Nine Years' War
The Nine Years' War
Louis XIV's decision to cross the Rhine in September 1688 was designed to extend his influence and pressure the Holy Roman Empire into accepting his territorial and dynastic claims. However, Leopold I, Holy Roman Emperor and German princes supported the Dutch in opposing French aims, while the November 1688 Glorious Revolution secured English resources and support for the Alliance. Over the next few years, fighting focused around the Spanish Netherlands, the Rhineland, the Duchy of Savoy, and Catalonia. Although engagements generally favoured Louis' armies, neither side was able to gain a significant advantage, and by 1696 the main belligerents were financially exhausted, making them keen to negotiate a settlement.
Under the terms of the 1697
Background: 1678–1687
In the years following the Franco-Dutch War (1672–78), Louis XIV of France, now at the height of his power, sought to impose religious unity in France and to solidify and expand his frontiers. He had already won personal glory by conquering new territory, but he was no longer willing to pursue an open-ended militarist policy of the kind that he had undertaken in 1672. Instead, he would rely upon France's clear military superiority to achieve specific strategic objectives along his borders. Proclaimed the "Sun King", a more mature Louis, conscious that he had failed to achieve decisive results against the Dutch, had turned from conquest to security by using threats, rather than open war, to intimidate his neighbours into submission.[11]
Louis XIV, along with his chief military advisor,
Reunions
The
On 30 September 1681, French troops also seized Strasbourg and its outpost,
Thus, the Reunions carved territory from the frontiers of present-day Germany, and the annexations established French power in Italy. However, by seeking to construct his impregnable border, Louis XIV so alarmed the other European states that a general war, which he had sought to avoid, became inevitable. His fortresses covered his frontiers but also projected French power.
Fighting on two fronts
Ever since Leopold I's intervention in the Franco-Dutch War, Louis XIV considered him his most dangerous enemy, although there was little reason to fear him.
Taking advantage of the Ottoman threat in the east, Louis invaded the Spanish Netherlands on 1 September 1683 and renewed the siege of Luxembourg, which had been abandoned the previous year.[f] The French required of the Emperor and of Charles II of Spain a recognition of the legality of the recent Reunions, but the Spanish were unwilling to see any more of their holdings fall under Louis's jurisdiction.[25] Spain's military options were highly limited, but the Ottoman defeat at Vienna on 12 September had emboldened it. In the hope that Leopold I would now make peace in the east and come to his assistance, Charles II declared war on France on 26 October. However, the Emperor had decided to continue the Turkish war in the Balkans and to compromise in the west for the time being. With Leopold I unwilling to fight on two fronts, a strong neutralist party in the Dutch Republic tying William's hands and the Elector of Brandenburg stubbornly holding to his alliance with Louis, no possible outcome could occur but complete French victory.[26]
The
Persecution of Huguenots
At Ratisbon in 1684, France had been in a position to impose its will on Europe; however, after 1685, its dominant military and diplomatic position began to deteriorate. One of the main factors for the diminution was Louis XIV's revocation of the
Although James II had permitted the Huguenots to settle in England, he had enjoyed an amicable relationship with his fellow Catholic Louis XIV since James realised the importance of the friendship for his own Catholicising measures at home against the suspicions of the Protestant majority.[34] However, the Huguenot presence gave an immense boost to anti-French discourse and joined forces with elements in England that had already been highly suspicious of James.[35] Moreover, conflicts between French and English commercial interests in North America had caused severe friction between both countries since the French had grown antagonistic towards the Hudson's Bay Company and the New England colonies, but the English looked upon French pretensions in New France as encroaching upon their own possessions. The rivalry had spread to the other side of the world, where English and French East India Companies had already embarked upon hostilities.[36]
Many in Germany reacted negatively to the persecution of the Huguenots, which disabused the Protestant princes of the idea that Louis XIV was their ally against the intolerant practices of the Catholic Habsburgs.
