Transcaucasian Democratic Federative Republic
Transcaucasian Democratic Federative Republic Закавказская демократическая федеративная республика ( | |||||||||||||
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Chairman of the Seim | |||||||||||||
• 1918 | Nikolay Chkheidze | ||||||||||||
Prime Minister | |||||||||||||
• 1918 | Akaki Chkhenkeli | ||||||||||||
Legislature | Transcaucasian Seim | ||||||||||||
Historical era | Russian Revolution | ||||||||||||
2 March 1917 | |||||||||||||
• Federation proclaimed | 22 April 1918 | ||||||||||||
• Georgia declares independence | 26 May 1918 | ||||||||||||
• Independence of Armenia and Azerbaijan | 28 May | ||||||||||||
Currency | Transcaucasian ruble (ru)[2] | ||||||||||||
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Today part of |
The Transcaucasian Democratic Federative Republic (TDFR;
The region that formed the TDFR had been part of the
Diverging goals of the three major groups (Armenians, Azerbaijanis,[c] and Georgians) quickly jeopardized the TDFR's existence. Peace talks again broke down and, facing a renewed Ottoman offensive in May 1918, Georgian delegates in the Seim announced that the TDFR was unable to continue, and declared the Democratic Republic of Georgia independent on 26 May. With the Georgians no longer part of the TDFR, the Republic of Armenia and Azerbaijan Democratic Republic each declared themselves independent on 28 May, ending the federation. Owing to its short existence, the TDFR has been largely ignored in the national historiographies of the region and has been given consideration only as the first stage towards independent states.
History
Background
Most of the South Caucasus had been
With the outbreak of the
The 1917
Transcaucasian Commissariat
News of the
With Russian and Ottoman forces still nominally engaged in the region, a temporary ceasefire, the Armistice of Erzincan, was signed on 18 December 1917 [O.S. 5 December].[30] With the fighting paused, on 16 January 1918 [O.S. 3 January], Ottoman diplomats invited the Commissariat to join the peace talks in Brest-Litovsk, where the Bolsheviks were negotiating an end to the war with the Central Powers. As the Commissariat did not want to act independently of Russia, they did not answer the invitation and thus did not participate in the peace talks there.[31] Two days later, on 18 January [O.S. 5 January], the Constituent Assembly had its first and only meeting, broken up by the Bolsheviks, thereby effectively consolidating their power in Russia.[32] This confirmed for the Commissariat that they would not be able to work with the Bolsheviks in any serious capacity, and so they began to form a more formal government.[33] The ceasefire between the Ottoman Empire and the Commissariat lasted until 30 January [O.S. 17 January], when the Ottoman army launched a new offensive into the Caucasus, claiming it was to retaliate against sporadic attacks by Armenian militias on the Muslim population in occupied Ottoman territory.[34] With Russian forces largely withdrawn from the front, the Commissariat realized that they would not be able to resist a full-scale advance by the Ottoman forces, and so on 23 February agreed to start a new round of peace talks.[30]
Seim
The idea to establish a Transcaucasian legislative body had been discussed since November 1917, though it had not been acted on at that time.[35] With the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly in January, it became apparent to the leaders of the Commissariat that ties with Russia had been all but severed. With no desire to follow the lead of the Bolsheviks, the Commissariat agreed to establish their own legislative body so that the Transcaucasus could have a legitimate government and negotiate with the Ottoman Empire more properly. Thus on 23 February they established the "Seim" ("legislature") in Tiflis.[36]
No election was held for the deputies; instead, the results for the Constituent Assembly election were used, the electoral threshold being lowered to one-third of that used for the Constituent Assembly to allow more members to join, which allowed smaller parties to be represented.
From the outset, the Seim faced challenges to its authority. With a diverse ethnic and political makeup and no clear status to its authority, there was conflict both within its chambers and outside.[39] It was largely dependent on national councils, represented by the three main ethnic groups, and was unable to proceed without their consent.[1] Thus the Ottoman offer to renew peace talks and a willingness to meet in Tiflis, where the Seim was based, was refused, as the Seim felt it would only showcase the internal disagreements taking place. Instead they agreed to travel to Trabzon, in northeast Anatolia.[40]
Trabzon peace conference
A delegation representing the Seim was scheduled to depart for Trabzon on 2 March, but that day it was announced that the peace talks at Brest-Litovsk had concluded, and the Russians would sign a peace treaty.
