Tragedy of the commons
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The tragedy of the commons is a
The metaphor is the title of a 1968 essay by ecologist Garrett Hardin. As another example, he cited a watercourse which all are free to pollute. But the principal concern of his essay was overpopulation of the planet. To prevent the inevitable tragedy (he argued) it was necessary to reject the principle (supposedly enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights) according to which every family has a right to choose the number of its offspring, and to replace it by "mutual coercion, mutually agreed upon".
The concept itself did not originate with Hardin, but rather extends back to classical antiquity, being discussed by Aristotle. Some scholars have argued that over-exploitation of the common resource is by no means inevitable, since the individuals concerned may be able to achieve mutual restraint by consensus. Others have contended that the metaphor is inapposite because its exemplar – unfettered access to common land – did not exist historically, the right to exploit common land being controlled by law.
Expositions
Classical
The concept of unrestricted-access resources becoming spent, where personal use does not incur personal expense, has been discussed for millennia. Aristotle wrote that "That which is common to the greatest number gets the least amount of care. Men pay most attention to what is their own: they care less for what is common."[1]
Lloyd's pamphlet
In 1833, the English economist William Forster Lloyd published a pamphlet which included a hypothetical example of over-use of a common resource.[2] This was the situation of cattle herders sharing a common parcel of land on which they were each entitled to let their cows graze. (For the real position in Lloyd's time see below, Criticisms.) He postulated that if a herder put more than his allotted number of cattle on the common, overgrazing could result. For each additional animal, a herder could receive additional benefits, while the whole group shared the resulting damage to the commons.[3] If all herders made this individually rational economic decision, the common could be depleted or even destroyed, to the detriment of all.[4]
Garrett Hardin's article
The Tragedy of the Commons | |
---|---|
Presented | 13 December 1968 |
Location | Science |
Author(s) | Garrett Hardin |
Media type | Article |
In 1968,
Therein is the tragedy. Each man is locked into a system that compels him to increase his herd without limit – in a world that is limited. Ruin is the destination toward which all men rush, each pursuing his own best interest in a society that believes in the freedom of the commons
— Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons
Hardin discussed problems that cannot be solved by technical means, as distinct from those with solutions that require "a change only in the techniques of the
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights describes the family as the natural and fundamental unit of society. [Article 16][11] It follows that any choice and decision with regard to the size of the family must irrevocably rest with the family itself, and cannot be made by anyone else.
In addition, Hardin also pointed out the problem of individuals acting in rational self-interest by claiming that if all members in a group used common resources for their own gain and with no regard for others, all resources would still eventually be depleted. Overall, Hardin argued against relying on
In the context of avoiding
The "Commons" as a modern resource concept
Hardin's article marked the mainstream acceptance of the term "commons" as used to connote a shared resource.[15] As Frank van Laerhoven and Elinor Ostrom have stated: "Prior to the publication of Hardin’s article on the tragedy of the commons (1968), titles containing the words 'the commons', 'common pool resources,' or 'common property' were very rare in the academic literature."[16] They go on to say: "In 2002, Barrett and Mabry conducted a major survey of biologists to determine which publications in the twentieth century had become classic books or benchmark publications in biology.[17][18] They report that Hardin’s 1968 article was the one having the greatest career impact on biologists and is the most frequently cited".[19]
System archetype
In systems theory, the commons problem is one of the ten most common system archetypes. The Tragedy of the Commons archetype can be illustrated using a causal loop diagram.[20]
Application
Metaphoric meaning
Like Lloyd and
As a metaphor, the tragedy of the commons should not be taken too literally. The "tragedy" is not in the word's conventional or theatric sense, nor a condemnation of the processes that lead to it. Similarly, Hardin's use of "commons" has frequently been misunderstood, leading him to later remark that he should have titled his work "The Tragedy of the Unregulated Commons".[21][22]
The metaphor illustrates the argument that free access and unrestricted demand for a finite resource ultimately reduces the resource through
The same concept is sometimes called the "tragedy of the fishers", because fishing too many fish before or during breeding could cause stocks to plummet.[24]
Modern commons
The tragedy of the commons can be considered in relation to environmental issues such as
Hardin's model posits that the tragedy of the commons may emerge if individuals prioritize self-interest.[27] Government regulations have been instituted to avert resource degradation. However, extensive research spanning decades highlights instances where community-level resource management, operating independently of government intervention, has effectively overseen common resources. In the United States, fishing communities employ a strategy wherein access to local fishing areas is restricted to accepted members, resembling a private, members-only club. Membership is sustained through fee payments, and outsiders are met with resistance, showcasing a quasi-privatized system.[citation needed]