The flight of the Huguenots in southern France caused outright war in the Alpine districts of Piedmont in the Duchy of Savoy, a northern Italian state that was nominally part of the Empire. From their fort at Pinerolo, the French were able to exert considerable pressure on the Duke of Savoy and to force him to persecute his own Protestant community, the Vaudois (Valdesi). The constant threat of interference and intrusion into his domestic affairs was a source of concern for Victor Amadeus, and in 1687, the Duke's policy started to become increasingly anti-French as he searched for a chance to assert his aspirations and concerns. Criticism of Louis XIV's regime spread all over Europe.[39] The Truce of Ratisbon, followed by the revocation of the Edict of Nantes, caused suspicion as to Louis's true intentions. Many also feared the King's supposed designs on universal monarchy, the uniting of the Spanish and the German crowns with that of France. In response, representatives from the Emperor, the southern German princes, Spain (motivated by the French attack in 1683 and the imposed truce of 1684) and Sweden (in its capacity as princes in the Empire) met in Augsburg to form a defensive league of the Rhine in July 1686. Pope Innocent XI, partly because of his anger at Louis's failure to go on crusade against the Turks, gave his secret support.[40]
Prelude: 1687–88
The
Another testing point concerned the pro-French Archbishop-Elector,
On 6 September, Leopold I's forces under the Elector of Bavaria secured Belgrade for the Empire.[46] With the Ottomans appearing close to collapse, Louis XIV's ministers, Louvois and Colbert de Croissy, felt it essential to have a quick resolution along the German frontier before the Emperor turned from the Balkans to lead a comparatively united German Empire against France on the Rhine and reverse the Ratisbon settlement.[49] On 24 September Louis published his manifesto, his Mémoire de raisons, listing his grievances: he demanded that the Truce of Ratisbon be turned into a permanent resolution, and that Fürstenburg be appointed Archbishop-Elector of Cologne. He also proposed to occupy the territories that he believed belonged to his sister-in-law regarding the Palatinate succession. The Emperor and the German princes, the Pope, and William of Orange were quite unwilling to grant these demands. For the Dutch in particular, Louis's control of Cologne and Liège would be strategically unacceptable, for with these territories in French hands the Spanish Netherlands 'buffer-zone' would be effectively bypassed. The day after Louis issued his manifesto – well before his enemies could have known its details – the main French army crossed the Rhine as a prelude to investing Philippsburg, the key post between Luxembourg (annexed in 1684) and Strasbourg (seized in 1681), and other Rhineland towns.[50] This pre-emptive strike was intended to intimidate the German states into accepting his conditions, while encouraging the Ottoman Turks to continue their own struggle with the Emperor in the east.[51]
Louis XIV and his ministers had hoped for a quick resolution similar to that secured from the War of the Reunions, but by 1688 the situation was drastically different. In the east, an Imperial army, now manned with veteran officers and men, had dispelled the Turkish threat and crushed
Nine years of war: 1688–1697
Rhineland and the Empire
Louis XIV now mastered the Rhine south of Mainz to the Swiss border, but although the attacks kept the Turks fighting in the east, the impact on Leopold I and the German states had the opposite effect of what had been intended.
The
Britain
James II's ill-advised attempts to Catholicise the army, government and other institutions had proved increasingly unpopular with his mainly Protestant subjects. His open Catholicism and his dealings with Catholic France had also strained relations between England and the Dutch Republic, but because
The invasion fleet consisted of 463 ships and 40,000 men on board, roughly twice the size of the Spanish Armada,[63] with 49 warships, 76 transports carrying soldiers and 120 for the five thousand horses required by the cavalry and supply train.[64][g] For propaganda purposes, English admiral
Louis XIV had considered William's invasion as a declaration of war between France and the Dutch Republic (officially declared on 26 November); but he did little to stop the invasion – his main concern was the Rhineland. Moreover, French diplomats had calculated that William's action would plunge England into a protracted civil war that would either absorb Dutch resources or draw England closer to France. However, after his forces landed unhindered at Torbay on 5 November (O.S), many welcomed William with open arms, and the subsequent Glorious Revolution brought a rapid end to James II's reign.[67] On 13 February 1689 (O.S.) William of Orange became King William III of England – reigning jointly with his wife Mary – and bound together the fortunes of England and the Dutch Republic. Yet few people in England suspected that William had sought the crown for himself or that his aim was to bring England into the war against France on the Dutch side. The Convention Parliament did not see that the offer of joint monarchy carried with it the corollary of a declaration of war, but the subsequent actions of the deposed king finally swung Parliament behind William's war policy.[68]British historian J. R. Jones states that King William was given
supreme command within the alliance throughout the Nine Years' War. His experience and knowledge of European affairs made him the indispensable director of Allied diplomatic and military strategy, and he derived additional authority from his enhanced status as king of England – even the Emperor Leopold ... recognized his leadership. William's English subjects played subordinate or even minor roles in diplomatic and military affairs, having a major share only in the direction of the war at sea. Parliament and the nation had to provide money, men and ships, and William had found it expedient to explain his intentions ... but this did not mean that Parliament or even ministers assisted in the formulation of policy.[69]
Before British forces could effectively take part in the war, the English army had to be reorganised. James' commander-in-chief Louis de Duras, Earl of Feversham, had disbanded the English army in December 1688 so it had to be effectively rebuilt from scratch. Hendrik Trajectinus, Count of Solms and other Dutch officers and officials were appointed by William III in key positions in the English military organisation to reform the English army according to the Dutch model and train the troops in the 'Dutch Exercise',[70] a musketry drill more commonly referred to as platoon fire.[71] To make their dominance over the English army less painful for the British, the Dutch agreed that an Englishman would always be in command of a combined Anglo-Dutch fleet.[72]
Ireland and Scotland
After his flight from England in December 1688, James II had been given refuge by Louis XIV, who provided him financial and diplomatic assistance. Accompanied by 6,000 French troops, on 12 March 1689 he landed in Ireland, where he was backed by the majority Catholic population.[73] His supporters were known as "Jacobites", and the war in Ireland was accompanied by a rising in Scotland; for James, the main objective was to retake England and thus he viewed both Scotland and Ireland as strategic dead ends.[74] On the other hand, Louis saw them as an opportunity to divert British resources from the Low Countries, a difference in aims that was never adequately resolved.[75]
James' Catholic deputy, the
The Scottish Jacobites suffered heavy losses in securing victory at
By the end of 1690, French and Jacobite troops were confined to the south and west of Ireland. Although repulsed with heavy losses at
War aims and the Grand Alliance
The success of William's invasion of England rapidly led to the coalition he had long desired. On 12 May 1689 the Dutch and the Holy Roman Emperor had signed an offensive compact in Vienna, the aims of which were no less than to force France back to her borders as they were at the end of the
William III regarded the war as an opportunity to reduce the power of France and protect the Dutch Republic, while providing conditions that would encourage trade and commerce.
