Trần Văn Đôn
Trần Văn Đôn | |
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House of Representatives of South Vietnam | |
In office 31 October 1971 – 14 April 1975 Serving with
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Preceded by |
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Succeeded by | Position abolished |
Constituency | Quảng Ngãi province |
Personal details | |
Born | Bordeaux, France | 17 August 1917
Died | 1 January 1997 | (aged 79)
Political party | Independent |
Other political affiliations |
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Children | 3 |
Military service | |
Allegiance | |
Branch/service | |
Years of service | 1940–1965 |
Rank | Brigadier general |
Trần Văn Đôn (August 17, 1917 – 1997) was a
Personal life
Đôn was born in Bordeaux, France. His father was the son of a wealthy Mekong Delta landowner, which allowed him to travel to France to study medicine. It was during this period that Đôn was born. He returned to France as an adult for his university study. He became a French Army officer when World War II began, later training at École spéciale militaire de Saint-Cyr. Đôn died in 1997.[1]
Military
This section needs additional citations for verification. (May 2021) |
He returned to
Đôn became Diệm's chief of staff and presided over a ceremony in Saigon in which the French-style military rank insignias were burnt and replaced with American-inspired new insignias. In the early 1960s, he commanded the I-Corps of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam, which operated in the far north of South Vietnam, in the border region along the demilitarised zone. He led his forces into the mountainous areas of the Central Highlands to flush out pockets of Việt Cộng resistance and to prevent further infiltration from North Vietnam. In all, his command took in five provinces. He often came into dispute with Diệm's brother, Ngô Đình Cẩn, who had his own autonomous private army and secret police and ruled the northern border regions of South Vietnam arbitrarily. Đôn was removed from command of troops and made the Joint Chief of Staff, where he was confined to an office with no troops. His work was mainly travelling to the airport to greet visiting American dignitaries. Diệm feared that the respect that Đôn commanded could make him a possible rival for power, as the army leadership was selected for the purpose of preserving Diệm in power, rather than defeating the communists. [citation needed]
Đôn, then army Chief of Staff, organised discontented officers, and in mid-1963 began meeting with
At the time, South Vietnam was gripped by widespread civil unrest due to Diem's suppression of the Buddhist majority, which responded with mass protests. In August, Don led a group of seven generals to meet President Diem and present a request for martial law to disband the groups of monks and their supporters from the temples in Saigon. Also present was Đôn's brother-in-law
After the raids occurred, Đôn privately met with Conein and reiterated that the Americans were mistaken in believing that the ARVN was responsible. Đôn insisted that Diem remained in control although Nhu had to approve all of the generals' meetings with Diệm. Đôn insisted Nhu had orchestrated the raids, fearing that the generals had too much power. He asserted that Nhu used the cover of martial law to discredit the generals by dressing the Special Forces in ARVN uniforms. Đôn insisted that he was unaware of the plans and was at Joint General Staff headquarters when he was informed of the assaults.[7]
After the pagoda raids, Đôn was sought out by
In the wake of the raids, Đôn attempted to win over General
Coup
At 10:00 on 1 November,
Before leaving Saigon, Felt held a press conference with Harkins and Đôn while the rebels were rolling into the city.[9] Thinking of the situation, Đôn kept glancing at his watch while waiting for Felt to fly out.[9] The three men were standing as they talked, and Đôn, overcome by nerves, chewed his gum "like a threshing machine", and could not stand still, frequently changing his footing as he talked.[13] After Felt left, the runway was closed,[10] and Đôn brushed off Harkins and quickly went away to get ready for the coup.[13] Up to the last minute, Harkins and Felt remained unaware of the imminent coup, despite Đôn's fidgety behaviour. The pair had paid a visit to Đôn to discuss military issues at 09:15, but instead of the Vietnamese general hosting his American visitors as Joint General Staff headquarters, as was the norm, Đôn went to the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam office.[14] Although Felt was surprised,[14] the Americans did not realise the reason for the unusual venue and then pointed at a map and wondered why two airborne battalions appeared to be idling. Đôn replied that they were going into battle, and Harkins nodded, unaware that they were entering Saigon.[11] Harkins had told the generals earlier that he opposed a coup, so Đôn avoided the topic. Felt had been told of the existence of coup plans by Lodge, who falsely informed him that it was not imminent, saying "There isn't a Vietnamese general with hair enough on his chest to make it go."[15] Felt later said that Đôn appeared to be calm and composed.[15]
At 13:00, the plotters summoned many senior officers who were not involved in the plot to the Joint General Staff headquarters at