Another case study involves beavers in Canada, historically crucial for natives who, as stewards, organized to hunt them for food and commerce. Non-native trappers, motivated by fur prices, contributed to resource degradation, wresting control from the indigenous population. Conservation laws enacted in the 1930s in response to declining beaver populations led to the expulsion of trappers, legal acknowledgment of natives, and enforcement of customary laws. This intervention resulted in productive harvests by the 1950s.[citation needed]
These case studies underscore the need to reevaluate the tragedy of the commons model. Significant advocacy for a "benefits of the commons" perspective emphasizes successful community management of common-pool resources. However, specific case studies reveal exclusionary practices by those managing the commons towards others, introducing nuances into communal resource management discourse.[citation needed]
While the "benefits of the commons" perspective highlight successful community management, potential drawbacks in exclusionary practices indicate that the communal resource management model may not universally guarantee equitable access. This nuanced understanding invites further exploration of the complexities of balancing community interests and individual access to shared resources.[citation needed]
Situations exemplifying the "tragedy of the commons" include the overfishing and destruction of the
In economics, an
The tragedy of the commons can also refer to the idea of open data.[33] Anonymised data are crucial for useful social research and represent therefore a public resource – better said, a common good – which is liable to exhaustion.[34] Some feel that the law should provide a safe haven for the dissemination of research data, since it can be argued that current data protection policies overburden valuable research without mitigating realistic risks.[35]
An expansive application of the concept can also be seen in Vyse's[36] analysis of differences between countries in their responses to the COVID-19 pandemic.[37] Vyse argues that those who defy public health recommendations can be thought of as spoiling a set of common goods,[38] "the economy, the healthcare system, and the very air we breathe,[39] for all of us. In a similar vein, it has been argued that higher sickness and mortality rates from COVID-19 in individualistic cultures with less obligatory collectivism,[40] is another instance of the "tragedy of the commons".
Tragedy of the digital commons
In the past two decades, scholars have been attempting to apply the concept of the tragedy of the commons to the digital environment. However, between scholars there are differences on some very basic notions inherent to the tragedy of the commons: the idea of finite resources and the extent of pollution.[16] On the other hand, there seems to be some agreement on the role of the digital divide and how to solve a potential tragedy of the digital commons.[16]
Resources
Many digital resources have properties that make them vulnerable to the tragedy of the commons, including
Finite digital resources can thus be digital commons. An example is a database that requires persistent maintenance, such as Wikipedia. As a non-profit, it survives on a network of people contributing to maintain a knowledge base without expectation of direct compensation. This digital resource will deplete as Wikipedia may only survive if it is contributed to and used as a commons. The motivation for individuals to contribute is reflective of the theory because, if humans act in their own immediate interest and no longer participate, then the resource becomes misinformed or depleted. Arguments surrounding the regulation and mitigation requirements for digital resources may become reflective of natural resources.
This raises the question whether one can view access itself as a finite resource in the context of a digital environment. Some scholars argue this point, often pointing to a proxy for access that is more concrete and measurable.
Pollution
In terms of pollution, there are some scholars who look only at the pollution that occurs in the digital environment itself.[52] They argue that unrestricted use of digital resources can cause an overproduction of redundant data which causes noise and corrupts communication channels within the digital environment.[46] Others argue that the pollution caused by the overuse of digital resources also causes pollution in the physical environment.[53] They argue that unrestricted use of digital resources causes misinformation, fake news, crime, and terrorism, as well as problems of a different nature such as confusion, manipulation, insecurity, and loss of confidence.[54][55]
Digital divide and solutions
Scholars disagree on the particularities underlying the tragedy of the digital commons; however, there does seem to be some agreement on the cause and the solution.[16] The cause of the tragedy of the commons occurring in the digital environment is attributed by some scholars to the digital divide.[16] They argue that there is too large a focus on bridging this divide and providing unrestricted access to everyone. Such a focus on increasing access without the necessary restrictions causes the exploitation of digital resources for individual self-interest that is underlying any tragedy of the commons.[46][49]
In terms of the solution, scholars agree that cooperation rather than regulation is the best way to mitigate a tragedy of the digital commons.