The Duke of Lorraine also joined the Alliance at the same time as England, while the King of Spain (who had been at war with France since April) and the Duke of Savoy signed in June 1690. The Allies had offered Victor Amadeus handsome terms to join the Grand Alliance, including the return of Casale to Mantua (he hoped it would revert to him upon the death of the childless
The Elector of Bavaria consented to add his name to the Grand Alliance on 4 May 1690, while the Elector of Brandenburg joined the anti-French coalition on 6 September.[87] However, few of the minor powers were as devoted to the common cause, and all protected their own interests; some never hesitated to exact a high price for continuing their support.[88] Charles XI of Sweden supplied the contingents due from his German possessions to the Allied cause (6,000 men and 12 warships),[89] while in August Christian V of Denmark agreed to a treaty to supply William III with 7,000 troops in return for a subsidy.[87] However, in March 1691 Sweden and Denmark put aside their mutual distrust and made a treaty of armed neutrality for the protection of their commerce and to prevent the war spreading north. To the annoyance of the Maritime Powers the Swedes now saw their rôle outside the great power-struggle of the Nine Years' War, exploiting opportunities to increase their own maritime trade.[90] Nevertheless, Louis XIV at last faced a powerful coalition aimed at forcing France to recognise Europe's rights and interests.[80]
Expanding war: 1690–91
The main fighting of the Nine Years' War took place around France's borders: in the
The smallest front of the war was in Catalonia. In 1689 the
French successes in 1690 had checked the Allies on most of the mainland fronts, yet their victories had not broken the Grand Alliance. With the hope of unhinging the coalition French commanders in 1691 prepared for an early double-blow: the
In 1691 there was little significant fighting in the Catalan and Rhineland fronts. In contrast, the northern Italian theatre was very active. Villefranche fell to French forces on 20 March, followed by Nice on 1 April, forestalling any chance of an Allied invasion of France along the coast. Meanwhile, to the north, in the Duchy of Savoy, the Marquis of La Hoguette took Montmélian (the region's last remaining stronghold) on 22 December – a major loss for the Grand Alliance. However, by comparison the French campaign on the Piedmontese plain was far from successful. Although Carmagnola fell in June, the Marquis of Feuquières, on learning of the approach of Prince Eugene of Savoy's relief force, precipitously abandoned the Siege of Cuneo with the loss of some 800 men and all his heavy guns. With Louis XIV concentrating his resources in Alsace and the Low Countries, Catinat was forced onto the defensive. The initiative in northern Italy now passed to the Allies who, as early as August, had 45,000 men (on paper) in the region, enabling them to regain Carmagnola in October. Louis XIV offered peace terms in December, but anticipating military superiority for the following campaign Amadeus was not prepared to negotiate seriously.[86]
Heavy fighting: 1692–93
After the sudden death of the influential Louvois in July 1691 Louis XIV had assumed a more active role in the direction of military policy, relying on advice from experts such as the
Over the winter of 1691/92 the French devised a grand plan to gain the ascendancy over their enemies – a design for the invasion of England in one more effort to support James II in his attempts to regain his kingdoms; and a simultaneous assault on Namur in the Spanish Netherlands. The French hoped that Namur's seizure might inspire the Dutch to make peace, but if not, its capture would nevertheless be an important pawn at any future negotiations.[100] With 60,000 men (protected by a similar force of observation under Luxembourg), Marshal Vauban invested the stronghold on 29 May. The town soon fell but the citadel – defended by van Coehoorn – held out until 30 June. Endeavouring to restore the situation in the Spanish Netherlands William III surprised Luxembourg's army near the village of Steenkirk on 3 August. The Allies enjoyed some initial success, but as French reinforcements came up William III's advance stalled. The Allies retired from the field in good order, and both sides claimed victory: the French because they repulsed the assault; the Allies because they had saved Liège from the same fate as Namur. However, due to the nature of late 17th-century warfare the battle, like Fleurus before it, produced little of consequence.[101] (See below).
While French arms had proved successful at Namur the proposed descent on England was a failure. James II believed that there would be considerable support for his cause once he had established himself on English soil, but a series of delays and conflicting orders ensured a very uneven naval contest in the English Channel.
