Tito–Stalin split
are not shown
The Tito–Stalin split, which Tito's Yugoslavia supported and the Soviet Union secretly opposed.
In the years following World War II, Yugoslavia pursued economic, internal, and foreign policy objectives that did not align with the interests of the Soviet Union and its Eastern Bloc allies. In particular, Yugoslavia hoped to admit neighbouring Albania to the Yugoslav federation. This fostered an atmosphere of insecurity within the Albanian political leadership and exacerbated tensions with the Soviet Union, which made efforts to impede Albanian–Yugoslav integration. Yugoslav support of the communist rebels in Greece against the wishes of the Soviet Union further complicated the political situation. Stalin tried to pressure Yugoslavia and moderate its policies using Bulgaria as an intermediary. When the conflict between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union became public in 1948, it was portrayed as an ideological dispute to avoid the impression of a power struggle within the Eastern Bloc.
The split ushered in the
Background
Tito–Stalin conflict during World War II
During
The
In June 1941, Tito informed the
In October 1941, Tito met Mihailović twice to propose a joint struggle against the Axis. Tito offered him the position of chief of staff of the Partisan forces, but Mihailović turned down the offer.[5] By the end of the month, Mihailović concluded that the Communists were the true enemy. At first, Mihailović's Chetniks fought the Partisans and the Axis simultaneously, but within months, they began collaborating with the Axis against the Partisans.[6] By November, the Partisans were fighting the Chetniks while sending messages to Moscow protesting Soviet propaganda praising Mihailović.[5]
In 1943, Tito transformed the
Territorial dispute in Trieste and Carinthia
In the final days of the war, the Partisans captured parts of Carinthia in Austria and started to advance across pre-war Italian soil. While the Western Allies believed Stalin had arranged the move,[10] he actually opposed it. Specifically, Stalin feared for the Soviet-backed Austrian government of Karl Renner, and was afraid that a wider conflict with the Allies over Trieste would ensue.[11] Stalin thus ordered Tito to withdraw from Carinthia and Trieste, and the Partisans complied.[12]
Nevertheless, Yugoslavia maintained its claims against Italy and Austria. The territorial dispute in the northwest part of
Political situation in Eastern Europe, 1945–1948
In the immediate aftermath of World War II, the Soviet Union sought to establish its political dominance in foreign countries captured by the
Deteriorating relations
Yugoslav foreign policy, 1945–1947
The Soviet Union and Yugoslavia signed a friendship treaty when Tito met with Stalin in Moscow in April 1945.[11] They established good bilateral relations despite differences in how to bring about a communist or socialist society.[21] In 1945, Yugoslavia relied on United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration aid as it experienced food shortages, but it gave much greater internal publicity to comparably smaller Soviet assistance.[22] On 10 January 1945, Stalin called Yugoslavia's foreign policy unreasonable because of its territorial claims against most of its neighbours,[23] including Hungary,[24] Austria,[25] and the Free Territory of Trieste, which had been carved out of pre-war Italian territory.[26] Tito then delivered a speech criticising the Soviet Union for not backing his territorial demands.[22] The confrontation with the Western Allies became tense in August 1946 when Yugoslav fighter aircraft forced a United States Army Air Forces Douglas C-47 Skytrain to crash-land near Ljubljana and shot down another above Bled, capturing ten and killing a crew of five in the span of ten days.[27] The Western Allies incorrectly believed that Stalin encouraged Tito's persistence; Stalin actually wished to avoid confrontation with the West.[12]