Patents and technology
Patents are effectively a limited-time exploitation monopoly given to inventors. Once the period has elapsed, the invention is in principle free to all, and many companies do indeed commercialize such products, now market-proven. However, around 50% of all patent applications do not reach successful commercialization at all, often due to immature levels of components or marketing failures by the innovators. Scholars have suggested that since investment is often connected to patentability, such inactive patents form a rapidly growing category of underprivileged technologies and ideas that, under current market conditions, are effectively unavailable for use.[57] Thus, "Under the current system, people are encouraged to register new patents, and are discouraged from using publicly available patents."[57]: 765 The case might be particularly relevant to technologies that are relatively more environmentally/human damaging but also somewhat costlier than other alternatives developed contemporaneously.[57]: 766
Examples
More general examples (some alluded to by Hardin) of potential and actual tragedies include:
- Physical resources
- Uncontrolled human population growth leading to overpopulation.[5]
- global warming, ocean acidification (by way of increased atmospheric CO2 being absorbed by the sea), and particulate pollution.[58]
- Light pollution: with the loss of the night sky for research and cultural significance, affected human, flora and fauna health, nuisance, trespass and the loss of enjoyment or function of private property.[59]
- Water: Water pollution, water crisis of over-extraction of groundwater and wasting water due to overirrigation.[60]
- slash and burn.[61]
- global warming.[62]
- Holocene mass extinction.[63]
- Space debris in Earth's surrounding space leading to limited locations for new satellites and the obstruction of universal observations.[66]
- Human health
- In many African and Asian countries, patriarchal culture creates a preference for sons that causes some people to abort foetal girls. This results in an imbalanced sex ratio in these countries to the extent that they have significantly more males than females,[67] even though the natural male to female ratio is about 1.04 to 1.[68]
- antibiotic resistance: Misuse of antibiotics anywhere in the world will eventually result in antibiotic resistance developing at an accelerated rate.[69] The resulting antibiotic resistance has spread (and will likely continue to do so in the future) to other bacteria and other regions, hurting or destroying the Antibiotic Commons that is shared on a worldwide basis.[70]
- Vaccines – Herd immunity: Avoiding a vaccine shot and relying on the established herd immunity instead will avoid potential vaccine risks, but if everyone does this, it will diminish herd immunity and bring risk to people who cannot receive vaccines for medical reasons.[71]
- Other
- Knowledge commons encompass immaterial and collectively owned goods in the information age, including, for example:
- Source code and software documentation in software projects that can get "polluted" with messy code or inaccurate information.[72]
- Skills acquisition and training, when all parties involved pass the buck on implementing it.[73]
- Knowledge commons encompass immaterial and collectively owned goods in the information age, including, for example:
Application to evolutionary biology
A parallel was drawn in 2006 between the tragedy of the commons and the competing behaviour of parasites that, through acting selfishly, eventually diminish or destroy their common host.[74] The idea has also been applied to areas such as the evolution of virulence or sexual conflict, where males may fatally harm females when competing for matings.[75]
The idea of
Microbial ecology studies have also addressed if resource availability modulates the cooperative or competitive behaviour in bacteria populations. When resources availability is high, bacterial populations become competitive and aggressive with each other, but when environmental resources are low, they tend to be cooperative and mutualistic.[80]
Ecological studies have hypothesised that competitive forces between animals are major in high carrying capacity zones (i.e., near the Equator), where biodiversity is higher, because of natural resources abundance. This abundance or excess of resources, causes animal populations to have "r" reproduction strategies (many offspring, short gestation, less parental care, and a short time until sexual maturity), so competition is affordable for populations. Also, competition could select populations to have "r" behaviour in a positive feedback regulation.[81]
Contrary, in low
Climate change
The effects of climate change have been given as a mass example of the tragedy of the commons.