Meanwhile, in southern Europe the Duke of Savoy with 29,000 men (substantially exceeding Catinat's number who had sent some troops to the Netherlands) invaded Dauphiné via the mountain trails shown to them by the Vaudois. The Allies invested Embrun, which capitulated on 15 August, before sacking the deserted town of Gap.[105] However, with their commander falling ill with smallpox, and concluding that holding Embrun was untenable, the Allies abandoned Dauphiné in mid-September, leaving behind seventy villages and châteaux burned and pillaged.[106] The attack on Dauphiné had required Noailles give up troops to bolster Catinat, condemning him to a passive campaign in Catalonia; but on the Rhine the French gained the upper hand. De Lorge devoted much of his effort imposing contributions in Swabia and up to Franconia.[105] In October the French commander relieved the siege of Ebernburg on the left bank of the Rhine before returning to winter quarters.[101]
By 1693 the French army had reached an official size of over 400,000 men (on paper), but Louis XIV was facing an economic crisis.[107] France and northern Italy witnessed severe harvest failures resulting in widespread famine which, by the end of 1694, had accounted for the deaths of an estimated two million people.[108] Nevertheless, as a prelude to offering generous peace terms before the Grand Alliance Louis XIV planned to go over to the offensive: Luxembourg would campaign in Flanders, Catinat in northern Italy, and in Germany, where Louis XIV had hoped for a war-winning advantage, Marshal de Lorge would attack Heidelberg. In the event, Heidelberg fell on 22 May before Luxembourg's army took to the field in the Netherlands, but the new Imperial commander on the Rhine, Prince Louis of Baden, provided a strong defence and prevented further French gains.
In the Low Countries, the French took Huy and on 23 July, Luxembourg found William's army near the villages of Neerwinden and Landen. The ensuing engagement on 29 July was a close and costly encounter but French forces, whose cavalry once again showed their superiority, prevailed.[109] William was however able to quickly replace his losses, while Luxembourg's infantry was so battered that he had to refrain from besieging Liège, the city that had been the main objective for the French that year. To still make something of the campaign Louis ordered Luxembourg and Vauban to take Charleroi, the last Spanish stronghold on the sambre, sandwiched between the French fortifications of Mons and Namur.[110] The French captured the town on 10 October which, together with the earlier prizes of Mons, Namur and Huy, provided the French with a new and impressive forward line of defence.[111]
In northern Italy, meanwhile, Catinat marched on
War and diplomacy: 1694–95
French arms at Heidelberg, Rosas, Huy, Landen, Charleroi and Marsaglia had achieved considerable battlefield success, but with the severe hardships of 1693 continuing through to the summer of 1694 France was unable to expend the same level of energy and finance for the forthcoming campaign. The crisis reshaped French strategy, forcing commanders to redraft plans to fit the dictates of fiscal shortfalls.[114] In the background, Louis XIV's agents were working hard diplomatically to unhinge the coalition but the Emperor, who had secured with the Allies his 'rights' to the Spanish succession should Charles II die during the conflict, did not desire a peace that would not prove personally advantageous. The Grand Alliance would not come apart as long as there was money available and a belief that the growing strength of their armies would soon be much greater than those of France.[115]
In the Spanish Netherlands Luxembourg still had 100,000 men; but he was outnumbered.
In 1695 French arms suffered two major setbacks: first was the death on 5 January of Louis XIV's greatest general of the period, Marshal Luxembourg (to be succeeded by the
Meanwhile, the recent fiscal crisis had brought about a transformation in French naval strategy – the Maritime Powers now outstripped France in shipbuilding and arming, and increasingly enjoyed a numerical advantage.
For their part, the Allied navy expended more shells on St Malo, Granville, Calais, and Dunkirk; likewise on Palamos in Catalonia where Charles II had appointed the Marquis of Gastañaga as the governor-general. The Allies sent Austrian and German reinforcements under
In the meantime the diplomatic breakthrough was made in Italy. For two years the Duke of Savoy's Minister of Finance,
Road to Ryswick: 1696–97
In the winter of 1695–1696, Louis XIV had come to the conclusion that he had been drawn into an unwinable war of attrition by the Maritime powers. He therefore initiated peace talks with William III. However, William only wanted to make peace after bringing Louis to his knees and therefore planned a large offensive in the Spanish Netherlands, but a monetary crisis in England made this impossible.[126] A French counter-offensive was prevented by the Bombardment of Givet, while a plan for an invasion of England had earlier been discarded after the Jacobite assassination plot on William was discovered.[127] Most other fronts were also relatively quiet throughout 1696: the armies along the Rhine, and in Catalonia, marched and counter-marched but little was achieved. Louis XIV's hesitancy to engage with the Allies (despite the confidence of his generals) may have reflected his knowledge of the secret talks that had begun more than a year earlier – with François de Callières acting for Louis XIV, and Jacob Boreel and Everhard van Weede Dijkvelt representing the Dutch.[128] By the spring of 1696 the talks covered the whole panorama of problems that were proving an obstacle to peace. The most difficult of these were the recognition of the Prince of Orange as the King of England and the subsequent status of James II in France; the Dutch demand for a barrier against future French aggression; French tariffs on Dutch commerce; and the territorial settlements in the Rhine–Moselle areas regarding the Reunions and the recent conquests, particularly the strategically important city of Strasbourg.[128] Louis XIV had succeeded in establishing the principle that a new treaty would be fixed within the framework of the Treaties of Westphalia and Nijmegen, and the Truce of Ratisbon, but with the Emperor's demands for Strasbourg, and William III's insistence that he be recognized as King of England before the conclusion of hostilities, it hardly seemed worthwhile in calling for a peace conference.[129]
