Triple Entente
Triple Entente | |||||||||||||
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1907–1917 | |||||||||||||
Status | Informal military alliance | ||||||||||||
Establishment | 1907 | ||||||||||||
History | |||||||||||||
• Established | 1907 | ||||||||||||
• Dissolved | 1917 | ||||||||||||
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The Triple Entente (from French
The Franco-Japanese Treaty of 1907 was a key part of building a coalition as France took the lead in creating alliances with Japan, Russia, and (informally) with Britain. Japan wanted to raise a loan in Paris, so France made the loan contingent on a Russo-Japanese agreement and a Japanese guarantee for France's strategically vulnerable possessions in Indochina. Britain encouraged the Russo-Japanese rapprochement. Thus was built the Triple Entente coalition that fought World War I.[1]
At the start of
Alliance system
During the Franco-Prussian War of 1870–71,
Russia had previously been a member of the
Franco-Russian Alliance
Events leading to World War I |
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Russia had by far the largest manpower reserves of all the six European powers, but it was also the most backward economically. Russia shared France's worries about Germany. Additionally, the Russians feared that the Ottomans, who had received assistance from the British under Admiral Limpus, et al., the French, and the Germans to reorganize and modernize the Ottoman armed forces, would come to control the Dardanelles, a vital trade artery that carried two-fifths of Russia's exports.[10]
There was also Russia's recent rivalry with Austria-Hungary over the spheres of influence in the Balkans and after the Reinsurance Treaty was not renewed in 1890,[11] Russian leaders grew alarmed at the country's diplomatic isolation and joined the Franco-Russian Alliance in 1894.[12]
France developed a strong bond with Russia by ratifying the Franco-Russian Alliance, which was designed to create a strong counter to the Triple Alliance. France's main concerns were to protect against an attack from Germany and to regain Alsace-Lorraine.
Entente cordiale
In the last decade of the nineteenth century, Britain continued its policy of "splendid isolation", with its primary focus on defending its massive overseas empire. However, by the early 1900s, the German threat had increased dramatically, and Britain thought it was in need of allies. London made overtures to Berlin which were not reciprocated,[citation needed] so London turned to Paris and St. Petersburg instead.
In 1904, Britain and France signed a series of agreements, the
Britain, traditionally having control of the seas, by 1909 saw the German navy as a serious threat to its Royal Navy. Britain was well ahead in terms of Dreadnought technology and responded with a major building program. They built a Royal Navy that Germany could never rival. The British sent war minister Lord Haldane to Berlin in February 1912 to reduce friction stemming from the Anglo-German naval arms race. The mission was a failure because the Germans attempted to link a "naval holiday" with a British promise to remain neutral if Germany should become engaged in a war where "Germany could not be said to be the aggressor." Zara Steiner says, "It would have meant abandoning the whole system of ententes which had been so carefully nurtured during the past six years. There was no German concession to counter the fear of German aggression."[14] Essentially, the British reserved the right to join whatever country was attacking Germany even if Germany did not start the conflict, dooming the talks to failure.[15][16] According to German historian Dirk Bönker, "To be sure, the [naval] race was decided early on; political leaders and diplomats learned to bracket it as an issue, and it did not cause the decision for war in 1914. But the naval competition nonetheless created an atmosphere of mutual hostility and distrust, which circumscribed the space for peaceful diplomacy and public recognition of shared interests, and helped to pave the twisted road to war in Europe."[17]
Not an alliance
The Entente, unlike the Triple Alliance and the Franco-Russian Alliance, was not an alliance of mutual defense and so Britain was free to make its own foreign policy decisions in 1914. As British Foreign Office Official Eyre Crowe minuted, "The fundamental fact, of course, is that the Entente is not an alliance. For purposes of ultimate emergencies, it may be found to have no substance at all. For the Entente is nothing more than a frame of mind, a view of general policy which is shared by the governments of two countries, but which may be, or become, so vague as to lose all content".[18]
Anglo-Russian Convention
Russia had also recently lost the humiliating Russo-Japanese War, a cause of the Russian Revolution of 1905, and the apparent transformation into a constitutional monarchy. Although it was perceived as useless during the war with Japan, the alliance was valuable in the European theatre to counteract the threat of the Triple Alliance. Tomaszewski describes the evolution of the triple entente relationship from the Russian standpoint during the period 1908 to 1914 as a progression from a shaky set of understandings that withstood various crises and emerged as a fully-fledged alliance after the outbreak of World War I.[19]
In 1907, the
The entente in operation
The coming into being of the entente did not necessarily fix a permanent division into two opposing power blocs. The situation remained flexible.[21] The alignment of the Russian Empire with Europe's two largest power centres was controversial on both sides. Many Russian conservatives distrusted the secular French and recalled British past diplomatic manoeuvres to block Russian influence in the
See also
- Causes of World War I
- Historiography of the causes of World War I
- International relations of the Great Powers (1814–1919)
- Little Entente
References
- ^ Ewen W. Edwards, "The Far Eastern Agreements of 1907." Journal of Modern History 26.4 (1954): 340–55. online
- ^ Robert Gildea, Barricades and Borders: Europe 1800–1914 (3rd ed. 2003) ch 15
- JSTOR 2212043.
