Transformation of the Ottoman Empire

Source: Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia.
The Ottoman Empire in 1590, at the peak of its territorial expansion
Part of a series on the
History of the
Ottoman Empire
Coat of Arms of the Ottoman Empire
Timeline
Rise (1299–1453)
Classical Age (1453–1566)
Transformation (1566–1703)
  • Köprülü Era
    (1656–1703)
Old Regime (1703–1789)
  • Tulip Era
    (1718–1730)
Decline & Modernization (1789–1908)
  • Nizam-i Djedid
    (late 18th and early 19th)
  • Tanzimat Era (1839–1876)
  • 1st Constitutional Era
    (1876–1878)
Dissolution (1908–1922)
Historiography (Ghaza, Decline)

The Transformation of the Ottoman Empire, also known as the Era of Transformation, constitutes a period in the history of the

period of decline for the Ottomans, but since the 1980s historians of the Ottoman Empire have increasingly rejected that characterization, identifying it instead as a period of crisis, adaptation, and transformation.[6]

In the second half of the 16th century, the empire came under increasing economic pressure due to rising

Imperial Harem, for which much of this period is often referred to as the Sultanate of Women
.

The changing nature of sultanic authority led to several political upheavals during the 17th century, as rulers and political factions struggled for control over the imperial government. In 1622 Sultan Osman II was overthrown in a Janissary uprising. His subsequent regicide was sanctioned by the empire's chief judicial official, demonstrating a reduced importance of the sultan in Ottoman politics. Nevertheless, the primacy of the Ottoman dynasty as a whole was never brought into question. Of seventeenth-century sultans, Mehmed IV was the longest reigning, occupying the throne for 39 years from 1648 to 1687. The empire experienced a long period of stability under his reign, spearheaded by the reform-minded Köprülü family of grand viziers. This coincided with a period of renewed conquest in Europe, conquests which culminated in the disastrous Siege of Vienna in 1683 and the fall from grace of the Köprülü family. Following the battle a coalition of Christian powers was assembled to combat the Ottomans, bringing about the fall of Ottoman Hungary and its annexation by the Habsburgs during the War of the Holy League (1683–99). The war provoked another political crisis and prompted the Ottomans to carry out additional administrative reforms. These reforms ended the problem of financial insolvency and made the transformation from a patrimonial to a bureaucratic state a permanent one.

Territory

In comparison with earlier periods of Ottoman history, the empire's territory remained relatively stable, stretching from Algeria in the west to Iraq in the east, and from Arabia in the south to Hungary in the north. The pace of expansion slowed during the second half of the reign of Suleiman the Magnificent (1520–66), as the Ottomans sought to consolidate the vast conquests carried out between 1514 and 1541,[nb 1] but did not come to an end. After making peace with Austria in 1568, the Ottomans launched the Ottoman–Venetian War (1570–1573), conquering Cyprus and most of Dalmatia. A naval campaign led to the capture of Tunis from the Spanish in 1574, and a truce was signed in 1580.

Subsequently, the Ottomans resumed warfare with the Safavids in the

Zaydi Shi'ites of Yemen finally forced the Ottomans to abandon that province in 1636.[8] The province of Lahsa in eastern Arabia also suffered from perpetual rebellion and tribal resistance to Ottoman rule, and was abandoned in 1670.[9]

From 1645 onward the Ottomans were preoccupied with the difficult conquest of

Ottoman Turkish: Orta Macar). Just as the vassalization of Right-Bank Ukraine had led to the Kamaniçe campaign, so too did the vassalization of Imre Thököly lead directly to the 1683 Vienna Campaign.[10]

After the unsuccessful Siege of Vienna in 1683, the coalition forces of the Holy League began to push the Ottomans out of Hungary, with most of the country having fallen by 1688. In the Treaty of Karlowitz the Ottomans accepted this loss as well as the return of Podolia to the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. While Crete remained in Ottoman hands, Morea was ceded to Venice along with most of Dalmatia. This was the first major instance of Ottoman territorial retreat in Europe, and it prompted the adoption of a defensive military policy along the Danube river during the eighteenth century.[11]


Ottoman territorial evolution during the Era of Transformation

Subject states

In addition to territory under direct imperial administration, the Ottoman Empire also possessed varying degrees of sovereignty over its many

Sharifs of Mecca in western Arabia were also subject to the Ottomans, but neither paid tribute nor offered military forces.[12] At times, the empire also received tribute from Venice, Habsburg Austria, Poland–Lithuania, and Russia, which made them vassals of the Ottoman Empire in theory, if not in practice.[13] The empire's territory also included many smaller and often geographically isolated regions where the state's authority was weak, and local groups could exercise significant degrees of autonomy or even de facto independence. Examples include the highlands of Yemen, the area of Mount Lebanon, mountainous regions of the Balkans such as Montenegro, and much of Kurdistan, where pre-Ottoman dynasties continued to rule under Ottoman authority.[14]

Demography

Due to scarcity of records and the tendency to record the number of households rather than individuals in taxation surveys, it is very difficult to determine with accuracy the population level in the Ottoman Empire. Thus rather than definite numbers, historians are more apt to demonstrate trends in population increase and decrease from region to region. It is known that the

Celali rebels. Controlling the bandits' activities became a major policy issue for the Ottomans, as bandit raids only worsened the agricultural situation in Anatolia. One method of control involved their recruitment into the Ottoman army as musketeers, known as sekban and sarıca.[16] Other methods were tried as well, such as the dispatch of an inspection team in 1659, which confiscated 80,000 illegally held firearms.[17]
Following the dramatic demographic growth of the sixteenth century, the seventeenth century population was mostly stable and in some regions even declined, again relatively consistent with general European trends.

