Germany–Japan relations
Germany |
Japan |
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Diplomatic mission | |
Embassy of Germany, Ambassador Clemens von Goetze | Ambassador Hidenao Yanagi |
Germany–Japan relations (German: Deutsch-japanische Beziehungen; Japanese: 日独関係, romanized: Nichidokukankei) are the current and historical relations between Germany and Japan. The diplomatic relations were officially established in 1861 with the first ambassadorial visit to Japan from Prussia (which predated the formation of the German Empire in 1866/1870). Japan modernized rapidly after the Meiji Restoration of 1868, often using German models through intense intellectual and cultural exchange. After Japan aligned itself with Britain in 1900, Germany and Japan became enemies in World War I. Japan declared war on the German Empire in 1914 and seized key German possessions in China and the Pacific.
In the 1930s, both countries adopted aggressive militaristic attitudes toward their respective regions. This led to a rapprochement and, eventually, a political and
After the Second World War, the economies of both nations experienced rapid recoveries; bilateral relations, now focused on economic issues, were soon re-established. Today, Germany and Japan are, respectively, the third and fourth largest economies in the world, and benefit greatly from many kinds of political, cultural, scientific and economic cooperation. Both nations are members of the G4 nations, G20 and World Trade Organization.
According to a late 2023 Bertelsmann Foundation Poll, the Germans view Japan overwhelmingly positively, and regard that nation as less a competitor and more a partner. The Japanese views of Germany are positive as well, with 97% viewing Germany positively and only 3% viewing Germany negatively.[1]
History
First contacts and end of Japanese isolation (before 1871)
Relations between Japan and Germany date from the
In 1854, the United States pressured Japan into the
Despite being considered one of the numerous unjust negotiations pressed on Japan during that time, the Eulenburg Expedition, and both the short- and long-term consequences of the treaty of amity and commerce, are today honoured as the beginning of official Japanese-German relations. To commemorate its 150th anniversary, events were held in both Germany and Japan from autumn 2010 through autumn 2011 hoping "to 'raise the treasures of [their] common past' in order to build a bridge to the future."[6]
Japanese diplomatic mission in Prussia
In 1863, three years after von Eulenburg's visit in Tokyo, a Shogunal legation arrived at the Prussian court of King
In 1868, the
Modernization of Japan and educational exchange (1871–1885)
With the start of the
In 1889, the Constitution of the Empire of Japan was promulgated, greatly influenced by German legal scholars
Cooling of relations and World War I (1885–1920)
At the end of the 19th century, Japanese–German relations cooled due to Germany's, and in general Europe's, imperialist aspirations in East Asia. After the conclusion of the
Another stress test for German–Japanese relations was the Russo-Japanese War of 1904/05, during which Germany strongly supported Russia. This circumstance triggered the Japanese foreign ministry to proclaim that any ship delivering coal to Russian vessels within the war zone would be sunk.[16] After the Russo-Japanese War, Germany insisted on reciprocity in the exchange of military officers and students, and in the following years, several German military officers were sent to Japan to study the Japanese military, which, after its victory over the tsarist army became a promising organization to study. However, Japan's growing power and influence also caused increased distrust on the German side.[14]
The onset of the First World War in Europe eventually showed how far German–Japanese relations had truly deteriorated. On 7 August 1914, only three days after
The only major battle that took place between Japan and Germany was the
Japan was a signatory of the Treaty of Versailles, which stipulated harsh repercussions for Germany. In the Pacific, Japan gained Germany's islands north of the equator (the Marshall Islands, the Carolines, the Marianas, the
Rapprochement, Axis and World War II (1920–1945)
Reestablishment of relations and Sino-Japanese dilemma
After Germany had to cede most of its Pacific and Asian possessions to Japan and with an intensifying
On 30 January 1933, the Nazi Party under Adolf Hitler assumed power in Germany, abolishing the democratic system of the Weimar Republic within the first two months of its reign. This political turning point proved to be far-reaching for the relations between Germany and Japan. In spring and again in fall of 1933, German-Japanese relations were damaged, when the
In late 1933-early 1934, another strain was placed on German-Japanese relations when the new German ambassador to Japan and outspoken proponent of German-Japanese partnership, Herbert von Dirksen, backed the appointment of Ferdinand Heye, a member of the Nazi Party and disreputable businessman, the Special German Trade Commissioner for Japan's puppet state Manchukuo in northern China. Berlin's interaction with Manchukuo was delicate, as its official diplomatic recognition by Germany was sought after by Japan, but would greatly damage Sino-German relations. Hitler's interest to keep China as a partner for the time being became obvious, when he disavowed Heye, who had falsely promised German recognition of Manchukuo in order to monopolize German trading in the region under his name.[25] In the summer of 1935, Joachim von Ribbentrop, a German foreign policy official operating independently from the Auswärtiges Amt, together with his friend, the Japanese military attaché to Germany, General Hiroshi Ōshima, planned to relieve Germany of its China-or-Japan-dilemma by promoting an anti-Communist alliance that would unite all three countries together. However, the Auswärtiges Amt under Konstantin von Neurath vetoed this approach, as it deemed trade relations with China too important to be risked by a pact that Chiang Kai-shek was unlikely to join.[26]