- ^ Edgar Feuchtwanger, Imperial Germany 1850–1918 (2002). p. 216.
- ^ Gildea 2003, p. 237.
- ^ Ruth Henig, The Origins of the First World War (2002), p. 3.
- ^ Norman Rich, Great power diplomacy, 1814–1914 (1992) pp. 244–62
- ^ Christopher Clark, Kaiser Wilhelm II (2000) pp. 35–47
- ^ John C.G. Wilhelm II: The Kaiser's personal monarchy, 1888–1900 (2004).
- ^ Fiona K. Tomaszewski, A Great Russia: Russia and the Triple Entente, 1905 to 1914 (2002)
- ^ "Reinsurance Treaty – Germany-Russia [1887]". Encyclopedia Britannica.
- ^ George Frost Kennan, The fateful Alliance: France, Russia, and the coming of the First World War (1984)
- ^ Christopher Clark, The Sleepwalkers: How Europe went to war in 1914 (2012), pp. 124–35, 190–96, 293–313, 438–42, 498–505.
- ^ Zara S. Steiner, Britain and the origins of the First World War (1977) p. 95.
- ^ Christopher Clark, The Sleepwalkers (2012) pp. 318–19.
- ^ John H. Maurer, "The Anglo-German naval rivalry and informal arms control, 1912–1914." Journal of Conflict Resolution 36.2 (1992): 284–308.
- ^ Bönker, Dirk (2015). "Naval Race between Germany & Great Britain, 1898–1912". International Encyclopedia of the First World War.
- ISBN 978-0-521-21347-9.
- ISBN 978-0-275-97366-7.
- ^ Edward Ingram, "Great Britain's Great Game: An Introduction" International History Review 2#2 pp. 160–71 online
- ^ Keiger 1983, p. 87.
- ISBN 9781445634395.
Further reading
- Andrew, Christopher. Théophile Délcassé and the Making of the Entente Cordiale, 1898–1905 (1968).
- Clark, Christopher. The Sleepwalkers: How Europe went to war in 1914 (2012), pp. 124–35, 190–96, 293–313, 438–42, 498–505.
- Coogan, John W.; Coogan, Peter F. (Jan 1985). "The British Cabinet and the Anglo-French Staff Talks, 1905–1914: Who Knew What and When Did He Know It?". Journal of British Studies. 24 (1): 110–31. S2CID 145736633.
- Fay, Sidney Bradshaw. The Origins of the World War (2nd ed. 1934) vol 1 pp 105–24, 312–42; vol 2 pp 277–86, 443–46 online
- Henig, Ruth Beatrice (2002). The origins of the First World War (Routledge. ISBN 0-415-26185-6)
- Keiger, John F.V. (1983). France and the Origins of the First World War. Macmillan International Higher Education. ISBN 978-1-349-17209-2.
- Kennan, George F. The fateful Alliance: France, Russia, and the coming of the First World War (Manchester UP, 1984).
- Kronenbitter, Günther (August 15, 2019). "Alliance System 1914". 1914–1918 online:International Encyclopedia of the First World War. Retrieved October 25, 2019.
- Langhorne, Richard (1971). "VII. The Naval Question in Anglo-German Relations, 1912–1914". The Historical Journal. 14 (2): 359–70. S2CID 159469947.
- MacMillan, Margaret. The war that ended peace: The road to 1914 (2013) pp 142–211.
- Maurer, John H. (1992). "The Anglo-German Naval Rivalry and Informal Arms Control, 1912–1914". Journal of Conflict Resolution. 36 (2): 284–308. S2CID 154834335.
- Murray, C. Freeman. The European Unity League in the past before the war (1914)
- Neilson, Keith. Britain and the Last Tsar: British Policy and Russia, 1894–1917 (Oxford, 1995).
- Schmitt, Bernadotte E. (1924). "Triple Alliance and Triple Entente, 1902–1914". American Historical Review. 29#3: 449–73. JSTOR 1836520.
- Sontag, Raymond. European Diplomatic History: 1871–1932 (1933), basic short summary online
- Steiner, Zara S. Britain and the origins of the First World War (1977).
- Tomaszewski, Fiona. "Pomp, Circumstance, and Realpolitik: The Evolution of the Triple Entente of Russia, Great Britain, and France." Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas vol. 3 (1999): 362–80. in JSTOR, in English
- Tomaszewski, Fiona K. A Great Russia: Russia and the Triple Entente, 1905–1914 (Greenwood, 2002); excerpt and text search
- White, John Albert. Transition to Global Rivalry: Alliance Diplomacy & the Quadruple Entente, 1895–1907 (1995) 344 pp. re France, Japan, Russia, Britain
Primary sources
- Scott, James Brown (1918). "Lord Haldane's Diary of Negotiations Between Germany and England in 1912". The American Journal of International Law. 12 (3): 589–96. S2CID 246010587.