The empire's premier city was

Cossack raids, such as Ankara, Tokat, and Sinop.[20][23]

In Ottoman Europe this period witnessed a major shift in religious demographics. Many of the cities and towns of the Balkans and Hungary became majority Muslim, including

Albania, Macedonia,[24] Crete and Bulgaria.[25]

Economy

Perhaps the most significant economic transformation of this period was the monetization of the economy and subsequent transformation of the feudal timar system. Over the course of the sixteenth century, coinage came to play a much larger role in the Ottoman rural economy, with tax payments in cash coming to replace payments in kind. As the Ottoman population expanded, the volume of trade grew and new regional markets appeared across the empire. The timar system, which had been designed to take advantage of the smaller scale of the economy in previous centuries, was thus rendered obsolete.[26] Timar fiefs, which were once used to support provincial cavalry forces, were increasingly confiscated by the central government to serve other purposes, a process which has been described as "modernization."[27][28]

Budget

Ottoman budget, 1669–70[29]
Amount (in akçe) Percentage
Standing army salaries 217.4 million 35.5%
Palace expenses[nb 2] 189.2 million 31%
Misc. military expenses 125.5 million 20.5%
Naval arsenal 41.3 million 6.7%
Construction projects ~12 million ~2%
Hajj expenses 3.5 million 0.6%
Misc. ~23.4 million ~3.7%
Total expenses 612.3 million 100%
Income 567.6 million -
Balance −44.7 million −7.3%

At the end of each year the Ottoman government produced a comprehensive balance-sheet depicting its revenues and expenses, giving historians a window through which to view their finances. Ottoman government income grew from 183 million akçe in 1560 to 581 million in 1660, an increase of 217%. However, this growth did not keep pace with inflation, and consequently the Ottomans experienced budgetary deficits throughout most of the seventeenth century, by an average of 14% but with much wider margins during wartime.[30] The province of Egypt played a major role in making up the difference. Each year, after covering local expenses, that province submitted its surplus revenue directly to Istanbul. Egypt was particularly rich, and it provided approximately 72 million akçe annually, allowing the central government to meet its financial obligations.[31] By the end of the seventeenth century, and largely a result of reforms carried out during the War of the Holy League, the central government's income had grown to 1 billion akçe, and continued to grow at an even more dramatic pace during the following period, now far outstripping inflation.[30]

Coinage

Monetization of the economy coincided with the

Price Revolution, a period of inflation affecting both Europe and the Middle East during the sixteenth century. As a result, the value of the main Ottoman silver coin (akçe) became unstable, particularly after a severe debasement in 1585.[32] The currency's instability lasted until the middle of the seventeenth century and led some regions of the empire to import counterfeit European coins for everyday use. This situation was brought under control in the 1690s when the empire carried out far-reaching monetary reforms and issued a new silver and copper currency.[33]

Trade

coffeehouses had emerged in cities and towns across the empire, and the drink became a major item of public consumption. By the end of the seventeenth century approximately 4–5,000 tons of coffee was being imported into Cairo annually, much of it exported to the rest of the empire.[34]

Trade along the maritime routes of the Black Sea was severely disrupted from the late sixteenth century by the extensive raiding activity of the

Khmelnytsky Rebellion
in 1648 Cossack activity reduced in intensity, but remained an issue of critical importance for the Ottoman government.

An Ottoman coffeehouse in Istanbul.

European merchants

European merchants active in the Ottoman Empire are by far the most highly studied aspect of Ottoman commerce, a fact which has frequently caused their importance to be exaggerated. European merchants were by no means dominant in the empire during this period,

Ottoman Turkish: ʿahdnāme),[nb 3] which granted Europeans the right to establish mercantile communities in specified Ottoman ports and to pay a lower rate of tariff on their goods. European communities were exempt from regular taxation and were given judicial autonomy with regard to personal and family issues. All commercial disputes were to be settled in the empire's Sharia courts, until the 1670s when they were granted the right to appeal major cases directly to Istanbul, where they could be argued by their resident ambassadors.[39] Capitulations were granted first to the French (1569), then the English (1580), and finally to the Dutch (1612).[40] The arrival of Western European traders in the Levant, dubbed the "Northern Invasion", did not result in their takeover or domination of Mediterranean commerce,[41] but it did usher in certain changes. Venice in particular suffered from heavy competition, and its commercial presence declined significantly, particularly after 1645, when the Ottomans and Venetians went to war over Crete.[42] The English were by far the most successful European merchants in the empire during the seventeenth century, and they benefited from friendly relations between the two states. The Ottomans exported raw silk and imported cheap woolen cloth, as well as tin necessary for the production of military armaments.[43]

Government

Mehmed IV (r. 1648–1687), the longest reigning sultan of the seventeenth century.

While in 1550 the Ottoman Empire was a patrimonial state in which all power was held exclusively by the sultan, by 1700 it had experienced a political transformation whereby the sultan's monopoly on power was replaced with a multi-polar system in which political power was informally shared among many different individuals and factions. This process came about gradually, and was not unopposed. Certain rulers, such as Osman II and Murad IV, sought to reverse this trend and re-establish absolute power for themselves. For his efforts, Osman II became the victim of regicide in 1622, the significance of which one historian has compared to the 1649 regicide of Charles I of England.[44]

Significant in this process of transformation were several changes in the nature of succession to the throne. At the outset of this period, Ottoman princes took up posts in the Anatolian provincial government upon reaching the age of maturity. However, Mehmed III (r. 1595–1603) died before any of his sons came of age. Ahmed I was thus enthroned as a minor, and subsequently princes were no longer sent to the provinces to govern. While the motivation behind this change cannot be known for certain, it may have been a method of preventing the type of fratricidal civil war experienced in the last years of the reign of Suleiman the Magnificent. Just as princely government was abandoned, so too did the practice of royal fratricide, which had been enforced since the time of Mehmed II, fall out of use. This seems to have been a reaction to the unusually gruesome fratricides occasioned by the enthronements of Murad III and Mehmed III, in which dozens of infants and young boys were killed. The result was that the whole imperial family collectively remained in Istanbul, and sultans allowed their brothers to live in the harem undisturbed. The ultimate consequence of this was a change in the order of succession; upon his death in 1617 Ahmed I was succeeded not by one of his sons, but by his brother Mustafa I. Henceforth the general principle of Ottoman succession would be that of seniority rather than patrilineality. However, in practice this meant that sovereignty came to be viewed as something vested in the Ottoman dynasty as a whole rather than in a particular member, making the individual sultan replaceable.[45]

A seventeenth-century European depiction of several janissaries.

