Ulm campaign
Ulm campaign | |||||||
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Part of the War of the Third Coalition | |||||||
The Capitulation of Ulm, a romanticised painting by Charles Thévenin | |||||||
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Belligerents | |||||||
France Bavaria | Austria | ||||||
Commanders and leaders | |||||||
Karl Mack von Leiberich Franjo Jelačić Michael Kienmayer Johann Riesch Karl von Schwarzenberg Franz Werneck | |||||||
Strength | |||||||
165,200[1]–235,000[2] | 72,000[3] | ||||||
Casualties and losses | |||||||
6,000[1] |
10,000 killed or wounded[1] 60,000 captured[1][3][4] |
The Ulm campaign was a series of
- four months of marching about, months of fatigue and wretchedness, have proved to me that nothing is more hideous, more miserable, than war. And yet our sufferings in the Guard are not to be compared with those of the line.
The victory at Ulm did not end the war since a large Russian army under
Background
Europe had been by then embroiled in the
Third Coalition
In December 1804, an Anglo-
French military preparations
Prior to the formation of the Third Coalition, Napoleon had assembled the
The men at Boulogne formed the core for what Napoleon would later call "
Austrian military preparations
Archduke Charles, brother of the Austrian Emperor, had started to reform the Austrian army in 1801 by taking away power from the Hofkriegsrat (Aulic Council), the military-political council responsible for decision making in the Austrian armed forces.[25] Charles was Austria's most able field commander,[26] but he was unpopular with the royal court and lost much influence when, against his advice, Austria decided to go to war with France.
Austrian cavalry forces were regarded as the best in Europe, but the detachment of many cavalry units to various infantry formations precluded the hitting power of their massed French counterparts, who could be ordered by Napoleon to amass a whole corps of cavalry to influence the battle.[27][28]
Campaign
The Ulm campaign lasted for nearly a month and saw the French army under Napoleon deliver blow after blow to the confused Austrians. It culminated on 20 October with the loss of an entire Austrian army.
Austrian plans and preparations
General Mack thought that Austrian security relied on sealing off the gaps through the mountainous Black Forest area in Southern Germany that had witnessed much fighting during the campaigns of the French Revolutionary Wars. Mack believed that there would be no action in central Germany. Mack decided to make the city of Ulm the centerpiece of his defensive strategy, which called for a containment of the French until the Russians under Kutuzov could arrive and alter the odds against Napoleon. Ulm was protected by the heavily fortified Michelsberg heights, giving Mack the impression that the city was virtually impregnable from outside attack.[29]
Fatally, the Aulic Council decided to make Northern Italy the main theater of operations for the
French plans and preparations
In both the campaigns of 1796 and 1800, Napoleon had envisaged the Danube theater as the central focus of French efforts, but in both instances the Italian theater became the most important. The Aulic Council thought Napoleon would strike in Italy again. Napoleon had other intentions: 210,000 French troops would be launched eastwards from the camps of Boulogne and would envelop General Mack's exposed Austrian army if it kept marching towards the
Murat and
The French invasion
On 22 September Mack decided to hold the
Realizing the danger of his position, Mack decided to go on the offensive. On 8 October he commanded the army to concentrate around Günzburg and hoped to strike at Napoleon's lines of communication. Mack instructed Kienmayer to draw Napoleon further east towards Munich and Augsburg. Napoleon did not seriously consider the possibility that Mack would cross the Danube and move away from his central base, but he did realize that seizing the bridges at Günzburg would yield a large strategic advantage.[36] To accomplish this objective, Napoleon sent Ney's Corps to Günzburg, completely unaware that the bulk of the Austrian army was heading to the same destination. On 8 October, however, the campaign witnessed its first serious battle at Wertingen between Auffenberg's troops and those of Murat and Lannes.
Battle of Wertingen
For reasons not entirely clear, on 7 October Mack ordered
The action at Wertingen convinced Mack to operate on the left (north) bank of the Danube instead of making a direct eastwards retreat on the right bank. This would require the Austrian army to cross to the north at Günzburg. On 8 October Ney was operating under
Haslach-Jungingen and Elchingen
The demoralized Austrian army arrived at Ulm in the early hours of 10 October. Mack was deliberating his course of action and the Austrian army remained inactive at Ulm until the 11th. Meanwhile, Napoleon was operating under flawed assumptions: he believed the Austrians were moving to the east or southeast and that Ulm was lightly guarded. Ney sensed this misapprehension and wrote to Berthier that Ulm was, in fact, more heavily defended than the French originally thought.