Tito also sought to establish regional dominance over Yugoslavia's southern neighbours—Albania, Bulgaria, and Greece. The first overtures in this direction occurred in 1943 when a proposal for a regional headquarters to coordinate national Partisan actions fell through. Tito, who saw the Yugoslav component of the Partisans as superior, declined to go ahead with any scheme that would give other national components equal say. The pre-war partition of Macedonia into Vardar, Pirin, and Aegean Macedonia—controlled by Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, and Greece respectively—complicated regional relations. The presence of a substantial ethnic Albanian population in the Yugoslav region of Kosovo further impeded relations. In 1943, the PKSH had proposed the transfer of Kosovo to Albania, only to be confronted with a counterproposal: incorporating Albania into a future Yugoslav federation.[28] Tito and PKSH first secretary Enver Hoxha revisited the idea in 1946, agreeing to merge the two countries.[29]
After the war, Tito continued to pursue dominance in the region. In 1946, Albania and Yugoslavia signed a treaty on mutual assistance and customs agreements, almost completely integrating Albania into the Yugoslav economic system. Nearly a thousand Yugoslav economic development experts were sent to Albania, and a KPJ representative was added to the PKSH Central Committee.[30] The two countries' militaries also cooperated, at least in the mining of the Corfu Channel in October 1946—an action which damaged two Royal Navy destroyers and resulted in 44 dead and 42 injured.[31] Even though the Soviet Union had previously indicated it would only deal with Albania through Yugoslavia, Stalin cautioned the Yugoslavs not to pursue unification with haste.[30]
In August 1947, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia signed a friendship and mutual assistance treaty in Bled without consulting the Soviet Union, leading Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov to denounce it.[32] Despite this, when the Cominform was established in September to facilitate international Communist activity and communication,[33] the Soviets openly touted Yugoslavia as a model for the Eastern Bloc to emulate.[34] From 1946, internal reports from the Soviet embassy in Belgrade began to portray Yugoslav leaders in increasingly unfavourable terms.[35]
Integration with Albania and support for Greek insurgents
The Soviet Union began sending its own advisors to Albania in mid-1947, which Tito saw as a threat to the further integration of Albania into Yugoslavia. He attributed the move to a power struggle within the PKSH Central Committee involving Hoxha, the interior minister
Yugoslav support to the
Shortly after Đilas and Stalin met, Tito suggested to Hoxha that Albania should permit Yugoslavia to use military bases near Korçë, close to the Albanian–Greek border, to defend against a potential Greek and Anglo–American attack. By the end of January, Hoxha accepted the idea. Moreover, Xoxe indicated that the integration of the Albanian and Yugoslav armies had been approved. Even though the matter was supposedly conducted in secrecy, the Soviets learned of the scheme from a source in the Albanian government.[42]
Federation with Bulgaria
In late 1944, Stalin first proposed a Yugoslav–Bulgarian federation, involving a dualist state where Bulgaria would be one half of the federation and Yugoslavia (further divided into its republics) the other. The Yugoslav position was that a federation was possible, but only if Bulgaria were one of the seven federal units and if Pirin Macedonia was ceded to the nascent Yugoslav federal unit of Macedonia. Since the two sides could not agree, Stalin invited them to Moscow in January 1945 for arbitration—first supporting the Bulgarian view—and days later switching to the Yugoslav position. Finally, on 26 January, the British government warned the Bulgarian authorities against any federation arrangement with Yugoslavia before Bulgaria signed a peace treaty with the Allies. The federation was shelved, to Tito's relief.[43]
Three years later, in 1948, when Tito and Hoxha were preparing to deploy the Yugoslav People's Army to Albania, the Bulgarian Workers' Party leader Georgi Dimitrov spoke to Western journalists about turning the Eastern Bloc into a federally organised state. He then included Greece in a list of "people's democracies", causing concern in the West and in the Soviet Union. Tito sought to distance Yugoslavia from the idea, but the Soviets came to believe that Dimitrov's remarks were influenced by Yugoslavia's intentions in the Balkans. On 1 February 1948, Molotov instructed the Yugoslav and Bulgarian leaders to send representatives to Moscow by 10 February for discussions.[44] On 5 February, just days before the scheduled meeting with Stalin, the DSE launched its general offensive, shelling Thessaloniki four days later.[45]
