Walter Bedell Smith

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For the American journalist, historian and author, see Sally Bedell Smith. For the Medal of Honor recipient, see Walter B. Smith (Medal of Honor).

Walter Bedell Smith
Deputy
Preceded byRoscoe H. Hillenkoetter
Succeeded byAllen Dulles
United States Ambassador
to the Soviet Union
In office
3 April 1946 – 25 December 1948
PresidentHarry Truman
Preceded byW. Averell Harriman
Succeeded byAlan G. Kirk
Personal details
Born(1895-10-05)5 October 1895
First Army
Battles/wars
Awards
Navy Distinguished Service Medal
Legion of Merit
Bronze Star
National Security Medal
(more below)
ASN0-10197

Tunisia Campaign and the Allied invasion of Italy in 1943, during World War II. He was Eisenhower's chief of staff at the Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF) in the campaign in Western Europe
from 1944 to 1945.

Smith enlisted as a

Aisne-Marne Offensive in 1918. After the war, he was a staff officer and instructor at the U.S. Army Infantry School. In 1941, he became secretary of the General Staff, and in 1942 he became the secretary to the Combined Chiefs of Staff. His duties involved taking part in discussions of war plans at the highest level, and Smith often briefed President Franklin D. Roosevelt
on strategic matters.

Smith became chief of staff to Eisenhower at AFHQ in September 1942 and acquired a reputation as Eisenhower's "

hatchet man" for his brusque and demanding manner. However, he also successfully represented Eisenhower in sensitive missions requiring diplomatic skill. Smith was involved in negotiating the armistice between Italy and the Allies, which he signed on behalf of Eisenhower. In 1944, he became the chief of staff of SHAEF, again under Eisenhower. In that position, Smith also negotiated successfully for food and fuel aid to be sent through German lines for the cold and starving Dutch civilian population, and he opened discussions for the peaceful and complete German capitulation to the First Canadian Army in the Netherlands. In May 1945, Smith met representatives of the German High Command in Reims, France, to conduct the surrender of the German Armed Forces, and he signed the German Instrument of Surrender
on behalf of Eisenhower.

After the war, he served as the

Eisenhower administration
in various posts for several years until he retired shortly before he died in 1961.

Early life

Walter Bedell Smith was born in

Indianapolis, Indiana, on 5 October 1895,[1] the elder of two sons of William Long Smith, a silk buyer for the Pettis Dry Goods Company, and his wife, Ida Francis née Bedell, who worked for the same company.[2]

Smith was called Bedell from his boyhood. From an early age he was nicknamed "Beetle" or occasionally "Beedle" or "Boodle."[3] He was educated at St. Peter and Paul School, Public Schools #10 and #29, Oliver Perry Morton School,[4] and Emmerich Manual High School, where he studied to be a machinist. There, he took a job at the National Motor Vehicle Company and eventually left high school without graduating.[5] Smith enrolled at Butler University, but his father developed serious health problems, and Smith left to return to his job and support his family.[2]

In 1911, at the age of 16, Smith enlisted as a

Indianapolis streetcar strike. Smith was promoted to corporal and then sergeant. During the Pancho Villa Expedition he served on the staff of the Indiana National Guard.[6]

In 1913, Smith met Mary Eleanor (Nory) Cline, who was born in 1893 and died in 1963, and they were married in a traditional

Roman Catholic wedding ceremony on 1 July 1917. Their marriage was of long duration but was childless.[7]

World War I

Smith's work during the

Aisne-Marne Offensive on 18 July 1918. Smith was wounded by shell fragments during an attack two days later.[9]

Because of his wounds, Smith was returned to the United States. He served with the

U.S. Department of War's General Staff and was assigned to the Military Intelligence Division. In September 1918, he was commissioned as a first lieutenant in the Regular Army.[10]

Smith was next sent to the newly formed 379th Infantry Regiment as its intelligence officer. The regiment was part of the

Armistice with Germany on 11 November 1918.[11]

