Treaty of London (1915)
Agreement between France, Russia, Great Britain and Italy. Signed at London April 26, 1915. | |
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Type | Multilateral treaty |
Context | Entry of Italy into World War I |
Signed | 26 April 1915 |
Location | London, England, United Kingdom |
Negotiators | |
Signatories | |
Parties | |
Full text | |
Treaty of London (1915) at Wikisource |
The Treaty of London (Italian: Trattato di Londra) or the Pact of London (Patto di Londra) was a secret agreement concluded on 26 April 1915 by the United Kingdom, France, and Russia on the one part, and Italy on the other, in order to entice the latter to enter World War I on the side of the Triple Entente. The agreement involved promises of Italian territorial expansion against Austria-Hungary, the Ottoman Empire and in Africa where it was promised enlargement of its colonies. The Entente countries hoped to force the Central Powers – particularly Germany and Austria-Hungary – to divert some of their forces away from existing battlefields. The Entente also hoped that Romania and Bulgaria would be encouraged to join them after Italy did the same.
In May 1915, Italy declared war on Austria-Hungary but waited a year before declaring war on Germany – leading France and the UK to resent the delay. At the
The results of the Paris Peace Conference transformed wartime national fervour in Italy into nationalistic resentment championed by
Background
Soon after the outbreak of
Negotiations
First offers
The August–September 1914 negotiations between the Entente and Italy were conducted on Russian initiative. On 4 August, only a day after Italy declared neutrality , its ambassador to Russia said that Italy might join the Entente in return for Trentino, Vlorë, and a dominant position in the Adriatic. Believing that such a move by Italy would prompt Romania to join the Entente as well against Austria-Hungary, Russian foreign minister Sergey Sazonov pursued the matter. British Foreign Minister Edward Grey supported the idea; he said that Trieste should be added to the claim as potentially important to win over Italian public opinion on joining the war.[1]
The Italian ambassador to the United Kingdom, Guglielmo Imperiali, presented Grey with Italy's conditions, but Grey did not consider the talks could produce any practical results. He told Imperiali that Britain would not consider the matter any further until Italy committed itself to joining the Entente. On Grey's instructions, Rennell Rodd, British ambassador to Italy, asked Italian Prime Minister Antonio Salandra if Italy could enter the war. Salandra informed Rodd that this was impossible at the time and that any premature attempt to abandon neutrality would jeopardise any prospect of a future alliance. Sazonov was informed accordingly, and Russia abandoned the matter.[4]
The motives for the Entente's overture to Italy and Italian consideration of entering the war were entirely opportunistic. The Entente saw Germany as the principal enemy and wanted to force it to divert some of its forces away from the existing battlefields. Italy had basically different interests from the Entente powers. It saw opportunities to fulfil
Occupation of Vlorë
Salandra and his foreign minister Antonino Paternò Castello did not break off the negotiations completely. They used the subsequent months to wait for a chance to increase Italian demands to the maximum at an opportune time. There was an attempt to relaunch the negotiations in London on 16 September when Castello told Rodd that British and Italian shared interests in preventing westward spread of Slavic domains under Russian influence – specifically by preventing Slavic influence in the Adriatic, where irredentists claimed Dalmatia. While Castello instructed Imperiali to tell the British that Italy would not decide to abandon its neutrality before the Entente accepted their conditions, Grey insisted on Italy first committing to joining the Entente and the talks collapsed again.[7]
Particular opposition to the Italian claim against Dalmatia came from the Permanent Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Arthur Nicolson who remarked that Sazonov was right to claim that Dalmatia wished to unite with Kingdom of Croatia-Slavonia. He added that if Dalmatia were annexed by Italy, it would inherit a problem from Austria-Hungary – that of having a large South Slavic population looking for greater independence.[8]
Nonetheless, Castello managed to obtain British endorsement for Italian occupation of Vlorë. The move was made as a preparation for Italian intervention and designed to lend some prestige to the Italian government. Expecting opposition from Sazonov, Castello asked Grey to get the Russians to let him have this without making any concessions in return as a necessary evil to attract Italy to join the Entente.[9]
Sonnino replaces Castello
In late October, there was an attempt to get Italy to intervene against an expected Turkish attack against the Suez Canal. Sazonov warned Grey not to offer Dalmatia in exchange and the latter replied that no such offer was made as the canal remaining open was in Italian interests too.[10]
The matter of an Italian alliance was taken up by Castello's successor Sidney Sonnino and Rodd in November. Sonnino proposed a non-binding agreement which could be turned into a binding one at an opportune time. Even though similar proposals by his predecessor were turned down, Rodd was informed through his contacts in the Italian government that the Italian Armed Forces were prepared to intervene by February 1915 – prompting Rodd to urge Grey to consider the proposal. However, Grey declined the idea as a hypothetical bargain as he appeared indifferent to an Italian alliance at this point.[11]
