Warlord Era
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The Warlord Era was a period in the history of the Republic of China when control of the country was divided among former military cliques of the Beiyang Army and other regional factions from 1916 to 1928.
In
After the death of Yuan Shikai, he was succeeded by
The warlords of the
The Warlord Era formally ended in 1928 when the Kuomintang under Chiang Kai-shek officially unified China through the Northern Expedition, marking the beginning of the Nanjing decade. However, several of the warlords continued to maintain their influence throughout the 1930s and the 1940s, which was problematic for the Nationalist government during both the Second Sino-Japanese War and Chinese Civil War.
Terminology
During World War I the New Culture Movement leader Chen Duxiu introduced the term Junfa (軍閥), taken from the Japanese gunbatsu. It was not widely used until the 1920s, when it was taken up by left-wing groups to excoriate local militarists.[10] Previously, these militarist leaders were known as a Tuchun (督軍), or provincial military governor, owing to the system Yuan Shikai introduced after his centralization of power.
Origins
The origins of the armies and leaders which dominated politics after 1912 lay in the military reforms of the late Qing dynasty. During the Taiping Rebellion (1850–1864), the Qing dynasty was forced to allow provincial governors to raise their own armies, the Yong Ying, to fight against the Taiping rebels; many of these provincial forces were not disbanded after the Taiping rebellion was over, like Li Hongzhang's Huai Army.[11]
Strong bonding, family ties, and respectful treatment of troops were emphasized.
Although the post-Taiping Rebellion governors are generally not recognized as the direct predecessors of the warlords, their combined military-civil authority and somewhat greater powers as compared to earlier governors provided a model for Republic-era provincial leaders. The fragmentation of military power due to the late Qing's lack of a unified military force, exacerbated by the rise of provincialism during the revolution, was also a strong factor behind the proliferation of warlords. Apart from administrative and financial obstacles, the late Qing government seemed to have relied on this divided military structure to maintain political control.[14]
The rising necessity of military professionalism, with scholars becoming heavily militarized, led to many officers from non-scholarly backgrounds rising to high command and even high office in civil bureaucracy. At this time, the military upstaged the civil service.[15] The influence of German and Japanese ideas of military predominance over the nation, coupled with the absence of national unity amongst the various cliques in the officer class, led to the fragmentation of power in the warlord era.[16]
The most powerful regional army was the northern-based
Reacting to Yuan's growing
Warlord political system
Yuan Shikai cut back on many government institutions in the beginning of 1914 by suspending parliament, followed by the provincial assemblies. His cabinet soon resigned, effectively making Yuan dictator of China.[18] After Yuan Shikai curtailed many basic freedoms, the country quickly spiraled into chaos and entered a period of warlordism. "Warlordism did not substitute military force for the other elements of government; it merely balanced them differently. This shift in balance came partly from the disintegration of the sanctions and values of China's traditional civil government."[19] In other words, during the warlord era, there was a characteristic shift from a state-dominated civil bureaucracy held by a central authority to a military-dominated culture held by many groups, with power shifting from warlord to warlord. A notable theme of warlordism is identified by C. Martin Wilbur. "He pointed out that a great majority of regional militarists were 'static', that is to say that their principal aim was to secure and maintain control of a particular tract of territory."[20]
Warlords, in the words of American political scientist Lucian Pye, were "instinctively suspicious, quick to suspect that their interests might be threatened, hard-headed, devoted to the short run and impervious to idealistic abstractions".[21] These Chinese warlords usually came from strict military background, and were brutal in their treatment toward both their soldiers and the general population. In 1921, the North China Daily News reported that in the Shaanxi province, robbery and violent crimes were prevalent and frightened the farmers. Wu Peifu of the Zhili clique was known for suppressing strikes by railroad workers by terrorizing them with execution. A British diplomat in Sichuan province witnessed two mutineers being publicly hacked to death with their hearts and livers hung out; another two being publicly burned to death; while others had slits cut into their bodies into which were inserted burning candles before they were hacked to pieces.[22]
Warlords placed great stress on personal loyalty, yet subordinate officers often betrayed their commanders in exchange for bribes known as "silver bullets", and warlords often betrayed allies. Promotion had little to do with competence, and instead warlords attempted to create an interlocking network of familial, institutional, regional, and master-pupil relationships together with membership in sworn brotherhoods and secret societies. Subordinates who betrayed their commanders could suffer harshly. In November 1925
"Alignment politics" prevented any one warlord from dominating the system. When one warlord started to become too powerful, the rest would ally to stop him, then turn on each other. The level of violence in the first years was restrained, as no leader wanted to engage in too much serious fighting. War brought the risk of damage to one's own forces. For example, when Wu Peifu defeated the army of Zhang Zuolin, he provided two trains to take his defeated enemies home, knowing that if in the future Zhang were to defeat him, he could count on the same courtesy. Furthermore, none of the warlords had the economic capacity or the logistical strength to inflict a decisive knockout blow; the most they could hope for was to gain some territory. None could conquer the whole country and impose a central authority. However, as the 1920s went on, the violence became increasingly intense and savage as the object was to damage the enemy and improve one's bargaining power within the "alignment politics".[24]
As the infrastructure in China was very poor, control of the railway lines and rolling stock were crucial in maintaining the sphere of influence. Railroads were the fastest and cheapest way of moving large number of troops, and most battles during this era were fought within a short distance of railways. In 1925, it was estimated that 70% of the locomotives on the railway lines connecting Wuhan and Beijing, and 50% of the locomotives on the lines connecting Beijing and Mukden were being used for mobilizing troops and supplies.