The existence of multiple adult males of the Ottoman dynasty facilitated the emergence of other centers of power within the government. Two figures of particular importance were the

Turhan Hatice, mother of Mehmed IV. Several sultans during this period occupied the throne while still children, and it was in their roles as regents that the Valide Sultans could become the most powerful figures in the empire.[47]

Another locus of power was the ever-expanding imperial army, consisting of the

Janissaries and Imperial Cavalry. The size of these organizations increased dramatically in the second half of the sixteenth century, with the number of janissaries increasing from 7,886 in 1527 to 39,282 in 1609.[48] While many of these men went on to serve in the empire's foreign wars, others were janissaries only on paper, benefiting from the status they received as members of the corps but otherwise avoiding the obligation to serve in war. Such men connected the Janissary Corps with the common people, giving them a voice in politics. Protests, mutinies, and rebellions allowed the Janissaries to express their disapproval of imperial policy, and they frequently played a role in forming political coalitions within the Ottoman government. The Janissaries thus transformed from an elite fighting force into a complex hybrid organization, part military and part socio-political association, maintaining an important influence over Ottoman government in spite of attempts by heavy-handed rulers to suppress them over the course of the seventeenth century.[49]

Political households

Another major development was the proliferation of so-called "vizier and pasha households" (kapı) among the political elite of the empire. The premier household in the empire was the sultan's imperial household in Istanbul, which the elite sought to emulate. Wealthy governors assembled large retinues of servants as well as private armies, forming connections of political patronage with one another.[50] The formation of households coincided with a general increase in the wealth and power of the empire's highest-ranking provincial officials,[51] which proved to be a mixed blessing for the central government: while the governors used their power to centralize imperial control and assemble larger armies to combat the Ottoman Empire's enemies, they also constituted more formidable foes in times of rebellion. The most successful elite household was established by the grand vizier Köprülü Mehmed Pasha (1656–1661), who used it to dominate the empire during his tenure in office, placing loyal men from his household in positions of power and authority. Men raised in the Köprülü household continued to occupy important positions in the Ottoman government well into the early eighteenth century.[52]

Bureaucracy

The Ottoman bureaucracy (mālīye) expanded dramatically both with regard to size and range of activity. While only 38 salaried scribes were serving in 1549, by 1593 this number had increased to 183.

tax farming (iltizām). A larger bureaucracy was thus needed in order to cope with the empire's increasingly centralized fiscal system. Bureaucratic organization was diversified, with new branches being formed and scribal duties increasingly specialized.[54] The high quality of the Ottoman bureaucracy was underpinned by stringent standards of scribal recruitment.[55] By the early seventeenth century the bureaucracy was moved out of its original location in Topkapı Palace, indicating that it was becoming independent of the sultan's household.[56] It thus became a stabilizing influence for the empire; while sultans and viziers rose and fell, the bureaucracy remained in place, providing cohesion and continuity to imperial administration.[57]

Military

The nature of the

timariots and standing army,[61] joined also by irregular militias and the armies of the empire's vassals, with a particularly significant contribution coming from the Crimean Khanate.[62] In general, the Ottoman army remained at least as effective as those of its European rivals throughout this period.[63] In contrast with older historical views, which posited a failure to keep pace with European military developments, the Ottomans in fact demonstrated a significant degree of dynamism and a continued capacity and willingness to innovate and improve their military forces.[64] Although the empire experienced significant defeats and territorial loss in the 1683–99 War of the Holy League, this was caused not by military inferiority, but by the size and effective coordination of the Christian coalition, as well as the logistical challenges of warfare on multiple fronts.[65]

Standing army

The Ottoman standing army (ḳapukulu), also referred to as the "central army", consisted of three main divisions: the infantry, known as the

Altı Bölük), and the Artillery corps. Unlike the provincial army, the standing army was based in Istanbul and was subject to regular training and discipline, and was paid quarterly in cash salaries.[66] The size of the army expanded dramatically beginning from the second half of the sixteenth century, more than doubling from 29,175 men in 1574 to 75,868 in 1609. Following this growth its numbers remained relatively stable for the rest of the century.[67] The payment of salaries to the standing army was by far the largest single expense in the imperial budget, and this growth in size was paired with a proportional growth in expenditures. By the seventeenth century the cost of the standing army could at times absorb more than half of the empire's entire central budget.[68] As the army grew the nature of its relationship with the government began to shift, as the janissaries and cavalry increasingly became involved in imperial politics and administration.[69]

Logistics

The Ottomans possessed a distinct superiority in logistical organization over their European rivals, who were typically forced to resort to ad hoc solutions or even outright plunder in order to keep their armies in good supply.

Ottoman Turkish: menzil) across the empire, stocked with provisions for the army along their route of march. Border fortresses contained depots which could supply the army once it arrived at the frontier.[71] This enabled the Ottoman army to largely, though not entirely, avoid having to live off the land through plunder.[72]

Border defense

Hungary

The Ottoman frontier in Hungary in 1572.

In Hungary the Ottomans were primarily concerned with ensuring the security of Buda and the Danube river, which served as a critical transport route for munitions and provisions. For this purpose they constructed several fortresses along the route of the river and surrounded Buda with a ring of protective fortresses, the most significant of which was Esztergom (Estergon), which was significantly enlarged and fortified subsequent to its capture in 1543. Buda's protective ring was completed in 1596 with the conquest of Eger (Eğri) to the northeast. Subsequent to the Peace of Zsitvatorok in 1606 the pace of Ottoman fortress construction slowed as the military threat of the Habsburgs receded.[73]

By the mid-seventeenth century

janissaries. These forces were supplemented by local timariots as well as the private armies of Ottoman governors.[74] These numbers, however, constitute wartime levels. During peacetime the garrison sizes would frequently be reduced in order to cut costs.[76] While in the second half of the sixteenth century the Hungarian fortress network was financially self-sufficient, and the local governors were even able to remit surplus revenue to Istanbul, this had deteriorated by the seventeenth century such that the administrative border of the province of Buda needed to be extended south of the Danube in order to increase its available revenue. Nevertheless, the Ottoman financial system was in better shape than that of the Habsburgs, who continually struggled to raise the revenue needed to maintain their own Military Frontier.[77]

Aside from periods of open warfare (1541–68, 1593–1606, 1660–4, 1683–99), the Ottoman-Habsburg frontier in Hungary was characterized by local skirmishes and small-scale conflict known as the "little war" (

Bosnia's conquest of Bihać.[78]

Northern frontier

The Ottoman northern frontier in the seventeenth century.