February 1948 meeting with Stalin
In response to Molotov's summons, Tito dispatched Kardelj and President of the Executive Council of the People's Republic of Croatia Vladimir Bakarić to Moscow, where they joined Đilas. Stalin berated Yugoslavia and Dimitrov for ignoring the Soviet Union by signing the Bled Agreement, and for Dimitrov's call to include Greece in a hypothetical federation with Bulgaria and Yugoslavia. He also demanded an end to the insurrection in Greece, arguing that any further support for the Communist guerrillas there might lead to a wider conflict with the United States and the United Kingdom.[45] By limiting his support to the DSE, Stalin adhered to the Percentages Agreement, an informal deal Stalin and Winston Churchill had struck in Moscow in October 1944, which placed Greece in the British sphere of influence.[46]
Stalin also demanded an immediate federation consisting of Bulgaria and Yugoslavia.[47] According to Stalin, Albania would join later. At the same time, he expressed support for similar unions of Hungary and Romania and of Poland and Czechoslovakia. Yugoslav and Bulgarian participants in the meeting acknowledged mistakes, and Stalin made Kardelj and Dimitrov sign a treaty obliging Yugoslavia and Bulgaria to consult the Soviet Union on all foreign policy matters.[48] The KPJ politburo met in secret on 19 February and decided against any federation with Bulgaria. Two days later, Tito, Kardelj, and Đilas met with Nikos Zachariadis, the general secretary of the KKE. They informed Zachariadis that Stalin was opposed to the KKE's armed struggle but promised continued Yugoslav support, nonetheless.[49]
The
In Albania, Xoxe purged all anti-Yugoslav forces from the PKSH Central Committee at a plenum of 26 February–8 March.[52] The PKSH Central Committee adopted a resolution that official Albanian policy was pro-Yugoslav. The Albanian authorities adopted an additional secret document detailing a planned merger of the Albanian and Yugoslav armies, citing the threat of a Greek invasion and arguing that having Yugoslav troops at the Albanian-Greek border was an "urgent necessity".[35] In response to these moves, Soviet military advisers were withdrawn from Yugoslavia on 18 March.[52]
Stalin's letters and open conflict
First letter
On 27 March, Stalin sent his first letter addressed to Tito and Kardelj, which formulated the conflict as an ideological one.
Tito convened the KPJ Central Committee on 12 April to draw up a letter in response to Stalin. Tito repudiated Stalin's claims and referred to them as slander and misinformation. He also emphasised the KPJ's achievements of national independence and equality. Žujović was the only one to oppose Tito at the meeting. He advocated making Yugoslavia a part of the Soviet Union, and questioned what the country's future position in international relations would be if the alliance between the two countries was not maintained.[56] Tito called for action against Žujović and Hebrang. He denounced Hebrang, claiming that his actions were the primary reason for Soviet mistrust. To discredit him, charges were fabricated alleging that Hebrang had become a spy for the Croatian ultra-nationalist and fascist Ustaše movement during his captivity in 1942, and that he was subsequently blackmailed with that information by the Soviets. Both Žujović and Hebrang were apprehended within a week.[57]
Second letter
On 4 May, Stalin sent the second letter to the KPJ. He denied the Soviet leadership was misinformed about the situation in Yugoslavia and claimed that the differences were over a matter of principle. He also denied Hebrang was a Soviet source in the KPJ but confirmed that Žujović was indeed one. Stalin questioned the scale of KPJ's achievements, alleging that the success of any communist party depended on Red Army assistance—implying the Soviet military was essential to whether or not the KPJ retained power. Finally, he suggested taking the matter up before the Cominform.[58] In their response to the second letter, Tito and Kardelj rejected arbitration by the Cominform and accused Stalin of lobbying other communist parties to affect the outcome of the dispute.[59]
Third letter and Cominform Resolution