The 32nd Infantry Regiment in Dupont's division marched from Haslach towards Ulm and ran into four Austrian regiments holding Boefingen. The 32nd carried out several ferocious attacks, but the Austrians held firm and repulsed every one. The Austrians flooded the battle with more cavalry and infantry regiments to Ulm-Jungingen hoping to score a knockout blow against Ney's corps by enveloping Dupont's force. Dupont sensed what was happening and preempted the Austrians by launching a surprise attack on Jungingen, during which he took as prisoner at least 4,000 of the Austrians.[43] Renewed Austrian attacks drove these forces back to Haslach, which the French managed to hold. Dupont was eventually forced to fall back on Albeck, where he joined Louis Baraguey d'Hilliers's foot dragoons division. The effects of the Battle of Haslach-Jungingen on Napoleon's plans are not fully clear, but the Emperor may have finally ascertained that the majority of the Austrian army was concentrated at Ulm.[44] Accordingly, Napoleon sent the corps of Soult and Marmont towards the Iller, meaning he now had four infantry and one cavalry corps to deal with Mack; Davout, Bernadotte, and the Bavarians were still guarding the region around Munich.[44] Napoleon did not intend to fight a battle across rivers and ordered his marshals to capture the important bridges around Ulm. He also began shifting his forces to the north of Ulm because he expected a battle in that region rather than an encirclement of the city itself.[45] These dispositions and actions would lead to a confrontation at Elchingen on the 14th as Ney's forces advanced on Albeck.
At this point in the campaign, the Austrian command staff was in full confusion. Ferdinand began to openly oppose Mack's command style and decisions, charging that the latter spent his days writing contradictory orders that left the Austrian army marching back and forth.[46] On 13 October Mack sent two columns out of Ulm in preparation for a breakout to the north: one under Johann Sigismund Riesch headed towards Elchingen to secure the bridge there and the other under Franz von Werneck went north with most of the heavy artillery.[47] Ney hurried his corps forward to reestablish contact with Dupont, who was still north of the Danube. Ney led Loison's division to the south of Elchingen on the right bank of the Danube to begin the attack. Malher's division crossed the river farther east and moved west toward Riesch's position. The field was a partially wooded flood plain, rising steeply to the hill town of Elchingen, which had a wide field of view.[48] The French cleared the Austrian pickets from a bridge, then a regiment boldly attacked and captured the abbey at the top of the hill at bayonet point. During the Battle of Elchingen, the Austrian cavalry was also defeated and Reisch's infantry fled toward Ulm. Ney was given the title Duke of Elchingen for his impressive victory.[48]
Battle of Ulm
On 13 October Soult's IV Corps fell on Memmingen from the east. After a minor clash that resulted in 16 French casualties, General-Major Karl Spangen von Uyternesse surrendered 4,600 soldiers, eight guns, and nine colors. The Austrians were low on ammunition, cut off from Ulm, and completely demoralized by the confusion reigning at army headquarters.[49]
More actions took place on the 14th. Murat's forces joined Dupont at Albeck just in time to drive off an Austrian attack from Werneck; together Murat and Dupont beat the Austrians to the north in the direction of Heidenheim. By night on the 14th, two French corps were stationed in the vicinity of the Austrian encampments at Michelsberg, right outside of Ulm.[50] Mack was now in a dangerous situation: there was no longer any hope of escaping along the north bank, Marmont and the Imperial Guard were hovering at the outskirts of Ulm to the south of the river, and Soult was moving north from Memmingen to prevent the Austrians escaping south to the Tyrol.[50] Troubles continued with the Austrian command as Ferdinand overrode the objections of Mack and ordered the evacuation of all cavalry from Ulm, a total of 6,000 troopers.[51] Murat's pursuit was so effective, however, that only eleven squadrons joined Werneck at Heidenheim.[51] Murat continued his harassment of Werneck and forced him to surrender with 8,000 men at Treuchtlingen on 19 October; Murat also took an entire Austrian field park of 500 vehicles, then swept on towards Neustadt an der Donau and captured 12,000 Austrians.[51][53]
Events at Ulm were now reaching a conclusion. On 15 October Ney's troops successfully charged the Michelsberg encampments and on the 16th the French began to bombard Ulm itself. Austrian morale was at a low point and Mack began to realize that there was little hope of rescue. On 17 October Napoleon's emissary,
Aftermath
As the Austrians were marching out of Ulm to surrender, a combined Franco-Spanish fleet was being destroyed at the Battle of Trafalgar. This decisive British victory ended the naval threat from France and ensured British naval domination for the next century.