In February 1919, Smith was assigned to Camp Dodge, Iowa, where he was involved with the disposal of surplus equipment and supplies. In March 1919, he was transferred to the 2nd Infantry Regiment, a regular unit based at Camp Dodge, remaining there until November 1919, when it moved to Camp Sherman.[12]

Between the wars

In 1921, the staff of the 2nd Infantry moved to

Fort William McKinley in the Philippines. After nine years as a first lieutenant, he was promoted to captain in September 1929.[13]

Returning to the United States, Smith reported to the

U.S. Army War College from which he graduated in 1937.[16]

He returned to the Infantry School once more and he was promoted to major on 1 January 1939 after nine years as a captain.[17] The slow promotion was common in the Army in the 1920s and the 1930s. Officers like Smith, commissioned between November 1916 and November 1918, made up 55.6% of the Army's officer corps in 1926. Promotions were usually based on seniority, and the modest objective of promoting officers to major after 17 years of service could not be met because of a shortage of posts for them to fill.[18]

World War II

Washington, DC

When General

Major General Edwin "Pa" Watson, the senior military aide to President Franklin D. Roosevelt.[19] Smith was promoted to lieutenant colonel on 4 May 1941, and then to colonel on 30 August 1941.[21] On 1 September, the Secretary of the General Staff, Colonel Orlando Ward, was given command of the 1st Armored Division, and Smith became secretary of the General Staff.[22]

The Arcadia Conference, which was held in Washington, D.C., December 1941 and January 1942, mandated the creation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as a counterpart to the British Chiefs of Staff Committee, and Smith was named as its secretary on 23 January 1942. The same conference also brought about the creation of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, which consisted of the (American) Joint Chiefs of Staff and the (British) Chiefs of Staff Committee meeting as a single body. Brigadier Vivian Dykes of the British Joint Staff Mission provided the secretarial arrangements for the new organization at first, but Marshall thought that an American secretariat was required.[23]

He appointed Smith as the secretary of the Combined Chiefs of Staff and of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Since Dykes was senior in service time to Smith, and Marshall wanted Smith to be in charge, Smith was promoted to brigadier general on 2 February 1942. He assumed the new post a week later, with Dykes as his deputy. The two men worked in partnership to create and organize the secretariat and to build the organization of the Combined Chiefs-of-Staff into one which could co-ordinate the war efforts of both allies, along with the Canadians, Australians, French and others.[23]

Smith's duties involved taking part in discussions of strategy at the highest level, and he often briefed Roosevelt on strategic matters.[23] However Smith became frustrated as he watched other officers receive operational commands that he desired.[24] He later remarked: "That year I spent working as secretary of the general staff for George Marshall was one of the most rewarding of my entire career, and the unhappiest year of my life."[25]

North African Theater

Dwight Eisenhower meets in North Africa with (foreground from left to right): Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Tedder, General Sir Harold R.L.G. Alexander, Admiral Sir Andrew B. Cunningham, and (top row): Mr. Harold Macmillan
, Major General W. Bedell Smith, and several unidentified British officers.

When Major General

Major General Humfrey Gale.[27]

AFHQ was a balanced binational organization in which the chief of each section was paired with a deputy of the other nationality. Its structure was generally American but with some British aspects. For example, Gale as CAO controlled both personnel and supply functions, which under the American system would have reported directly to Smith.

hatchet man."[30]

Pending the organization of the

mosaics, oriental rugs, and art treasures. Like Eisenhower, Smith had a female companion, a nurse, Captain Ethel Westerman.[34]

After the disastrous

George S. Patton Jr. Eisenhower also relieved his Assistant Chief of Staff Intelligence (G-2), Brigadier Eric Mockler-Ferryman, pinpointing faulty intelligence at AFHQ as a contributing factor in the defeat at Kasserine. Mockler-Ferryman was replaced by Brigadier Kenneth Strong.[35]

The debacle at Kasserine Pass strained relations between the Allies, and another crisis developed when II Corps reported that enemy aviation operated at will over its sector because of an absence of Allied air cover. That elicited a scathing response from British