Around the same time, von Rippentrop negotiated the Anglo-German Naval Agreement, which caused a temporary deterioration of German-Japanese relations when it was signed in June 1935. At the time, many Japanese politicians, including Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto (who was an outspoken critic of an alliance with Nazi Germany), were shocked[27] by what was seen as Germany attempting to create an alliance with Great Britain. Nevertheless, the leaders of the military clique then in control in Tokyo concluded that it was a ruse designed to buy the Germans time to match the Royal Navy. After all, Hitler had already laid down his plans in Mein Kampf, in which he identified Britain as a potential ally but also defined Japan as a target of "international Jewry", and thus a nation which Germany could potentially form an alliance with:
It was not in the interests of Great Britain to have Germany annihilated, but primarily a Jewish interest. And to-day the destruction of Japan would serve British political interests less than it would serve the far-reaching intentions of those who are leading the movement that hopes to establish a Jewish world-empire.
— Adolf Hitler, Mein Kampf (volume 1)
Consolidation of cooperation
Tokyo's military leaders proceeded to devise plans assuring the Empire's supply with resources by eventually creating a "Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere". In general, further expansion was envisioned – either northwards, attacking the Soviet Union, a plan which was called Hokushin-ron, or by seizing French, Dutch and/or British colonies to the south, a concept dubbed Nanshin-ron.[28] Hitler, on the other hand, never desisted from his plan to conquer new territories in Eastern Europe for Lebensraum; thus, conflicts with Poland and later with the Soviet Union seemed inevitable.
The first legal consolidation of German-Japanese mutual interests occurred in 1936, when the two countries signed the
Originally, Germany had a very close relationship with the Chinese nationalist government, even providing military aid and assistance to the Republic of China. Relations soured after the outbreak of the Second Sino-Japanese War on 7 July 1937, and when China shortly thereafter concluded the Sino-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact with the Soviet Union. Notwithstanding the superior Sino-German economic relationship, Hitler concluded that Japan would be a more reliable geostrategic partner and chose to end his alliance with the Chinese as the price of gaining an alignment with the more modern and militarily powerful Japan.[31] In a May 1938 address to the Reichstag, Hitler announced German recognition of Japan's puppet state Manchukuo and renounced the German claims to the former colonies in the Pacific now held by the Japanese Empire.[32] Hitler ordered the end of arm shipments to China, as well as the recall of all German officers attached to the Chinese Army.[32] Despite this move, however, Hitler retained his general perception of neither the Japanese nor the Chinese civilizations being inferior to the German one. In The Testament of Adolf Hitler, he wrote:
Pride in one's own race – and that does not imply contempt for other races – is also a normal and healthy sentiment. I have never regarded the Chinese or the Japanese as being inferior to ourselves. They belong to ancient civilizations, and I admit freely that their past history is superior to our own. They have the right to be proud of their past, just as we have the right to be proud of the civilization to which we belong. Indeed, I believe the more steadfast the Chinese and the Japanese remain in their pride of race, the easier I shall find it to get on with them.[33]
The relations between Japan and Germany continued to grow closer during the late 1930s and several cultural exchanges took place, albeit motivated by political and propaganda reasons. A focus was put on youth exchanges, and numerous mutual visits were conducted; for instance, in late 1938, the ship
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Emperor Shōwa
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The Hitlerjugend meeting with Japanese leader Prince Fumimaro Konoe, August 1938
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Female members of the Nichigeki dancing team welcoming the Hitlerjugend at Nichigeki Music Hall in Tokyo
Although tentative plans for a joint German-Japanese approach against the USSR were hinted on in the 1936 Anti-Comintern Pact, the years 1938 and 1939 were already decisive for Japan's decision to not expand northward (i.e., against the USSR) but to the south. The Empire decisively lost two border fights against the Soviets, the
In contrast to his actual plans, Hitler's concept of stalling – in combination with his frustration with a Japan embroiled in seemingly endless negotiations with the United States, and tending against a war with the USSR
Over the following year, Japan also proceeded with its expansion plans. The
Formation of the Axis
With Nazi Germany not only having conquered most of continental Europe including France, but also maintaining the impression of a Britain facing imminent defeat,[41] Tokyo interpreted the situation in Europe as proof of a fundamental and fatal weakness in western democracies. Japan's leadership concluded that the current state of affairs had to be exploited[37] and subsequently started to seek even closer cooperation with Berlin. Hitler, for his part, not only feared a lasting stalemate with Britain, but also had started planning an invasion of the Soviet Union. These circumstances, together with a shortage in raw materials and food,[42] increased Berlin's interest in a stronger alliance with Japan. German foreign minister Joachim von Ribbentrop was sent to negotiate a new treaty with Japan, whose relationships with Germany and Italy, the three soon to be called "Axis powers", were cemented with the Tripartite Pact of 27 September 1940.