While the delegates waited for the conference in Trabzon to begin, the head of the
The
Formation
Renewed Ottoman invasion
During the recess at Trabzon, the Ottoman forces continued their advance into the Transcaucasian territory, crossing the 1914 border with the Russian Empire by the end of March.[52] The Seim debated the best course of action; a majority of the delegates favored a political solution. On 20 March the Ottoman delegates offered that the Seim could only return to negotiations if they declared independence, thereby confirming that Transcaucasus was no longer part of Russia.[53] The idea of independence had arisen before, the Georgians having discussed it in depth in preceding years; it was decided against as the Georgian leadership felt the Russians would not approve it and the Menshevik political ideology leaned away from nationalism.[54]
By 5 April, Chkhenkeli accepted the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk as a basis for further negotiations and urged the Transcaucasian Seim to accept this position.[55] He initially asked that Batum remain part of the Transcaucasus, arguing that as the major port in the region it was an economic necessity. The Ottomans refused the proposal, making it clear that they would only accept the terms of Brest-Litovsk, to which Chkhenkeli conceded.[56] Acting on his own accord, on 9 April Chkhenkeli agreed to negotiate further based on the terms set out, though requested that representatives from the other Central Powers participate in the talks. Rauf replied that such a request could only be considered if the Transcaucasus were an independent state.[57]
Tired of fruitless negotiations and realizing that the contested territories could be occupied by force, Ottoman officials issued an ultimatum to the defenders in Batum, ordering it evacuated by 13 April.[58] While Chkhenkeli was receptive to the loss of Batum, recognizing its importance but accepting that it was part of the terms at Brest-Litovsk, the Georgian members of the Seim were adamant about keeping the city, Gegechkori noting that it could be defended quite easily.[57][59] Irakli Tsereteli, a Georgian Menshevik, gave an impassioned speech calling for the defense of the city and asked the Seim to denounce the Brest-Litovsk treaty altogether. Armenian delegates had long been in support of fighting the Ottoman Empire, a response to the 1915 genocide and continued attacks on Armenian civilians, while only the Azerbaijanis resisted going to war, as they were reluctant to fight fellow Muslims.[60] Azerbaijanis were outvoted and on 14 April the Seim declared war on the Ottoman Empire.[61][62] Immediately after the voting finished, Tsereteli and Jordania left to join the defense of Batum, while the delegation in Trabzon was ordered to return to Tiflis immediately.[63] Some Azerbaijani delegates defied this order and remained there, seeking potential negotiation, though nothing came of this.[64]
Establishment
The military superiority of the Ottoman forces became apparent right away.[65] They occupied Batum on 14 April, with little resistance. They also attacked Kars, but a force of 3,000 Armenian soldiers, with artillery support, held the city until it was evacuated on 25 April.[66] Having captured most of their claimed territory and unwilling to lose more soldiers, the Ottoman delegates offered another truce on 22 April and waited for the Transcaucasians to reply.[67]
In the face of Ottoman military superiority, the Georgian National Council decided that the only option was for Transcaucasia to declare itself an independent state.[68] The idea was debated in the Seim on 22 April, the Georgians leading the debate, noting that the Ottoman representatives had agreed to resume peace talks provided that the Transcaucasus would meet them as an independent state.[69] The choice to move forward was not unanimous initially: the mostly Armenian Dashnaks felt that the best option at the time was to stop the Ottoman military's advance, though they were reluctant to give up so much territory, while the Musavats, who represented Azerbaijani interests, were still hesitant to fight fellow Muslims, but conceded that independence was the only way to ensure the region would not be divided by foreign states. The only major opposition came from the Socialist Revolutionary Party, when one of their representatives, Lev Tumanov , argued that the people of Transcaucasia did not support such an action. He also argued that while the Musavats claimed their driving force was "conscience not fear", it was in reality "fear and not conscience". He concluded that they would all regret this act.[70]
When the debate finished,
Independence
