Trunajaya rebellion

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Trunajaya rebellion

An 1890 Dutch depiction of fighting between VOC soldiers and Trunajaya's forces during the war
Date1674–1680 (main campaign);
Puger rebellion continued until 1681
Location
Java (in modern-day Indonesia)
Result

VOC–Mataram victory

  • Rebellion defeated
Belligerents

Mataram Sultanate
Dutch East India Company (VOC)

  • VOC's Indonesian allies

Rebel forces
Makassarese itinerant fighters


Rival claimants to Mataram throne (after 1677)
Commanders and leaders

X

Amangkurat II

Cornelis Speelman
Anthonio Hurdt
Jacob Couper

Arung Palakka

Rebel leaders:
Trunajaya Surrendered Executed
Karaeng Galesong
Raden Kajoran Executed
Lord of Giri Executed


Co-belligerent (1677–1681):

Pangeran Puger Surrendered
Strength

Mataram:
"Much larger" than 9,000 (1676)[1]
13,000 (late 1678)[2]
VOC:
1,500 (1676)[3]
1,750 (1678)[4]
VOC's Bugis allies:
1,500 (1678)[5]

6,000 (1679)[6]

Trunajaya:
9,000 (1676)[1]
14,500 (rebel claim, 1678)[4]


Puger:

10,000 (Aug 1681)[7]

The Trunajaya Rebellion (also spelled Trunojoyo;

Madurese prince Trunajaya and fighters from Makassar against the Mataram Sultanate and its Dutch East India Company (VOC) supporters in Java
(in modern-day Indonesia) during the 1670s.

The uprising was initially successful; the rebels

Amangkurat II, his son and successor, asked the VOC for assistance in exchange for cash payments and territorial concessions. The subsequent engagement of the VOC changed the course of the battle. Trunajaya was driven from Surabaya (1677) by VOC and Mataram forces, who also helped him reclaim lost territory and take control of his new capital at Kediri
(1678). However, the uprising persisted until Trunajaya was captured at the end of 1679 and the other rebel leaders were overthrown, killed, or submitted (1679–1680). Amangkurat II personally executed Trunajaya in 1680 while he was a prisoner of the VOC.

After his father died in 1677, Amangkurat II also faced rival claims to the throne. The most serious rival was his brother

Pangeran Puger, who took the capital Plered
in 1677 and did not surrender until 1681.

Background

Map of Java, illustrating Mataram's expansions just before Amangkurat I took the throne in 1646.

Amangkurat II), who was also Pekik's grandson.[10] Over the next few years, Amangkurat carried out several additional killings against members of the nobility who had lost his trust.[10]

Raden Trunajaya (also spelled Trunojoyo) was a descendant of the rulers of Madura, who was forced to live in the Mataram court after Madura's defeat and annexation by Mataram in 1624.[11] After his father was executed by Amangkurat I in 1656, he left the court, moved to Kajoran, and married the daughter of Raden Kajoran, the head of the ruling family there.[12][11] The Kajoran family was an ancient family of clerics and was related by marriage to the royal family.[12] Raden Kajoran was alarmed at the brutality of Amangkurat I's rule, including executions of noblemen at court.[11] In 1670 Kajoran introduced his son-in-law Trunajaya to the crown prince, who had recently been banished by the king due to a scandal, and the two forged a friendship that included a mutual dislike of Amangkurat.[11] In 1671 Trunajaya returned to Madura, where he used the crown prince's support to defeat the local governor and become the master of Madura.[13]

taking of Makassar
by the VOC in 1669 caused emigration of Makassarese fighters to Java, many of which would later join the rebels' side.

Makassar was the principal trading center east of Java.

Kraeng of Galesong.[13] These Makassarese itinerant fighters would later join the rebellion as Trunajaya's allies.[12]

Forces involved

Bugis forces under the prince Arung Palakka (pictured) were among those allied with the VOC to suppress the rebellion.