The purpose of the Pact, directed against an unnamed power presumed to be the United States, was to deter that power from supporting Britain, thereby not only strengthening Germany's and Italy's cause in the
Another decisive limitation in the German-Japanese alliance were the fundamental differences between the two nation's policies towards Jews. With Nazi Germany's well-known attitude being extreme Antisemitism, Japan refrained from adopting any similar posture. On 31 December 1940, Japanese foreign minister Yōsuke Matsuoka, a strong proponent of the Tripartite Pact, told a group of Jewish businessmen:
I am the man responsible for the alliance with Hitler, but nowhere have I promised that we would carry out his anti-Semitic policies in Japan. This is not simply my personal opinion, it is the
opinion of Japan, and I have no compunction about announcing it to the world.— Yōsuke Matsuoka (31 December 1940)[44]
On a similar note, both countries would continue to conceal any war crimes committed by the other side for the remainder of the war.
Nevertheless, after the signing of the Tripartite Pact, mutual visits of political and military nature increased. After German ace and parachute expert Ernst Udet visited Japan in 1939 to inspect the Japanese aerial forces, reporting to Hermann Göring that "Japanese flyers, though brave and willing, are no sky-beaters", General Tomoyuki Yamashita was given the job of reorganizing the Japanese Air Arm in late 1940. For this purpose, Yamashita arrived in Berlin in January 1941, staying almost six months. He inspected the broken Maginot Line and German fortifications on the French coast, watched German flyers in training, and even flew in a raid over Britain after decorating Hermann Göring, head of the German Luftwaffe, with the Japanese "Grand Cordon of the Rising Sun". General Yamashita also met and talked with Hitler, on whom he commented,
I felt, that in the mind of Hitler there was much of spiritual matters, transcending material plans. When I met the Führer he said that since boyhood he had been attracted by Japan. He read carefully reports of Japan's victory over Russia when he was only 17 years old and was impressed by Japan's astonishing strength.
— Gen. Tomoyuki Yamashita (1940)[47]
According to Yamashita, Hitler promised to remember Japan in his will, by instructing the Germans "to bind themselves eternally to the Japanese spirit."
On 11 November 1940, German–Japanese relations, as well as Japan's plans to expand southwards into South-East Asia, were decisively bolstered when the crew of the
After reading the captured documents, on 7 January 1941 Japanese
Stalling coordination of joint war plans
Hitler, on the other hand, was concluding the preparations for "
- 1. It must be the aim of the collaboration based on the Three Power Pact to induce Japan, as soon as possible, to take active measures in the Far East. Strong British forces will thereby be tied down, and the center of gravity of the interests of the United States of America will be diverted to the Pacific. The sooner she intervenes, the greater will be the prospects of success for Japan in view of the still undeveloped preparedness for war on the part of her adversaries. The Barbarossa operation will create particularly favorable political and military prerequisites for this.
- 2. To prepare the way for the collaboration it is essential to strengthen the Japanese military potential with all means available. For this purpose the High Commands of the branches of the Armed Forces will comply in a comprehensive and generous manner with Japanese desires for information regarding German war and combat experience, and for assistance in military economics and in technical matters. Reciprocity is desirable, but this factor should not stand in the way of negotiations. Priority should naturally be given to those Japanese requests which would have the most immediate application in waging war. In special cases the Führer reserves the decisions for himself.
- 3. The harmonizing of the operational plans of the two parties is the responsibility of the Naval High Command. This will be subject to the following guiding principles:
- a. The common aim of the conduct of war is to be stressed as forcing England to the ground quickly and thereby keeping the United States out of the war. Beyond this Germany has no political, military, or economic interests in the Far East which would give occasion for any reservations with regard to Japanese intentions.
- b. The great successes achieved by Germany in mercantile warfare make it appear particularly suitable to employ strong Japanese forces for the same purpose. In this connection every opportunity to support German mercantile warfare must be exploited.
