Washington Doctrine of Unstable Alliances
The Washington Doctrine of Unstable Alliances, sometimes called the caution against entangling alliances, was an early
Background
Prelude
By 1796, the end of
Receiving counsel from Treasury Secretary Alexander Hamilton, who cautioned the president that "we forget how little we can annoy," Washington became convinced that the United States could not further antagonize the Kingdom of Great Britain and feared the possibility of British-imposed commercial isolation, which would precipitate an economic catastrophe that would "overturn the constitution and put into an overwhelming majority the anti-national forces."[2] At the same time, radical government elements, led by Thomas Jefferson, had all but declared their support for American aid to the beleaguered French First Republic, which was at war with Great Britain. Jefferson mused that Hamilton, who was pro-British, was "panic-struck if we refuse our breach to every kick which Great Britain may choose to give it."[3]
In his valedictory Farewell Address, Washington announced his decision to step down from the presidency, partly because of his increasing weariness with public life, and included a short passage defending his policy of ignoring French requests for American assistance.[2][4][5] In an attempt to keep his remarks apolitical, Washington defended his policy by framing it as generic guidance for the future and avoided mentioning the French by name:[2]
The great rule of conduct for us, in regard to foreign nations, is in extending our commercial relations, to have with them as little political connection as possible. Europe has a set of primary interests, which to us have none, or a very remote relation. Hence she must be engaged in frequent controversies the causes of which are essentially foreign to our concerns. Hence, therefore, it must be unwise in us to implicate ourselves, by artificial ties, in the ordinary vicissitudes of her politics, or the ordinary combinations and collisions of her friendships or enmities... it is our true policy to steer clear of permanent alliances with any portion of the foreign world; so far, I mean, as we are now at liberty to do it; for let me not be understood as capable of patronizing infidelity to existing engagements.
— George Washington's Farewell Address[6]
However, in private correspondence about his address, Washington wrote that the geopolitical situation inspiring his advice would disappear in "not... probably more than twenty years."[2]
Formalization
The rise of
The day is within my time as well as yours, when we may say by what laws other nations treat us on the sea. And we will say it. In the meantime, we wish to let every treaty we have drop off without renewal. We call in our diplomatic missions, barely keeping up those to the more important nations.[8]
Outlined by Jefferson in his 1801 inaugural address, the Washington Doctrine of Unstable Alliances asserted that the US should consider its external military alliances to be temporary arrangements of convenience and should freely abandon or reverse them, as indicated by the national interest.[9][10] Citing the Farewell Address as his inspiration, Jefferson described the doctrine as "peace, commerce, and honest friendship with all nations—entangling alliances with none."[11]
The results of the policy during Jefferson's presidency have been generally criticized.[12] According to the historian Doron Ben-Atar, "Jefferson gambled [that] commerce could be used as an instrument for forcing the belligerent nations to do America justice and to respect the republic's honor."[12] The Embargo Act of 1807, which virtually sealed the US from the outside world, has been cited as the most dramatic example of the failure of Jefferson's "inflated assessment" of US power. Jefferson never fully grasped the failure, which helped lead the US into the War of 1812.[12][13]
Significance
The Washington Doctrine of Unstable Alliances is a rare example of a policy endorsement of what is known in international relations as renversement des alliances ("reversal of alliances"), a state abandoning an ally for an alliance with a recent enemy, possibly in opposition to the former ally. The Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact between the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany has been cited as an example.[9]
Although some argue interpret Washington's advice to apply in the short term, until the geopolitical situation had stabilized, the doctrine has endured as a central argument for
According to a critical 1898 New York Times editorial, "The policy... suggested by Jefferson in his first inaugural address has been so faithfully maintained during the century which has since intervened that many of our people regard it as a policy as fixed as the stars in their courses."[17] The American economist Steven Rosefielde noted the doctrine's influence on current policy: "Our nation seeks coalitions and alliances with other nations for tactical purposes when at war, and reserves our overall strategy-making to ourselves."[18]
Misattribution
The phrase "entangling alliances," which forms the basis of the Washington Doctrine of Unstable Alliances, has been misattributed in the popular press to Washington, rather than Jefferson.[19][20]
See also
- History of U.S. foreign policy
References
- ISBN 978-1107020702.
- ^ JSTOR 25108862.
- ^ JSTOR 1920087.
- U.S. Department of State. Retrieved 13 October 2015.
- ^ "Farewell Address". ushistory.org. Independence Hall Association. Retrieved 13 October 2015.
- ISBN 978-1-135-26882-4.
- ^ "The National Interest". Encyclopedia of American Foreign Relations. Retrieved 13 October 2015.
- ^ ISBN 0195074831.
- ^ a b Evans, Graham (1998). Dictionary of International Relations. Penguin. p. 477.
- ISBN 0415939240.
- ^ Fromkin, David (July 1970). "Entangling Alliances". Foreign Policy. Retrieved 28 August 2015.
- ^ .
- ^ "The Embargo Act of 1807". Digital History. University of Houston. Retrieved 15 October 2015.
- ISBN 0873383362.
- .
- ISBN 0195063171.
- New York Times. 27 March 1898. Retrieved 28 August 2015.
- ISBN 978-0521857444.
- ISBN 0312340044.
- ISBN 978-0393058475.