Lacking a standing army, the bulk of Mataram's forces were drawn from troops raised by the king's vassals, who also provided the arms and supplies.[14][15] The majority of the men were peasants who were conscripted by the local lords (Javanese: sikep dalem).[15] In addition, the army included a small number of professional soldiers drawn from the palace guards.[14] The army used cannons, small firearms including flintlocks (Javanese: senapan, from Dutch snaphaens) and carbines, cavalry, and fortifications.[16] Historian M. C. Ricklefs said the transfer of European military technology to the Javanese was "virtually immediate", with the Javanese manufacturing gunpowder and firearms by 1620 at the latest.[15] Europeans were hired to train the Javanese troops in weapons handling, military leadership skills, and construction techniques,[15] but despite this training, the conscripted peasants of the Javanese armies often lacked discipline and fled during battle.[17][18] Mataram's troops numbered "much larger" than the rebel's 9,000 at Gegodog in September 1676,[1] dropped to just "a small retinue" after the fall of the capital in June 1677,[19] and grew to over 13,000 during the march to Trunajaya's capital at Kediri in late 1678.[2]

The VOC had professional soldiers of its own.[15] Each VOC soldier had a sword, small arms, cartridges, carrying pouches and belts, smoke bombs, and grenades.[15] The majority of VOC regulars were Indonesians, with a small number of European soldiers and marines, all under the command of European officers.[20] While in the technological sense, VOC troops were not superior to their indigenous counterparts,[16] they generally had better training, discipline, and equipment than indigenous Indonesian armies.[15] The VOC troops also differed about logistics: its troops marched in step followed by a long caravan of carts carrying supplies.[16] This gave them an advantage over Javanese troops, who often lived off the land and frequently faced supply shortages.[16] VOC forces numbered 1,500 in 1676,[21] but they were later augmented by Bugis allies under the leadership of Arung Palakka. The first contingent of 1,500 Bugis arrived in Java in late 1678,[5] and by 1679 there were 6,000 Bugis troops on Java.[6]

Similar to other belligerents, the armies of Trunajaya and his allies also used cannons, cavalry, and fortifications.[16] When the VOC took Surabaya from Trunajaya in May 1677, Trunajaya fled with twenty of his bronze cannons and left behind 69 iron and 34 bronze pieces.[22] Trunajaya's forces included Javanese, Madurese, and Makassarese.[1] When the rebels invaded Java in 1676, they numbered 9,000[1] and consisted of Trunajaya's followers and the Makassarese fighters. Later, the rebellion was joined by other Javanese and Madurese nobles. Notably, the lord of Giri, one of the most prominent Islamic spiritual lords in Java, joined in early 1676.[23] Trunajaya's father-in-law Raden Kajoran, head of the powerful Kajoran family, joined after Trunajaya's victory at Gegodog in September 1676,[24] and Trunajaya's uncle the prince of Sampang (later Cakraningrat II) joined after the fall of Mataram's capital in June 1677.[25]

Campaign

Beginning and initial rebel victories

The rebellion started with a series of raids from Makassarese pirates based in Demung against the trading towns on the northern coast of Java.

Amangkurat I appointed a military governor in Jepara, the provincial capital of the northern coast, and reinforced the town.[26] Mataram forces marching on Demung were defeated, and combined actions by Mataram and VOC ships on the coast controlled by the raiders were not always successful.[26] The Kraeng of Galesong moved to Madura, the domain of his ally Trunajaya. In 1676 Trunajaya gave himself the title Panembahan (Lord of) Maduretna and secured the support of the Sunan (spiritual lord) of Giri, near Gresik. A VOC fleet attack later destroyed the raiders' base in Demung, but they did not take action against Trunajaya in Madura.[27]

In September 1676, a rebel army of 9,000

Kudus and Demak.[28] The towns fell easily, partly because their fortifications had been destroyed due to their conquest by Sultan Agung about 50 years earlier.[28] Only Jepara managed to resist capture, due to the combined efforts of the new military governor and VOC forces who reinforced the town just in time.[28] The rebellion spread inland when Raden Kajoran, Trunajaya's powerful father-in-law based to the east of the Mataram capital, joined the rebellion.[24] Kajoran and Trunajaya's forces marched on the capital but were repelled by loyalist forces.[24]