- c. The raw material situation of the pact powers demands that Japan should acquire possession of those territories which it needs for the continuation of the war, especially if the United States intervenes. Rubber shipments must be carried out even after the entry of Japan into the war, since they are of vital importance to Germany.
- d. The seizure of Singapore as the key British position in the Far East would mean a decisive success for the entire conduct of war of the three powers. In addition, attacks on other systems of bases of British naval power – extending to those of American naval power only if the entry of the United States into the war cannot be prevented – will result in weakening the enemy's system of power in that region and also, just like the attack on sea communications, in tying down substantial forces of all kinds (e.g. Australia). A date for the beginning of operational discussions cannot yet be fixed.
- 4. In the military commissions to be formed in accordance with the Tripartite Pact, only such questions are to be dealt with as equally concern the three participating powers. These will include primarily the problems of economic warfare. The working out of the details is the responsibility of the main commission, with the co-operation of the Armed Forces High Command.
- 5. The Japanese must not be given any intimation of the Barbarossa operations.[51]
On 18 March 1941, at a conference attended by Hitler, Alfred Jodl, Wilhelm Keitel and Erich Raeder, Admiral Raeder stated:
Japan must take steps to seize Singapore as soon as possible, since the opportunity will never again be as favorable (tie-up of the whole English fleet; unpreparedness of U.S.A. for war against Japan; inferiority of the
the Japanese). Japan is indeed making preparations for this action; but according to all declarations made by Japanese officers, she will only carry it out if Germany proceeds to land in England. Germany must, therefore, concentrate all her efforts on spurring Japan to act immediately. If Japan has Singapore, all other East Asiatic questions regarding the U.S.A. and England are thereby solved (Guam, Philippines, Borneo, Dutch East Indies). Japan wishes, if possible, to avoid war against the U.S.A. She can do so if she determinedly takes Singapore as soon as possible.— Adm. Erich Reader (18 March 1941)[52]
In talks involving Hitler, his foreign minister Joachim von Ribbentrop, his Japanese counterpart at that time, Yōsuke Matsuoka, as well as Berlin's and Tokyo's respective ambassadors, Eugen Ott and Hiroshi Ōshima, the German side then broadly hinted at, but never openly asked for, either invading the Soviet Union from the east or attacking Britain's colonies in South-East Asia, thereby preoccupying and diverting the British Empire away from Europe and thus somewhat covering Germany's back.[28] Although Germany would have clearly favored Japan's attacking the USSR, exchanges between the two allies were always kept overly formal and indirect, as shown in the following statement by Hitler to ambassador Ōshima (2 June 1941):
It would, of course, be up to Japan to act as it saw fit, but Japan's cooperation in the fight against the Soviet Union would be welcomed if the [Japanese] advance to the south should run into difficulty because of supply and equipment.
— Adolf Hitler to Ambassador Oshima (2 June 1941)[40]
Matsuoka, Ōshima and parts of the
From Japan's point of view the attack on Russia very nearly ruptured the Tripartite Pact, since the Empire had been depending on Germany to help in maintaining good relations with Moscow so as to preclude any threat from Siberia. Prime Minister
Subsequently, Konoe removed Matsuoka from his cabinet and stepped up Japan's negotiations with the US again, which still failed over the China and Indochina issues, however, and the American demand to Japan to withdraw from the Tripartite Pact in anticipation of any settlement. Without any perspective with respect to Washington, Matsuoka felt that his government had to reassure Germany of its loyalty to the pact. In Berlin, Ōshima was ordered to convey to the German foreign minister Ribbentrop that the "Japanese government have decided to secure 'points d'appui' in French Indochina [i.e., also occupy its southern half] to enable further to strengthen her pressure on Great Britain and the United States of America", and to present this as a "valuable contribution to the common front" by promising that "We Japanese are not going to sit on the fence while you Germans fight the Russians."[37]
Over the first months, Germany's advances in Soviet Russia were spectacular and Stalin's need to transfer troops currently protecting South-East Siberia from a potential Japanese attack to the future defense of Moscow grew. Japan's Kwantung Army in Manchukuo was constantly kept in manoeuvres and, in talks with German foreign minister Ribbentrop, ambassador Oshima in Berlin repeatedly hinted at an "imminent Japanese attack" against the USSR. In fact, however, the leadership in Tokyo at this time had in no way changed its mind and these actions were merely concerted to create the illusion of an eastern threat to the Soviet Union in an effort to bind its Siberian divisions.[55] Unknown to Japan and Germany, however, Richard Sorge, a Soviet spy disguised as a German journalist working for Eugen Ott, the German ambassador in Tokyo, advised the Red Army on 14 September 1941, that the Japanese were not going to attack the Soviet Union until:
- Moscow was captured
- the size of the Kwantung Army was three times that of the Soviet Union's Far Eastern forces
- a civil war had started in Siberia.[56]
Toward the end of September 1941, Sorge transmitted information that Japan would not initiate hostilities against the USSR in the East, thereby freeing Red Army divisions stationed in Siberia for the defence of Moscow. In October 1941 Sorge was unmasked and arrested by the Japanese. Apparently, he was entirely trusted by the German ambassador Eugen Ott, and was allowed access to top secret cables from Berlin in the embassy in Tokyo. Eventually, this involvement would lead to Heinrich Georg Stahmer replacing Ott in January 1943. Sorge on the other hand would be executed in November 1944 and elevated to a national hero in the Soviet Union.[57]
Japan enters World War II
In September 1941, Japan began its southward expansion by expanding its military presence to southern Indochina ("securing 'points d'appui'"
On 25 November 1941, Germany tried to further solidify the alliance against Soviet Russia by officially reviving the Anti-Comintern Pact of 1936, now joined by additional signatories,
In case Germany demands that we participate in the war against the Soviet Union, we will respond that we do not intend to join the war for the time being. If this should lead to a situation whereby Germany will delay her entry into the war against the United States, it cannot be helped.