Upon its establishment, the TDFR had no cabinet to lead the new government. The Commissariat had been dissolved when independence was declared, and Gegechkori refused to continue in a leadership position, feeling he had lost support to do so. Though it had been agreed during the Seim debates that Chkhenkeli would take up the role of prime minister, he refused to serve in a caretaker position until a new cabinet could be formed. The cabinet was not finalized until 26 April, so for three days the TDFR effectively had no executive.[72] With pressing needs to attend to, Chkhenkeli took up his role as prime minister. He ordered the Armenian forces to cease fighting and also requested Vehib to meet him for peace negotiations in Batum, the location deliberately chosen so that he could travel to Tiflis if necessary, something that was not possible from Trabzon.[77]
Upset at Chkhenkeli's actions over the previous days, namely the evacuation of Kars, the Dashnaks initially refused to join the cabinet. They negotiated with the Mensheviks but relented when the latter warned they would only support Chkhenkeli or Hovhannes Kajaznuni, an Armenian. The Mensheviks knew that electing Kajaznuni would give the perception that the TDFR intended to keep fighting to defend Armenian territory, and it was feared that this would see the Azerbaijanis leave the federation and make it easier for Ottoman forces to threaten the rest of Armenia, a proposition the Dashnaks were not eager to endorse.[78] The cabinet was confirmed by the Seim on 26 April, consisting of thirteen members. Chkhenkeli, aside from being prime minister, assumed foreign minister's office, the remaining positions being split among Armenians (four), Azerbaijanis (five), and Georgians (three).[79] Azerbaijanis and Georgians took up the leading positions in the cabinet, an act that historian Firuz Kazemzadeh said revealed as "the relationship of forces in Transcaucasia" at the time.[74] In his inaugural address to the Seim, Chkhenkeli announced that he would work to ensure all citizens had equality and to establish borders for the TDFR that were based on agreement with their neighbors.[80] He further laid out a platform with five main points: write a constitution; delineate borders; end the war; combat counter-revolution and anarchy; and land reform.[74]
A new peace conference was convened at Batum on 11 May, with both Chkhenkeli and Vehib in attendance.[81] Before the conference, Chkhenkeli repeated his request to have the other Central Powers present, which the Ottoman delegates ignored.[82] Both sides invited observers: the TDFR brought a small German contingent, led by General Otto von Lossow, while the Ottoman delegates had representatives from the Mountainous Republic of the Northern Caucasus, an unrecognized state they were backing. Chkhenkeli wished to proceed on the basis of the Brest-Litovsk terms, but this was refused by the Ottoman delegation, led by Halil Bey, the Ottoman minister of justice. Halil Bey argued that as the two states were in conflict, the Ottoman would no longer recognize Brest-Litovsk and instead presented Chkhenkeli with a duly prepared draft treaty.[83]
The treaty contained twelve articles which called for the Ottoman Empire to be ceded not only the
Giving the TDFR several days to consider their options, the Ottoman forces resumed their military advances into Armenia on 21 May. They engaged the Armenians at the battles of
Dissolution
German intervention
By 22 May the Ottoman forces, split into two groups, were 40 km (25 mi) from Erevan and 120 km (75 mi) from Tiflis.[88] With this threat, the TDFR reached out to Von Lossow and the Germans in hopes of securing their help and protection. Von Lossow had previously offered to mediate between the TDFR and the Ottoman Empire on 19 May, though this had not led to any progress.[89] While the German and Ottoman Empires were nominally allies, the relationship had deteriorated in the preceding months, as the German public had not approved of reports that the Ottoman government was massacring Christians, nor did the German government appreciate the Ottoman army's advance into territory not agreed to at Brest-Litovsk.[90] The Germans also had their own strategic interests in the Caucasus: they wanted both a potential path to attack British India and access to raw materials in the region, both of which could be blocked by the Ottomans.[91]
With the Armenians fighting the Ottoman forces and the Azerbaijanis having their own issues with
Break-up
On 26 May Tsereteli gave two speeches in the Seim. In the first, he explained that the TDFR was unable to continue as there was a lack of unity among the people and that ethnic strife led to a division of action in regards to the Ottoman invasion. In his second speech, Tsereteli blamed the Azerbaijanis for failing to support the defense of the TDFR and declared that as the federation had failed it was time for Georgia to proclaim itself independent.
