Wanshan Archipelago Campaign
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21°57′N 113°45′E / 21.95°N 113.75°E
Cross-Strait conflict | |||||||
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| |||||||
Belligerents | |||||||
Republic of China | People's Republic of China | ||||||
Commanders and leaders | |||||||
Qi Hongzhang | Hong Xuezhi | ||||||
Strength | |||||||
4,000 40+ naval vessels |
10,000 24 naval vessels | ||||||
Casualties and losses | |||||||
700+ 4 gunboats sunk 11 naval vessels captured |
300+ 1 landing ship 1 gunboat severely damaged |
The Wanshan Archipelago Campaign (万山群岛战役) was a campaign fought between
Prelude
After
Order of battle
Nationalist order of battle Around 4,000, including:
- 1 Marine regiment
- 1 battalion from the 208th Division of the Youth Army
- 6 infantry companies of various units
- Units of the Cantonese Assault Army
- The 3rd Fleet
- More than 30 naval vessels, later increased to more than 40.
- 2 regiments from the 131st Division of the 44th Army
- 1 Artillery battalion of the 132nd Division
- 1 Artillery company of the 130th Division
- 1 Artillery company of the South-central Military Region with 100 mm long range cannons
- 1 Artillery company from the 50th Army with recoilless guns
- 1 Artillery regiment of the Pearl River sub-Military Region
- Riverine Defense Force of the Cantonese Military Region (naval force)
- 5 gunboats (including three respectively named Liberation, Vanguard, and Struggle)
- 1 Landing ship
- 10 Landing craft
- 8 Transports
First stage
The
After the sunrise, the
The
.Unfortunately for the
Once the main anchorage of the Wanshan Archipelago, the Laurel Mountain (Guishan, 桂山) Island fell into the communist hands, many other islands fell in a domino effect. From May 25, 1950, thru May 28, 1950, Ox Head (Niutou, 牛头) island, Spider Islet (Zhi Zhou, 蜘洲), Dalu (大碌), Large Head Islet (Datou Zhou, 大头洲) and other small islets fell into the communist hands.
Second stage
On May 28, 1950, the
Although the bombardment mission ended early and thus was not a success, the nationalists were quick to devise a plan based on the experience to counterattack by wiping out the communist naval force after luring it out to the open ocean, and then retake the islands from the communists who would not have any naval support of their own. However, the communists also learned from earlier experience and reached the conclusion of not to engaging the much stronger nationalist naval force in the open ocean where the condition favored the latter. In attempt to search the communists, a detachment of the nationalist fleet ventured too close to shore and three ships suffered damages from communist shore batteries on the Large Head Islet (Datou Zhou, 大头洲) and Triangle (Sanjiao, 三角) Island on May 30, 1950. The nationalists consequently changed their tactics by letting the communists come to them at the waters favored the nationalists, instead of going to the communist's turf to seek out the communists in the coastal regions that favored the communists.
However, the communists had learned from the engagement as well and correctly deducted the nationalist objective, and thus made a plan of their own to counter that of the nationalist: instead of falling into the nationalist trap by fighting the way nationalists had wanted, the best way to engage the superior nationalist naval fleet was to utilize the long range shore batteries, and the much weaker naval force would act as auxiliary to the shore batteries.
Third stage
On June 5, 1950, the communist force adopted the leapfrog tactic under the cover of shore batteries on adjacent islands and islets close by, succeeding in taking Dong'ao (东澳) Island, Greater Ten-thousand Mountain (Da Wanshan, 大万山) Island, and Lesser Ten-thousand Mountain (Xiao Wanshan, 小万山) Island, forcing the nationalist to withdraw to Outer Linding (Wailinding, 外伶仃) Island, Burden Pole (Dangan, 担杆) Island and other outlying islands. On the night of June 26, 1950, the communists had secretly set up the long-range shore batteries on Tri-gate (Sanmen, 三门) Island under the cover of darkness, and the communist gunboats were also deployed accordingly.
