Truthmaker theory
Truthmaker theory is "the branch of
Truthmaker maximalism is the thesis that every truth has a truthmaker. An alternative view is truthmaker atomism, the thesis that only atomic sentences have truthmakers. Truthmaker atomism remains true to the basic intuition that truth depends on being by holding that the truth of molecular sentences depends on the truth of atomic sentences, whose truth in turn depends on being. All non-maximalist positions accept that there are truthmaker gaps: truths without truthmakers. Opponents have tried to disprove truthmaker theory by showing that there are so-called deep truthmaker gaps: truthbearers that not only lack a truthmaker but whose truths do not even depend on being. Various principles governing the truthmaking relation have been proposed in order to make the intuitions about the role and nature of truthmaking explicit. Truthmaker theory is closely related to the correspondence theory of truth, but not identical to it. Truthmaker theory has been applied to various fields in metaphysics, often with the goal of exposing ontological cheaters: theorists who are committed to certain beliefs but do not or cannot account for the existence of a truthmaker for these beliefs.
Overview
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In Truth-Makers (1984),
This maximalist position leads to philosophical difficulties, such as the question of what the truthmaker for an ethical, modal or mathematical truthbearer could be. Someone who is deeply enough committed to truthmakers and who simultaneously doubts that a truthmaker could be found for a certain kind of truthbearer will simply deny that that truthbearer could be true. Those who find the Parmenidean insight sufficiently compelling often take it to be a particularly enlightening metaphysical pursuit to search for truthmakers of these kinds of propositions.
Another difficulty for the claim that every truthbearer has a truthmaker is with negations of
Truthmaker theorists differ as to what entities are the truthmakers of various truthbearers. Some say that the truthmaker of the proposition that Socrates is sitting (assuming he is) is "Socrates' being seated" (whatever exactly that might turn out to be on the correct ontology) and in general the truthmaker of the truthbearer expressed by a sentence s can be denoted by the
While the existence of truthmakers may seem an abstruse question, concrete instances are at the heart of a number of philosophical issues. Thus, J. L. Mackie has argued that the truthmakers of moral claims would be "queer entities", too strange to exist, and hence all moral claims are false.[5] Alternatively, a divine command metaethicist may insist that the only possible candidate for a truthmaker of a moral claim is a command from a perfect God, and hence if moral claims are true and a truthmaker theory holds, then God exists. Thus the disagreement between various metaethical schools is in part a disagreement over what kinds of truthmakers moral claims would have if these claims were true and over whether such truthmakers exist.
Truthmaker gaps
A truthmaker gap is a truth that lacks a truthmaker. Truthmaker maximalists hold that there are no truthmaker gaps: every truth has a truthmaker.[6] Truthmaker non-maximalists, on the other hand, allow that some truths lack a truthmaker. Truthmaker non-maximalists still count as truthmaker theorists in the sense that they hold onto the core intuition of truthmaker theory that truth depends on being.[1]
Atomic truthmaker theories, which have their root in
This type of truthmaker gap has been called a "shallow" truthmaker gap. Shallow truthmaker gaps are contrasted with "deep" truthmaker gaps. Deep truthmaker gaps are truths that do not depend on being.
Truthmaking principles
Various principles governing the truthmaking relation have been proposed.[1][6] They aim to make our intuitions about the role and nature of truthmaking explicit.
The entailment principle states that if entity e is a truthmaker for proposition p and p entails proposition q then e is also a truthmaker for q.
The conjunction principle states that if entity e is a truthmaker for the conjunction of proposition p and proposition q then e is also a truthmaker for p.
The disjunction principle states that if entity e is a truthmaker for the disjunction of proposition p and proposition q then e is either a truthmaker of p or a truthmaker of q.