Legacy
As the TDFR lasted only a month, it has had a limited legacy, and the historical scholarship on the topic is limited.[102] Historians Adrian Brisku and Timothy K. Blauvelt have noted that it "seemed both to the actors at the time and to later scholars of the region to be unique, contingent, and certainly unrepeatable."[103] Stephen F. Jones stated it was "the first and last attempt at an independent Transcaucasian union",[104] while Hovannisian noted that the actions of the TDFR during its short existence demonstrated that it "was not independent, democratic, federative, or a republic".[72]
Under Bolshevik rule, the three successor states would be forcibly reunited within the
Government
Cabinet
Portfolio | Minister[79] |
---|---|
Prime Minister | Akaki Chkhenkeli |
Minister of Foreign Affairs | Akaki Chkhenkeli |
Minister of the Interior | Noe Ramishvili |
Minister of Finance | Alexander Khatisian |
Minister of Transportation | Khudadat bey Malik-Aslanov |
Minister of Justice | Fatali Khan Khoyski |
Minister of War | Grigol Giorgadze |
Minister of Agriculture | Noe Khomeriki |
Minister of Education | Nasib bey Yusifbeyli |
Minister of Commerce and Industry | Mammad Hasan Hajinski |
Minister of Supplies | Avetik Saakian
|
Minister of Social Welfare | Hovhannes Kajaznuni |
Minister of Labour | Aramayis Erzinkian |
Minister State Control | Ibrahim Haidarov
|
Notes
- ^ Russian: Закавказская демократическая Федеративная Республика (ЗДФР), Zakavkazskaya Demokraticheskaya Federativnaya Respublika (ZDFR).[3]
- ^ Russia and the TDFR used the Julian calendar, which was 13 days behind the Gregorian calendar used by most of Europe at that time. Both switched to the Gregorian calendar in early 1918.[4] Both dates are given until February 1918, when Russia changed over, at which point only the Gregorian calendar is used.
- Transcaucasia. Unlike the Armenians and Georgians, the Tatars did not have their own alphabet and used the Perso-Arabic script. After 1918 with the establishment of the Azerbaijan Democratic Republic, and "especially during the Soviet era", the Tatar group identified itself as "Azerbaijani".[5][6] Before 1918 the word "Azerbaijan" exclusively referred to the Iranian province of Azarbayjan.[7]
- ^ Now the capital of Azerbaijan.
- ^ Russian: Особый Закавказский Комитет; Osobyy Zakavkazskiy Komitet.[20]
- ^ Saint Petersburg had been renamed Petrograd in 1914.[23]
- ^ Russian: Совет; Sovet, meaning "Council".[24]
- ^ Each deputy to the Constituent Assembly had represented 60,000 people, while this was lowered to 20,000 for the Seim, effectively tripling the number of representatives.[36]
- ^ Russian: Совнарком; short for Совет народных комиссаров, Sovet narodnykh kommissarov.[36]
- ^ Now known as Erzurum.[75]
References
- ^ a b Brisku & Blauvelt 2020, p. 2
- ^ Javakhishvili 2009, p. 159
- ^ Uratadze 1956, p. 64
- ^ Slye 2020, p. 119, note 1
- ^ Bournoutian 2018, p. 35 (note 25).
- ^ Tsutsiev 2014, p. 50.
- ^ Bournoutian 2018, p. xiv.