Despite this setback, the Ulm campaign had been a spectacular victory and had witnessed the elimination of an entire Austrian army at very little cost for the French; additionally, the road to the Austrian capital of Vienna was wide open and Napoleon would conquer the city a month later.[55] The 8th bulletin of the Grande Armée described the scale of the achievement:
Thirty thousand men, among them 2,000 cavalry, together with 60 guns and 40 standards have fallen into the hands of the victors....Since the beginning of the war, the total number of prisoners taken can be evaluated at 60,000, the number of standards at 80 without listing the artillery or baggage trains....Never have victories been so complete and less costly.[56][55]
Significance
The Ulm campaign is considered to be one of the greatest historical examples of a strategic turning movement;[59][10] for instance, in his Harper Encyclopedia of Military History, Dupuy would describe it in the following terms: "Ulm was not a battle; it was a strategic victory so complete and so overwhelming that the issue was never seriously contested in tactical combat. Also, This campaign opened the most brilliant year of Napoleon's career. His army had been trained to perfection; his plans were faultless".[60]
Historians often analyze the campaign on a wide strategic level that does not include tactical confrontations, but they were common and relevant.[60][11] The decisive victory at Ulm is also believed to be a product of the long training and preparation the Grande Armée received at the camps of Boulogne.[60] The Grande Armée carried little baggage, invaded enemy territory at harvest time and marched far faster than the Austrians had expected.[61] The campaign highlighted the utility of the Corps d'Armée system; corps went on to become the fundamental strategic building block for the major wars in the 19th and the 20th centuries.[62] A typical corps might have three infantry divisions, a light cavalry brigade for reconnaissance and reserve artillery batteries in addition to those attached to each division. Their increased size allowed them to fight without support for long periods of time, as Ney did, and their durability permitted them to spread out and subsist by requisitioning local food.[61] The French needed about an eighth of the transport used by contemporary armies, which gave them a level of mobility and flexibility unseen at that time. Invasions of southern Germany by Marlborough and Moreau covered a narrow front, but the Grande Armée invaded in 1805 on a front that was 100 miles (161 km) wide, an action that took the Austrians by complete surprise and caused them to underestimate the gravity of the situation.[62][11][7]
In popular culture
The Ulm campaign is included in Leo Tolstoy's novel War and Peace.[63]: 83
Notes
- ^ a b c d Clodfelter 2017, p. 152.
- ^ a b Chandler 2009, p. 384, 34. Plans and Preparations (PART SEVEN. From the Rhine to the Danube).
- ^ a b Fisher & Fremont-Barnes 2004, p. 41.
- ^ a b Nafziger 2002, p. 282, Ulm, Capitulation of. (-U-).
- ^ Schneid 2012, p. 35-50, 3. The Campaigns.
- ^ Brooks 2000, p. 156"It is a historical cliché to compare the Schlieffen Plan with Hannibal's tactical envelopment at Cannae (216 BC); Schlieffen owed more to Napoleon's strategic maneuver on Ulm (1805)"
- ^ LCCN 2015042278.
- ^ Jean-Baptiste Barrès, A Memoir of a French Napoleonic Officer (London, 1988), 55. cited in Napoleon and the Operational Art of War, Chapter 5, 1805: Ulm and Austerlitz by Mark T. Gerges
- ^ Forster Groom & Co. Ltd. 1912.