Air Chief Marshal Arthur Tedder, Major General Carl Spaatz, and Brigadier General Laurence S. Kuter paid Patton a visit at his headquarters. Their meeting was interrupted by a German air raid, which convinced the airmen that Patton had a point. Coningham withdrew his written criticisms and apologized.[36]

Four men pose awkwardly for a photograph. Two wear shirt-sleeve uniforms and the other two wear suits. All are bare-headed.
Secret Emissaries to Lisbon (left to right) Brigadier Kenneth W. D. Strong, Generale di Brigata Giuseppe Castellano, Smith, and Consul Franco Montanari, an official from the Italian Foreign Office.

For the Allied invasion of Sicily, the Combined Chiefs of Staff designated Eisenhower as the overall commander but ordered the three component commanders, Alexander, Tedder, and Admiral Sir Andrew Cunningham of the Royal Navy, to "cooperate." To Eisenhower, that command arrangement meant a reversion to the old British "committee system". He drafted a cable to the Combined Chiefs of Staff demanding a unified command structure, but Smith persuaded him to tear it up.[38]

Disagreements arose between Allied commanders over the operational plan, which called for a series of dispersed landings based on the desire of the air, naval, and logistical planners concerning the early capture of ports and airfields. General Bernard Montgomery, the commander of the British Eighth Army, objected to that aspect of the plan since it exposed the Allied forces to defeat in detail. Montgomery put forward an alternate plan that involved American and British forces landing side by side. He convinced Smith that his alternate plan was sound, and the two men persuaded most of the other Allied commanders. Montgomery's plan provided for the early seizure of airfields, which satisfied Tedder and Cunningham. The fears of logisticians like Major General Thomas B. Larkin that supply would not be practical without a port were resolved by the use of amphibious trucks.[39]

In August 1943, Smith and Strong flew to

armistice between Italy and Allied armed forces but was unable to negotiate political matters.[40] On 3 September, Smith and Castellano signed the agreed-upon text on behalf of Eisenhower and Pietro Badoglio, respectively, in a simple ceremony beneath an olive tree at Cassibile, Sicily.[41] In October, Smith traveled to Washington for two weeks to represent Eisenhower in a series of meetings, including one with Roosevelt at Hyde Park, New York, on 10 October.[42]

European theater

In December 1943, Eisenhower was appointed

British Prime Minister Winston Churchill wanted to retain Smith at AFHQ as Deputy Supreme Commander in the Mediterranean. Churchill reluctantly gave way at Eisenhower's insistence.[30] On New Year's Eve, Smith met with General (one day later Field Marshal) Sir Alan Brooke to discuss the transfer of key British staff members from AFHQ to Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF). Brooke released Gale only after a strong appeal from Smith[44] but refused to transfer Strong. A heated exchange resulted, and Brooke later complained to Eisenhower about Smith's behavior. That was the only time that a senior British officer ever complained openly about Smith.[45] Whiteley became Chief of Intelligence (G-2) at SHAEF instead of Strong, but Eisenhower and Smith had their way in the long run, and Strong assumed the post on 25 May 1944, with Brigadier General Thomas J. Betts as his deputy.[46]

A woman in uniform hands papers to Smith, who wears glasses and is seated behind his desk.
Smith and his wartime secretary, Ruth Briggs, who was also Smith's executive assistant when he was a postwar ambassador to the Soviet Union.

Smith was promoted to lieutenant general and made a

Knight Commander of the Order of the Bath in January 1944.[47] On 18 January, he set out for London with two-and-a-half tons of personal baggage loaded onto a pair of Boeing B-17 Flying Fortresses.[48] The staff of the chief-of-staff to the Supreme Allied Commander (COSSAC) was already active, and he had been planning Operation Overlord since April 1943.[49]

This staff was absorbed into SHAEF, with COSSAC, with Major General

Roger Lumley (G-5).[51]

Morgan had located his COSSAC headquarters in

St. James's Square, London,[52] but Smith moved it to Bushy Park, in the outskirts of London in accord with Eisenhower's expressed desire not to have his headquarters in a major city. A hutted camp was built with 130,000 square feet (12,000 m2) of floor space. By the time Operation Overlord began, accommodations had been provided for 750 officers and 6,000 enlisted men and women.[53]

Eisenhower and Smith's offices were in a subterranean complex. Smith's office was spartan, dominated by a large portrait of Marshall.

