Xi'an Incident
Xi'an Incident | |
---|---|
Hanyu Pinyin | Xī'ān Shìbiàn |
Wade–Giles | Hsi-an Shih-pian |
The Xi'an Incident[a] was a major Chinese political crisis from 12 to 26 December 1936. Chiang Kai-shek, leader of the Nationalist government of China, was placed under house arrest in the city of Xi'an by a Nationalist army he was there to review. Chiang's captors hoped to end the Chinese Civil War and confront Japanese imperial expansion into Chinese territory. After two weeks of intense negotiations between Chiang, his captors, and representatives of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), Chiang was released with a verbal promise to end the civil war and put up a firmer resistance to Japan.
Before the incident, Chiang Kai-shek had followed a strategy of "first internal pacification, then external resistance" that entailed eliminating the CCP before confronting Japanese aggression. This strategy was deeply unpopular among many groups in China, including the Northeastern Army tasked with suppressing the main Communist base in Yan'an. The Northeastern Army was mainly composed of troops exiled from Manchuria after that region was invaded by Japan in 1931. Northeastern Army soldiers and officers had also begun to fraternize with the Communists and were convinced of the need for a united Nationalist-Communist front against Japan.
The commanders of the Northeastern Army, Generals
Background
Japanese expansionism in China
In 1931, the
Chang's father had been assassinated by Japan in 1928.[2]: 32 Over time, Chang came to view Chiang as ignoring the threat of Japan because of Chiang's focus on opposing the Communists.[2]: 32
Chinese Civil War
In the aftermath of the
By late 1935 the Communists had narrowly avoided destruction on their Long March and had begun to establish themselves in a new base area on the border between Gansu and Ningxia provinces. They were besieged by a number of nationalist armies, including the Northwestern Army under Yang and the Northeastern Army, to which Chang was re-assigned as commander after his return from a tour of Europe.[6][7] The Nationalist armies initially gave no notice to the Communist exhortations for war against Japan, but this began to change because of the Red Army's "eastern expedition" from February to April 1936. The Communists declared that they were sending a detachment through Shanxi to fight the Japanese in Rehe and Hubei. Letting the Red Army through would have broken the encirclement, so Yan Xishan stopped them by force. Although defeated militarily, the Red Army had convinced the Shanxi peasantry of their patriotism and gained 8,000 new recruits on their retreat. Chang was likewise impressed and began to see them as potential allies rather than foes. When Mao announced on March 14 that the Communists were willing to conclude a truce, Chang covertly agreed.[8] He proposed to Chiang Kai-shek that he reverse the Nationalist policy of prioritizing the purge of Communists, and instead focusing on military preparation against Japanese aggression.[9] After Chiang refused, Chang began to plot a coup in "great secrecy".[10] By June 1936, the secret agreement between Chang and the CCP had been successfully settled.[11]
Events
Arrest of Chiang
In November 1936, Chang asked Chiang to come to Xi'an to raise the morale of troops unwilling to fight the Communists.[12] After Chiang agreed, Chang informed Mao Zedong, who called the plan "a masterpiece". At Xi'an, Chiang stayed in his resort headquarters at the Huaqing Pool complex.[13] On 12 December 1936, bodyguards of Chang and Yang stormed the cabin where Chiang was sleeping. Chiang was able to escape but suffered an injury in the process. He was eventually detained by Chang's troops in the morning.[12][14]
As conflicting reports of the events reached the capital, the Nationalist government was sent into disarray.[9] The response to the coup from high-level officials was divided. The Military Affairs Commission led by He Yingqin recommended a military campaign against Xi'an, and immediately send a regiment to capture Tongguan.[15] Soong Mei-ling and Kong Xiangxi were strongly in favor of negotiating a settlement to ensure the safety of Chiang.[16]
Negotiations and release
A faction of the army led by Yang Hucheng and the radical young officers of the "Anti-Japanese Comrade Society" wanted to execute Chiang, but Chang and the Communists insisted that he be kept alive in order to maintain the possibility of a united front.[17][18] They argued that an alliance with Chiang was their best chance to combat the Japanese, while killing him would only provoke retaliation from the Nanjing Government.[10] The Northeastern Army sent a telegram to Nanjing explaining to the Chinese public why they had arrested Chiang and the 8 demands they had for his release. These included an immediate end to civil war against the CCP, expulsion of pro-Japanese factions from the Nationalist government, and the adoption of an active anti-Japanese military stance. They attempted to broadcast these demands publicly, but Nationalist censorship prevented their publication outside the Communist-held areas.[19][20]