- ^ ISSN 2153-5760. Archived from the originalon October 6, 2016.
- ^ ISSN 0031-1723. Archived (PDF) from the original on October 6, 2021 – via Defense Technical Information Center (DTIC).
- ^ Mikaberidze 2020, p. 173-187, CHAPTER 9. The Elephant Against the Whale: France and Britain at War, 1803–1804.
- ^ Connelly 2012, p. 107-117, 8. Marengo and the Grand Armée, 1800—1805.
- ^ Chandler 2009, p. 304, 28. Peace Restored (PART FIVE. Toward the Summit: The Conspirator and Peacemaker).
- ^ Chandler 2009, p. 320, 30. The Camp of Boulogne (PART SIX. The Works of Peace and the Road to War).
- ^ Connelly 2012, p. 118-141, 9. Subduing the European powers: Austerlitz—Jena-Auerstädt—Friedland, 1805–07.
- ^ Mikaberidze 2020, p. 188-227, CHAPTER 10. The Emperor's Conquest, 1805–1807.
- Po valleyincreasingly strained relations between the two.
- ^ France had defeated Austrian in the War of the First Coalition (1792–1797) and the War of the Second Coalition (1798–1801)
- ^ Chandler 2009, p. 331, 31. Prospects of Wider War (PART SIX. The Works of Peace and the Road to War).
- ^ Chandler 2009, p. 323, 30. The Camp of Boulogne (PART SIX. The Works of Peace and the Road to War).
- ^ a b Chandler 2009, p. 332, 32. La Grande Armée (PART SIX. The Works of Peace and the Road to War).
- ^ Chandler 2009, p. 333, 32. La Grande Armée (PART SIX. The Works of Peace and the Road to War).
- ^ Maude 1912, p. 43-73, Chapter II. The French Army.
- ^ Fisher & Fremont-Barnes 2004, p. 31.
- ^ Andrew Uffindell, Great Generals of the Napoleonic Wars. p. 155
- ^ a b Fisher & Fremont-Barnes 2004, p. 32.
- ^ a b Maude 1912, p. 1-43, Chapter I. The Austrian Army.
- ^ Fisher & Fremont-Barnes 2004, p. 36.
- ^ a b Chandler 2009, p. 382, 34. Plans and Preparations (PART SEVEN. From the Rhine to the Danube).
- ^ a b c d Chandler 2009, p. 385, 34. Plans and Preparations (PART SEVEN. From the Rhine to the Danube).
- ^ Kagan 2007, p. 389.
- ^ Kagan 2007, p. 393.
- ^ a b Kagan 2007, p. 395.
- ^ Kagan 2007, p. 397.
- ^ Kagan 2007, p. 400.
- ^ Kagan 2007, p. 402.
- ^ Kagan 2007, p. 404.
- ^ a b Kagan 2007, p. 408.
- ^ Kagan 2007, p. 409.
- ^ Kagan 2007, p. 412.
- ^ Kagan 2007, p. 414.
- ^ Goetz 1964, p. 57.
- ^ a b Kagan 2007, p. 417.
- ^ Kagan 2007, p. 420.
- ^ Kagan 2007, p. 421.
- ^ Fisher & Fremont-Barnes 2004, p. 39-40.
- ^ a b Fisher & Fremont-Barnes 2004, p. 40.
- ^ Smith, p 204
- ^ a b Chandler 2009, p. 399, 35. Strategic Triumph-Ulm (PART SEVEN. From the Rhine to the Danube).
- ^ a b c d e Chandler 2009, p. 400, 35. Strategic Triumph-Ulm (PART SEVEN. From the Rhine to the Danube).
- ^ Chandler 2009.
- ^ Chandler says in his seminal book "The Campaigns of Napoleon"[52] Trochtelfingen but this cannot possibly be correct because it is 55 km to the west of Ulm. On the other hand, Treuchtlingen is a far better candidate since it is in the expected direction, that is, 48 km northeast of Neresheim and 91 km northeast of Ulm. Chandler also names Neustadt, which could be either Neustadt am der Donau (148 km east of Ulm) or a mistake.
- ^ Bonaparte 1805.
- ^ a b Maude 1912, p. 252-264, Chapter IX. Conclusion.