Admiral Sir Bertram Ramsay's Allied Naval Expeditionary Force headquarters were located.[53]

Ground operations in

12th Army Group and Montgomery's 21st Army Group.[55] Smith soon realized that he had made a mistake. The forward headquarters was remote and inaccessible and lacked the necessary communications equipment.[56]

On 6 September, Eisenhower ordered both SHAEF Forward and SHAEF Main to move to

Versailles as soon as possible. SHAEF Forward began its move on 15 September and it opened in Versailles on 20 September. SHAEF Main followed, moving from Bushy Park by air. The move was completed by October, and SHAEF remained there until 17 February 1945, when SHAEF Forward moved to Reims.[57] By this time, SHAEF had grown in size to 16,000 officers and enlisted men, of whom 10,000 were American and 6,000 British.[58]

Dwight Eisenhower, General Sir Bernard Montgomery, Air Chief Marshal Sir Trafford Leigh-Mallory
and Lieutenant General Bedell Smith.

By November 1944, Strong was reporting that there was a possibility of a German counteroffensive in the

Ardennes Offensive came as a shock, and Smith had to defend Strong against criticism for failing to sound the alarm. He felt that Bradley had been given ample warning.[60]

Once battle was joined, Eisenhower acted decisively by committing the two armored divisions in the 12th Army Group's reserve over Bradley's objection, along with his own meager reserves, two airborne divisions. Whiteley and Betts visited the U.S. First Army headquarters and were unimpressed with how its commanders were handling the situation. Strong, Whiteley, and Betts recommended that command of the armies north of the Ardennes be transferred from Bradley to Montgomery.[61]

Smith's immediate reaction was to dismiss the suggestion out of hand. He told Strong and Whiteley that they were fired and should pack their bags and return to the United Kingdom. On the next morning, Smith apologized, had had second thoughts, and informed them that he would present their recommendation to Eisenhower as his own. He realized the military and political implications and knew that such a recommendation had to come from an American officer. On 20 December, he recommended it to Eisenhower, who telephoned both Bradley and Montgomery, and Eisenhower ordered it.[61]

This decision was greatly resented by many Americans, particularly in 12th Army Group, who felt that the action discredited the

U.S. Army's command structure.[62] Heavy casualties since the start of Operation Overlord had resulted in a critical shortage of infantry replacements even before the crisis situation created by the Ardennes Offensive. Steps were taken to divert men from Communications Zone units. The commander of the Communication Zone, Lieutenant General John C. H. Lee, persuaded Eisenhower to allow soldiers to volunteer for service "without regard to color or race to the units where assistance is most needed, and give you the opportunity of fighting shoulder to shoulder to bring about victory."[63]

Smith immediately grasped the political implications and put his position to Eisenhower in writing:

Although I am now somewhat out of touch with the War Department's Negro policy, I did, as you know, handle this during the time I was with General Marshall. Unless there has been a radical change, the sentence which I have marked in the attached circular letter will place the War Department in very grave difficulties. It is inevitable that this statement will get out, and equally inevitable that the result will be that every Negro organization, pressure group and newspaper will take the attitude that, while the War Department segregates colored troops into organizations of their own against the desires and pleas of all the Negro race, the Army is perfectly willing to put them in the front lines mixed in units with white soldiers, and have them do battle when an emergency arises. Two years ago I would have considered the marked statement the most dangerous thing that I had ever seen in regard to Negro relations. I have talked with Lee about it, and he can't see this at all. He believes that it is right that colored and white soldiers should be mixed in the same company. With this belief I do not argue, but the War Department policy is different. Since I am convinced that this circular letter will have the most serious repercussions in the United States, I believe that it is our duty to draw the War Department's attention to the fact that this statement has been made, to give them warning as to what may happen and any facts which they may use to counter the pressure which will undoubtedly be placed on them.[64]