- ^ Saparov 2015, p. 20
- ^ Saparov 2015, pp. 21–23
- ^ Marshall 2010, p. 38
- ^ King 2008, p. 146
- ^ King 2008, p. 150
- ^ Kazemzadeh 1951, p. 3
- ^ King 2008, p. 154
- ^ Marshall 2010, pp. 48–49
- ^ Suny 2015, p. 228
- ^ Kévorkian 2011, p. 721
- ^ King 2008, pp. 157–158
- ^ Kazemzadeh 1951, pp. 32–33
- ^ Hovannisian 1969, p. 75
- ^ Hasanli 2016, p. 10
- ^ Swietochowski 1985, pp. 84–85
- ^ Reynolds 2011, p. 137
- ^ a b Suny 1994, p. 186
- ^ Kazemzadeh 1951, p. 35
- ^ Kazemzadeh 1951, pp. 54–56
- ^ Kazemzadeh 1951, p. 57
- ^ Swietochowski 1985, p. 106
- ^ Kazemzadeh 1951, p. 58
- ^ a b Mamoulia 2020, p. 23
- ^ Kazemzadeh 1951, p. 84
- ^ Swietochowski 1985, p. 108
- ^ Kazemzadeh 1951, p. 85
- ^ Engelstein 2018, p. 334
- ^ Hovannisian 1969, p. 124
- ^ a b c d Hovannisian 1969, p. 125
- ^ a b Kazemzadeh 1951, p. 87
- ^ Bakradze 2020, p. 60
- ^ Swietochowski 1985, p. 110
- ^ Hovannisian 1969, pp. 128–129
- ^ Hovannisian 1969, p. 130
- ^ Forestier-Peyrat 2016, p. 166
- ^ Kazemzadeh 1951, p. 91
- ^ a b Kazemzadeh 1951, p. 93
- ^ Hovannisian 1969, p. 131
- ^ Swietochowski 1985, p. 121
- ^ Hovannisian 1969, p. 132
- ^ Kazemzadeh 1951, pp. 93–94
- ^ Hovannisian 1969, p. 135
- ^ Kazemzadeh 1951, pp. 94–95
- ^ Hovannisian 1969, p. 140
- ^ Hovannisian 1969, p. 137
- ^ Kazemzadeh 1951, p. 96
- ^ Brisku 2020, p. 32
- ^ Reynolds 2011, p. 203
- ^ Hovannisian 1969, pp. 150–151
- ^ a b Hovannisian 1969, p. 152
- ^ Kazemzadeh 1951, pp. 98–99
- ^ Kazemzadeh 1951, p. 99
- ^ Kazemzadeh 1951, pp. 99–100
- ^ Swietochowski 1985, p. 124
- ^ Kazemzadeh 1951, p. 101
- ^ Hovannisian 1969, p. 155
- ^ Kazemzadeh 1951, p. 100
- ^ Taglia 2020, p. 50
- ^ Marshall 2010, p. 89
- ^ Kazemzadeh 1951, p. 103
- ^ Kazemzadeh 1951, pp. 103–104
- ^ Hovannisian 1969, pp. 159–160
- ^ Hovannisian 1969, pp. 160–161
- ^ Kazemzadeh 1951, p. 105
- ^ a b c Hovannisian 1969, p. 162
- ^ Kazemzadeh 1951, p. 106
- ^ a b c Kazemzadeh 1951, p. 108
- ^ de Waal 2015, p. 149
- ^ Hovannisian 2012, pp. 292–294
- ^ Hovannisian 1969, p. 163
- ^ Hovannisian 1969, pp. 167–168
- ^ a b Kazemzadeh 1951, p. 107
- ^ Hovannisian 1969, p. 168
- ^ Kazemzadeh 1951, p. 109
- ^ Hovannisian 1969, p. 172
- ^ Hovannisian 1969, p. 173
- ^ Kazemzadeh 1951, p. 110
- ^ Hovannisian 1969, p. 174
- ^ Zolyan 2020, p. 17
- ^ Hovannisian 2012, p. 299
- ^ Hovannisian 1969, p. 176
- ^ Kazemzadeh 1951, pp. 113–114
- ^ Hovannisian 1969, pp. 176–177
- ^ Hovannisian 1969, pp. 177–179
- ^ a b Kazemzadeh 1951, p. 115
- ^ Hovannisian 1969, p. 183
- ^ Hovannisian 1969, p. 184
- ^ Hovannisian 1969, p. 181
- ^ Kazemzadeh 1951, p. 120
- ^ Hovannisian 1969, p. 188
- ^ Suny 1994, pp. 191–192
- ^ Kazemzadeh 1951, pp. 123–124
- ^ Kazemzadeh 1951, pp. 125–127
- ^ Kazemzadeh 1951, pp. 177–183, 215–216
- ^ Brisku & Blauvelt 2020, p. 3
- ^ Brisku & Blauvelt 2020, p. 1
- ^ Jones 2005, p. 279
- ^ King 2008, p. 187
- ^ Brisku & Blauvelt 2020, p. 4
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Further reading
- Zürrer, Werner (1978), Kaukasien 1918–1921: Der Kampf der Großmächte um die Landbrücke zwischen Schwarzem und Kaspischem Meer [Caucasus 1918–1921: The Great Powers' Struggle for the Land Bridge between the Black and Caspian Seas] (in German), Düsseldorf: Droste Verlag GmbH, ISBN 3-7700-0515-5