In Italy the secret negotiations were proving more productive, with the French possession of Pinerolo now central to the talks. When Amadeus threatened to besiege Pinerolo the French, concluding that its defence was not now possible, agreed to hand back the stronghold on condition that its fortifications were demolished. The terms were formalised as the
The Treaty of Turin started a scramble for peace. With the continual disruption of trade and commerce politicians from England and the Dutch Republic were desirous for an end to the war. France was also facing economic exhaustion, but above all Louis XIV was becoming convinced that Charles II of Spain was near death and he knew that the break-up of the coalition would be essential if France was to benefit from the dynastic battle ahead.[131] The contending parties agreed to meet at Ryswick (Rijswijk) and come to a negotiated settlement. But as talks continued through 1697, so did the fighting,[132] and on 16 April the Allies, under Maximilian of Bavaria, re-took Deinze.[133] The main French goal that year in the Spanish Netherlands was Ath. Vauban and Catinat (now with troops freed from the Italian front) invested the town on 15 May while Marshals Boufflers and Villeroi covered the siege; after an assault on 5 June the Count of Roeux surrendered and the garrison marched out two days later. The Rhineland theatre in 1697 was again quiet: the French commander, Marshal Choiseul (who had replaced the sick de Lorge the previous year), was content to remain behind his fortified lines. Although Baden took Ebernburg on 27 September, news of the peace brought an end to the desultory campaign, and both armies drew back from one another. In Catalonia, however, French forces (now also reinforced with troops from Italy) achieved considerable success when Vendôme, commanding some 32,000 troops, besieged and captured Barcelona.[134] The garrison, under Prince George of Hesse-Darmstadt, capitulated on 10 August. Yet it had been a hard-fought contest: French casualties amounted to about 9,000, and the Spanish had suffered some 12,000 killed, wounded or lost.[132]
North American theatre (King William's War)
The European war was reflected in North America, where it was known as King William's War, though the North American contest was very different in meaning and scale. The European war declaration arrived amid long-running tensions over control of the fur trade, economically vital to both French and English colonies, and influence over the Iroquois, who controlled much of that trade.[135] The French were determined to hold the St. Lawrence country and to extend their power over the vast basin of the Mississippi.[136] Moreover, Hudson Bay was a focal point of dispute between the Protestant English and Catholic French colonists, both of whom claimed a share of its territory and trade. Although important to the colonists, the North American theatre of the Nine Years' War was of secondary importance to European statesmen. Despite numerical superiority, the English colonists suffered repeated defeats as New France effectively organised its French regulars, local militiamen and Indian allies (notably the Algonquins and Abenakis), to attack frontier settlements.[137] Almost all resources sent to the colonies by England were to defend the English West Indies, the "crown jewels" of the empire.[citation needed]
Friction over Indian relations worsened in 1688 with French incursions against the Iroquois in upstate New York, and with Indian raids against smaller settlements in
The war dragged on for several years longer in a series of desultory sallies and frontier raids: neither the leaders in England nor France thought of weakening their position in Europe for the sake of a knock-out blow in North America.[141] By the terms of the Treaty of Ryswick, the boundaries and outposts of New France, New England, and New York remained substantially unchanged. In Newfoundland and Hudson's Bay French influence now predominated but William III, who had made the interests of the Bay Company a cause of war in North America, was not prepared to hazard his European policy for the sake of their pursuit. The Five Nations, abandoned by their English allies, were obliged to open separate negotiations, and by the treaty of 1701 they agreed to remain neutral in any future Anglo-French conflicts.[142]
Asia and the Caribbean
When news of the European war reached Asia, English, French and Dutch colonial governors and merchants quickly took up the struggle. In October 1690 the French Admiral
The Caribbean and the Americas were historically an area of conflict between England and Spain but the two were now allies. Outside North America, French interests were far less significant. Saint Kitts twice changed hands. There was sporadic conflict in Jamaica, Martinique and Hispaniola, but mutual suspicion between the English and Spanish limited joint operations. The Allies had the naval advantage in these isolated areas, though it proved impossible to keep the French from supplying their colonial forces.[89]
By 1693, it was clear the campaigns in Flanders had not dealt a decisive blow to either the Dutch Republic or England, so the French switched to attacking their trade. The Battle of Lagos in 1693 and the loss of the Smyrna convoy caused intense anger among English merchants who demanded increased global protection from the navy. In 1696, a combination of regular French naval forces and privateers went to the Caribbean hoping to intercept the Spanish silver fleet; this was a double threat since capture of the silver would give France a major financial boost and the Spanish ships also carried English cargoes. The strategy failed, but combined with de Pointis' expedition of 1697, it demonstrated the vulnerability of English interests in the Caribbean and North America; their protection in future conflicts became a matter of urgency.[144] In May 1697 French naval forces raided Cartagena and plundered the city.