Following this, Salandra and Sonnino conducted negotiations with the Central Powers in an apparent attempt to keep the Central Powers at bay until further negotiations were possible with the Entente. These talks collapsed on 15 February 1915. The following day, Sonnino sent Imperiali a specific list of conditions set out in sixteen points necessary for Italy to enter the war.[12][13]
Seeking Bulgarian alliance
While the Entente Powers were negotiating with Italy, they led a concurrent diplomatic effort aimed at obtaining Bulgarian alliance (or at least friendly neutrality). This situation led to a conflict of territorial claims staked by Italy and Serbia. Namely, awarding Italy Dalmatia would largely block the Adriatic outlet offered to Serbia (in addition to Bosnia and Herzegovina) as compensation to Serbia's cession of much of Vardar Macedonia to Bulgaria requested by the Entente as enticement to Bulgaria. Sazonov wanted to strengthen his offer to Serbia and indirectly to Bulgaria by guaranteeing such an outlet to Serbia, but Grey blocked the initiative – arguing that an Italian alliance was more important.[14]
In mid-February, following the start of the Gallipoli campaign, the British were convinced that Bulgaria would enter the war on the side of the Entente within weeks, certain of its victory. Even though it worked to bring Bulgaria on board, Russia was anxious that Bulgarian and Greek forces might occupy Constantinople to push Russia out of the region despite being promised control of the city by the Entente.[15] Sonnino saw the combined Bulgarian and Greek entry into the war likely to assure Entente victory in the Balkans. On 4 March, Imperiali informed Grey that Italy would enter the war and presented him with the 16 conditions insisting on curtailing Slavic westward advance.[16]
Russian claim over Constantinople
Grey noted that the Italian claims were excessive, but also that they did not conflict with British interests. He also thought that recent Russian stubborn objections against Greek attack to capture Constantinople could be overcome by addition of Italian troops, and that Italian participation in the war would expedite a decision from Bulgaria and Romania – still waiting to commit to the war.[16]
Sazonov objected to any Italian role regarding Constantinople – seeing it as a threat to Russian control of the city promised by the allies in return for Russian losses in the war.
The request concerning the Turkish Straits was found acceptable by Grey since the British never anticipated Italy would take part in the campaign against Constantinople. The bulk of the Italian claim, concerning acquisition of Trentino, Trieste, and Istria was likely to attract protests against handing predominantly Slav-populated territories to Italy from Frano Supilo – a dominant figure in the nascent Yugoslav Committee advocating interests of South Slavs living in Austria-Hungary. On the other hand, the Serbian Prime Minister Nikola Pašić and Sazonov found it acceptable.[17] Even though Serbian Niš Declaration of war objectives called for the struggle to liberate and unify "unliberated brothers",[18] referring to "three tribes of one people" meaning the Serbs, the Croats, and the Slovenes, as means to attract support from South Slavs living in Austria-Hungary,[19] Pašić was primarily concerned with achieving a Greater Serbia. Sazonov acquiesced,[17] adding that he has nothing to say on behalf of the Croats and the Slovenes and would not approve Russian forces to fight "half a day" for liberty of the Slovenes.[20]
Final six weeks of talks
Nonetheless, negotiations extended for six weeks over disagreements as the extent of Italian territorial gains in Dalmatia was still objected to by Sazonov. The Italian claim of Dalmatia to the
Hoping to achieve the diplomatic breakthrough in securing alliances with Bulgaria, Romania, and Greece, Grey turned Sonnino's 16 points into a draft agreement and forwarded it to Russia against protests by the Yugoslav Committee. Sazonov objected to the draft agreement and dismissed an Italian offer of Dubrovnik as a port for South Slavs as it lacked inland transport routes. Sazonov demanded Split in addition as a better port and objected to the requested demilitarisation of the coast belonging to the Kingdom of Montenegro. Grey drew up a document taking into consideration the Russian objections and forwarded it to Imperiali, but Sonnino threatened to end the negotiations over the differences.[22]
The deadlock was broken by
Terms
Article 1 of the treaty determined that a military agreement shall be concluded to guarantee the number of troops committed by Russia against Austria-Hungary to prevent it from concentrating all its forces against Italy. Article 2 required Italy to enter the war against all enemies of the United Kingdom, Russia, and France, and Article 3 obliged the French and British navies from supporting the Italian war effort by destroying Austro-Hungarian fleet.[25]
Article 4 of the treaty determined that Italy shall receive Trentino, and the South Tyrol by defining a new Italian–Austrian frontier line between the Piz Umbrail and Toblach, and a new eastern Italian frontier running from Tarvisio in the north to the coast in the Kvarner Gulf leaving Rijeka just outside the Italian territory.[26][27]
Article 5 awarded Dalmatia to Italy – specifically the part north of a line running northeast from
Furthermore, Article 5 required demilitarisation of the coast between the Cape Planka and the
Articles 6 and 7 gave Italy full sovereignty over Vlorë, the
Provisions detailing territorial gains beyond Europe were comparably vaguely written.