In contrast with their Hungarian and Safavid frontiers, the Ottomans generally did not seek to expand further north from the

Caffa, directly administered by the Ottomans, but also created perpetual tension between the Ottomans and their neighbors.[80]

The security of the Ottomans' northern frontier was first threatened at the end of the sixteenth century with the emergence of the

went to war in 1621 and very nearly again in 1634 and 1646.[82] Countermeasures were developed in order to limit the damage the Cossacks could cause; by the 1620s the Ottomans had established tighter control over the mouth of the Dnieper, preventing large flotillas from passing into the sea, and naval squadrons were established to patrol for raiders.[83]

The Commonwealth had little ability to control the activities of the Cossacks, and in 1648 Ukraine descended into chaos with the

clashing with the Russians and expelling them from the traditional Cossack capital of Chyhyryn in 1678. Kamaniçe remained the bulwark of the Ottoman northern frontier throughout the War of the Holy League. With a garrison of over 6,000 men and 200 cannons, it was one of the most heavily defended fortresses in the Ottoman Empire. Despite continuous attempts by the Commonwealth to blockade and besiege the city, Kamaniçe managed to hold out throughout the war, and in accordance with the Treaty of Karlowitz was returned to the Commonwealth in 1699 without having been conquered.[84]

Navy

Although the Ottoman army remained effective throughout this period, the same cannot be said of the navy. While dominant in the Mediterranean in 1550, the

Cretan War with Venice in 1645, nearly seventy years later. This period of inaction played a role in weakening the effectiveness of the Ottoman navy, such that the Venetians were able to blockade the Dardanelles and inflict several defeats upon the Ottomans, most significantly in the Battle of the Dardanelles (1656), described as the worst Ottoman defeat since Lepanto. Although these defeats have often been ascribed to an Ottoman failure to modernize their navy through the replacement of oar-propelled galleys with sail-driven galleons, in fact the Ottoman navy contained just as many galleons as that of the Venetians. Rather than innovation or technical ability, what the Ottomans lacked was skilled mariners to crew and command their vessels, whereas the Venetians could draw upon their extensive merchant marine for manpower. In contrast with the sixteenth century, the skilled mariners of the Barbary Coast were less willing to commit themselves to the Ottoman cause.[87] Whereas sixteenth-century Ottoman admirals frequently began their careers as corsairs in North Africa, in the middle of the seventeenth century the admiralty was merely a prestigious office to be held by various statesmen who did not necessarily have any naval experience.[88] Despite these difficulties, the Ottomans were ultimately able to overcome the Venetians, breaking the blockade of the Dardanelles in 1657 and completing the conquest of Crete with the fall of Heraklion in 1669.[89]

Subsequent to the Cretan War, the Ottomans sought to improve the quality of their navy, and particularly its galleons. Investments were made toward improving their technical design, such that by 1675 an English captain could write home with suggestions for altering the design of English ships on the Ottoman model.[90] In 1682 a dedicated squadron of galleons was created, organizationally separate from the fleet's remaining galleys,[91] and in that year alone ten new galleons were commissioned to be built.[92] The Ottomans' next major naval conflict began in 1684, when Venice aligned with Habsburg Austria, Poland–Lithuania, and the Papacy to combat the Ottomans in the War of the Holy League. The Venetians opened a front in the Aegean Sea and Peloponnese, but failed in an attempt to reconquer Crete in 1692. From 1695 to 1701 the Ottoman navy was placed under the command of Mezzo Morto Hüseyin Pasha, an experienced corsair from Algiers, who defeated the Venetian fleet in the Battle of the Oinousses Islands on 9 February 1695 and demonstrated the success of the previous decades' reforms.[93]

Religious and intellectual life

Şeyhülislâm
, the chief Islamic religious official in the empire.

The Ottoman Empire of this period was home to a vibrant religious and intellectual life. The legal reforms of Şeyhülislâm Ebussuud Efendi (1545–74) stimulated Ottoman intellectuals to vigorously debate many of society's issues. Ottomans were conflicted over the religious and moral qualities of newly available consumer goods, such as coffee and tobacco, which were sometimes banned and sometimes permitted. Equally divisive was the legality of several religious practices associated with Sufism, which were most staunchly opposed by the fiercely conservative Kadızadelis, a movement which began in the early seventeenth century but traced its origins to the sixteenth century preacher Birgili Mehmed Efendi (d. 1573).[94] Kazıdadeli ideology centered on the Islamic invocation to "enjoin good and forbid wrong," leading them to oppose practices they perceived as "innovation" (bid'ah), in a manner roughly analogous to modern Wahhabism. The Kadızadelis spread their ideology by serving as preachers in Istanbul's major mosques, and twice won the support of the imperial government, first under Murad IV and later under Mehmed IV. Despite this, the Kadızadelis were looked upon with scorn by many of Istanbul's scholars and intellectuals, who ridiculed them for their zealous conservatism.[95] The Kadızadeli preacher Vani Mehmed Efendi acted as a personal spiritual advisor to Mehmed IV, but fell from grace and was banished from court following the unsuccessful Siege of Vienna in 1683. The Kadızadelis henceforth received no direct imperial support.[96]

In the early seventeenth century, Ottoman intellectual life was further influenced by an influx of scholars from

Arabic: taḥqīq, as opposed to taqlīd, "imitation") of the scientific discoveries of previous generations. The result was a burst of new written works on rationalist topics, such as mathematics, logic, and dialectics, with many scholars tracing their intellectual lineage back to these Iranian and Kurdish immigrants.[97]

Nasihatname

This period also witnessed the flowering of the literary genre known as "Advice for Kings" (

Ottoman Decline Thesis. However, since the 1980s, due to a re-examination of the nasihatname literature as well as countless other facets of Ottoman civilization, historians have achieved a consensus that in fact no such decline occurred, and thus the notion of the "Decline of the Ottoman Empire" was a myth.[6]

Historiography

Ottoman historical writing underwent major changes during this period. Particularly after 1600, Ottoman writers shifted away from the Persianate style of previous generations, writing in a form of

Katib Çelebi, and Mustafa Naima
.