Commons dilemma
The commons dilemma is a specific class of
Commons dilemma researchers have studied conditions under which groups and communities are likely to under- or
In game theory, which constructs mathematical models for individuals' behavior in strategic situations, the corresponding "game", developed by Hardin, is known as the Commonize Costs – Privatize Profits Game (CC–PP game).[88]
Psychological factors
Kopelman, Weber, & Messick (2002), in a review of the experimental research on cooperation in commons dilemmas, identify nine classes of independent variables that influence cooperation in commons dilemmas: social motives, gender, payoff structure, uncertainty, power and status, group size, communication, causes, and frames.[89] They organize these classes and distinguish between psychological individual differences (stable personality traits) and situational factors (the environment).[90] Situational factors include both the task (social and decision structure) and the perception of the task.[91]
Empirical findings support the theoretical argument that the cultural group is a critical factor that needs to be studied in the context of situational variables.[92][93] Rather than behaving in line with economic incentives, people are likely to approach the decision to cooperate with an appropriateness framework.[94] An expanded, four factor model of the Logic of Appropriateness,[95][96] suggests that the cooperation is better explained by the question: "What does a person like me (identity) do (rules) in a situation like this (recognition) given this culture (group)?"
Strategic factors
Strategic factors also matter in commons dilemmas. One often-studied strategic factor is the order in which people take harvests from the resource. In simultaneous play, all people harvest at the same time, whereas in sequential play people harvest from the pool according to a predetermined sequence – first, second, third, etc.[97] There is a clear order effect in the latter games: the harvests of those who come first – the leaders – are higher than the harvest of those coming later – the followers.[98] The interpretation of this effect is that the first players feel entitled to take more. With sequential play, individuals adopt a first come-first served rule, whereas with simultaneous play people may adopt an equality rule.[99] Another strategic factor is the ability to build up reputations.[100] Research found that people take less from the common pool in public situations than in anonymous private situations. Moreover, those who harvest less gain greater prestige and influence within their group.[101]
Structural factors
Hardin stated in his analysis of the tragedy of the commons that "Freedom in a commons brings ruin to all."[102] One of the proposed solutions is to appoint a leader to regulate access to the common.[103] Groups are more likely to endorse a leader when a common resource is being depleted and when managing a common resource is perceived as a difficult task.[104] Groups prefer leaders who are elected, democratic, and prototypical of the group, and these leader types are more successful in enforcing cooperation.[105] A general aversion to autocratic leadership exists, although it may be an effective solution, possibly because of the fear of power abuse and corruption.[106]
The provision of rewards and punishments may also be effective in preserving common resources.[107] Selective punishments for overuse can be effective in promoting domestic water and energy conservation – for example, through installing water and electricity meters in houses.[107] Selective rewards work, provided that they are open to everyone. An experimental carpool lane in the Netherlands failed because car commuters did not feel they were able to organize a carpool.[108] The rewards do not have to be tangible. In Canada, utilities considered putting "smiley faces" on electricity bills of customers below the average consumption of that customer's neighborhood.[109]
Solutions
Articulating solutions to the tragedy of the commons is one of the main problems of political philosophy.[110][111] In some situations, locals implement (often complex) social schemes that work well.[112] When these fail, there are many possible governmental solutions such as privatization, internalizing the externalities, and regulation.[112]
Non-governmental solution
Robert Axelrod contends that even self-interested individuals will often find ways to cooperate, because collective restraint serves both the collective and individual interests.[113] Anthropologist G. N. Appell criticized those who cited Hardin to "impos[e] their own economic and environmental rationality on other social systems of which they have incomplete understanding and knowledge."[114]
Political scientist Elinor Ostrom, who was awarded 2009's Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences for her work on the issue, and others revisited Hardin's work in 1999.[115] They found the tragedy of the commons not as prevalent or as difficult to solve as Hardin maintained, since locals have often come up with solutions to the commons problem themselves.[116] For example, another group found that a commons in the Swiss Alps has been run by a collective of farmers there to their mutual and individual benefit since 1517, in spite of the farmers also having access to their own farmland.[117] In general, it is in the interest of the users of a commons to keep them functioning and so complex social schemes are often invented by the users for maintaining them at optimum efficiency.[118][119] Another prominent example of this is the deliberative process of granting legal personhood to a part of nature, for example rivers, with the aim of preserving their water resources and prevent environmental degradation. This process entails that a river is regarded as its own legal entity that can sue against environmental damage done to it while being represented by an independently appointed guardian advisory group.[120] This has happened as a bottom-up process in New Zealand: Here debates initiated by the Whanganui Iwi tribe have resulted in legal personhood for the river. The river is considered as a living whole, stretching from mountain to sea and even includes not only the physical but also its metaphysical elements.[121]
Similarly, geographer Douglas L. Johnson remarks that many