Warlord profiles
Few of the warlords had any sort of ideology.
More typical was Marshal
Other notable information on some of the above-mentioned major warlords:
- Zhang Zuolin, "Warlord of Manchuria", became Japan's ally against Russia during the Russo-Japanese War. He had also served as the military governor of Mukden since 1911.
- Feng Yuxiang was a soldier since childhood and like Wu, was a graduate of Paoting. He was baptized by a YMCA leader in 1913; he was known as the "Christian General" as he encouraged his troops to pursue Christianity. He seized Beijing in 1924 and demonstrated how easily a major Chinese city could be overthrown.[28]
The great ideological flexibility of warlords and politicians during this era can be well exemplified in the activities of Bai Lang, an important bandit leader. Even though he initially fought in support of the Qing dynasty with ultraconservative monarchists as well as warlords, Bai Lang later formed an alliance with republicans,[29] declared himself loyal to Sun Yat-sen and formed a "Citizen's Punitive Army" to rid China of all the warlords.[30]
Warlord armies
Good iron does not make nails, good men do not make soldiers.
—Chinese proverb[31]
Many of the common soldiers in warlord armies were also
Besides bandits, the rank-and-file of the warlord armies tended to be village
Finances
In 1916 there were about a half-million soldiers in China. By 1922 the numbers had tripled, then tripled again by 1924; more than the warlords could support. For example, Marshal Zhang, the ruler of industrialized Manchuria, took in $23 million in tax revenues in 1925 while spending some $51 million. Warlords in other provinces were even more hard-pressed. One way of raising funds were taxes called lijin that were often confiscatory and inflicted much economic harm. For example, in Sichuan province there were 27 different taxes on salt, and one shipload of paper that was sent down the Yangtze River to Shanghai was taxed 11 different times by various warlords to the sum total of 160% of its value. One warlord imposed a tax of 100% on railroad freight, including food, even though there was a famine in his province. Taxes owed to the central government in Beijing on stamp and salt were usually taken by regional authorities. Despite all of the wealth of Manchuria and the support of the Japanese army, Marshal Zhang had to raise land taxes by 12% between 1922 and 1928 to pay for his wars.[36]
The warlords demanded loans from the banks. The other major revenue source besides taxes, loans and looting was the selling of opium, with the warlords selling the rights to grow and sell opium within their provinces to consortia of gangsters. Despite his ostensible anti-opium stance, Gen. Feng Yuxiang, "the Christian General", took in some $20 million per annum from opium sales. Inflation was another means of paying for their soldiers. Some warlords simply ran the money printing presses, and some resorted to duplicating machines to issue new Chinese dollars. The warlord who ruled Hunan province printed 22 million Chinese dollars on a silver reserve worth only one million Chinese dollars in the course of a single year, while Zhang in Shandong province printed 55 million Chinese dollars on a silver reserve of 1.5 million Chinese dollars during the same year. The illiterate Marshal Zhang Zuolin, who engaged in reckless printing of Chinese dollars, did not understand it was him who was causing the inflation in Manchuria, and his remedy was simply to summon the leading merchants of Mukden, accuse them of greed because they were always raising their prices, had five of them selected at random publicly shot and told the rest to behave better.[37]
Despite their constant need for money, the warlords lived in luxury. Marshal Zhang owned the world's biggest pearl, while Gen. Wu owned the world's biggest diamond. Marshal Zhang, the "Old Marshal", lived in a lavish palace in
Equipment
The warlords bought machine guns and artillery from abroad, but their uneducated and illiterate soldiers could not operate or service them. A British mercenary complained in 1923 that
During the crossing of the Russian-Chinese border in November 1922 and the disarmament, the Chinese authorities of Marshal Zhang Zuolin bought or received for free almost all the weapons of the Russian White Army, which left Vladivostok. In the border city of Kirin, the Chinese received a large number of the rifles, the machine guns, the cartridges and the grenades, the artillery pieces were sent immediately to the city of Changchun.[41]
