Jagiellonian compromise
The Jagiellonian compromise is an
Penrose–Banzhaf index
of a member of a voting body is inversely proportional to the square root of its size. Hence the number of votes obtained by a representative of a state with population
is proportional to .
Jagiellonian Compromise is based on a single criterion only. Decision of the Council of the union of member states is taken if the sum of the weights of states voting in favour of a given proposal exceeds the qualified majority quota equal to
For a generic distribution of population among states of the union, the optimal threshold decreases with as .[4]
See also
References
Footnotes
- ^ Słomczyński & Życzkowski 2004.
- ^ Kirsch 2010; Pukelsheim 2010; Ratzer 2006.
- ^ Highfield, Roger (14 July 2004). "The EU Constitution Is 'Unfair', According to Game Theorists". The Telegraph. London. Retrieved 30 August 2017.
- ^ Życzkowski & Słomczyński 2012.
Bibliography
- Kirsch, Werner (2010). "The Distribution of Power in the Council of Ministers of the European Union". In ISBN 978-1-4094-9995-4.
- Pukelsheim, Friedrich (2010). "Putting Citizens First: Representation and Power in the European Union". In ISBN 978-1-4094-9995-4.
- Ratzer, Edward (2006). "On the 'Jagiellonian Compromise': Voting in the European Union" (PDF). Cambridge, England: University of Cambridge. Retrieved 30 August 2017.
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(help) - Słomczyński, Wojciech; arXiv:cond-mat/0405396.
- S2CID 118756505.