Elinor Ostrom and her colleagues looked at how real-world communities manage communal resources, such as fisheries, land irrigation systems, and farmlands, and they identified a number of factors conducive to successful resource management.[127] One factor is the resource itself; resources with definable boundaries (e.g. land) can be preserved much more easily.[128] A second factor is resource dependence; there must be a perceptible threat of resource depletion, and it must be difficult to find substitutes.[129] The third is the presence of a community; small and stable populations with a thick social network and social norms promoting conservation do better.[118] A final condition is that there be appropriate community-based rules and procedures in place with built-in incentives for responsible use and punishments for overuse.[130] When the commons is taken over by non-locals, those solutions can no longer be used.[116]
Many of the economic and social structures recommended by Ostrom coincide with the structures recommended by
Individuals may act in a deliberate way to avoid consumption habits that deplete natural resources. This consciousness promotes the
Altruistic punishment
Various well-established theories, such as theory of kin selection and direct reciprocity, have limitations in explaining patterns of cooperation emerging between unrelated individuals and in non-repeatable short-term interactions.[132][133] Studies have shown that punishment is an efficacious motivator for cooperation among humans.[134][135]
Altruistic punishment entails the presence of individuals that punish defectors from a cooperative agreement, although doing so is costly and provides no material gain. These punishments effectively resolve tragedy of the commons scenarios by addressing both first-order free rider problems (i.e. defectors free riding on cooperators) and second-order free rider problems (i.e. cooperators free riding on work of punishers).[136] Such results can only be witnessed when the punishment levels are high enough.
While defectors are motivated by self-interest and cooperators feel morally obliged to practice self-restraint, punishers pursue this path when their emotions are clouded by annoyance and anger at free riders.[137]
Governmental solutions
Governmental solutions are used when the above conditions are not met (such as a community being larger than the cohesion of its social network).[138] Examples of government regulation include privatization, regulation, and internalizing the externalities.[139]
Privatization
One solution for some resources is to convert common good into private property (Coase 1960), giving the new owner an incentive to enforce its sustainability.[140] Libertarians and classical liberals cite the tragedy of the commons as an example of what happens when Lockean property rights to homestead resources are prohibited by a government.[141] They argue that the solution to the tragedy of the commons is to allow individuals to take over the property rights of a resource, that is, to privatize it.[142]
In England, this solution was attempted in the Inclosure Acts. According to Karl Marx in Das Kapital, this solution leads to increasing numbers of people being pushed into smaller and smaller pockets of common land which has yet to be privatised, thereby merely displacing and exacerbating the problem while putting an increasing number of people in precarious situations.[143] Economic historian Bob Allen coined the term "Engels' pause" to describe the period from 1790 to 1840, when British working-class wages stagnated and per-capita gross domestic product expanded rapidly during a technological upheaval.[144]
Regulation
In a typical example, governmental regulations can limit the amount of a common good that is available for use by any individual.
In Hardin's essay, he proposed that the solution to the problem of overpopulation must be based on "mutual coercion, mutually agreed upon" and result in "relinquishing the freedom to breed". Hardin discussed this topic further in a 1979 book, Managing the Commons, co-written with
German historian Joachim Radkau thought Hardin advocates strict management of common goods via increased government involvement or international regulation bodies.[154] An asserted impending "tragedy of the commons" is frequently warned of as a consequence of the adoption of policies which restrict private property and espouse expansion of public property.[155][156]
Giving legal rights of personhood to objects in nature is another proposed solution. The idea of giving land a legal personality is intended to enable the democratic system of the rule of law to allow for prosecution, sanction, and reparation for damage to the earth.[157] For example, this has been put into practice in Ecuador in the form of a constitutional principle known as "Pacha Mama" (Mother Earth).[158]
Internalizing externalities
Privatization works when the person who owns the property (or rights of access to that property) pays the full price of its exploitation.[159] As discussed above negative externalities (negative results, such as air or water pollution, that do not proportionately affect the user of the resource) is often a feature driving the tragedy of the commons.[160] Internalizing the externalities, in other words ensuring that the users of resource pay for all of the consequences of its use, can provide an alternate solution between privatization and regulation.[161] One example is gasoline taxes which are intended to include both the cost of road maintenance and of air pollution.[162] This solution can provide the flexibility of privatization while minimizing the amount of government oversight and overhead that is needed.[163]
The mid-way solution
One of the significant actions areas which can dwell as potential solution is to have co-shared communities that have partial ownership from governmental side and partial ownership from the community.[164] By ownership, here it is referred to planning, sharing, using, benefiting and supervision of the resources which ensure that the power is not held in one or two hands only.[165] Since, involvement of multiple stakeholders is necessary responsibilities can be shared across them based on their abilities and capacities in terms of human resources, infrastructure development ability, and legal aspects, etc.[166]
Criticism
Commons in historical reality
The status of common land in England as mentioned in Lloyd's pamphlet has been widely misunderstood.
