Cowan rail accident
| Cowan rail accident | |
|---|---|
| Details | |
| Date | 6 May 1990 7:20 pm |
| Location | 3801 Limited, CityRail |
| Incident type | Collision |
| Cause | Signaling fault |
| Statistics | |
| Trains | 2 |
| Deaths | 6 |
| Injured | 106 |
The Cowan rail accident occurred at 7:20pm on 6 May 1990 when the
inter-urban passenger service. The steam train had stalled while attempting to climb the steep gradient from the Hawkesbury River to Cowan, New South Wales, and it was found that sand applied to the rails to regain traction had interfered with the signals and given the following train a false clear indication
.
Overview
The crash occurred approximately 5 kilometres (3.1 mi) south of
traction, but the train came to a complete stop approximately 50 metres clear of the tunnel. Passengers on the steam train reported seeing a signal fluctuating aspects between green and yellow. The following CityRail V set inter-urban train, which had been halted at the northern entrance to Boronia No. 4 tunnel for 10 minutes by a red stop signal
, received a green indication and proceeded, colliding with the steam train shortly after.
The impact killed the driver of the inter-urban train, Gordon Hill, and a passenger who was riding in its cab, as well as four passengers in the rear carriage of 3801's train. The passengers killed were the recently retired
coupling
and push the engine 12 metres forward.
A subsequent
track circuits failed to detect the presence of the first train, allowing the following inter-urban train to be given a false green (clear) aspect (known as a wrong-side failure). Mr Hand also considered it likely that a passenger on 3801 had applied a handbrake
on the third carriage, and that this, combined with the heavy load, the steep grade and the curvature of the line, had prevented the steam train from restarting. No fault was found with the signalling system, although the coroner recommended that it be upgraded as soon as possible.
Contributing factors
Contributing factors include:
- rail vehicles.
- Sand on the rails insulated the train's wheels and prevented the track circuit from detecting it - the train effectively became invisible to the signalling system.
- The signalling system was two-aspect colour light - a three aspect colour light may have provided the driver of the following train with more warning.
- No sand removal system fitted to 3801.
- No mechanism (at the time) for train-to-train or train-to-signalman communication (communication with signal boxes was only possible by track-side phones).
- It is believed that the handbrakes on one of the carriages may have been applied as a stunt.[2]
Consequences
- An interim ban was placed on the use of steam locomotives on the NSW railway system. The ban was lifted 9 months later.
- Operators were required to use one State Rail employee on each train
- Operators were required to carry insurance cover of $10 million. The government agreed to underwrite any claims exceeding that amount.
See also
References
- ^ Fellows of Senate: John Manning Ward AO, Memorial Service, http://sydney.edu.au/senate/Ward_memorial.shtml, Retrieved 17 February 2013
- ISBN 978-0-908876-09-9.
- "1990, May 6, Cowan rail emergency". Emergency Management NSW. Archived from the original on 2 October 2013. Retrieved 15 September 2010.
- "RAIL SAFETY ACT 1993 NEW SOUTH WALES". Retrieved 15 September 2010.