Political narrative

Suleiman's successors

Safavids
.

Hungary, bringing Selim to the throne.[103]

Mediterranean. This allowed the Ottomans to focus their expansion to the east against Safavid Iran, where a long and devastating war was fought from 1578 to 1590, from which the Ottomans emerged with significant, if short-lived, conquests.[104]

Selim died in 1574 and was succeeded by his son

Valide Sultan. This was directly related to the changes taking place in the system of succession, whereby princes no longer traveled to the provinces to take up governorships, but remained in the harem in Istanbul.[105] From the time of Murad III onward, sultans no longer slept in the male segment of Topkapı Palace, but resided in a new bedchamber within the harem.[106] Due to the increasing role of imperial women in political life, this period is sometimes referred to as the Sultanate of Women
.

Crisis and adaptation

Blue Mosque
in Istanbul, constructed in the reign of Ahmed I (1603–1617).

The Ottoman government at the turn of the century was presented with a severe military and economic crisis. War erupted with the

new war against the Ottomans, reversing all of the gains that had made in the previous decades. Thus the Ottomans found themselves fighting on three fronts at once, at a time when the economy was still recovering from the currency debasement of 1585.[107] To overcome this challenge, they adopted an innovative strategy of co-opting the rebel forces into the structure of the empire. The Celali armies were manned by Anatolian bandits known as sekban, former peasants who sought an alternate livelihood in the harsh economic climate of the turn of the century. When given the opportunity, these men were eager to earn pay and status by serving in the Ottoman army as mercenaries. By recruiting such men into the Ottoman army as musketeers their energies were redirected from banditry and put to use against the empire's external enemies. The Celali leaders, as well, were at times granted positions within the provincial administration in order to pacify them.[108] This did not bring the anarchy in Anatolia to an end, but it did make it easier to manage. In 1609 the grand vizier Kuyucu Murad Pasha
traversed Anatolia with an army, clearing away the Celalis wherever he found them and bringing an end to the greater part of Celali activity.

The wars with the Habsburgs and Safavids eventually devolved into stalemates. Mehmed III personally led the Ottoman army to victory over the Habsburgs in the Battle of Keresztes in 1596, and the Ottomans went on to seize the Hungarian fortresses of Eger and Nagykanizsa, but ultimately neither side was able to achieve a decisive victory and the war was brought to an end in 1606 with the Peace of Zsitvatorok. The war with the Safavids continued to drag on until 1618.

The recruitment of

tax farming, formerly used primarily in the Arab provinces. Taxation rights which were formerly given to cavalrymen were now sold to the highest bidder, a practice which was in use in much of Europe as well. Other taxes were also reformed, with the wartime tax known as avarız becoming permanent and providing for 20% of the empire's annual revenue. These reforms greatly increased the revenue available to the central government and played a major role in the empire's continued strength throughout the century. To accommodate these changes, the bureaucracy was expanded and diversified, coming to play a much larger role in the empire's administration.[110]

Sultan Osman II, victim of the regicide of 1622.

Regicide and war

Ahmed I's death in 1617 brought his brother to the throne as

Janissaries and Imperial Cavalry, and relations became particularly strained after the sultan's failed Polish campaign, in which the army felt it had been mistreated. After their return to Istanbul, Osman II announced his desire to perform the pilgrimage to Mecca; in fact this was a plan to recruit a new and more loyal army in Anatolia, out of the bandit-mercenary forces which had taken part in the Celali Rebellions and the Ottomans' wars with the Habsburgs and Safavids. To prevent him from carrying out this plan, the imperial army launched a revolt on May 18, 1622, and two days later, with the approval of the Şeyhülislâm, executed Osman. This event, the legally approved regicide of a reigning Ottoman monarch, cemented the empire's transformation from a patrimonial empire into one in which power was shared between various loci of authority.[112]

The regicide was followed by the revolt of

Safavids saw another opportunity to attack and seized control of Baghdad in January 1624, but were unable to advance to Diyarbakır. In 1628 Abaza Mehmed's revolt was suppressed by the grand vizier Gazi Hüsrev Pasha, whose dismissal from office in 1632 triggered a Janissary revolt. This event fueled Murad IV's desire to regain control over the state, and he henceforth began to exercise power in his own right. He carried out a reform of military land tenure in an effort to strengthen the army, encouraged peasant resettlement of abandoned fields, and enforced moral reform in Istanbul in conjunction with the religious movement of the Kadizadelis.[113] First achieving military success in 1635 with the conquest of Yerevan, he was ultimately able to lead the empire to victory by reconquering Baghdad in 1638 and establishing a long-lasting peace with the Safavids the following year.[114]

Murad IV died in 1640, only 29 years old. He was succeeded by his brother

Chief Black Eunuch, to Mecca. The Ottomans quickly overran most of Crete, but were unable to evict the Venetians from the fortress of Heraklion.[115] At sea, the Venetians managed to achieve the upper hand and blockade the Dardanelles, strangling Istanbul's trade and food supply. The subsequent disorder in the capital prompted Ibrahim's deposition in 1648, which was sanctioned by the Janissaries, the şeyhülislâm, and even Kösem Sultan, his mother. Ibrahim's replacement was his seven-year-old son, who was enthroned as Mehmed IV. The new government in Istanbul thus consisted of the young ruler's grandmother and regent Kösem Sultan and her allies in the Janissary Corps, one of whom was made grand vizier. Despite continued unrest both in Istanbul and the provinces, the blockade of the Dardanelles was successfully broken the following year. Kösem's position was nevertheless under threat from Mehmed IV's mother Turhan Sultan. Upon learning of a plot by Kösem to poison Mehmed IV, Turhan's faction leapt into action and assassinated her in 1651.[116]

Turhan Sultan was henceforth in a secure position of power, but was unable to find an effective grand vizier, leaving the empire without a coherent policy with regard to the war with Venice. The result was

another revolt of the imperial troops in March 1656, which demanded the lives of several government officials, blamed for neglecting to properly pay the troops who had been struggling to conquer Crete for so long.[117]

Köprülü era

Main article: Köprülü era
Köprülü Mehmed Pasha (1656–1661) restored stability to the empire after the disorder of the previous decade.