— Japanese communiqué to Berlin (December 1941)[40]
Nevertheless, publicly the German leadership applauded their new ally[65] and ambassador Ōshima became one of only eight recipients of the Grand Cross of the Order of the German Eagle in Gold, which was awarded by Hitler himself, who reportedly said:
You gave the right declaration of war. This method is the only proper one. Japan pursued it formerly and it corresponds with his own system, that is, to negotiate as long as possible. But if one sees that the other is interested only in putting one off, in shaming and humiliating one, and is not willing to come to an agreement, then one should strike as hard as possible, and not waste time declaring war.
— Adolf Hitler about the Japanese raid on Pearl Harbor (December 1941)[66]
Although the amendment to the Tripartite Pact was not yet in force, Hitler chose to declare war on the United States and ordered the
Until the attack on the Soviet Union, Germany and Japan were able to exchange materials and personnel using the
Despite this treaty, the envisioned German-Japanese economic relations were never able to grow beyond mostly propagandistic status. The British kept control of the Suez Canal and submarines with very small cargo capability remained the main method of contact. With the loss of North Africa and the heavy defeat at Stalingrad, Germany was in a defensive posture by early 1943, and never regained the initiative.[citation needed]
Japan was being outproduced in carriers and was unable to launch any offensives after its defeat at Midway in June 1942. It was overextended and could not even feed its garrisons on islands across the Pacific. Tokyo's plan of
With submarines remaining practically the only link between Nazi-controlled Europe and Japan, trade was soon focused on strategic goods such as technical plans and weapon templates. Only 20–40% of goods managed to reach either destination and merely 96 persons travelled by submarine from Europe to Japan and 89 vice versa during the war as only six submarines succeeded in their attempts of the trans-oceanic voyage: I-30 (August 1942), delivering drawings and examples of the torpedo bomber-deployed, aerial Type 91 torpedo used in the Attack on Pearl Harbor,[73] I-8 (June 1943), I-34 (October 1943), I-29 (December 1943), I-52 (March 1944), and the German submarine U-511 (August 1943). Before I-29 embarked on her voyage to German-occupied France in December 1943, she had rendezvoused with the German submarine U-180 during an earlier mission to the Indian Ocean. During this meeting on 28 April 1943, Indian nationalist Subhas Chandra Bose transferred to I-29, thereby becoming the only civilian exchange between two submarines of two different navies in World War II.[74][75] U-234 on the other hand is one of the most popular examples of an aborted Yanagi mission in May 1945.[72] Amongst others, her cargo included examples of the newest electric torpedoes, one crated Me 262 jet aircraft, a Henschel Hs 293 glide bomb, and 560 kg of uranium oxide. Whether the uranium was weapons-grade material has not yet been clarified, however.[76][77]
On rare occasions, German surface ships were able to reach Japan as well. These included auxiliary cruisers Michel and Thor, which were brought to Yokohama after the Kriegsmarine chiefs realized in late 1942 that it would not be practical for them to return to Germany-controlled European ports.[78] German supply ships (Uckermark) and foreign ships captured by German merchant raiders would come to Japanese ports as well.
In the face of their failing war plans, Japanese and German representatives more and more began to deceive each other at tactical briefings by exaggerating minor victories and deemphasizing losses. In several talks in spring and summer 1943 between
They lie right to your face and in the end all their depictions are calculated on something which turns out to be a deceit afterwards!