Millions of acres were "common land", but this did not mean public land open to everybody, a popular fallacy. There was no such thing as ownerless land. Every parcel of "common" land had a legal owner, who was a private person or corporation. The owner was called the lord of the manor[167] (which, like landlord, was a legal term denoting ownership, not aristocratic status).
It was true that there were local people, called commoners, defined as those who had a legal right to use his land for some purpose of their own, typically grazing their animals. Certainly their rights were strong, because the lord was not entitled to build on his own land, or fence off any part of it,[168][169] unless he could prove he had left enough pasture for the commoners.[170] But these individuals were not the general public at large: not everyone in the vicinity was a commoner.[171]
Furthermore the commoners' right to graze the lord's land with their animals was restricted by law - precisely in order to prevent overgrazing.[172] If overgrazing did nevertheless occur, which it sometimes did, it was because of incompetent or weak land management,[173] and not because of the pressure of an unlimited right to graze, which did not exist.
Hence Christopher Rodgers said that "Hardin's influential thesis on the 'tragedy of the commons' ... has no application to common land in England and Wales. It is based on a false premise". Rodgers, professor of law at Newcastle University, added:
Far from suffering a tragedy of the commons in Hardin's sense, common land .. was subject to common law principles of customary origin that promoted 'sustainable management'. These were expressed through property rights, in the form of qualifications on the resource use conferred by property entitlements, and were administered by local manor courts... Moreover, the administration of customary rules by the manor courts represented a wholly different means for organising the management of common resources than the model posited by Hardin, which stresses the need for exclusive ownership by either individuals or government in order to promote the effective management of the resource.[174]
Every productive unit ("manor") had a manorial court; without it, the manor ceased to exist.[175] Manorial courts could fine commoners, and the lord of the manor for that matter,[176] for breaches of customary law, e.g. grazing too many cattle on the land. Customary law varied locally. It could not be altered without the consent of the whole body of the commoners,[177] except by getting an Act of Parliament.[178]
By the time of Lloyd's pamphlet (1833) the majority of land in England had been enclosed and had ceased to be common land,[179] a complex and controversial topic outside the scope of this article. That which remained may not have been good agricultural land anyway,[180] or the best managed. Lloyd takes for granted that common lands were inferior[181] and argues his over-grazing theory to explain it. He does not examine other possible causes e.g. common land was difficult to drain, to keep disease-free, and to use for improved cattle breeding.[182]
Likewise, Susan Jane Buck Cox argues that the common land example used to argue this economic concept is on very weak historical ground, and misrepresents what she terms was actually the "triumph of the commons":[183] the successful common usage of land for many centuries. She argues that social changes and agricultural innovation, and not the behaviour of the commoners, led to the demise of the commons.[184] In a similar vein, Carl Dahlman argues that commons were effectively managed to prevent overgrazing.[185]
Others
Hardin's work is criticised as historically inaccurate in failing to account for the demographic transition,[186] and for failing to distinguish between common property and open access resources.[187][188] Radical environmentalist
Marxist geographer David Harvey has a similar criticism, noting that "The dispossession of indigenous populations in North America by 'productive' colonists, for instance, was justified because indigenous populations did not produce value",[193] and asks generally: "Why, for instance, do we not focus in Hardin's metaphor on the individual ownership of the cattle rather than on the pasture as a common?"[194]
Some authors, like
Tragedy of the commons has served as a pretext for powerful
Comedy of the commons
In certain cases, exploiting a resource more may be a good thing. Carol M. Rose, in a 1986 article, discussed the concept of the "comedy of the commons", where the public property in question exhibits "increasing returns to scale" in usage (hence the phrase, "the more the merrier"),[205] in that the more people use the resource, the higher the benefit to each one. Rose cites as examples commerce and group recreational activities. According to Rose, public resources with the "comedic" characteristic may suffer from under-investment rather than over usage.[206]
A modern example presented by Garrett Richards in
See also
- Bounded rationality – Making of satisfactory, not optimal, decisions
- Collective action problem – Type of social dilemma
- Conflict of interest – Situation when a party is involved in multiple interests
- Dutch disease – Theory in economics, the apparent causal relationship between the increase in the economic development of a specific sector (for example natural resources) and a decline in other sectors (like the manufacturing sector or agriculture).