Arthur Tedder

The policy was revised, with colored soldiers serving in provisional

6th Army Group the platoons were grouped into whole companies attached to the division. The former arrangement were generally better rated by the units they were attached to, because the colored platoons had no company-level unit training.[65]

During the

Free French Forces leading the march to be all white, which was made difficult as the vast majority of units were over two-thirds African.[66] Smith wrote a confidential memo that stated that it was "more desirable that the division mentioned above consist of white personnel" to match US segregated platoons.[67]

On 15 April 1945, the Nazi governor (Reichskommissar) of the

Francis de Guingand from 21st Army Group, met with Seyss-Inquart in the Dutch village of Achterveld on 30 April. After threatening Seyss-Inquart with prosecution for war crimes, Smith successfully negotiated for the provision of food to the suffering Dutch civilian population in the cities in the west of the country and opened discussions for the peaceful and complete German capitulation in the Netherlands to the First Canadian Army, which occurred on 5 May.[68]

Smith had to conduct another set of surrender negotiations, that of the German armed forces, in May 1945. Smith met with the representatives of the German High Command (the

General-Admiral Hans-Georg von Friedeburg. Once again, Strong acted as an interpreter. Smith took a hard line by threatening that unless terms were accepted, the Allies would seal the front, which would force the remaining Germans into the hands of the Red Army, but he made some concessions on a ceasefire before the surrender came into effect. On 7 May, Smith cosigned the surrender document along with Soviet General Susloparov, both of whom represented the Allies, and Jodl, who represented Germany. The French representative, Major General François Sevez, signed as a witness.[69][70]

Postwar

Ambassador to the Soviet Union

Half length portrait of sitting man in a suit and tie.
Smith as the U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union, 1946–48

Smith briefly returned to the United States in late June 1945, after spending several days resting at the 108th General Hospital in

United States Ambassador to the Soviet Union.[72] In putting Smith's nomination for the post before the United States Senate, Truman asked for and received special legislation permitting Smith to retain his permanent military rank of major general.[71]

Smith's service as the American ambassador was eventful. Although it was not Smith's fault, the relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union during his tenure deteriorated rapidly as the Cold War set in. Smith's tenacity of purpose was in line with the policy of containment that replaced about 1947 the conciliant stance that had for some years tried to find common ground with Moscow. He became convinced that no understanding was possible in dealings with the Soviets short of acquiescence to their expansionism, and that their intransigence and delaying tactics precluded the reconstruction and economic recovery of Europe. He saw the Soviet Union as a secretive, totalitarian, and antagonistic state.[71] In My Three Years in Moscow (1950), Smith's account of his time as ambassador, he wrote:

...we are forced into a continuing struggle for a free way of life that may extend over a period of many years. We dare not allow ourselves any false sense of security. We must anticipate that the Soviet tactic will be to wear us down, to exasperate us, and to keep probing for weak spots, and we must cultivate firmness and patience to a degree we have never before required.[73]

Smith returned to the United States in March 1949. Truman offered him the post of

Walter Reed Army Hospital, whose surgeons decided to remove most of his stomach. That did cure his ulcer, but Smith remained malnourished and thin.[75]

Director of Central Intelligence

Six standing men in suits and ties, with 48-star American flag covering the wall behind them.
Smith (center) with top CIA leaders, including outgoing Director of Central Intelligence Roscoe H. Hillenkoetter (to Smith's left, in the light suit), 7 October 1950

Truman selected Smith as Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), the head of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Since the post had been established in 1946, there had been three directors, none of whom had wanted the position.[76] Smith became the director on 7 October 1950.[77]

The 1949 Intelligence Survey Group had produced the

U.S. National Security Council accepted the conclusions and recommendations of the report. It remained to implement them.[78] In May 1950, Truman decided that Smith was the man he needed for the CIA.[79] Before Smith could assume the post on 7 October, there was a major intelligence failure. The North Korean invasion of South Korea in June 1950, which started the Korean War, took the administration entirely by surprise and raised fears of World War III.[80]