Articles 11 and 14 promised a share in any war indemnity and a loan to Italy in the amount of 50 million
Aftermath
Response
Even though the treaty was meant to be secret, an outline of its provisions became known to the Yugoslav Committee and its supporters in London in late April 1915.[35] Serbia and the Yugoslav Committee protested it in strong terms in Entente capitals.[2] Pašić condemned the disregard for the self-determination principle on which the Niš Declaration rested and the lack of consultations with Serbia. He demanded the Entente refrain from treaties with Hungary or Romania on borders of interest to Croatia without conferring with Serbia first, as well as requesting assurances of future political union of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes. Pašić telegraphed his proposal to Grey from the provisional wartime capital of Niš through British ambassador Charles Louis des Graz. However, Grey declined both requests. The Yugoslav Committee president Ante Trumbić met with Lord Crewe, a senior member of the British Cabinet, demanding support for unification of Croatia, Istria, and Dalmatia and then for a political union with Serbia.[36] News of the treaty also compelled the Yugoslav Committee to adopt a less critical view of Serbian demands concerning the method of political unification of the South Slavs as it became clear that the unity of the Croats and the unity of the Slovenes would depend on success of Serbia.[37] Full text of the treaty text was published by the Bolsheviks after the October Revolution.[35] In 1917, Pašić and Trumbić negotiated and agreed upon the Corfu Declaration setting out a plan for post-war unification of South Slavs to counter the Italian territorial claims outlined in the Treaty of London.[38]
Grey's policy and the treaty were criticised in British press. An early example of such critique was "The National Union of South Slavs and the
Further course of the war
In the final weeks before entering the war, internal struggle took place in Italy. National fervour was whipped up by speeches of Gabriele D'Annunzio – calling for war as a measure of national worth and inciting violence against neutralists and the former Prime Minister Giovanni Giolitti who favoured neutrality. This period became known as the radiant days.[39]
On 22 May 1915, the Italian government decided to launch the
The entry of Italy into the war did not entice Bulgaria to join the Entente as it became more cautious regarding further developments after early British and French setbacks at Gallipoli.
Agreement of Saint-Jean-de-Maurienne
Partition of the Ottoman Empire was discussed by the Entente powers at two conferences in London in January and February 1917, and in
Paris Peace Conference
Provisions of the Treaty of London were a major point of dispute between Italy and the remaining Entente powers at the Paris Peace Conference. The chief Italian representatives, Prime Minister Vittorio Emanuele Orlando and Sonnino demanded enforcement of the Treaty of London relying on application of the security principle, and annexation of Rijeka on the basis of self-determination. The British and the French would not publicly endorse any claims exceeding those afforded by the treaty while privately holding Italy deserved little because of its reserved attitude towards Germany in early stages of the war.[51]
The French and the British let the
Orlando and Sonnino held different positions regarding the eastern Adriatic shore claims. Orlando was prepared to give up on Dalmatia except Zadar and Šibenik while insisting on annexing Rijeka. Sonnino held the opposite view. This led to adoption of a widely publicised slogan of "Pact of London plus Fiume" – and demanding the London Treaty promises and Rijeka becoming the matter of Italian national honour.[56] Ultimately, Italian gains on the eastern Adriatic shore were limited to the Julian March, Istria, and several islands. Rijeka was assigned the status of an independent city – following negotiations between Orlando and Trumbić. Italian gains included corrections of the Treaty of London borders around Tarvisio to give Italy a direct rail link with Austria.[57] In Dalmatia, the British Prime Minister David Lloyd George only supported a free-city status for Zadar and Šibenik, while French Prime Minister Georges Clemenceau only supported such a status for Zadar.[57] In the secret Venizelos–Tittoni agreement, Italy renounced its claims over the Dodecanese Islands except for Rhodes in favour of Greece while the two countries agreed to support each other's claims in partition of Albania.[58]
Mutilated victory
Orlando's and Sonnino's inability to secure all the territory promised by the Treaty of London or the city of
The Impresa di Fiume brought about the fall of the Nitti government under pressure from the Italian Socialist Party, D'Annunzio, and Benito Mussolini.[60] Nitti's successor Giolitti and "democratic renouncers" of Dalmatian heritage were next criticised by the nationalists. D'Annunzio formulated the charge in the slogan "Victory of ours, you shall not be mutilated", referencing the promise of Dalmatia given in the Treaty of London, failure to annex the "utterly Italian" city of Rijeka, and elusive Adriatic domination as rendering Italian participation in the war meaningless. His position thus gave rise to the myth of the mutilated victory.[61]
Following the
See also
- unfulfilled parts of Dalmatia and small parts of adjacent shores.