Treaty of Ryswick
The peace conference opened in May 1697 in William III's palace at Ryswick near The Hague. The Swedes were the official mediators, but it was through the private efforts of Boufflers and William Bentinck, the Earl of Portland that the major issues were resolved. William III had no intention of continuing the war or pressing for Leopold I's claims in the Rhineland or for the Spanish succession: it seemed more important for Dutch and British security to obtain Louis XIV's recognition of the 1688 revolution.[145]
By the terms of the
The representatives of the Dutch Republic, England, and Spain signed the treaty on 20 September 1697. Emperor Leopold I, desperate for a continuation of the war so as to strengthen his own claims to the Spanish succession, initially resisted the treaty, but because he was still at war with the Turks and could not face fighting France alone, he also sought terms and signed on 30 October.[145] The Emperor's finances were in a bad state, and the dissatisfaction aroused by the raising of Hanover to electoral rank had impaired Leopold I's influence in Germany. The Protestant princes had also blamed him for the religious clause in the treaty, which stipulated that the lands of the Reunions that France was to surrender would remain Catholic, even those that had been forcibly converted – a clear defiance of the Westphalia settlement.[148] However, the Emperor had netted an enormous accretion of power: Leopold I's son, Joseph, had been named King of the Romans (1690), and the Emperor's candidate for the Polish throne, August of Saxony, had carried the day over Louis XIV's candidate, the Prince of Conti. Additionally, Prince Eugene of Savoy's decisive victory over the Ottoman Turks at the Battle of Zenta – leading to the Treaty of Karlowitz in 1699 – consolidated the Austrian Habsburgs and tipped the European balance of power in favour of the Emperor.[149]
The war had allowed William III to destroy militant Jacobitism and helped bring Scotland and Ireland under more direct control. England emerged as a great economic and naval power and became an important player in European affairs, allowing her to use her wealth and energy in world politics to the fullest advantage.[145] William III also continued to prioritise the security of the Dutch Republic, and in 1698 the Dutch garrisoned a series of fortresses in the Spanish Netherlands as a barrier to French attack – future foreign policy would centre on the maintenance and extension of these barrier fortresses.[150] However, the question of the Spanish inheritance was not discussed at Ryswick, and it remained the most important unsolved question of European politics. Within three years Charles II of Spain would be dead, and Louis XIV and the Grand Alliance would again plunge Europe into conflict – the War of the Spanish Succession.
Weapons, technology, and the art of war
Military developments
The campaign season typically lasted from May through October. Winter campaigns were rare for lack of animal fodder, but the French practice of storing food and provisions in magazines brought them considerable advantage, often enabling them to take to the field weeks before their foes.
Another contributing factor for the lack of decisive action was the necessity to fight for secure resources. Armies were expected to support themselves in the field by imposing contributions (taxing local populations) upon a hostile, or even neutral, territory. Subjecting a particular area to contributions was deemed more important than pursuing a defeated army from the battlefield to destroy it. It was primarily financial concerns and availability of resources that shaped campaigns, as armies struggled to outlast the enemy in a long war of attrition.[156] The only decisive action during the whole war came in Ireland where William III crushed the forces of James II in a campaign for legitimacy and control of Britain and Ireland. But, unlike Ireland, Louis XIV's continental wars were never fought without compromise: the fighting provided a foundation for diplomatic negotiations and did not dictate a solution.[157]
The major advancement in weapon technology in the 1690s was the introduction of the
In 1688 the most powerful navies were the French, English, and Dutch; the Spanish and Portuguese navies had suffered serious declines in the 17th century.
Combat between naval fleets was decided by cannon duels delivered by ships in
Once the Allies had secured a clear superiority in numbers the French found it prudent not to contest them in fleet action. At the start of the Nine Years' War the French fleet had 118 rated vessels and a total of 295 ships of all types. By the end of the war the French had 137 rated ships. In contrast, the English fleet started the war with 173 vessels of all types, and ended it with 323. Between 1694 and 1697 the French built 19 first- to fifth-rated ships; the English built 58 such vessels, and the Dutch constructed 22. Thus the maritime powers outbuilt the French at a rate of four vessels to one.[166]
Footnotes
- ^ Including 11,000 Dutch troops[3]
- ^ 57,410 Imperial, 70,000 Habsburg[4]
- ^ Also known as War of the Grand Alliance, War of the League of Augsburg or War of the English Succession
- ^ A coalition that included the Holy Roman Empire, the Dutch Republic, England, Spain and Savoy
- Treaty of Cherasco.
- ^ With the growing Ottoman threat in the east, Louis XIV, the Most Christian King, had deemed it impolitic, cynically to some, for him to continue the assault in 1682, which could be seen as aiding the infidel.
- fireships. Transports included seventy-six fluyts to carry the soldiers, 120 small transports to carry five thousand horses and about seventy supply vessels. Also, sixty fishing vessels served as landing craft.[65][64] Most of the warships had been provided by the Admiralty of Amsterdam
- ^ The Duke of Savoys' dynastic pretensions included a serious claim on the Spanish succession that provided an alternative to the rival claims of the Grand Dauphin and the Austrian Habsburgs.
- ^ John Childs calls the recapture of Namur the most important event of the Nine Years' War.
- ^ Ath, Mons, Kortrijk, Charleroi, Namur, Nieuwpoort, Oudenaarde and Luxembourg
References
- ^ Glete (2001), p. 156.
- ^ Goorts (2019), p. 136.
- ^ Van Niwegen (2020), p. 59.
- ^ a b Wilson (2016), p. 461.
- ^ Stapleton (2003), pp. 88–89.
- ^ Stapleton (2003), p. 99.
- ^ Lynn (2020), p. 167.
- ^ Bartlett 1997, p. 190.
- ^ Chandler 2003, p. 35.
- ^ Levy, Jack S (1983). War in the Modern Great Power System: 1495 to 1975. University Press of Kentucky. p. 90.