— Adolf Hitler about the Japanese (5 March 1943)[80]
As the war progressed and Germany began to retreat further, Japanese ambassador Ōshima never wavered in his confidence that Germany would emerge victorious. However, in March 1945 he reported to Tokyo on the "danger of Berlin becoming a battlefield" and revealing a fear "that the abandonment of Berlin may take place another month". On 13 April, he met with Ribbentrop – for the last time, it turned out – and vowed to stand with the leaders of the Third Reich in their hour of crisis but had to leave Berlin at once by Hitler's direct order.[81] On 7 and 8 May 1945, as the German government surrendered to the Allied powers, Ōshima and his staff were taken into custody and brought to the United States. Now fighting an even more hopeless war, the Japanese government immediately denounced the German surrender as an act of treason and interned the few German individuals as well as confiscated all German property (such as submarines) in Japanese territory at the time.[45] Four months later, on 2 September, Japan had to sign its own surrender documents.
Alleged German-Japanese long-term conspiracy
After the Second World War was officially concluded with the capitulation of the Empire of Japan, plans for trying the major German and Japanese war criminals were quickly implemented in 1946. While Japanese officials had to face the
The Nazi plans of aggression called for use of Asiatic allies and they found among the Japanese men of kindred mind and purpose. They were brothers, under the skin.
— Robert H. Jackson, American chief prosecutor at the Nuremberg Trials 1945/46[82]
Although there was a limited and cautious military cooperation between Japan and Germany during the Second World War, no documents corroborating any long-term planning or real coordination of military operations of both powers exist.[83]
Post-WWII developments
Rebuilding relations and new common interests
After their defeat in World War II, both Japan and Germany were occupied. Japan regained its sovereignty with the
Beginning in the 1950s, Japanese companies sought to acquire needed raw materials like steel and chemical products in the West German
West German-Japanese political dealings were enlarged with both countries taking part in the creation of the so-called
Over the following years, institutions, such as in 1985 the "Japanese–German Center" (JDZB) in Berlin[89] and in 1988 the German Institute for Japanese Studies (DIJ) in Tokyo,[90] were founded to further contribute to the academic and scientific exchange between Japan and West Germany.
Around the mid-1980s, West German and Japanese representatives decided to rebuild the old Japanese embassy in Berlin from 1938. Its remains had remained unused after the building was largely destroyed during World War II. In addition to the original complex, several changes and additions were made until 2000, like moving the main entrance to the Hiroshima Street, which was named in honour of the Japanese city, and the creation of a traditional
Post-war relations between Japan and both Germanies, as well as with unified Germany since 1990, have generally focused on economic and business questions. Germany, dedicated to free trade, continues to be Japan's largest trading partner within Europe. This general posture is also reflected in the so-called "7 pillars of cooperation" agreed on by Foreign Minister of Japan Yōhei Kōno and Foreign Minister of Germany Joschka Fischer on 30 October 2000:[93]
- Pillar 1: Contribution for peace and stability of the international community
- Pillar 2: Consolidation of economic and trade relationships, under benefit of globalization impulses.
- Pillar 3: Contribution for a solution of global problems and social duties and responsibilities.
- Pillar 4: Contribution for the stability in the regions (Korean Peninsula, People's Republic of China, former Yugoslavia, Russia, South Asia, new independent states, Middle East and Gulf region, Middle and South America, East Timor, Africa)
- Pillar 5: Further constitution of faithful political relations between Japan and Germany
- Pillar 6: Promotion of economic relations
- Pillar 7: Promotion of mutual understanding and the cultural relations
In 2000, bilateral cultural exchange culminated in the "Japan in Germany" year, which was then followed by the "Germany in Japan" year in 2005/2006.[94] Also in 2005, the annual German Film Festival in Tokyo was brought into being.[95]
In 2004, German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder and Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi agreed upon cooperations in the assistance for reconstruction of Iraq and Afghanistan,[96][97] the promotion of economic exchange activities,[98] youth and sports exchanges[99] as well as exchanges and cooperation in science, technology and academic fields.[100]
Current relations
In the late 1990s and early 2000s, Germany and Japan, being the United Nations' second and third largest funders respectively, demanded a reform of the United Nations Security Council and an increase of the number of its permanent members. For this purpose both nations organized themselves together with Brazil and India to form the so-called "G4 nations". On 21 September 2004, the G4 issued a joint statement mutually backing each other's claim to permanent seats, together with two African countries. This proposal has found opposition in a group of countries called Uniting for Consensus. In January 2006, Japan announced that it would not support putting the G4 resolution back on the table and was working on a resolution of its own.[101]
Certain inefficiencies with respect to the bilateral cooperation between Germany and Japan were also reflected in 2005, when former Japanese Prime Minister Kiichi Miyazawa wrote in a commemoration to the 20th anniversary of the Japanese-German Center in Berlin that
the German-Japanese relations are generally good and there are no particular bilateral problems. This results in a certain indifference, which may be considered a problem by now.