References
- ^ a b Lowe 1969, p. 534.
- ^ a b Robbins 1971, p. 574.
- ^ Robbins 1971, pp. 565–568.
- ^ Lowe 1969, p. 535.
- ^ Burgwyn 1997, p. 3.
- ^ Knox 2007, pp. 174–175.
- ^ Lowe 1969, pp. 535–536.
- ^ Lowe 1969, p. 537.
- ^ Lowe 1969, pp. 537–538.
- ^ Lowe 1969, p. 538.
- ^ Lowe 1969, p. 539.
- ^ Lowe 1969, pp. 539–540.
- ^ Lowe 1969, p. 545.
- ^ Robbins 1971, p. 570.
- ^ a b Robbins 1971, pp. 572–573.
- ^ a b c Lowe 1969, p. 541.
- ^ a b c Lowe 1969, p. 542.
- ^ Ramet 2006, p. 40.
- ^ Lampe 2000, pp. 102–103.
- ^ Pavlowitch 2003, p. 30.
- ^ Lowe 1969, pp. 542–544.
- ^ Lowe 1969, pp. 544–546.
- ^ Lowe 1969, pp. 546–548.
- ^ Treaty 1920, Preamble.
- ^ Treaty 1920, §§ 1–3.
- ^ Treaty 1920, § 4.
- ^ Moos 2017, pp. 27–39.
- ^ a b Treaty 1920, § 5.
- ^ a b Mitrović 2003, p. 49.
- ^ Trubetskoi 2016, pp. 101–102.
- ^ a b c Burgwyn 1997, p. 2.
- ^ Treaty 1920, §§ 6–8.
- ^ Treaty 1920, §§ 9–10, 12–13.
- ^ Treaty 1920, §§ 11, 14–16.
- ^ a b Seton-Watson 1926, pp. 292–293.
- ^ a b Živojinović 2019, pp. 131–135.
- ^ Banac 1984, p. 119.
- ^ Merlicco 2021, pp. 119–120.
- ^ Knox 2007, p. 177.
- ^ Riccardi 2019, pp. 48–49.
- ^ Riccardi 2019, pp. 50–52.
- ^ Riccardi 2019, p. 53.
- ^ Riccardi 2019, p. 64.
- ^ Pavlowitch 2003, p. 36.
- ^ Banac 1984, p. 129.
- ^ Ramet 2006, p. 43.
- ^ a b Robbins 1971, p. 580.
- ^ Pavlović 2019, pp. 262–264.
- ^ Riccardi 2019, p. 69.
- ^ Riccardi 2019, pp. 66–67.
- ^ Burgwyn 1997, pp. 4–7.
- ^ a b Burgwyn 1997, pp. 7–8.
- ^ Glenny 2012, p. 371.
- ^ Hill 1934, pp. 60–61.
- ^ a b Mitrović 2003, p. 54.
- ^ Burgwyn 1997, p. 8.
- ^ a b Burgwyn 1997, p. 12.
- ^ a b c Burgwyn 1997, p. 15.
- ^ "Italiano popolare a Fiume. Lettere di semicolti (1915-1945)" (PDF) (in Italian). Retrieved 6 February 2021.
- ^ a b Morgan 2004, pp. 45–46.
- ^ Knox 2007, p. 223.
- ^ Hall 2014, p. 98.
- ^ a b Knox 2007, p. 276.
- ^ Burgwyn 1997, pp. 15–16.
- ^ Velikonja 2003, p. 87.
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Further reading
- Howard, Christopher (1941). "The Treaty of London, 1915". JSTOR 24401844.
- S2CID 143758311.
- Renzi, William A. (1987). In the Shadow of the Sword: Italy's Neutrality and Entrance Into the Great War, 1914-1915. New York: P. Lang. ISBN 9780820404103.