Unaware the communist's plan, the nationalist naval fleet carried out their original plan with the help of three more warships newly arrived from Taiwan, including destroyers. More than a dozen nationalist warships were deployed in waters near Outer Linding (Wailinding, 外伶仃) Island, Burden Pole (Dangan, 担杆) Islands, attempting to lure out the communist naval units. In the early morning of June 27, 1950, the hidden communist shore batteries suddenly opened up on the unsuspecting nationalist fleet, and defenders on the nationalist-held islands, the fierce fight lasted for more than five hours.
After numerous extraordinarily brave but completely futile attempts[
Outcome
The
The nationalist control of the Wanshan Archipelago was mostly symbolic for political propaganda and the battle for the control of the archipelago was destined to fail for the same simple reason just like the earlier Battle of Nan'ao Island: the location was just too far away from any friendly bases and thus it was difficult to support in war, and when the support was available, it was rather costly. Although the largest island provided a relatively good anchorage, there was just not enough land to build any comprehensive facilities and infrastructures to support a fleet. As a result, many of the repairs that could be done locally had the comprehensive facilities and infrastructures been available would require traveling back to the distant friendly bases, thus greatly increased cost. When a major damage occurred, tugs were needed to tow the damaged vessel, and in the event of war when tugs could not be available, the damaged vessels had to be abandoned. In contrast, the communists had comprehensive facilities and infrastructures on the mainland and since the archipelago at the communist's doorstep, they could simply recover the abandoned nationalist vessels and repair them after taking them back to the mainland, and put them back into service to fight against the former owners of these vessels, as the case of the eleven naval vessels abandoned by the nationalists after the battle.
As for the blockade of the mouth of the Pearl River, it certainly caused difficulties for the communists. However, these difficulties could be overcome because there were and still are link between the mainland and Hong Kong, and Macau via land, and for the maritime traffic, the nationalist naval force could only cover the coastal region outside the effective range of the communist's land batteries and the communist could simply move a little deeper into the Pearl River to avoid the nationalist naval force. Though this did indeed increased the cost for the communist, the price tag for the operation of the naval task force performing this duty so far away from any support base was far greater comparatively speaking, because communist transportation was mostly by wooden junks that only required wind, while the modern nationalist navy required much more, such as fuel and maintenance supplies. Many nationalist strategist and naval commanders had pointed out this disadvantage and along with the geographically disadvantage (i.e. the lack of comprehensive facilities and infrastructures), wisely and correctly suggest to withdraw from the Wanshan Archipelago in order to strengthen the defense elsewhere, but their requests were denied because holding on something at the enemy's door step would have a significant symbolic meaning of great political propaganda value, but when the inevitable fall had finally occurred, the resulting disaster had negated any previous gains in political and psychological propaganda.
See also
- List of Battles of Chinese Civil War
- National Revolutionary Army
- History of the People's Liberation Army
- Chinese Civil War
References
- Zhu, Zongzhen and Wang, Chaoguang, Liberation War History, 1st Edition, Social Scientific Literary Publishing House in ISBN 7-80149-207-2(set)
- Zhang, Ping, History of the Liberation War, 1st Edition, Chinese Youth Publishing House in ISBN 7-5006-0081-X(pbk.)
- Jie, Lifu, Records of the Liberation War: The Decisive Battle of Two Kinds of Fates, 1st Edition, ISBN 7-202-00733-9(set)
- Literary and Historical Research Committee of the ISBN 7-212-00007-8
- Li, Zuomin, Heroic Division and Iron Horse: Records of the Liberation War, 1st Edition, ISBN 7-80199-029-3
- Wang, Xingsheng, and Zhang, Jingshan, Chinese Liberation War, 1st Edition, ISBN 7-5033-1351-X(set)
- Huang, Youlan, History of the Chinese People's Liberation War, 1st Edition, Archives Publishing House in ISBN 7-80019-338-1
- Liu Wusheng, From ISBN 7-5073-0074-9
- Tang, Yilu and Bi, Jianzhong, History of Chinese ISBN 7-80021-719-1(Volum 1), 7800219615 (Volum 2), 7800219631 (Volum 3), 7801370937 (Volum 4), and 7801370953 (Volum 5)