Shortly after 16:00, Diệm telephoned JGS headquarters. Đôn answered and stated "the time has come when the army must respond to the wishes of the people" because Diệm had failed to reform his leadership. The pair had a robust argument and Diệm asked the commanders to visit him at the palace to negotiate and work on a reform plan. The generals, remembering that he bought time for loyalists to come to his aid during the 1960 coup attempt by stalling the coup with talks and a false promise of reform and power-sharing, turned down his suggestion.[19]
After the coup proved successful, Đôn promised Diệm safe passage from the country, and asked Conein to secure an American aircraft to take the brothers out of the country.[20] However, Major Nguyễn Văn Nhung, Minh's bodyguard and one of the arresting officers, shot Diệm and Nhu. Đôn maintained that the generals were "truly grievous" over the deaths, maintaining that they were sincere in their intentions to give Diệm a safe exile.[21] Đôn charged Nhu with convincing Diệm to reject the offer,[21] and blamed Minh for the executions, saying "I can state without equivocation that this was done by General Dương Văn Minh and by him alone."[22]
Junta
Đôn then served in the Military Revolutionary Council that resulted from the coup as Defense Minister. A civilian government and cabinet led by Prime Minister Nguyễn Ngọc Thơ was appointed by the MRC to ease some of the workload on non-military matters. However, the presence of Đôn and Đính in both the civilian cabinet and the MRC paralyzed the governance process. Đính and Đôn were subordinate to Thơ in the cabinet, but as members of the MRC they were superior to him. Whenever Thơ gave an order in the civilian hierarchy with which they disagreed, they would go into the MRC and give a counter-order.[23]
During this time, Minh, Don and Tho wanted to coax back non-communist dissidents and isolate those that were communists.[24] They later said that they believed the Americans had become aware of this and grown hostile to them.[24] At the same time, in accordance with the political strategy, the MRC was reluctant to carry out large-scale offensives, which concerned the Americans,[25] who wanted large-scale bombing of North Vietnam.[26]
Overthrow
A group of officers, led by Generals
On January 30, Khánh launched a coup, arresting Minh, Dinh, Đôn and Kim, claiming that they were part of a neutralist plot with the
On May 28, 1964, Khanh put his rivals on trial. The generals were secretly interrogated for five and a half hours, mostly about details of their coup against Diệm, rather than the original charge of promoting neutralism. As all of the officers were involved in the plot against Diệm, this did not reveal any information new to them. The court deliberated for over nine hours, and when it reconvened for the verdict on May 29,[34] Khánh stated, "We ask that once you begin to serve again in the army, you do not take revenge on anybody".[32] The tribunal then "congratulated" the generals, but found that they were of "lax morality" and unqualified to command due to a "lack of a clear political concept".[32][33] They were chastised for being "inadequately aware of their heavy responsibility" and of letting "their subordinates take advantage of their positions".[35] The four imprisoned generals were allowed to remain in Da Lat under surveillance with their families.[32][35] However, there were reports that the trial ended in a festive manner akin to a party, as the officers shook hands and made up with one another,[36] with Minh reported to have commended Khanh for his "fairness" before organising a celebratory dinner for the generals.[34] All four generals were barred from commanding troops for a period; Kim was banned for six years, and Đôn 18 months. Offices were prepared for the quartet so that they could participate in "research and planning".[32] Worried that the group of idle officers would plot against him, Khánh made some preliminary arrangements to send them to the United States for military study, but this fell through.[35][37] When Khánh was himself deposed in 1965, he handed over dossiers proving that the four generals were innocent;[38] the original documents that Khánh claimed proved his accusations of neutralism were neither presented to nor found by anyone.[33]
Brief restoration
In September, Khanh survived a coup attempt by Generals
In February 1965, Don was again in view as Phat and Colonel
Political service
In 1965, Đôn retired and was elected to the Senate in 1967 after topping the elections.
In early April 1975 he was appointed as defense minister in the Nguyễn Bá Cẩn cabinet. In this role he attempted to persuade military leaders to stabilise the situation to buy time for an acceptable political settlement.[44]
Đôn was evacuated from Saigon one day before the fall of Saigon.
In a postwar interview with the RAND Corporation discussing the reasons for the fall of South Vietnam, Đôn stated:[45]
We needed the minds of the people because the problem in Vietnam was not only military but also social, economic and political. When I say "political" I don't mean political party, I mean "people." We needed to have a people's army as we have seen in Israel. [But] we could not ask the people to be involved and to support the struggle, if in this fight we did not change the social order. We [needed] a new social order because what we had was the social order we got from the French side. And it was not a real new social order made by the Vietnamese themselves. The other side, when they opened the war against the South, their motivation was independence and unity and a new social order. We must give the same motivation for the people if you want them to follow you. Independence yes; unity yes; but also a new social order and we failed to do it.