These principles seem intuitively to be true but it has been shown that they lead to implausible conclusions when combined with other plausible principles.[12][13]
Relation to the correspondence theory of truth
The correspondence theory of truth states that truth consists in correspondence with reality.[7] Or in the words of Thomas Aquinas: "A judgment is said to be true when it conforms to the external reality".[14] Truthmaker theory is closely related to correspondence theory; some authors see it as a modern version of correspondence theory.[15] The similarity between the two can be seen in the following example definitions:
- Correspondence theory: David's belief that the sky is blue is true if and only if this belief stands in a correspondence-relation to the fact that the sky is blue.
- Truthmaker theory: David's belief that the sky is blue is true if and only if this belief stands in a truthmaking-relation to the fact that the sky is blue.
But despite the obvious similarities there are a few important differences between truthmaker theory and correspondence theory. For one, correspondence theory aims to give a substantive account or a definition of what truth is. Truthmaker theory, on the other hand, has the goal of determining how truth depends on being.[16] So it presupposes the notion of truth instead of defining it. While it seems natural to combine truthmaker theory with a correspondence-conception of truth, this is not necessary.[1] Another difference between the two theories is that correspondence is a symmetric relation while the truthmaking relation is asymmetric.[17]
Applications
Arguments based on truthmaker theory have been used in various fields to criticize so-called "ontological cheaters".[17][7] An ontological cheater is someone who is committed to a certain belief but does not or cannot account for the existence of a truthmaker for this belief. If such a belief was true then its truth would be brute or free-floating: it would be disconnected from any underlying reality. This is opposed to the basic intuition behind truthmaker theory that truth depends on being.[18]
Defense strategies open to theorists accused of ontological cheating include denying that the proposition in question is true, denying the legitimacy of truthmaker theory as a whole or finding a so-called "proxy" or "trace" within their preferred ontology.
Presentism
One such criticism has been leveled against presentism. Presentism is the view that only the present exists, i.e. that past entities or events lack existence.[21] Eternalism is the opposite of presentism. It holds that past, present and future existents are equally real. Beliefs about the past and the future are very common, for example the belief that dinosaurs existed. Providing a truthmaker for this belief is quite straightforward for eternalists: they may claim that the dinosaurs themselves or facts about dinosaurs act as truthmakers. This is unproblematic since, for eternalists, past entities have regular existence. This strategy is not available to the presentists since they deny that past entities have existence.[1] But there seem to be no obvious truthmaker candidates for this belief among the present entities. The presentist would have to be labeled an ontological cheater unless he can find a truthmaker within his ontology.[18]
Phenomenalism
Actualism
Actualism is the view that everything there is, is actual, i.e. that only actual things have existence.[20] Actualism contrasts with possibilism, the view that there are some entities that are merely possible. Actualists face the problem of how to account for the truthmakers of modal truths, like "it was possible for the Cuban Missile Crisis to escalate into a full-scale nuclear war", "there could have been purple cows" or "it is necessary that all cows are animals". Actualists have proposed various solutions, but there is no consensus as to which one is the best solution.[25][26]
A well-known account relies on the notion of possible worlds, conceived as actual abstract objects, for example as maximal consistent sets of propositions or of states of affairs.[27] A set of propositions is maximal if, for any statement p, either p or not-p is a member.[28] Possible worlds act as truthmakers for modal truths. For example, there is a possible world which is inhabited by purple cows. This world is a truthmaker for "there could have been purple cows". Cows are animals in all possible worlds that are inhabited by cows. So all worlds are the truthmaker of "it is necessary that all cows are animals". This account relies heavily on a logical notion of modality, since possibility and necessity are defined in terms of consistency. This dependency has prompted some philosophers to assert that no truthmakers at all are needed for modal truths, that modal truths are true "by default".[25][29] This position involves abandoning truthmaker maximalism.