- Externality – In economics, an imposed cost or benefit
- Credentialism and educational inflation– Unnecessary increases in jobs' educational requirements
- The Evolution of Cooperation – 1984 book by Robert Axelrod
- Free-rider problem – Market failure benefitting non-paying users
- International Association for the Study of the Commons – Non-profit organization
- Jevons paradox – Efficiency leads to increased demand
- Nash equilibrium – Solution concept of a non-cooperative game
- Overfishing – Removal of a species of fish from water at a rate that the species cannot replenish
- Shark finning – Harvesting of fins from live sharks
- Pacific bluefin tuna – Species of fish
- Panic buying – Unusual pattern of purchase, when consumers buy unusually large amounts of a product in anticipation of, or after, a disaster or perceived disaster, or in anticipation of an incredibly large price increase or shortage.
- Parasitism (social offense)– Crime of living at the expense of others
- Prisoner's dilemma – Standard example in game theory, wherein two parties may each act in an individually beneficial fashion to the detriment of both
- Race to the bottom – Repeated decisions by jurisdictions to compete for economic activity against one another by offering ever lower standards of regulation or taxation
- Resource curse – Theory that resource wealth slows growth
- Social reputation in fiction (category)
- Social trap – Type of 'tragedy of the commons'
- Somebody else's problem – Dismissive figure of speech
- Stone Soup – European folk story, the inverse of the tragedy
- Tragedy of the anticommons – Type of resource coordination breakdown
- Tyranny of small decisions – Economic phenomenon, a situation in which a number of decisions, individually small and insignificant in size and time perspective, cumulatively result in a larger and significant outcome which is neither optimal nor desired.
- Unscrupulous diner's dilemma – Game theory: n-player "prisoner's dilemma"
- Unintended consequences – Unforeseen outcomes of an action
- Universalisability– Concept in Kantian ethics
- Volunteer's dilemma – Game theory case weighing own/others' sacrifice, in which each player can either make a small sacrifice that benefits everybody, or instead wait in hope of benefiting from someone else's sacrifice
Related concepts
- Enclosure – In England, appropriation of common land, depriving commoners of their ancient rights
References
Notes
- ^ "An Ecolate View of the Human Predicament by Garrett Hardin". Garrett Hardin Society. The Garrett Hardin Society. Retrieved 2022-11-24.
- doi:10.1093/ref:odnb/27284. (Subscription or UK public library membershiprequired.)
- .
- ^ Lloyd 1833.
- ^ a b Hardin 1968
- S2CID 119679290.
- ISBN 978-0-429-06861-4, retrieved 2021-05-24
- ^ a b c Hardin 1968, p. 1248: "it is the role of education to reveal to all the necessity of abandoning the freedom to breed. Only so, can we put an end to this aspect of the tragedy of the commons?"
- .
- ^ ISBN 978-1-4798-4474-6
- ^ Nations, United (10 December 1948). "The Universal Declaration of Human Rights". United Nations. Retrieved 4 September 2011.
- ISBN 978-92-1-151399-8.
some have argued that it may be inferred from the rights to privacy, conscience, health and well-being set forth in various United Nation's conventions […] Parents have a basic human right to determine freely and responsibly the number and spacing of their children (United Nations, 1968)
- .
- ISBN 978-0-19-884788-5, retrieved 2021-05-24
- S2CID 153630734.
- ^ S2CID 158249954.
- S2CID 86354323.
- OCLC 245532963.
- S2CID 18897696.
- ISBN 978-0-385-26094-7.
- ^ Hesse, Stephen (2006-07-26). "Will commons sense dawn again in time?". The Japan Times Online. Search.japantimes.co.jp. Retrieved 22 October 2013.
- ^ Hardin 1998.
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{{cite thesis}}
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External links
- The Digital Library of the Commons
- The Myth of the Tragedy of the Commons by Ian Angus
- "Global Tragedy of the Commons" by John Hickman and Sarah Bartlett
- "Tragedy of the Commons Explained with Smurfs" by Ryan Somma
- Public vs. Private Goods & Tragedy of the Commons
- On averting the Tragedy of the Commons