VOC intervention and fall of Mataram's capital

Cornelis Speelman, who led the VOC forces in the war in 1677, and later Governor-General of the VOC

In response to Mataram's request for intervention, VOC dispatched a large fleet containing Indonesian and European forces, commanded by Admiral Cornelis Speelman.[24] In April 1677 the fleet sailed to Surabaya, where Trunajaya was based.[24] After negotiations failed, Speelman's forces stormed Surabaya and took it after hard fighting.[30] The troops proceeded to clear the rebels from the area surrounding Surabaya.[30] VOC forces also took Madura, Trunajaya's native island, and laid his residence there in ruin.[31] Trunajaya fled Surabaya and established his capital in Kediri.[30]

Although the rebels were defeated in Surabaya, rebel forces campaigning in the interior of Central and East Java had more success. The rebel campaign culminated in the fall of the capital Plered in June 1677.[31] The king was ill, and distrust among the royal princes prevented organized resistance.[31] The king fled west with the crown prince and his retinue, allowing the rebels to enter and plunder the capital with little fighting.[31] The rebels then withdrew to Kediri, taking the royal treasury with them.[32]

Amangkurat II's accession and alliance with the VOC

Amangkurat I in Tegal Arum Complex, Tegal Regency, Central Java
.
Amangkurat II
, the king of Mataram from 1677, in a Javanese traditional painting.

King Amangkurat I died during his retreat in

Pangeran Puger (later Pakubuwana I) took the now-ruined capital, refused entry to Amangkurat II's loyalists, and declared himself king under the title of Ingalaga Mataram.[33]

Having no army or treasury and unable to assert his authority, Amangkurat decided to ally himself with the VOC.

Priangan highlands and Semarang would be ceded to the VOC.[32] The king also agreed to recognize the jurisdiction of VOC courts over all non-Javanese residing in his domains.[34] Dutch historian H. J. de Graaf commented that by doing this, the VOC, being a corporation, engaged in a "hazardous speculation", which they expected to pay off in the future when their associate would regain his rule over Mataram.[34]

VOC–Mataram forces made slow progress against the rebels.

Rijcklof van Goens, who became Governor-General (Speelman would become Governor-General in 1681).[32] His command in Jepara was handed over to Anthonio Hurdt, who arrived in June 1678.[32]

Loyalist victories and the death of Trunajaya

overland campaign
to take Trunajaya's capital at Kediri.
VOC troops storming Trunajaya's capital at Kediri in 1678. Depicted in an 1890 Dutch children's novel.

VOC and Mataram forces

marched inland against Kediri in September 1678. Following a proposal by the king, the troops were split to take three parallel, less direct routes, to cover more locations and "overawe" factions who were wavering on which side to take.[36] The king's idea worked, and as the campaign proceeded, local bands joined the troops, eager for booty.[20] Kediri was taken on 25 November by an assault force led by Captain François Tack.[20][32] The victorious troops proceeded to Surabaya, the largest city in East Java, where Amangkurat established his court.[37] Elsewhere, the rebels were also defeated. In September 1679, combined VOC, Javanese, and Bugis forces under Sindu Reja and Jan Albert Sloot defeated Raden Kajoran in a battle in Mlambang, near Pajang.[7][38] Kajoran surrendered but was executed under Sloot's orders.[38] In November, the VOC and allied Bugis forces under Arung Palakka expelled the Makassarese rebels' stronghold in Keper, East Java.[7] In April 1680, after what the VOC considered the fiercest battle of the war, the rebellious lord of Giri was defeated and most of his family was executed.[7] As the VOC and Amangkurat won more victories, more and more Javanese declared their allegiance to the king.[7]

After the fall of his stronghold in Kediri, Trunajaya managed to escape to the mountains of eastern Java.