When importing weapons became impractical, warlord armies either used locally-made copies of Western firearms (including ones in uncommon use such as the Franz Stock Pistol) or indigenous designs.[42] [43]
Other forces
Because their soldiers were not able to use or take proper care of modern weapons, the warlords often hired foreign
Alcoholic White Russian mercenaries defeated Muslim
Hui Muslims fought brutal battles against White Russians and Soviet Red Army Russians at the Battle of Tutung and Battle of Dawan Cheng inflicting heavy losses on the Russian forces.[58]
Chinese forces killed many White Russian soldiers and Soviet soldiers in 1944-1946 when the White Russians of Ili and Soviet Red Army served in the Second East Turkestan Republic Ili national army during the Ili Rebellion.[59]
To defend themselves from the attacks of the warlord factions and armies, peasants organized themselves into militant secret societies and village associations which served as self-defense militias as well as vigilante groups. As the peasants usually had neither money for guns nor military training, these secret societies relied on martial arts, self-made weapons such as swords and spears, as well as the staunch belief in protective magic.[60][61] The latter was especially important, as the conviction of invulnerability was "a powerful weapon for bolstering the resolve of people who possessed few alternative resources with which to defend their meager holdings".[62] Magical rituals practiced by the peasants ranged from rather simple ones, such as swallowing charms,[63] to much more elaborate practices. For example, elements of the Red Spear Society performed secret ceremonies to confer invulnerability from bullets to channel the power of Qi and went into battle naked with supposedly bulletproof red clay smeared over their bodies.[30] The Mourning Clothes Society would perform three kowtows and weep loudly before each battle.[63] There were also all-female self-defense groups, such as the Iron Gate Society[30] or the Flower Basket Society.[63] The former would dress entirely in white (the color of death in China) and waved fans that they believed would deflect gunfire,[30] while the latter fought with a sword and a magical basket to catch their opponents' bullets.[63] Disappointed with the Republic of China and despairing due to the warlords deprivations, many peasant secret societies adopted millenarian beliefs,[62] and advocated the restoration of the monarchy, led by the old Ming dynasty. The past was widely romanticized, and many believed that a Ming emperor would bring a "reign of happiness and justice for all".[64][65]
Factions
Northern factions
Southern factions
- Kuomintang
- Chinese Communist Party
- Yunnan clique
- Guizhou warlords
- Old Guangxi clique
- New Guangxi clique
- Guangdong warlords
- Two-Liu war)
- Hunan warlords
North
The death of Yuan Shikai split the Beiyang Army into two main factions. The Zhili and Fengtian clique were in alliance with one another, while the Anhui clique formed their own faction. International recognition was based on the presence in Beijing, and every Beiyang clique tried to assert their dominance over the capital to claim legitimacy.
Duan Qirui and Anhui dominance (1916–1920)
While Li Yuanhong replaced Yuan Shikai as the President after his death, the political power was in the hands of Premier Duan Qirui. The government worked closely with the Zhili clique, led by Vice President Feng Guozhang, to maintain stability in the capital. Continuing military influence over the Beiyang government led to provinces around the country refusing to declare their allegiance. The debate between the President and the Premier on whether or not China should participate in the First World War was followed by political unrest in Beijing. Both Li and Duan asked Beiyang general Zhang Xun, stationed in Anhui, to militarily intervene in Beijing. As Zhang marched into Beijing on 1 July, he quickly dissolved the parliament and proclaimed a Manchu Restoration. The new government quickly fell to Duan after he returned to Beijing with reinforcements from Tianjin. As another government formed in Beijing, Duan's fundamental disagreements over national issues with the new President Feng Guozhang led to Duan's resignation in 1918. The Zhili clique forged an alliance with the Fengtian clique, led by Zhang Zuolin, and defeated Duan in the critical Zhili–Anhui War in July 1920.