Since Smith knew little about the CIA, he asked for a deputy who knew a lot. Sidney Souers, the executive secretary of the National Security Council, recommended William Harding Jackson, one of the authors of the Dulles-Jackson-Correa Report, to Smith. Jackson accepted the post of deputy director on three conditions, one of which was "no bawlings out."[81]

Smith and Jackson moved to reorganize the agency in line with the recommendations of the Dulles-Jackson-Correa Report. They streamlined procedures to gather and disseminate intelligence.[82] On 10 October, Smith was asked to prepare estimates for the Wake Island Conference between the president and General Douglas MacArthur. Smith insisted for the estimates to be simple, readable, conclusive, and useful, rather than mere background. They reflected the best information available, but unfortunately, one estimate concluded that the Chinese would not intervene in Korea, which was another major intelligence failure.[83]

Four months after the outbreak of the Korean War, the CIA had produced no co-ordinated estimate of the situation in Korea. Smith created a new Office of National Estimates (ONE) under the direction of William L. Langer, the Harvard historian who had led the Research and Analysis branch of the wartime Office of Strategic Services (OSS). Langer's staff created procedures that were followed for the next two decades. Smith stepped up efforts to obtain economic, psychological, and photographic intelligence. By 1 December, Smith had formed a Directorate for Administration. The agency would ultimately be divided by function into three directorates: Administration, Plans, and Intelligence.[80]

Smith (wearing glasses) and Truman lean over a large globe. A clock on the mantelpiece behind the globe indicates that it is ten o'clock.
D.C.I. Smith briefing President Truman

Smith is remembered in the CIA as its first successful Director of Central Intelligence and one of its most effective by redefining its structure and mission. The CIA's expansive covert action program remained the responsibility of Frank Wisner's quasi-independent Office of Policy Coordination (OPC), but Smith began to bring OPC under the DCI's control. In early January 1951 he made Allen Dulles the first deputy director for plans (DDP), to supervise both OPC and the CIA's separate espionage organization, the Office of Special Operations (OSO). Not until January 1952 were all intelligence functions consolidated under a deputy director for intelligence (DDI). Wisner succeeded Dulles as DDP in August 1951, and it took until August 1952 to merge the OSO and the OPC, each of which had its own culture, methods, and pay scales, into an effective, single directorate.[80]

By consolidating responsibility for covert operations, Smith made the CIA the arm of government that was primarily responsible for them.[84] Smith wanted the CIA to become a career service.[85] Before the war, the so-called "Manchu Law" limited the duration of an officer's temporary assignments, which effectively prevented anyone from making a career as a general staff officer. There were no schools for intelligence training, and the staffs had little to do in peacetime. Career officers therefore tended to avoid such work unless they aspired to be a military attaché. Smith consolidated training under a director of training and developed a career service program.[86]

When Eisenhower was appointed as the

four-star rank, Truman decided that Smith should be promoted as well. However, Smith's name was omitted from the promotion list. Truman then announced that no one would be promoted before Smith, which occurred on 1 August 1951.[85] Smith retired from the Army upon leaving the CIA on 9 February 1953.[87]

Under Secretary of State

On 11 January 1953, Eisenhower, now

U.S. Senate on 6 February and he resigned as the DCI three days later.[88] In May 1954, Smith traveled to Europe in an attempt to convince the British to participate in an intervention to avert French defeat in the Battle of Dien Bien Phu. When that failed, he reached an agreement with the Soviet Foreign Minister, Vyacheslav Molotov to partition Vietnam into two separate states.[89]

In 1953,

Corning Incorporated.[89]