End of Pangeran Puger's rebellion

In addition to Trunajaya's forces, Amangkurat II continued to face opposition from his brother Pangeran Puger, who had taken the old capital in Plered and had claimed the throne for himself in 1677.[33] Before the defeat of Trunajaya, Amangkurat's forces had not taken action against him.[34] After Trunajaya was defeated, Amangkurat still could not convince his brother to submit.[7] In September 1680 Amangkurat constructed a new capital in Kartasura.[7] In November, Amangkurat and VOC forces drove Puger from Plered.[7] However, Puger quickly rebuilt his forces, took Plered again in August 1681, and nearly took Kartasura.[7] In November 1681 VOC and Mataram forces again defeated Puger, and this time he submitted and was pardoned by his brother.[7][44]

Aftermath

Remains of Mataram's new capital Kartasura. Amangkurat II built Kartasura and moved the capital there in the aftermath of the rebellion.

Amangkurat II secured his reign with the defeat of the rebels. Due to the rebel capture and subsequent destruction of the capital in Plered, he built a new capital, Kartasura, in the district of Pajang, and moved his court there.

Surapati, an enemy of the VOC, in 1684,[49] and the death of VOC captain François Tack in the Mataram court in 1686.[49]

The king's brother Pangeran Puger, who tried to claim the throne during the Trunajaya rebellion, was pardoned by the king.

References

Footnotes

  1. ^ a b c d e f Andaya 1981, pp. 214–215.
  2. ^ a b Ricklefs 1993, p. 50.
  3. ^ Ricklefs 1993, p. 35.
  4. ^ a b Ricklefs 1993, p. 51.
  5. ^ a b Andaya 1981, p. 218.
  6. ^ a b Andaya 1981, p. 221.
  7. ^ a b c d e f g h i j k l Ricklefs 2008, p. 94.
  8. ^ Pigeaud 1976, pp. 56–57.
  9. ^ a b Pigeaud 1976, p. 55.
  10. ^ a b c d Pigeaud 1976, p. 66.
  11. ^ a b c d Pigeaud 1976, p. 67.
  12. ^ a b c Ricklefs 2008, p. 90.
  13. ^ a b c d e f Pigeaud 1976, p. 68.
  14. ^ a b Houben & Kolff 1988, p. 183.
  15. ^ a b c d e f g Taylor 2012, p. 49.
  16. ^ a b c d e Houben & Kolff 1988, p. 184.
  17. ^ Houben & Kolff 1988, pp. 183–184.
  18. ^ Taylor 2012, pp. 49–50.
  19. ^ Pigeaud 1976, p. 74.
  20. ^ a b c Pigeaud 1976, p. 79.
  21. ^ a b c Ricklefs 2008, p. 92.
  22. ^ Ricklefs 1993, p. 39.
  23. ^ Ricklefs 1993, p. 40.
  24. ^ a b c d e Pigeaud 1976, p. 71.
  25. ^ Ricklefs 1993, p. 41.
  26. ^ a b c d e Pigeaud 1976, p. 69.
  27. ^ Pigeaud 1976, pp. 69–70.
  28. ^ a b c d e f g h i Pigeaud 1976, p. 70.
  29. ^ Andaya 1981, pp. 215.
  30. ^ a b c Pigeaud 1976, p. 72.
  31. ^ a b c d e Pigeaud 1976, p. 73.
  32. ^ a b c d e f Ricklefs 2008, p. 93.
  33. ^ a b c d e Pigeaud 1976, p. 76.
  34. ^ a b c d e f g Pigeaud 1976, p. 77.
  35. ^ Pigeaud 1976, pp. 76–77.
  36. ^ Pigeaud 1976, p. 78-79.
  37. ^ Pigeaud 1976, p. 80.
  38. ^ a b Pigeaud 1976, p. 89.
  39. ^ a b Pigeaud 1976, p. 82.
  40. ^ a b c Pigeaud 1976, p. 83.
  41. ^ Ricklefs 1993, p. 57.
  42. ^ Pigeaud 1976, p. 84.
  43. ^ Pigeaud 1976, pp. 83–84.
  44. ^ a b c d Pigeaud 1976, p. 94.
  45. ^ a b c Ricklefs 2008, p. 95.
  46. ^ a b Ricklefs 2008, p. 99.
  47. ^ a b Pigeaud 1976, p. 95.
  48. ^ Ricklefs 2008, p. 100.
  49. ^ a b Ricklefs 2008, p. 101.
  50. ^ a b c Pigeaud 1976, p. 103.

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