On 19 May, Tito received an invitation for the Yugoslav delegation to attend a Cominform meeting to discuss the situation concerning the KPJ. However, the KPJ Central Committee rejected the invitation the next day. Stalin then sent his third letter, now addressed to Tito and Hebrang, stating that failure to speak on behalf of the KPJ before the Cominform would amount to a tacit admission of guilt. On 19 June, the KPJ received a formal invitation to attend the Cominform meeting in Bucharest two days later. The KPJ leadership informed the Cominform that they would not send any delegates.[60]
The Cominform published its Resolution on the KPJ on 28 June exposing the conflict and criticising the KPJ for anti-Sovietism and ideological errors, lack of democracy in the party, and an inability to accept criticism.[61] Moreover, the Cominform accused the KPJ of opposing the parties within the organisation, splitting from the united socialist front, betraying international solidarity of the working people, and assuming a nationalist posture. Finally, the KPJ was declared outside the Cominform. The resolution claimed there were "healthy" members of the KPJ whose loyalty would be measured by their readiness to overthrow Tito and his leadership—expecting this to be achieved solely because of Stalin's charisma. Stalin expected the KPJ to back down, sacrifice the "dubious Marxists", and realign itself with him.[61]
Aftermath
Faced with the choice of resisting or submitting to Stalin, Tito chose the former, likely counting on the KPJ's wide organic base, built through the Partisan movement, to support him. It is estimated that up to 20 percent of the KPJ's membership supported Stalin instead of Tito. The party's leadership noticed this, and it led to wide-ranging purges that went far beyond the most visible targets like Hebrang and Žujović. These purges came to be referred to as the Informbiro period, meaning the "Cominform period". The real or perceived supporters of Stalin were termed "Cominformists" or "ibeovci" as a pejorative initialism based on the first two words in the official name of the Cominform—the Information Bureau of the Communist and Workers' Parties. Thousands were imprisoned, killed, or exiled.[62] According to Ranković, 51,000 people were killed, imprisoned, or sentenced to forced labour.[63] In 1949, special-purpose prison camps were built for male and female Cominformists on the uninhabited Adriatic islands of Goli Otok and Sveti Grgur respectively.[64]
U.S. aid to Yugoslavia
Yugoslavia faced significant economic difficulties as a result of the split since its
Yugoslavia first requested assistance from the United States in the summer of 1948.[67] In December, Tito announced that strategic raw materials would be shipped to the West in return for increased trade.[68] In February 1949, the U.S. decided to provide Tito with economic assistance. In return, the U.S. demanded the cessation of Yugoslav aid to the DSE when the internal situation in Yugoslavia allowed for such a move without endangering Tito's position.[69] Ultimately, Secretary of State Dean Acheson took the position that the Yugoslav five-year plan would have to succeed if Tito was to prevail against Stalin. Acheson also argued that supporting Tito was in the interest of the United States, regardless of the nature of Tito's regime.[70] The American aid helped Yugoslavia overcome the poor harvests of 1948, 1949 and 1950,[71] but there would be almost no economic growth before 1952.[72] Tito also received U.S. backing in Yugoslavia's successful 1949 bid for a seat on the United Nations Security Council,[73] despite Soviet opposition.[71]
In 1949, the United States provided loans to Yugoslavia, increased them in 1950, and then provided large grants.
Soviet actions and military coup
When the conflict became public in 1948, Stalin embarked upon a propaganda campaign against Tito.
In the immediate aftermath of the split, there was at least one failed attempt at a Yugoslav
In
See also
- De-satellization of the Socialist Republic of Romania
- De-Stalinization
- Sino-Soviet split
- Albanian–Soviet split
Footnotes
Citations
- ^ a b Banac 1988, p. 4.
- ^ Banac 1988, pp. 4–5.
- ^ Banac 1988, pp. 6–7.
- ^ Banac 1988, p. 9.
- ^ a b Banac 1988, p. 10.
- ^ Tomasevich 2001, p. 142.
- ^ Banac 1988, p. 12.
- ^ Reynolds 2006, pp. 270–271.
- ^ Banac 1988, p. 15.
- ^ Reynolds 2006, pp. 274–275.
- ^ a b Banac 1988, p. 17.
- ^ a b Tomasevich 2001, p. 759.
- ^ Judt 2005, pp. 141–142.
