Domino's Pizza, Inc. v. McDonald
Domino's Pizza, Inc. v. McDonald | |
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Case history | |
Prior | Dismissed, No. 02-00311 (D. Nev. Aug. 22, 2002); reversed, 107 Fed. Appx. 18 (9th Cir. 2004); rehearing denied (9th Cir. Aug. 2, 2004); cert. granted, 125 S. Ct. 1928 (2005) |
Holding | |
The agent of a party to a contract cannot state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, because he himself does not have rights to make or enforce under the contract. Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed. | |
Court membership | |
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Case opinion | |
Majority | Scalia, joined by Roberts, Stevens, Kennedy, Souter, Thomas, Ginsburg, Breyer |
Alito took no part in the consideration or decision of the case. | |
Laws applied | |
42 U.S.C. § 1981 (Civil Rights Act of 1866 § 1) |
Domino's Pizza, Inc. v. McDonald, 546 U.S. 470 (2006), is a decision by the
Background
John McDonald, an
McDonald wanted to see the contracts completed, but claimed that the agent threatened "serious consequences" if he did not back out. The agent was alleged to have said to McDonald "I don't like dealing with you people anyway," a phrase she did not explain. The contracts were never completed, and at least in part because of that JWM filed for
The
Domino's filed a
The
Opinion of the Court
The Supreme Court unanimously reversed the Ninth Circuit in a decision delivered by
Section 1981 protects the equal right of "all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States" to "make and enforce contracts" without respect to race.[7] The statute currently defines "make and enforce contracts" to "include the making, performance, modification, and termination of contracts, and the enjoyment of all benefits, privileges, terms, and conditions of the contractual relationship."[8]
The Court rejected McDonald's argument that the statute applied to him because he had "made and enforced contracts" on behalf of JWM. It believed that the right to "make contracts" guaranteed by the statute "was not the insignificant right to act as an
A § 1981 claim must therefore identify an impaired "contractual relationship" under which the plaintiff personally has rights,
The Court did not reject McDonald's alternative argument that § 1981 standing be extended to anyone who was the "actual target" of discrimination, and who loses some benefit that he would have received had a contract not been impaired. The Court believed this theory ignored the "explicit statutory requirement" that the plaintiff be the person whose rights were impaired on account of race. Past cases in which McDonald characterized the plaintiff's contractual relationship as unclear (and therefore, he argued, undermining a requirement of a contractual relationship) provided no support for his position, because those cases simply did not discuss or decide that issue.
McDonald also argued that "many discriminatory acts will go unpunished" if his interpretation of the statute was not adopted. The Court instead believed that the parties who actually suffered a breach of contract would likely pursue available remedies. In response to numerous hypothetical examples of unpunished discrimination described in McDonald's brief, including a scenario in which "Domino's officials had beaten up McDonald in an attempt to intimidate him," the Court simply noted that there are other laws available, particularly criminal law, to address such conduct. "The most important response, however, is that nothing in the text of § 1981 suggests that it was meant to provide an omnibus remedy for all racial injustice. If so, it would not have been limited to situations involving contracts." Giving it a more expansive reading would "produce satellite § 1981 litigation of immense scope," for example permitting class actions by all the minority employees of a nonbreaching party to a broken contract.
See also
Footnotes
- failure to state a claim, the truth of McDonald's factual allegationswere never determined by a court. Instead, the court ruled that, even assuming his allegations of fact were completely true, the law did not afford him a remedy.
- court of appealsto consider the issue has concluded that corporations may bring such a claim.
- ^ This ground for dismissal is set forth under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), and is often referred to in federal civil practice simply as a 12(b)(6) motion.
- ^ McDonald v. Domino's Pizza, Inc., 107 Fed. Appx. 18 (9th Cir. 2004).
- ^ Domino's Pizza, Inc. v. McDonald, 544 U.S. 998 (2005).
- ^ The decision was unanimous among the eight justices participating; because Justice Samuel Alito was not confirmed to the Court until January 31, 2006—over a month after the case had been argued, he did not take part in the decision.
- ^ 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a).
- ^ 42 U.S.C. § 1981(b).
- ^ See Black Codes for an overview of the laws passed after the American Civil War to restrict the rights of freed slaves.
- ^ For this quotation, the Court cited to 1 S. Livermore, A Treatise on the Law of Principal and Agent 215 (1818).
- ^ The Court clarified in a footnote that it purposefully avoided limiting § 1981 claims to parties to contracts, to leave open the possibility that an intended third-party beneficiary of a contract may have rights under § 1981.
External links
- Text of Domino's Pizza, Inc. v. McDonald, 546 U.S. 470 (2006) is available from: Google Scholar Justia Oyez (oral argument audio) Supreme Court (slip opinion) (archived)
- Transcript of oral argument in the case (.pdf)