. Thomas S. Power Dies; SAC Chief Under 3 Presidents". December 8, 1970.
- ^ "Biography of Lt. Gen. Thomas S. Power" (PDF). Air Force Historical Research Agency. May 11, 1956. pp. 16, 39–40. Retrieved October 26, 2021.
- ^ Ziarnick, Brent (June 2016). "General Thomas S. Power And The Air Force Space Program" (PDF). Maxwell AFB, Alabama: Air University. p. 15. Archived (PDF) from the original on November 15, 2020. Retrieved June 18, 2021.
- ^ Ronald Schaffer, Wings of Judgment: American Bombing in World War II (New York, NY: Oxford U. Press, 1985), p. 131.
- ^ http://www.airforce-magazine.com/MagazineArchive/Pages/2011/August%202011/0811dome.aspx [bare URL]
- ^ "William Kaufmann, 90; MIT political scientist reshaped Kennedy's defense strategy". The Boston Globe. 26 December 2008. Retrieved 17 October 2009.
- ^ Cited in Fred Kaplan, The Wizards of Armageddon, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1991), p 246.
- ^ Cited in The Wizards of Armageddon, p 246.
- ISBN 0-670-03285-9
- ISSN 0028-792X. Retrieved 2023-11-30.
- General Thomas S. Power, USAF official biography
External links
- Thomas S. Power Papers at Syracuse University
This article incorporates public domain material from the United States Air Force