Final positions

After retiring as Under Secretary of State in 1954, Smith continued to serve the Eisenhower administration in various posts. He was a member of the National Security Training Commission from 1955 to 1957, the National War College board of consultants from 1956 to 1959, the Office of Defense Mobilization Special Stockpile Advisory Committee from 1957 to 1958, the President's Citizen Advisors on the Mutual Security Program from 1956 to 1957, and the President's Committee on Disarmament in 1958.[90]

Smith was a consultant at the Special Projects Office (Disarmament) in the

Executive Office of the President from 1955 to 1956. He also served as chairman of the advisory council of the President's Committee on Fund Raising and as a member-at-large from 1958 to 1961. In recognition of his other former boss, he was a member of the George C. Marshall Foundation Advisory Committee from 1960 to 1961.[90]

In 1955, Smith was approached to perform the voice-over and opening scene for the film

Ike: The War Years
(1979).

Death and legacy

Smith suffered a heart attack on 9 August 1961 at his home in Washington, D.C., and he died in the ambulance on the way to

Eisenhower Presidential Center in Abilene, Kansas.[90]

Dates of rank

Insignia Rank Component Date
No insignia Private Indiana National Guard 1911
Various Corporal to Sergeant Indiana National Guard to 1917
No pin insignia at the time Second lieutenant Officers' Reserve Corps 27 November 1917
First lieutenant Regular Army (United States Army) 10 September (effective 4 October) 1918
First lieutenant Regular Army 1 July (effective 23 September) 1920 (permanent rank)
Captain Regular Army 24 September 1929
Major Regular Army 1 January 1939
Lieutenant colonel Army of the United States 18 April (effective 3 May) 1941
Lieutenant colonel Regular Army 4 May 1941
Colonel Army of the United States 30 August 1941
Brigadier general Army of the United States 2 February 1942
Major general Army of the United States 3 December 1942
Brigadier general Regular Army 1 September 1943
Lieutenant general Army of the United States 13 January 1944
Major general Regular Army 1 August 1945
General Army of the United States 1 August 1951
General Regular Army, retired 31 January 1953

Source:[94][95]

Awards and decorations

U.S. military decorations
Bronze oak leaf cluster
Bronze oak leaf cluster
Army Distinguished Service Medal with two oak leaf clusters
Navy Distinguished Service Medal
Legion of Merit
Bronze Star Medal
U.S. Civil Medals
National Security Medal
U.S. Military Service Medals
Bronze star
Bronze star
Bronze star
 World War I Victory Medal with three battle clasps
American Defense Service Medal
Silver star
Bronze star
Bronze star
European-African-Middle Eastern Campaign Medal with seven service stars
World War II Victory Medal
Army of Occupation Medal with "Germany" clasp
National Defense Service Medal
International and Foreign Awards
Grand Croix de l'Ordre de la Couronne (Belgium)
Croix de guerre
with palm (Belgium)
Order of Military Merit, Grand Cross (Brazil)
Medal of Military Merit of the Army, First Class
, Grand Cross (Chile)
Order of the White Lion, Star II Class (Czechoslovakia)
War Cross 1939–1945
(Czechoslovakia)
Legion of Honor
, Grand Officer (France)
Croix de guerre 1914–1918 with palm (France)
Croix de guerre 1939–1945
with palm (France)
Order of the Bath, Knight Commander (United Kingdom)
Order of the British Empire, Knight Commander (United Kingdom)
Order of the Oak Crown, Grand Cross (Luxembourg)
Order of Ouissam Alaouite, Grand Cross (Morocco)
Order of the Netherlands Lion, Knight Grand Cross (Netherlands)
Order of Virtuti Militari
, Silver Cross (Poland)
Order of Polonia Restituta, II Class (Poland)
Cross of Grunwald
, Second Class (Poland)
Order of Nichan Iftikhar (Tunisia)
U.S.S.R.
)

Source: "In Memoriam. General Walter Bedell Smith. 5 October 1895 – 9 August 1961". Central Intelligence Agency. Archived from the original on 10 January 2008. Retrieved 31 August 2010.