- ^ Chandler 2009, p. 402, 36. The Warriors of Holy Russia (PART SEVEN. From the Rhine to the Danube).
- ^ Chandler 2009, p. 402, 36. the Warriors of Holy Russia (PART SEVEN. From the Rhine to the Danube).
- ^ Chandler 2009, p. 186, 16. Grand Tactics on the Battlefield (PART THREE. Napoleon's Art of War).
- ^ Thompson, Philip S. (April 9, 1991). "III. The Lessons of History" (PDF). In Barefield, Robert L.; McDonough, James R.; Brookes, Philip J. (eds.). U.S. Army Deception Planning at the Operation Level of War. School of Advanced Military Studies (Monograph on operational deception at the Ulm Campaign of 1805 and Operation Mincemeat of 1943). Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: United States Army Command and General Staff College. pp. 11–23. Retrieved October 6, 2021 – via Defense Technical Information Center (DTIC).
- ^ a b c Dupuy & Dupuy 1993, p. 816.
- ^ a b Brooks 2000, p. 108.
- ^ a b Brooks 2000, p. 109.
- ^ Tolstoy, Leo (1949). War and Peace. Garden City: International Collectors Library.
Sources
- Brooks, Richard (January 1, 2000). Brooks, Richard; Drury, Ian (eds.). Atlas of World Military History: The Art of War from Ancient Times to the Present Day (4th ed.). ISBN 978-0-76072-025-7.
- Chandler, David G.; et al. (Graphics and illustrations by Shelia Waters, design by Abe Lerner) (2009) [1966]. Lerner, Abe (ed.). The Campaigns of Napoleon: The mind and method of history's greatest soldier. Vol. I (4th ed.). New York City, New York: .
- Clodfelter, M. (2017). Warfare and Armed Conflicts: A Statistical Encyclopedia of Casualty and Other Figures, 1492-2015 (4th ed.). Jefferson, North Carolina: McFarland. ISBN 978-0-7864-7470-7.
- Nafziger, George F. (2002). Woronoff, Jon (ed.). Historical Dictionary of the Napoleonic Era. Historical Dictionaries of Ancient Civilizations and Historical Eras. Vol. 6 (1st ed.). ISBN 9780810866171 – via Google Books.
- Goetz, Robert (1964). 1805, Austerlitz : Napoleon and the destruction of the Third Coalition. Greenhill Books. ISBN 978-1-85367-644-4.
- Dupuy, R. Ernest; Dupuy, Trevor N. (1993) [1977]. The Harper Encyclopedia of Military History: From 3500 B.C. to the Present (4th ed.). New York City, New York: ISBN 0062700561.
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- Uffindell, Andrew. Great Generals of the Napoleonic Wars. Kent: Spellmount Ltd., 2003. ISBN 1-86227-177-1
- Maude, Fredericn Natusche (1912). The Ulm Campaign, 1805: The Special Campaign Series. Vol. XII (1st ed.). London, England: George Allen & Company, Ltd. – via Internet Archive.
- French Republican Calendar; October 27, 1805, in the Gregorian calendar)
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: CS1 maint: postscript (link - Connelly, Owen (2012) [2005]. The Wars of the French Revolution and Napoleon, 1792-1815 (3rd ed.). ISBN 978-0-415-23983-7 – via Google Books.
- Schneid, Frederick C. (July 1, 2012). Napoleonic Wars: The Essential Bibliography (1st ed.). .
- Mikaberidze, Alexander (January 13, 2020). The Napoleonic Wars: A Global History (1st ed.). New York City, New York: .
- Forster Groom & Co. Ltd. (1912). "Map of Central Europe showing the routes taken by Napoleon to defeat the allied Russo-Austrian army at the Battle of Ulm on 16–19 October 1805 and the Battle of Austerlitz in December 1805" (Military map). Sketch Map illustrating Napoleon's Campaign in 1805 (Ulm & Austerlitz). 1:1,600,000. Whitehall Campaign Series. Cartography by Forster Groom & Co. Ltd. London, England: Forster Groom & Co. Ltd. Vol. 11. Retrieved October 6, 2021 – via Trove (National Library of Australia).