In 1656 the Venetians seized control over the islands of Lemnos and Tenedos, and established another blockade of the Dardanelles. This action led to panic in Istanbul and prompted a renewed political crisis. In need of a change of policy, Turhan Hatice appointed the highly experienced Köprülü Mehmed Pasha as grand vizier, who immediately set forth on a drastic process of reform. This involved the dismissal or execution of all officials deemed corrupt, and their replacement with men loyal to the vizier.[118] While wintering in Edirne after leading a successful campaign to reconquer the islands, Köprülü extended his purge to the imperial cavalry, executing thousands of soldiers who showed any sign of disloyalty. This move prompted a serious reaction, and as Köprülü led the army in a campaign against Transylvania, many of the empire's eastern governors first refused to join him, then launched an open revolt under the leadership of Abaza Hasan Pasha, demanding from the sultan that Köprülü be executed. Mehmed IV, now no longer a minor, chose to side with his vizier and dispatched an army to defeat the rebels. Despite initial rebel victories, the revolt was suddenly brought to an end in February 1659 with the assassination of Abaza Hasan.[119]

Köprülü Mehmed died in 1661, leaving the empire in a much better military and financial position than he had found it. He was succeeded in office by his son

Merzifonlu Kara Mustafa Pasha (1676–1683), and it is due to this unbroken control of the Köprülü family over the office of grand vizier that this period is referred to as the Köprülü era.[120]

Köprülü Mehmed's two successors were highly competent administrators, and the empire enjoyed a remarkable degree of stability under their tutelage. Mehmed IV was content to allow them to manage the political affairs of the empire, but was nevertheless not an inactive ruler. He played a major role in imperial symbolism and legitimation, traveling with the army on campaign before handing supreme command over to the grand vizier. Thus while not directly leading the army, he still participated in the imperial campaigns, for which he was referred to as gazi, or "holy warrior," by contemporaries.[121] Under the Köprülüs the empire revived its expansion into Europe, conquering territory from the Habsburgs, Poland–Lithuania, and Russia, as well as bringing the war with Venice to an end with the conquest of Heraklion in 1669. The push for territorial expansion under the Köprülüs reached its apex in 1683 with the Siege of Vienna, which ended in Ottoman defeat.

The defeat at Vienna ushered in a major political shift in the empire. As punishment for his failure, Mehmed IV ordered that Merzifonlu Kara Mustafa be executed, bringing an end to the undisputed Köprülü hold over the empire. The result was a period of political confusion at a time when the Ottoman Empire's European enemies were rallying together. In 1684 the Habsburgs, Poland–Lithuania, Venice, and the Papacy forged an alliance known as the Holy League to oppose the Ottomans, launching a period of warfare which would last for sixteen years.[122]

War of the Holy League

The forces of the Holy League conquer Buda in 1686.
Eighteenth-century Europe depicting the Ottoman Empire's new western boundaries following the Treaty of Karlowitz.

Conflict on multiple fronts placed great strain on the Ottoman ability to wage war. The empire was attacked simultaneously in Hungary, Podolia, and the Mediterranean region, while after 1686 their

Köprülü Fazıl Mustafa Pasha, a younger son of Köprülü Mehmed, was appointed grand vizier and led the army to successfully recover both Niš and Belgrade.[124] What followed was a long period of stalemate, with the Habsburgs having lost their bridgehead south of the Danube and the Ottomans unable to achieve any lasting success north of it. The Habsburgs concerned themselves with the conquest of the Principality of Transylvania, an Ottoman vassal state, the loss of which the Ottomans were forced to accept after the disastrous defeat of an army personally led by Sultan Mustafa II in the 1697 Battle of Zenta. This defeat prompted the Ottomans to sue for peace.[125]

While territorial losses to the Habsburgs have at times been cited as evidence of military weakness, more recently historians have challenged this notion, arguing that Ottoman defeats were primarily a result of the sheer size of the coalition arrayed against them, and the logistical burden of fighting a war on multiple fronts. To this may be added political instability, for the empire's greatest losses took place from 1684 to 1688, when its political leadership was paralyzed first by the execution of Kara Mustafa Pasha and then the deposition of Mehmed IV. Subsequently, the Ottomans were able to stabilize their position and reverse Habsburg gains south of the Danube.[126][127]

The pressure of sustained warfare had prompted the Ottomans to carry out extensive fiscal reform. The sale of tobacco was legalized and taxed, previously tax-immune

tax farms known as malikâne was implemented, vastly increasing the empire's revenue. These measures enabled the Ottoman Empire to maintain fiscal solvency during the war, and to enjoy significant budget surpluses by the beginning of the eighteenth century.[128][129][130]

The war was brought to an end in 1699 with the

Edirne incident, bringing an end to the rule of the final Ottoman warrior-sultan, cementing the empire's transformation into a bureaucratic empire.[132]

See also

Notes

  1. Battle of Çaldıran) to 1541 (the annexation of Buda) was the most rapid period of expansion in the empire's history. The Ottomans annexed eastern Anatolia, Syria, Egypt
    , Iraq, most of North Africa, and much of Hungary.
  2. ^ Palace expenses included not only money set aside for the sultan's personal upkeep, but also the maintenance of the vast imperial household, the palace school, and many of the diplomatic expenses of the empire. The palace carried out functions which could be classified as civil administration.[29]
  3. ^ The term "capitulation" comes from the Latin "capitulum", referring to a chapter heading, and did not have the connotation of "surrendering" as does the modern English word.[38]