- ^ McKay & Scott (1983), p. 36.
- ^ a b c Lynn (1999), p. 37.
- ^ Lynn (1999), p. 161.
- ^ Wolf (1970), p. 499. Although it did not technically belong to France, Louis XIV had integrated Lorraine into his kingdom after he had occupied it in 1670.
- ^ Doyle (2001), p. 182.
- ^ Childs (1991), p. 11.
- ^ Lynn (1999), p. 163.
- ^ Lynn (1999), p. 164.
- ^ McKay & Scott (1983), p. 37.
- ^ Lynn (1999), p. 38.
- ^ Wolf (1962), p. 19.
- ^ a b McKay & Scott (1983), p. 38. Frederick William would not move against France since he hoped, with French aid, to conquer Pomerania.
- ^ Wolf (1962), p. 20.
- ^ Wolf (1962), p. 18. To John Baptist Wolf, Louis's determination to break the power of Leopold I was a sign that the Louis's ultimate aim was European hegemony. With the Austrian Habsburgs defeated, France would be the only power capable of driving the Ottomans from Germany, whose princes might reward Louis XIV by electing him or one of his progeny as Holy Roman Emperor. To the historian John A. Lynn, the argument is compelling but not absolutely conclusive since distracting the Austrians by encouraging the Turks was an old French stratagem and did not itself prove Louis XIV's lust for universal monarchy.
- ^ Wolf (1970), p. 513.
- ^ Wolf (1962), p. 24.
- ^ Lynn (1999), pp. 167–169.
- ^ McKay & Scott (1983), p. 39.
- ^ a b Wolf (1962), p. 35.
- S2CID 238652614. Retrieved 4 November 2022.
- ^ a b Wolf (1962), p. 36.
- Henrietta Maria, was the sister of Louis XIV's father, Louis XIII. William's mother, Mary, Princess Royal, was James II's sister.
- ^ McKay & Scott (1983), p. 40.
- ^ Miller (1978), p. 145.
- ^ Simms (2008), p. 34.
- ^ Wolf (1962), p. 38.
- ^ Childs (1991), p. 13.
- ^ Wolf (1970), p. 530.
- ^ Wolf (1970), p. 52.
- ^ Simms (2008), p. 35.
- ^ Lynn (1999), p. 191.
- ^ Lord Kinross, The Ottoman Centuries: The Rise and Fall of the Turkish Empire (Morrow Quill Paperbacks: New York, 1977) p. 350.
- ^ Lord Kinross, The Wars of Louis XIV: 1667–1714, p. 350.
- ^ Childs (1991), p. 15.
- ^ Wolf (1970), p. 529.
- ^ a b Lynn (1999), p. 192.
- ^ McKay & Scott (1983), p. 42. The Bavarian Wittelsbachs traditionally provided the electoral bishop.
- ^ Childs (1991), p. 15. The New Cambridge Modern History VI states Clement was awarded the election on 18 September.
- ^ McKay & Scott (1983), p. 41.
- ^ Lynn (1999), pp. 192–193.
- ^ McKay & Scott (1983), p. 42.
- ^ Wolf (1970), pp. 542–43.
- ^ a b Lynn (1999), p. 194.
- ^ McKay & Scott (1983), p. 43.
- ^ a b Childs (1991), p. 17.
- ^ Lynn (1999), p. 198.
- ^ Wilson (2016), p. 172.
- ^ Lynn (1999), p. 201.
- ^ Lynn (1999), p. 202.
- ^ McKay & Scott (1983), p. 44.
- ^ Bromley (1971), p. 200.
- ^ Childs (1991), p. 3.
- ^ Rodger (2004), p. 137.
- ^ a b Prud'homme van Reine (2009), p. 289.
- ^ Western (1972), p. 260.
- ^ Prud'homme van Reine (2009), p. 288.
- ^ Lynn (1999), p. 193.
- ^ Childs (1991), p. 21–22.
- ^ J. R. Jones, Britain and the World, 1649–1815 (1980) p. 157.
- ^ Van Nimwegen 2020, p. 190.
- ^ Stapleton (2003), p. 21.
- ^ Van Nimwegen 2020, p. 191.
- ^ Harris (2006), p. 440; Magennis (1998), pp. 6–111.
- ^ McKay & Scott (1983), pp. 138–140.
- ^ Lynn (1999), p. 203.
- ^ Harris (2006), p. 405.
- ^ Kinross (1998), pp. 27–28.
- ^ Lynn (1999), p. 215.
- ^ Kinross (1998), p. 98.
- ^ a b Wolf (1962), p. 43.
- ^ Spielman (1977), p. 147.
- ^ Childs (1991), p. 27.
- ^ "William and Mary, 1688: An Act for Prohibiting all Trade and Commerce with France. [Chapter XXXIV. Rot. Parl. pt. 4. nu. 14.]". British History Online.
- ^ Childs (1991), p. 25.
- ^ Clark (1971), p. 240.
- ^ a b c d e f g h Rowlands (2000)
- ^ a b Childs (1991), p. 24.
- ^ Clark (1971), p. 230.
- ^ a b c Wolf (1962), p. 47.
- ^ Bromley (1971), pp. 650–651.