Cao Kun and Zhili dominance (1920–1924)
After the death of Feng Guozhang in 1919, the Zhili clique was led by
Duan Qirui return as chief executive (1924–1926)
Feng Yuxiang's defection resulted in the defeat of Wu Peifu and the Zhili clique and forced them to withdraw to the south. The victorious Zhang Zuolin unpredictably named Duan Qirui as the new Chief Executive of the nation on 24 November 1924. Duan's new government was grudgingly accepted by the Zhili clique because, without an army of his own, Duan was now considered a neutral choice. In addition, instead of "President" Duan was now called the "Chief Executive", implying that the position was temporary and therefore politically weak. Duan called on Sun Yat-sen and the Kuomintang in the south to restart negotiations towards reunification. Sun demanded that the "unequal treaties" with foreign powers be repudiated and that a new national assembly be assembled. Bowing to public pressure, Duan promised a new national assembly in three months; however he could not unilaterally discard the "unequal treaties", since the foreign powers had made official recognition of Duan's regime contingent upon respecting these very treaties. Sun died on 12 March 1925 and the negotiations fell apart.
With his clique's military power in a shambles, Duan's government was hopelessly dependent on Feng Yuxiang and Zhang Zuolin. Knowing that those two did not get along, he secretly tried to play one side against the other. On 18 March 1926, a protest march was held against continued foreign infringement on Chinese sovereignty and a recent incident in Tianjin involving a Japanese warship. Duan dispatched military police to disperse the protesters, and in the resulting melee 47 protesters were killed and over 200 injured, including Li Dazhao, co-founder of the Communist Party. The event came to be known as the 18 March Massacre. The next month Feng Yuxiang again revolted, this time against the Fengtian clique, and deposed Duan, who was forced to flee to Zhang for protection. Zhang, tired of his double dealings, refused to restore him after re-capturing Beijing. Most of the Anhui clique had already sided with Zhang. Duan Qirui exiled himself to Tianjin and later moved to Shanghai where he died on 2 November 1936.
Zhang Zuolin and Fengtian (1924–1928)
During the Second Zhili–Fengtian War, Feng Yuxiang changed his support from Zhili to Fengtian and forced the Beijing Coup which resulted in Cao Kun being imprisoned. Feng soon broke off from the Zhili clique again and formed Guominjun and allied himself with Duan Qirui. In 1926, Wu Peifu from the Zhili clique launched the Anti-Fengtian War. Zhang Zuolin took advantage of the situation, and entered Shanhai Pass from the Northeast and captured Beijing. The Fengtian clique remained in control of the capital until the Northern Expedition led by Chiang Kai-shek's National Revolutionary Army forced Zhang out of power in June 1928.
South
Nanjing-Wuhan' split and the divisions inside the KMT. You can help by adding to it . (May 2020) |
The southern provinces of China were notably against the Beiyang government in the north, having resisted the restoration of monarchy by Yuan Shikai and the subsequent government in Peking after his death.
Sun Yat-sen and "Constitutional protection" military junta in Guangzhou (1917–1922)
In September Sun was named generalissimo of the military government with the purpose of protecting the
Reorganization of military junta in Guangzhou (1923–1925)
After Chen was driven out of Guangzhou, Sun returned again to assume leadership in March 1923. The party was reorganized along
Nanjing-Wuhan Split (1927)
In April 1927, Commander-in-Chief of the NRA (National Revolutionary Army) Chiang Kai-Shek began a purge of leftists and communists in what is known as the Shanghai massacre. As a result of the massacre the Wuhan government chose to split from Chiang which resulted in him forming a new nationalist government in Nanjing.
Reunification
The National Revolutionary Army (NRA) formed by the KMT swept through southern and central China until it was checked in Shandong, where confrontations with the Japanese garrison escalated into armed conflict. The conflicts were collectively known as the Jinan incident of 1928.
Although Chiang had consolidated the power of the KMT in Nanking, it was still necessary to capture
The politics of the
Despite the reunification, there were still ongoing conflicts across the country. Remaining regional warlords across China chose to cooperate with the Nationalist government, but disagreements with the Nationalist government and regional warlords soon broke out into the Central Plains War in 1930. Northwest China erupted into a series of wars in Xinjiang from 1931 to 1937. Following the Xi'an Incident in 1936, efforts began to shift toward preparation of war against the Japanese Empire.
The warlords continued posing problems for the National Government up until the communist victory in 1949, when many turned on the KMT and defected to the CCP, such as Yunnanese warlord Lu Han, whose troops had earlier been responsible for receiving the surrender of the Japanese in Hanoi and had engaged in widespread looting.[67]
Although Chiang was generally not considered personally corrupt, his power was dependent on balancing between the various warlords. Although he understood and expressed hatred at the fact that KMT corruption was driving the public to the communists, he continued dealing with warlords, tolerating incompetence and corruption while undermining subordinates who became too strong so as to preserve unity. After the Japanese surrender, warlords turned against the KMT.[68]
See also
- China–Nazi Germany relations
- List of aircraft used in China before 1937
- Military of the Republic of China
- Politics of the Republic of China
- Warring States period
References
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- ^ McCord 1993, pp. 246–250.