References

  1. ISBN 90-04-10289-2
    .
  2. ISBN 0-521-57455-2
    .
  3. ISBN 978-0-582-41899-8
    .
  4. ISBN 978-0-415-44492-7
    .
  5. ISBN 978-1-107-03442-6
    . the post-Süleymanic Ottoman polity continued to manifest a tremendous political and economic dynamism, a pervasive pragmatism, and an important level of social mobility and mobilization.
  6. ^
    ISBN 978-0-582-41899-8
    . historians of the Ottoman Empire have rejected the narrative of decline in favor of one of crisis and adaptation
  7. ^ Hegyi, Klára (2000). "The Ottoman network of fortresses in Hungary". In Dávid, Géza; Pál Fodor (eds.). Ottomans, Hungarians, and Habsburgs in Central Europe: The Military Confines in the Age of Ottoman Conquest. Leiden: Brill. p. 169.
  8. ^ Hathaway, Jane (2006). "The Ottomans and the Yemeni Coffee Trade". Oriente Moderno. 25 (86): 167.
  9. JSTOR 597091
    .
  10. ISBN 978-90-04-24606-5
    .
  11. ISBN 978-0-582-30807-7
    .
  12. ISBN 978-90-04-24606-5
    .
  13. ISBN 978-90-04-24606-5
    .
  14. ISBN 978-90-04-24606-5
    .
  15. ISBN 0-521-57456-0
    .
  16. ISBN 978-0-415-44492-7
    .
  17. ISBN 978-0-465-02396-7
    .
  18. ISBN 9780816062591
    .
  19. ^
    ISBN 0-521-57456-0
    .
  20. ^
    ISBN 0-521-57456-0
    .
  21. ISBN 978-0-814-75435-1
    .
  22. ISBN 978-9652233882
    .
  23. ^ a b Ostapchuk, Victor (2001). "The Human Landscape of the Ottoman Black Sea in the Face of the Cossack Naval Raids". Oriente Moderno. 20: 24, 29, 40.
  24. ^ Vacalopoulos, A (1973). A History of Macedonia, 1354-1833. Institute of Balkan Studies, Thessaloniki.
  25. ISBN 90-04-13576-6
    .
  26. ISBN 978-1-107-41144-9
    .
  27. ISBN 0-231-05578-1
    .
  28. ISBN 978-1-107-41144-9
    .
  29. ^
    ISBN 0-521-57456-0
    .
  30. ^
    ISBN 90-04-10289-2
    .
  31. ISBN 1-85728-389-9
    .
  32. ^ Pamuk, Şevket (2000). A Monetary History of the Ottoman Empire. Cambridge University Press. pp. 112, 131.
  33. S2CID 154823709
    .
  34. ISBN 0-521-57456-0
    .
  35. ^ Ostapchuk, Victor (2001). "The Human Landscape of the Ottoman Black Sea in the Face of the Cossack Naval Raids". Oriente Moderno. 20: 65–70.
  36. ISBN 0-521-57455-2
    .
  37. ISBN 0-295-97668-3
    .
  38. ISBN 978-0-300-15260-9
    .
  39. ISBN 9780816062591
    .
  40. ISBN 0-521-57456-0
    .
  41. ^ Greene, Molly (2002). "Beyond the Northern Invasion: The Mediterranean in the Seventeenth Century". Past & Present (174): 43.
  42. ISBN 0-521-57455-2
    .
  43. ISBN 0-521-57455-2
    .
  44. ISBN 978-1-107-41144-9
    .
  45. ISBN 0-19-508677-5
    .
  46. ISBN 978-1-107-41144-9
    .
  47. ISBN 0-19-508677-5
    .
  48. ^ Murphey, Rhoads (1999). Ottoman Warfare, 1500–1700. UCL Press. p. 16.
  49. ISBN 978-1-107-41144-9
    .
  50. ISBN 978-0-415-44492-7
    .
  51. ^ Kunt, Metin (1983). The Sultan's Servants: The Transformation of Ottoman Provincial Government, 1550–1650. Columbia University Press. pp. 95–9.
  52. JSTOR 600586
    .
  53. ISBN 90-04-10289-2
    .
  54. ISBN 90-04-10289-2
    .
  55. ISBN 978-1-84725-220-3
    .
  56. ISBN 90-04-10289-2
    .
  57. ISBN 90-04-10289-2
    .
  58. ISBN 1-85728-389-9
    .
  59. ISBN 3-85369-708-9
    .
  60. ^ Gábor Ágoston (2014). "Firearms and Military Adaptation: The Ottomans and the European Military Revolution, 1450–1800". Journal of World History. 25: 123.
  61. ISBN 1-85728-389-9
    .
  62. ^ Virginia Aksan (2006). "War and peace". In Suraiya Faroqhi (ed.). The Cambridge History of Turkey. Vol. 3. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. p. 96.
  63. ISBN 978-0-582-30807-7
    .
  64. ^ Gábor Ágoston (2014). "Firearms and Military Adaptation: The Ottomans and the European Military Revolution, 1450–1800". Journal of World History. 25: 87–8.
    • Murphey, Rhoads (1999). Ottoman Warfare, 1500–1700. Rutgers University Press. pp. 105–6.
      ISBN 1-85728-389-9
      .
  65. ISBN 1-85728-389-9
    .
  66. ISBN 1-85728-389-9
    .
  67. ISBN 1-85728-389-9
    .
  68. ISBN 1-85728-389-9
    .
  69. ISBN 90-04-10289-2
    .
  70. ISBN 3-85369-708-9
    .
  71. ISBN 3-85369-708-9
    .
  72. ISBN 3-85369-708-9
    .
  73. ^ Hegyi, Klára (2000). "The Ottoman network of fortresses in Hungary". In Dávid, Géza; Pál Fodor (eds.). Ottomans, Hungarians, and Habsburgs in Central Europe: The Military Confines in the Age of Ottoman Conquest. Leiden: Brill. pp. 166–71.
  74. ^ a b Ágoston, Gábor (2011). "Defending and administering the Hungarian frontier". In Christine Woodhead (ed.). The Ottoman World. Routledge. pp. 227–8.