Awards and decorations
National Honours
- Commander of the National Order of Vietnam
- Gallantry Cross with palm
Foreign Honours
- France :
- Officer of the Legion of Honour
- Croix de Guerre
- Thailand :
- Commander of the Order of the White Elephant (1965)
Notes
- ^ Ngô Đình Diệm (1998), lời khen tiếng chê, pg. 71
- ^ Jacobs, pp. 168–69.
- ^ a b c Hammer, p. 166.
- ^ a b c Jones, p. 300.
- ^ Karnow, p. 301.
- ^ Halberstam, pp. 144–45.
- ^ Jones, pp. 307–08.
- ^ Hammer, p. 249.
- ^ a b c Karnow, p. 320.
- ^ a b c Jones, p. 420.
- ^ a b Prochnau, p. 464.
- ^ Prochnau, pp. 462–66.
- ^ a b Prochnau, p. 468.
- ^ a b Hammer, p. 280.
- ^ a b Hammer, p. 281.
- ^ Jones, p. 408.
- ^ Moyar, p. 267.
- ^ Hammer, p. 285.
- ^ Jones, p. 412.
- ^ Hammer, p. 294.
- ^ a b Jones, p. 429.
- ^ Jones, p. 435.
- ^ Jones, p. 437.
- ^ a b Kahin, p. 185.
- ^ Kahin, p. 186.
- ^ Kahin, pp. 192–195.
- ^ Shaplen, p. 232.
- ^ a b Kahin, p. 197.
- ^ Logevall, p. 162.
- ^ a b c Kahin, p. 198.
- ^ Blair, p. 113.
- ^ a b c d e Langguth, pp. 289–291.
- ^ a b c Blair, p. 115.
- ^ New York Times. 1964-05-31. p. 2.
- ^ a b c Shaplen, pp. 244–245.
- ^ "Khanh releases 4 rival generals". The New York Times. 1964-05-31. p. 2.
- ^ Karnow, p. 355.
- ^ Langguth, p. 347.
- ^ Kahin, p. 232.
- ^ Moyar (2004), p. 769.
- ^ Shaplen, p. 294.
- ^ a b Kahin, p. 514.
- ^ Kahin, p. 512.
- ^ Hosmer, p. 121.
- ^ Hosmer, p. 17.
References
- Blair, Anne E. (1995). Lodge in Vietnam: A Patriot Abroad. New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press. ISBN 0-300-06226-5.
- Buttinger, Joseph (1967). Vietnam: A Dragon Embattled. Praeger publishers.
- Gettleman, Marvin E. (1966). Vietnam: History, documents and opinions on a major world crisis. Penguin Books. pp. 280–293.
- ISBN 978-0-7425-6007-9.
- ISBN 0-525-24210-4.
- Jacobs, Seth (2006). Cold War Mandarin: Ngo Dinh Diem and the Origins of America's War in Vietnam, 1950–1963. Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield. ISBN 0-7425-4447-8.
- Jones, Howard (2003). Death of a Generation: How the Assassinations of Diem and JFK Prolonged the Vietnam War. New York City: Oxford University Press. ISBN 0-19-505286-2.
- ISBN 0-394-54367-X.
- ISBN 0-670-84218-4.
- ISBN 0-684-81202-9.
- Logevall, Fredrik (2006). "The French Recognition of China and its Implications for the Vietnam War". In Roberts, Priscilla (ed.). Behind the Bamboo Curtain: China, Vietnam, and the World Beyond Asia. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press. pp. 153–171. ISBN 0-8047-5502-7.
- ISBN 0-521-86911-0.
- ISBN 0-8129-2633-1.
- Shaplen, Robert (1965). The lost revolution: Vietnam 1945–1965. André Deutsch.
- Tucker, Spencer C. (2000). Encyclopedia of the Vietnam War. ABC-CLIO. pp. 288–289. ISBN 1-57607-040-9.
- Hosmer, Stephen; Kellen, Konrad; Jenkins, Brian (1978). The Fall of South Vietnam: Statements by Vietnamese military and civilian leaders. RAND Corporation.
External links
- "Video Interview with Tran Van Don" (Video). Interview with Tran Van Don (in French and English). WGBH Media Library & Archives. 7 May 1981. Retrieved 19 December 2011.