- ^ McCord 1993, pp. 245–250.
- ^ McCord 1993, p. 288.
- ^ McCord 1993, p. 254.
- ^ McCord 1993, p. 295.
- ISBN 9789004547148.
- ISBN 9780824880866.
- JSTOR 2164996.
- ^ Henry McAleavy, "China Under The Warlords, Part I". History Today (April 1962) 12#4 pp 227–233; and "Part II" (May 1962), 12#5 pp 303–311.
- ^ Maochun Yu (2002), "The Taiping Rebellion: A Military Assessment of Revolution and Counterrevolution", in David A. Graff & Robin Higham (eds.), A Military History of China 149
- ISBN 978-0-521-22029-3. Retrieved 18 January 2012.
- ^ McCord, Edward A. (1993). The Power of the Gun: The Emergence of Modern Chinese Warlordism. Berkeley, California: University of California Press. pp. 29, 39, 44.
- ISBN 978-0-521-22029-3. Retrieved 18 January 2012.
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- ^ Billingsley (1988), pp. 56, 57, 59.
- ^ a b c d e Fenby (2004), pp. 105–106.
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- ^ Fenby (2004), p. 106.
- ^ Jowett (2014), pp. 87, 88.
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- ^ Fenby (2004), p. 108.
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- ^ Palmer, James The Bloody White Baron The Extraordinary Story of the Russian Nobleman Who Become the Last Khan of Mongolia, New York: Basic Books, 2009 pages 149, 158.
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- ^ Duan, Lei (August 2017). The Prism of Violence: Private Gun Ownership in Modern China, 1860-1949 (PhD thesis). Syracuse University. Archived from the original on 31 May 2022.
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- ^ "CHINA: Potent Hero". TIME. 24 September 1928. Archived from the original on 23 September 2009. Retrieved 11 April 2011.
- ^ Fenby (2004), p. 111.
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- ^ Novikov (1972), pp. 61–63.
- ^ Perry (1980), p. 232.
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Works cited
- Billingsley, Phil (1988). Bandits in Republican China. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press.
- Chan, Anthony B. (1 October 2010). Arming the Chinese: The Western Armaments Trade in Warlord China, 1920–28, Second Edition. UBC Press. pp. 69–. ISBN 978-0-7748-1992-3.
- Chesneaux, Jean (1972). "Secret Societies in China's Historical Evolution". In Jean Chesneaux (ed.). Popular Movements and Secret Societies in China 1840-1950. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press. pp. 1–21.
- McCord, Edward A. (1993), The Power of the Gun: The Emergence of Modern Chinese Warlordism, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press
- Fenby, Jonathan (2004). Generalissimo: Chiang Kai-shek and the China He Lost. London. ISBN 9780743231442.)
{{cite book}}
: CS1 maint: location missing publisher (link - Jowett, Philip. Chinese Warlord Armies 1911–30 (Men-at-Arms Series 2010)
- Lary, Diana. “Warlord Studies.” Modern China 6#4 (1980), pp. 439–470. online
- Lary, Diana (1985). Warlord Soldiers: Chinese Common Soldiers 1911–1937. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-0-521-13629-7.
- McAleavy, Henry. "China Under The Warlords, Part I." History Today (Apr 1962) 12#4 pp 227–233; and "Part II" (May 1962), 12#5 pp 303–311.
- Michael, Franz H. “Military Organization and Power Structure of China during the Taiping Rebellion.” Pacific Historical Review 18#4 (1949), pp. 469–483. online
- Novikov, Boris (1972). "The Anti-Manchu Propaganda of the Triads, ca. 1800–1860". In Jean Chesneaux (ed.). Popular Movements and Secret Societies in China 1840–1950. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press. pp. 49–63.
- Sheridan, James E. (1975). China in Disintegration: The Republican Era in Chinese History, 1912–1949. New York: Free Press. ISBN 978-0029286104.
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- —— (1995). From War to Nationalism: China's Turning Point, 1924–1925. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-0-521-52332-5.
- Jowett, Philip S. (1997). Chinese Civil War Armies 1911–49. Osprey Publishing. ]
- Jowett, Philip S. (2014). The Armies of Warlord China 1911–1928. ISBN 978-0764343452.
- Jowett, Philip S. (2017). The Bitter Peace. Conflict in China 1928–37. ISBN 978-1445651927.
- Perry, Elizabeth J. (1980). Rebels and Revolutionaries in North China, 1845-1945. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press.