- ^ Judt 2005, pp. 130–132.
- ^ Perović 2007, p. 59.
- ^ Perović 2007, p. 61.
- ^ McClellan 1969, p. 128.
- ^ Ziemke 1968, pp. 375–377.
- ^ Banac 1988, p. 14.
- ^ Josipovič 2012, pp. 40–42.
- ^ Perović 2007, pp. 36–37.
- ^ a b Ramet 2006, p. 176.
- ^ Banac 2008, p. xl.
- ^ Klemenčić & Schofield 2001, pp. 12–13.
- ^ Ramet 2006, p. 173.
- ^ Judt 2005, p. 142.
- ^ Jennings 2017, pp. 239–240.
- ^ Perović 2007, pp. 42–43.
- ^ Banac 1988, p. 219.
- ^ a b Perović 2007, pp. 43–44.
- ^ Kane 2014, p. 76.
- ^ Perović 2007, p. 52.
- ^ Judt 2005, p. 143.
- ^ Perović 2007, p. 40.
- ^ a b c Perović 2007, p. 57.
- ^ Perović 2007, pp. 46–47.
- ^ Perović 2007, pp. 47–48.
- ^ a b c Perović 2007, pp. 45–46.
- ^ Lulushi 2014, pp. 121–122.
- ^ Theotokis 2020, p. 142.
- ^ Perović 2007, note 92.
- ^ Perović 2007, pp. 48–49.
- ^ Banac 1988, pp. 31–32.
- ^ Perović 2007, pp. 50–52.
- ^ a b Banac 1988, p. 41.
- ^ Banac 1988, pp. 32–33.
- ^ Banac 1988, pp. 41–42.
- ^ Perović 2007, p. 55.
- ^ Perović 2007, p. 56.
- ^ a b Banac 1988, p. 42.
- ^ Lees 1978, p. 408.
- ^ a b Banac 1988, p. 43.
- ^ Perović 2007, p. 58.
- ^ Banac 1988, pp. 43–45.
- ^ Ramet 2006, p. 177.
- ^ Banac 1988, pp. 117–118.
- ^ Banac 1988, pp. 119–120.
- ^ Banac 1988, p. 123.
- ^ Banac 1988, p. 124.
- ^ Banac 1988, pp. 124–125.
- ^ a b Banac 1988, pp. 125–126.
- ^ Perović 2007, pp. 58–61.
- ^ Woodward 1995, p. 180, note 37.
- ^ Banac 1988, pp. 247–248.
- ^ Banac 1988, p. 131.
- ^ Lees 1978, pp. 410–412.
- ^ Lees 1978, p. 411.
- ^ Lees 1978, p. 413.
- ^ Lees 1978, pp. 415–416.
- ^ Lees 1978, pp. 417–418.
- ^ a b Auty 1969, p. 169.
- ^ Eglin 1982, p. 126.
- ^ Woodward 1995, p. 145, note 134.
- ^ Brands 1987, p. 41.
- ^ Brands 1987, pp. 46–47.
- ^ Perović 2007, p. 33.
- ^ Banac 1988, p. 130.
- ^ Banac 1988, p. 228.
- ^ Perović 2007, note 120.
- ^ Mehta 2011, note 111.
- ^ Laković & Tasić 2016, p. 116.
- ^ Perović 2007, pp. 58–59.
- ^ Perović 2007, p. 60.
- ^ Laković & Tasić 2016, pp. 116–117.
- ^ Ramet 2006, pp. 199–200.
- ^ Banac 1988, pp. 129–130.
- ^ Ramet 2006, p. 200.
- ^ Jennings 2017, p. 251.
- ^ Perović 2007, pp. 61–62.
- ^ a b Banac 1988, p. 138.
- ^ Judt 2005, p. 505.
- ^ Judt 2005, p. 141.
References
Books
- Auty, Phyllis (1969). "Yugoslavia's International Relations (1945–1965)". In ISBN 978-0-520-33110-5.
- ISBN 0-8014-2186-1.