An alternative solution to the problem of truthmakers for modal truths is based on the notion of "essence".[26][30] Objects have their properties either essentially or accidentally. The essence of an object involves all the properties it has essentially. The essence of a thing defines its nature: what it fundamentally is. On this type of account, the truthmaker for "it is necessary that all cows are animals" is that it belongs to the essence of cows to be animals. The truthmaker for "there could have been purple cows" is that color is not essential to cows. Some essentialist theories focus on object essences, i.e. that certain properties are essential to a specific object. Other essentialist theories focus on kind essences, i.e. that certain properties are essential to the kind or species of the object in question.[26]
See also
References
- ^ a b c d e f g h Asay, Jamin. "Truthmaker Theory". Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
- JSTOR 2107686.
- ^ Armstrong, D. M. (2010). "10. Limits". Sketch for a Systematic Metaphysics. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press UK.
- ISBN 978-0-415-24981-2.
- ^ Mackie, John Leslie (1977). Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong. Penguin Books.
- ^ a b Armstrong, D. M. (2004). "2. The general theory of truthmaking". Truth and Truthmakers. Cambridge University Press.
- ^ ISBN 978-1-119-11611-0.
- JSTOR 2182265.
- ^ Magnus, P. D.; Button, Tim; Thomas-Bolduc, Aaron; Zach, Richard; Trueman, Robert (2021). "II Truth-functional logic". Forall X: Calgary. An Introduction to Formal Logic. Open Logic Project.
- .
- hdl:11336/51136.
- JSTOR 2659994.
- S2CID 170114895.
- Summa Theologiae, I. Q.16).
- ^ Armstrong, D. M. (1997). A World of States of Affairs. Cambridge University Press. p. 128.
- ^ Beebee, Helen; Dodd, Julian (2005). Truthmakers: The Contemporary Debate. Clarendon Press. pp. 13–14.
- ^ a b MacBride, Fraser (2020). Truthmakers. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University.
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ignored (help) - ^ a b Sider, Theodore (2001). "2. Against Presentism". Four Dimensionalism: An Ontology of Persistence and Time. Oxford University Press.
- S2CID 125607032.
- ^ a b Menzel, Christopher (2018). Actualism. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University.
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ignored (help) - ^ Ingram, David; Tallant, Jonathan (2018). Presentism. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University.
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ignored (help) - ^ Armstrong, D. M. (2004). "1. An introduction to truthmakers". Truth and Truthmakers. Cambridge University Press.
- ^ The Editors of Encyclopaedia Britannica. Phenomenalism. Encyclopædia Britannica.
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ignored (help) - ^ Armstrong, David Malet (1989). "C. B. Martin, counterfactuals, causality and conditionals". Cause, Mind, and Reality: Essays Honoring C. B. Martin. Norwell: Kluwer.
- ^ S2CID 29061342.
- ^ .
- .
- ^ Parent, Ted. "Modal Metaphysics". Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
- ^ Mellor, D. H. (2003). "Real Metaphysics: Replies". Real Metaphysics: Essays in honour of D. H. Mellor. Routledge.
- JSTOR 2214160.
Further reading
- Armstrong, D. M. (2004). Truth and truthmakers. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ISBN 0-521-54723-7
- Beebee, H., & Dodd, J. (Eds.). (2005). Truthmakers: The contemporary debate. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ISBN 0-19-928356-7
- Fine, Kit (2018) Truthmaking and the is–Ought Gap. Synthese, 1-28.
- Lewis, David (2001) Truthmaking and Difference-Making, Noûs 35 (4):602–615.
- MacBride, Fraser. (2013). “Truthmakers.” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
- Mulligan, K., Simons, P. M. and Smith B. (1984). "Truth-Makers", Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 44, 287–321.
- Mulligan, K. (2007). Two dogmas of truthmaking, Metaphysics and Truthmakers Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag, 51–66.
- Rodriguez-Pereyra, Gonzalo. (2006). “Truthmakers.” Philosophy Compass (1), 186–200.
- Smith, B. (1999). “Truthmaker Realism”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 77 (3), 274–291.
External links
- Truthmaker theory at the Indiana Philosophy Ontology Project
- "Truth-makers", by Kevin Mulligan, Barry Smith, & Peter Simons, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 44 (1984), 287–321.