Hempel's dilemma
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Hempel's dilemma is a question first asked (at least on record) by the philosopher Carl Hempel.[1] It has relevance to naturalism and physicalism in philosophy, and to philosophy of mind.
The dilemma questions how the language of physics can be used to accurately describe existence, given that it relies on imperfect human linguistics, or as Hempel stated: "The thesis of physicalism would seem to require a language in which a true theory of all physical phenomena can be formulated. But it is quite unclear what is to be understood here by a physical phenomenon, especially in the context of a doctrine that has taken a decidedly linguistic turn."[2]
Overview
On the one hand, we may define the physical as whatever is currently explained by our best physical theories, e.g., quantum mechanics, general relativity. Though many would find this definition unsatisfactory, some would accept that we have at least a general understanding of the physical based on these theories, and can use them to assess what is physical and what is not. And therein lies the rub, as a worked-out explanation of mentality currently lies outside the scope of such theories.
On the other hand, if we say that some future, "ideal" physics is what is meant, then the claim is rather empty, for we have no idea of what this means. The "ideal" physics may even come to define what we think of as mental as part of the physical world. In effect, physicalism by this second account becomes the circular claim that all phenomena are explicable in terms of physics because physics properly defined is whatever explains all phenomena.
Beenakker has proposed[3] to resolve Hempel's dilemma with the definition: "The boundary between physics and metaphysics is the boundary between what can and what cannot be computed in the age of the universe".
Hempel's dilemma is relevant to philosophy of mind because explanations of issues such as
References
- ^ Hempel, Carl Gustav (1969), "Reduction: Ontological and linguistic facets", in S. Morgenbesser; P. Suppes; M. White (eds.), Philosophy, Science, and Method: Essays in Honor of Ernest Nagel, New York: St. Martin's Press, pp. 179–199
- ^ Hempel, C. 1980, Comments on Goodman’s Ways of Worldmaking, Synthese, 45: 139-199
- ^ Carlo Beenakker (2007), "Hempel's dilemma and the physics of computation"