- Banac, Ivo (2008). "Introduction". In Banac, Ivo (ed.). The Diary of Georgi Dimitrov, 1933–1949. New Hven: ISBN 978-0-300-13385-1.
- Eglin, Darrel R. (1982). "The Economy". In Nyrop, Richard F. (ed.). Yugoslavia, a Country Study. Area handbook series (2nd ed.). Washington, DC: LCCN 82011632.
- Jennings, Christian (2017). Flashpoint Trieste: The First Battle of the Cold War. London, UK: ISBN 978-1-5126-0172-5.
- ISBN 1-59420-065-3.
- Kane, Robert B. (2014). "Corfu Channel Incident, 1946". In Hall, Richard C. (ed.). War in the Balkans (2nd ed.). Santa Barbara, California: ISBN 978-1-61069-030-0.
- Klemenčić, Mladen; Schofield, Clive H. (2001). War and Peace on the Danube: The Evolution of the Croatia-Serbia Boundary. Durham, UK: ISBN 978-1-897643-41-9.
- Laković, Ivan; Tasić, Dmitar (2016). The Tito–Stalin Split and Yugoslavia's Military Opening toward the West, 1950–1954: In NATO's Backyard. Lanham, Maryland: ISBN 978-1-4985-3934-0.
- Lulushi, Albert (2014). Operation Valuable Fiend: The CIA's First Paramilitary Strike Against the Iron Curtain. New York City, New York: ISBN 978-1-62872-394-6.
- McClellan, Woodford (1969). "Postwar Political Evolution". In Vucinich, Wayne S. (ed.). Contemporary Yugoslavia: Twenty Years of Socialist Experiment. Berkeley, California: ISBN 978-0-520-33110-5.
- ISBN 978-0-253-34656-8.
- ISBN 978-0-19-928411-5.
- Theotokis, Nikolaos (2020). Airborne Landing to Air Assault: A History of Military Parachuting. Barnsley, UK: ISBN 978-1-5267-4702-0.
- ISBN 978-0-8047-0857-9.
- Woodward, Susan L. (1995). Socialist Unemployment: The Political Economy of Yugoslavia, 1945–1990. Princeton, New Jersey: ISBN 0-691-08645-1.
- LCCN 67-60001.
Journals
- JSTOR 24911740.
- Josipovič, Damir (2012). "Slovenian–Croatian Boundary: Backgrounds of Boundary-Making and Boundary-Breaking in Istria Regarding the Contemporary Boundary Dispute". Geoadria. 17 (1). Zadar: Croatian Geographic Society, Geography Department of the ISSN 1331-2294.
- Lees, Lorraine M. (1978). "The American Decision to Assist Tito, 1948–1949". Diplomatic History. 2 (4). JSTOR 24910127.
- Mehta, Coleman (2011). "The CIA Confronts the Tito-Stalin Split, 1948–1951". S2CID 57560689.
- Perović, Jeronim (2007). "The Tito–Stalin Split: A Reassessment in Light of New Evidence". Journal of Cold War Studies. 9 (2). ISSN 1520-3972.
Further reading
- Banac, Ivo (1995). "The Tito–Stalin Split and the Greek Civil War". In Iatrides, John O.; Wrigley, Linda (eds.). Greece at the Crossroads: The Civil War and Its Legacy. University Park, Pennsylvania: ISBN 978-0-271-02568-1.
- ISBN 978-86-7179-073-4.
- Karchmar, Lucien (1982). "The Tito-Stalin Split in Soviet and Yugoslav Historiography". In ISBN 978-0-914710-98-1.
- Stokes, Gale, ed. (1996). "The Expulsion of Yugoslavia". From Stalinism to Pluralism: A Documentary History of Eastern Europe Since 1945 (2nd ed.). Oxford, UK: ISBN 978-0-19-509446-6.
- ISBN 978-0-571-28110-7.
Works related to Resolution of the Information Bureau Concerning the Communist Party of Yugoslavia at Wikisource