— PM Kiichi Miyazawa (2005)[102]
Nevertheless, as of 2008, Japan still was Germany's second largest trading partner in Asia after China.
In 2013, the top three imported cars sold in Japan are all German cars: Volkswagen, Mercedes-Benz, and BMW.[105] In Germany, the market share of Japanese cars such as Mazda, Toyota, Honda, and Nissan is 8.6%.[106]
Unaffected by any stagnating German-Japanese trade relations, the
On 14 and 15 January 2010, German foreign minister
On Friday 11 March 2011, the
On 2 April 2011, German Foreign Minister Westerwelle visited Tokyo on an Asia voyage, again offering Japan "all help, where it is needed" to recover from the tsunami and subsequent nuclear disaster of the previous month. Westerwelle also emphasised the importance of making progress with a free trade agreement between Japan and the European Union in order to accelerate the recovery of the Japanese economy. Together with his German counterpart, Japanese foreign minister Takeaki Matsumoto also addressed potential new fields of cooperation between Tokyo and Berlin with respect to a reform of the United Nations Security Council.[120]
Cultural exchange
In modern literature, many literary figures have been influenced by German literature since Mori Ōgai, and the lineage of pro-German cultural figures continues, with people in medicine, philosophy, and economics who were strongly influenced by the German school. This is even more noticeable in music, where Japan has greatly enjoyed German music for a long time. Although it has become somewhat more diverse in modern times, Japan is still a country with a strong ethos of worshiping German music and musicians, along with Britain and France. There has been a faith in mechanical products as well, and with cameras and other products as a model. In terms of automobiles, more than 70% of imported foreign cars are German cars.
In addition, Germans have felt a sense of affinity at the grassroots level due to common national traits such as hard work, meticulousness, and organisation. Even in subcultures such as anime and manga, German characters or characters with German-like names, as well as Germany-inspired settings, often appear, and in girls' manga, Germany is the second most frequently featured country after France. In addition, there is a tendency for villains with Nazi motifs to often appear in action works, regardless of whether they are 2D or special effects.
There are also many other pro-German cultural figures who, although not connected to their work, have declared themselves to be German lovers or nerds, such as well known rakugo performers Kokontei Shincho and Katsura Beitanji.
Sports
In football, West Germany had a very strong influence on Japan. Dettmar Cramer, who was invited as a coach to strengthen the Japanese men's national team in preparation for the 1964 Tokyo Olympics, which led Japan to the top eight at the tournament, and key players such as Kunishige Kamamoto, who received his guidance, also participated. He subsequently won a bronze medal at the 1968 Summer Olympics. In addition, Cramer's recommendations, such as the creation of the Japan Soccer League and the strengthening of the training age group, became the foundation of the Japanese football world, and Cramer, who was hailed as the "Father of Japanese Football," was the first recipient of the Japan Football Hall of Fame. became.
The "Golden Plan,'' a comprehensive development plan for sports facilities drawn up by the West German government in 1960, was the envy of Japanese sports leaders, and the philosophy of "creating a comprehensive sports club rooted in the local community'' was established in 1991. It was incorporated into the
See also
- Baruto no Gakuen
- France–Japan relations
- Germany–Japan industrial co-operation before World War II
- Germany–South Korea relations
- History of Germany
- History of Japan
- Italy–Japan relations
- Japanese people in Germany
- Japan–United Kingdom relations
- List of German ministers, envoys and ambassadors to Japan
- List of Japanese ministers, envoys and ambassadors to Germany
- Category:German expatriates in Japan
- Category:Foreign relations of the Empire of Japan (Japanese version)
- Category:Foreign relations of the State of Japan (Japanese version)
References
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Further reading
English
- Akira, Kudo. (1998) Japanese-German Business Relations: Co-operation and Rivalry in the Interwar Period (Nissan Institute/Routledge Japanese Studies) (1998)
- Bara, Xavier. "The Kishū Army and the Setting of the Prussian Model in Feudal Japan, 1860–1871". War in History 19.2 (2012): 153–171. https://doi.org/10.1177/0968344511432980
- Baskett, Michael (2009). "All Beautiful Fascists?: Axis Film Culture in Imperial Japan" in The Culture of Japanese Fascism, ed. ISBN 0822344521
- Boyd, Carl. Hitler's Japanese Confidant: General Hiroshi Ōshima and Magic Intelligence, 1941–1945 (University Press of Kansas, 1993)
- Burton, Fred, and Freddy Saelens. "The Structure and Characteristics of Japanese Foreign Direct Investment in West Germany". Management International Review (1980): 7–16. online
- Cho, Joanne Miyang, Lee M. Roberts, and Christian W. Spang. "German-Japanese Relations from Meiji to Heisei". in Cho et al. eds. Transnational Encounters between Germany and Japan (Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2016) pp. 1–15. excerpt
- Hübner, Stefan (2012), "National Socialist Foreign Policy and Press Instructions, 1933–9: Aims and Ways of Coverage Manipulation based on the Example of East Asia", The International History Review, 34 (2): 271–291, S2CID 154888005
- Katada, Saori N., Hanns Maull and Takashi Inoguchi, eds. Global Governance: Germany and Japan in the International System (2004).