  75. ^ Hegyi, Klára (2000). "The Ottoman network of fortresses in Hungary". In Géza Dávid; Pál Fodor (eds.). Ottomans, Hungarians, and Habsburgs in Central Europe: The Military Confines in the Age of Ottoman Conquest. Leiden: Brill. pp. 172–6.
  76. ISBN 1-85728-389-9
    .
  77. ^ Ágoston, Gábor (2000). "The costs of the Ottoman fortress-system in Hungary in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries". In Dávid, Géza; Pál Fodor (eds.). Ottomans, Hungarians, and Habsburgs in Central Europe: The Military Confines in the Age of Ottoman Conquest. Leiden: Brill. pp. 214–228.
  78. ISBN 1-85728-389-9
    .
  79. ^ Ostapchuk, Victor (2001). "The Human Landscape of the Ottoman Black Sea in the Face of the Cossack Naval Raids". Oriente Moderno. 20: 34–5.
  80. ^ Mária Ivanics (2007). "Enslavement, Slave Labour, and the Treatment of Captives in the Crimean Khanate". In Dávid, Géza; Pál Fodor (eds.). Ransom Slavery along the Ottoman Borders (Early Fifteenth-Early Eighteenth Centuries). Leiden: Brill. pp. 93–4.
  81. ^ Ostapchuk, Victor (2001). "The Human Landscape of the Ottoman Black Sea in the Face of the Cossack Naval Raids". Oriente Moderno. 20: 37–9.
  82. ISBN 978-0-465-02396-7
    .
  83. ^ Ostapchuk, Victor (2001). "The Human Landscape of the Ottoman Black Sea in the Face of the Cossack Naval Raids". Oriente Moderno. 20: 43.
  84. ^ Kołodziejczyk, Dariusz (2004). "Introduction". The Ottoman Survey Register of Podolia (ca. 1681) Part I: Text, Translation, and Commentary. Harvard University Press. pp. 3–10.
  85. ISBN 978-975-428-554-3
    .
  86. ISBN 978-0-226-33031-0
    .
  87. ISBN 978-975-428-554-3
    .
  88. ^ Schwarz, Klaus (1987). "Zur Blockade der Dardanellen während des venezianisch-osmanischen Krieges um Kreta im Jahre 1650". Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde des Morgenlandes. 77: 77. [in German]
  89. ISBN 978-975-428-554-3
    .
  90. JSTOR 1773126
    .
  91. ISBN 978-975-428-554-3
    .
  92. JSTOR 1773126
    .
  93. ISBN 978-975-428-554-3
    .
  94. ISBN 978-0-19-979783-7
    .
  95. ^ Thomas, Lewis V. (1972). Norman Itzkowitz (ed.). A Study of Naima. New York University Press. pp. 106–10.
  96. ISBN 978-0-19-979783-7
    .
  97. ISBN 978-1-107-04296-4
    .
  98. ISBN 978-0-8156-3085-2
    .
  99. ^ Howard, Douglas (1988). "Ottoman Historiography and the Literature of 'Decline' of the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Century". Journal of Asian History. 22: 52–77.
  100. ^ Murphey, Rhoads (2009). "Ottoman historical writing in the seventeenth-century: a survey of the general development of the genre after the reign of Sultan Ahmed I (1603–1617)". Essays on Ottoman Historians and Historiography. Istanbul: Muhittin Salih Eren. pp. 90–1.
  101. ^ Murphey, Rhoads (2009). "Ottoman historical writing in the seventeenth-century: a survey of the general development of the genre after the reign of Sultan Ahmed I (1603–1617)". Essays on Ottoman Historians and Historiography. Istanbul: Muhittin Salih Eren. p. 98.
  102. ISBN 0-19-508677-5
    .
  103. ISBN 978-0-465-02396-7
    .
  104. ISBN 978-0-465-02396-7
    .
  105. ISBN 0-19-508677-5
    .
  106. ISBN 0-262-14050-0
    .
  107. ISBN 978-0-465-02396-7
    .
  108. ISBN 0-8014-2944-7
    .
  109. doi:10.1556/AOrient.59.2006.4.2
    .
  110. ISBN 90-04-10289-2
    .
  111. ISBN 978-0-465-02396-7
    .
  112. ISBN 978-1-107-41144-9
    .
  113. ISBN 978-0-465-02396-7
    .
  114. ISBN 978-0-465-02396-7
    .
  115. ISBN 978-0-465-02396-7
    .
  116. ISBN 978-0-465-02396-7
    .
  117. ISBN 978-0-465-02396-7
    .
  118. ISBN 978-0-465-02396-7
    .
  119. ISBN 978-0-465-02396-7
    .
  120. ISBN 978-0-465-02396-7
    .
  121. ISBN 978-0-19-979783-7
    .
  122. ISBN 978-0-465-02396-7
    .
  123. ^ Murphey, Rhoads (1999). Ottoman Warfare, 1500–1700. UCL Press. p. 10.
  124. ISBN 978-0-465-02396-7
    .
  125. ISBN 978-0-465-02396-7
    .
  126. ^ Ágoston, Gábor (2005). Guns for the Sultan: Military Power and the Weapons Industry in the Ottoman Empire. Cambridge University Press. pp. 200–2.
  127. ^ Murphey, Rhoads (1999). Ottoman Warfare, 1500–1700. UCL Press. pp. 9–11.
  128. JSTOR 1773126
    .
  129. ISBN 90-04-10289-2
    .
  130. ISBN 978-0-465-02396-7
    .
  131. ISBN 978-0-582-30807-7
    .
  132. ISBN 978-1-107-41144-9
    .

Bibliography

Further reading

General surveys

Significant works
Retrieved from "https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Transformation_of_the_Ottoman_Empire&oldid=1220066844"