- ^ Spielman (1977), p. 149.
- ^ Childs (2003), p. 187.
- ^ Childs (2003), p. 188.
- ^ Lynn (1999), p. 213.
- ^ Lynn (1999), p. 218.
- ^ Wolf (1970), p. 564.
- ^ Bromley (1971), p. 353.
- ^ Wolf (1970), p. 568.
- ^ McKay & Scott (1983), p. 50.
- ^ a b Wolf (1970), p. 573.
- ^ a b Lynn (1999), p. 227.
- ^ Fleet strengths taken from Aubrey (1979), pp. 175–179; sources vary.
- ^ Aubrey (1979), pp. 118–121.
- ^ Wolf (1970), pp. 574–75.
- ^ a b Clark (1971), p. 245.
- ^ Lynn (1999), p. 228.
- ^ Lynn (1999), p. 233.
- ^ Doyle (2001), p. 184.
- ^ Chandler (1990), p. 53.
- ^ Van Nimwegen 2020, pp. 236–237.
- ^ Lynn (1999), p. 236.
- ^ Lynn (1999), p. 239.
- ^ Rodger (2004), p. 153. 30 million livres was equivalent to the entire French naval budget for 1692.
- ^ Lynn (1999), p. 241.
- ^ Wolf (1970), p. 581.
- ^ Clark (1971), p. 248.
- ^ Lynn (1999), p. 242.
- ^ Childs (2003), p. 197.
- ^ Lynn (1999), p. 246.
- ^ Childs (2003), p. 202.
- ^ Van Nimwegen 2020, p. 250.
- ^ Symcox: War, Diplomacy, and Imperialism: 1618–1763, 236: For Vauban's Memorandum on Privateering, 1695, and Memorandum on the French Frontier, 1678, see Symcox
- ^ Lynn (1999), p. 102.
- ^ Wolf (1970), p. 589.
- ^ Childs (2003), p. 198. Victor Amadeus thought it would be to his advantage to have Casale dismantled and neutralized. Because of its position it would then be at the mercy of Savoy.
- ^ Van Nimwegen 2020, p. 251.
- ^ Childs 1991, p. 310.
- ^ a b Wolf (1970), p. 591.
- ^ Wolf (1970), pp. 591–92.
- ^ Rowlands describes this as little short of a humiliation for Louis XIV when set alongside French demands in the summer of 1690.
- ^ McKay & Scott (1983), p. 51.
- ^ a b Lynn (1999), p. 261.
- ^ Wijn 1950, p. 37.
- ^ Childs states 25,000 French troops.
- ^ Lovejoy (1987), pp. 215–218.
- ^ Elson (1908), pp. 226–227.
- ^ a b Taylor: The Thirteen Colonies: The Settling of North America, p. 290.
- ^ Lovejoy (1987), p. 218.
- ^ Lovejoy (1987), p. 315.
- ^ Elson (1908), pp. 227–228.
- ^ Bromley (1971), p. 488.
- ^ Bromley (1971), pp. 489–490.
- ^ Lynn (1999), p. 262.
- ISBN 978-1843838623.
- ^ a b c McKay & Scott (1983), p. 52.
- ^ Childs (2003), p. 205.
- ^ Clark (1971), pp. 252–253.
- ^ Bromley (1971), pp. 473–474.
- ^ Wolf (1970), p. 594.
- ^ McKay & Scott (1983), p. 53.
- ^ Lynn (1999), p. 54–55.
- ^ Lynn (1999), pp. 80–81.
- ^ a b Chandler (1990), p. 235.
- ^ a b Childs (1991), p. 1.
- ^ Wolf (1962), p. 44.
- ^ Lynn (1999), pp. 372–373.
- ^ Lynn (1999), pp. 264–265.
- ^ Chandler (1990), p. 78.
- ^ a b Bromley (1971), p. 747.
- ^ Childs (2003), p. 155. Different authorities credit both Hugh Mackay and Vauban for the socket bayonet.
- ^ Bromley (1971), p. 790.
- ^ Rodger (2004), pp. 219–221.
- ^ Rodger (2004), p. 222.
- ^ Lynn (1999), p. 93.
- ^ Lynn (1999), p. 103.
- ^ Lynn (1999), p. 97.
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- ISBN 0-52107524-6.
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Further reading
- Baxter, Stephen. William III and the Defence of European Liberty. London, 1966
- Childs, John. The Army, James II and the Glorious Revolution. Manchester University Press, 1980. online review
- –––. The British Army of William III 1698–1702. Manchester University Press, 1987.
- Clark, George. "The Character of the Nine Years War, 1688–97." Cambridge Historical Journal 11#2 (1954): 168–82.
- –––. The Nine Years' War" in J. S. Bromley, ed. The New Cambridge Modern History, VI: The Rise of Great Britain and Russia, 1688–1725 (1970) pp. 223–67.
- –––. "From the Nine Years War to the War of the Spanish Succession." The New Cambridge Modern History VI: 1688–1725 pp. 381–409.
- Lynn, John A. Giant of Grand the Siècle: The French Army 1610–1715. Cambridge University Press, 1997.
- Symcox, Geoffrey. The Crisis of French Sea Power 1688–1697: From the guerre d'escadre to the guerre de course. The Hague, 1974