On 16 December,
Aftermath
After Chiang returned to Nanjing, he announced a cease fire in the civil war. However, he also repudiated any promises that he had made in Xi'an. He had Chang imprisoned and charged with treason.[22]: 53 Chiang then sent 37 army divisions north to surround the Northeastern Army and force them to stand down. The army was deeply divided on the appropriate response. Yang Hucheng and the Anti-Japanese Comrade Society wanted to stand and fight if the KMT army attacked, and refuse to negotiate until Chang was released. The Communist representatives strongly disagreed and cautioned that civil war would, in the words of Zhou Enlai, "make China into another Spain".[21] Negotiations between the CCP and Nanjing continued. However, when a conference of Northeastern officers in January 1937 overwhelmingly resolved not to surrender peacefully, the CCP reluctantly decided that they could not abandon their allies and pledged to fight alongside them if the KMT attacked. The situation was again reversed when the five most senior Northeastern generals met separately and decided to surrender. The radical officers were enraged and assassinated one of the generals on 2 February, but this only turned the majority of the soldiers against the plan to stand and fight.[23] The Northeastern Army peacefully surrendered to advancing KMT forces and was divided into new units, which were sent to Hebei, Hunan, and Anhui.[24] Yang Hucheng, however, was arrested and eventually executed,[25] while the leaders of the Anti-Japanese Comrade Society defected to the Red Army. Chang was kept under house arrest for over 50 years before emigrating to Hawaii in 1993.[26]
The rapprochement between the Communists and Nationalists outraged the Japanese, and eventually helped lead to the Second Sino-Japanese War.[27] This in turn hastened the two Chinese factions into formalizing their alliance as the Second United Front.[26]
The Xi'an Incident was a turning point for the CCP. Chiang's leadership over political and military affairs in China was affirmed, while the CCP was able to expand its own strength under the new united front, which played a role in the Chinese Communist Revolution.[28]
See also
References
Notes
- ^ Also romanized as the Sian Incident
Citations
- ^ Taylor 2009, p. 100.
- ^ ISBN 9781736850084.
- ^ Taylor 2009, p. 68.
- ^ Garver 1988, p. 5.
- ^ Taylor 2009, p. 125.
- ^ Ch'en 1991, p. 105.
- ^ Taylor 2009, p. 116.
- ^ Ch'en 1991, p. 109.
- ^ a b Worthing 2017, p. 168.
- ^ a b Ch'en 1991, p. 111.
- ^ Taylor 2009, p. 119.
- ^ a b Taylor 2009, p. 127.
- ^ Ray Huang, China: A Macro History (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1997), p. 4.
- ISBN 9780307595881.)
{{cite book}}
: CS1 maint: location missing publisher (link - ^ Taylor 2009, p. 128.
- ^ Worthing 2017, p. 169.
- ^ Itoh 2016, pp. 176–178.
- ^ Eastman 1991, p. 48.
- ^ a b c Barnouin & Yu 2006, p. 67.
- ^ a b Worthing 2016, p. 168.
- ^ a b Itoh 2016, pp. 176–180.
- ISBN 978-1-009-29761-5.
- ^ Itoh 2016, pp. 180–185.
- ^ Itoh 2016, p. 191.
- ^ Wakeman 2003, p. 234.
- ^ a b Eastman 1991, p. 48-49.
- ^ Paine 2012, pp. 102–103.
- ^ Garver 1988, p. 78.
Sources
- Cohen, Paul A (2014). History and Popular Memory: The Power of Story in Moments of Crisis. New York: Columbia University Press. ISBN 978-0231166362.
- Barnouin, Barbara; Yu, Changgen (2006). Zhou Enlai: A Political Life. Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press. Retrieved 28 January 2023.
- Eastman, Lloyd E. (1991). "Nationalist China during the Nanking decade, 1927-1937". In Eastman, Lloyd E. (ed.). The Nationalist Era in China, 1927-1949. New York: Cambridge University Press. ISBN 0521385911.
- Ch'en, Jerome (1991). "The Communist movement, 1927-1937". In Eastman, Lloyd E. (ed.). The Nationalist Era in China, 1927-1949. New York: Cambridge University Press. ISBN 0521385911.
- Garver, John W. (1988). Chinese-Soviet Relations, 1937–1945: The Diplomacy of Chinese Nationalism. New York: Oxford University Press. ISBN 0195363744.
- Paine, Sarah C. (2012). The Wars for Asia 1911–1949. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-1107020696.
- Taylor, Jay (2009). The Generalissimo. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. ISBN 978-0674033382.
- Wakeman, Frederic (2003). Spymaster: Dai Li and the Chinese Secret Service. Berkeley: University of California Press. ISBN 0520234073.
- Worthing, Peter (2017). General He Yingqin: The Rise and Fall of Nationalist China. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-1107144637.
- Itoh, Mayumi (3 October 2016). The Making of China's War with Japan: Zhou Enlai and Zhang Xueliang. Springer. ISBN 978-981-10-0494-0.
- Worthing, Peter (2016). General He Yingqin: The Rise and Fall of Nationalist China. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ISBN 9781107144637.