Notes

  1. ^ Ancell & Miller 1996, p. 300
  2. ^ a b Crosswell 1991, pp. 3–7
  3. ^ Urseth 2010, pp. 19–20 Some British sources assumed that he had a hyphenated name, which are somewhat common in Britain, and so referred to Bedell Smith as "Bedell-Smith."
  4. ^ Urseth 2010, p. 22
  5. ^ Urseth 2010, p. 31 Smith had enough credits to graduate and was eventually awarded his high school diploma in 1945.
  6. ^ Crosswell 1991, pp. 6–7
  7. ^ Crosswell 1991, pp. 7–9
  8. ^ Crosswell 1991, pp. 9–10
  9. ^ Crosswell 1991, pp. 13–17
  10. ^ Crosswell 1991, pp. 22–23
  11. ^ "Headquarters and Headquarters Company 95th Division".
  12. ^ Crosswell 1991, pp. 27–28
  13. ^ Crosswell 1991, pp. 39–42
  14. ^ Crosswell 1991, pp. 46–47
  15. ^ Crosswell 1991, pp. 51–52
  16. ^ Crosswell 1991, pp. 63–65
  17. ^ Crosswell 1991, p. 76
  18. ^ Schifferle 2010, pp. 22–24
  19. ^ a b Crosswell 1991, pp. 77–79
  20. ^ Watson 1950, p. 71
  21. ^ Crosswell 1991, p. 82
  22. ^ Snyder 1984, p. 7
  23. ^ a b c Crosswell 1991, pp. 89–91
  24. ^ Crosswell 1991, p. 98
  25. ^ Montague 1992, p. 82
  26. ^ Snyder 1984, pp. 6–7
  27. ^ a b Howe 1957, p. 33
  28. ^ Crosswell 1991, pp. 136–138
  29. ^ Crosswell 1991, p. 140
  30. ^ a b Pogue 1954, p. 62
  31. ^ Crosswell 1991, p. 142
  32. ^ Howe 1957, pp. 495–496
  33. ^ Crosswell 1991, pp. 197–198
  34. ^ Crosswell 1991, p. 200
  35. ^ Howe 1957, pp. 487–489
  36. ^ a b Howe 1957, p. 573
  37. ^ Crosswell 1991, p. 163
  38. ^ Garland & Smyth 1965, p. 11
  39. ^ Crosswell 1991, pp. 164–165
  40. ^ Garland & Smyth 1965, pp. 455–461
  41. ^ Crosswell 1991, p. 188
  42. ^ Crosswell 1991, pp. 196–197
  43. ^ Pogue 1954, pp. 25–33
  44. ^ Pogue 1954, p. 64
  45. ^ Crosswell 1991, p. 213
  46. ^ Pogue 1954, p. 71
  47. ^ Crosswell 1991, p. 236
  48. ^ Crosswell 1991, p. 214
  49. ^ Harrison 1951, pp. 48–52.
  50. ^ Pogue 1954, pp. 63–65
  51. ^ Pogue 1954, pp. 536–537
  52. ^ Pogue 1954, p. 58
  53. ^ a b Pogue 1954, pp. 96–97
  54. ^ Crosswell 1991, p. 235
  55. ^ Pogue 1954, pp. 264–265
  56. ^ Crosswell 1991, pp. 254–255
  57. ^ Pogue 1954, pp. 276–277
  58. ^ Pogue 1954, p. 534
  59. ^ Crosswell 1991, p. 281
  60. ^ Montague 1992, p. 59
  61. ^ a b Crosswell 1991, pp. 283–286
  62. ^ Pogue 1954, p. 378
  63. ^ Lee 1966, p. 689
  64. ^ Lee 1966, p. 690
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References

External links

Wikimedia Commons has media related to Walter Bedell Smith.
Diplomatic posts
Preceded by
United States Ambassador to the Soviet Union

1946–1948 		Succeeded by
Military offices
Preceded by
Commanding General First Army

1949–1950 		Succeeded by
Government offices
Preceded by Director of Central Intelligence
1950–1953 		Succeeded by
Political offices
Preceded by United States Under Secretary of State
1953–1954 		Succeeded by
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