- Law, Ricky W. (2019). Transnational Nazism: Ideology and Culture in German-Japanese Relations, 1919–1936. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-1-108-47463-4.
- McLaren, Ian A. Nazi Germany and imperial Japan: The hollow diplomatic alliance (Routledge, 2017), 1930s and World War II.
- Martin, Bernd (2005). Japan and Germany in the Modern World. Berghahn Books. ISBN 9781845450472.
- Saaler, Sven, Akira Kudo, and Nobuo Tajima, eds. (2017). Mutual Perceptions and Images in Japanese-German Relations, 1860-2010. Leiden: Brill, 2017.
- Skya, Walter A. (2004) "Fascist Encounters: German Nazis and Japanese Shintō Ultranationalists". in Japan in the Fascist Era (Palgrave Macmillan, 2004) pp. 133–153.
- Spang, Christian W. and Rolf-Harald Wippich (eds.). (2006) Japanese–German Relations, 1895–1945. War, Diplomacy and Public Opinion (ISBN 0-415-34248-1). London: Routledge. excerpt and text search
- Yellen, Jeremy A. "Into the Tiger's Den: Japan and the Tripartite Pact, 1940". Journal of Contemporary History 51.3 (2016): 555–576. online
Other languages
- Hübner, Stefan (2009) Hitler und Ostasien, 1904 bis 1933. Die Entwicklung von Hitlers Japan- und Chinabild vom Russisch-Japanischen Krieg bis zur "Machtergreifung" [Hitler and East Asia, 1904 to 1933. The Development of Hitler's Image of Japan and China from the Russo-Japanese War to the "Coming to Power"], in OAG-Notizen 9/2009, 22–41. [PDF download]
- Ishii, Shiro et al. (ed.): Fast wie mein eigen Vaterland: Briefe aus Japan 1886–1889 [Almost as my own Motherland: Letters from Japan]. München: Iudicium 1995.
- Kreiner, Josef (ed.). (1984) Deutschland – Japan. Historische Kontakte [Germany – Japan. Historical Contacts]. Bonn: Bouvier.
- Kreiner, Josef (ed.). (1986) Japan und die Mittelmächte im Ersten Weltkrieg und in den zwanziger Jahren [Japan and the Central Powers in World War I and the 1920s]. Bonn: Bouvier.
- Kreiner, Josef and Regine Mathias (ed.). (1990) Deutschland–Japan in der Zwischenkriegszeit [Germany – Japan in the inter-war period]. Bonn: Bouvier.
- Pantzer, Peter und Saaler, Sven: Japanische Impressionen eines Kaiserlichen Gesandten. Karl von Eisendecher im Japan der Meiji-Zeit/明治初期の日本 - ドイツ外交官アイゼンデッヒャー公使の写真帖より (A German Diplomat in Meiji Japan: Karl von Eisendecher. German/Japanese). München: Iudicium, 2007.
- Martin, Bernd and Gerhard Krebs (eds.). (1994) Formierung und Fall der Achse Berlin–Tôkyô [Construction and Fall of the Berlin–Tôkyô Axis]. Munich: Iudicium.
- Martin, Bernd. (2001) Deutschland und Japan im Zweiten Weltkrieg 1940–1945, Vom Angriff auf Pearl Harbor bis zu deutschen Kapitulation. Nikol Verlagsgesellschaft mdH & Co. KG, Hamburg.
External links
- "Relations between Germany and Japan: 150 Years of Friendship between Germany and Japan" 2015 exhibit at National Museum of Japanese History, in English
- OAG (German East Asiatic Society)
- German Institute for Japanese Studies, Tōkyō
- Japanese–German Center, Berlin
- The Knackfuss Painting