Lisa Bortolotti

philosophy of the cognitive sciences, including philosophy of psychology and philosophy of psychiatry, as well as bioethics and medical ethics. She was educated at the University of Bologna, King's College London, University of Oxford and the Australian National University, and worked briefly at the University of Manchester before beginning at Birmingham, where she has been a lecturer, senior lecturer, reader

Bloomsbury Academic, 2023). Delusions and Other Irrational Beliefs, in which Bortolotti challenges the argument that delusions cannot be beliefs due to their irrationality, was the winner of the 2011 American Philosophical Association book prize. In addition, she edited Philosophy and Happiness (Palgrave Macmillan

doctoral thesis, which was supervised by Martin Davies, challenged Donald Davidson's account of belief ascription. She completed her PhD in 2004.^[1]

Polity.^[2] A Portuguese version was published in 2013.^[3]

Mary Warnock saying that "[d]espite its title, it's a gripping read".^[13]

US$4000 award.^[15] The book was reviewed in a number of publications,^{[16][17][18][19][20]} and was the subject of a special issue in the journal Neuroethics. The issue, edited by Neil Levy, contained five articles engaging with the book. These were by: Jakob Hohwy and Vivek Rajan;^[21] Eric Schwitzgebel;^[22] Dominic Murphy;^[23] Keith Frankish;^[24] and Maura Tumulty.^[25] In addition, Bortolotti contributed a précis of the book^[26] and an article in defence of some of her claims.^[27]

Bloomsbury Academic.^[37]

the delusion that one is actually dead—and because they work differently from paradigmatic beliefs. For example, delusions are often maintained despite overwhelming counter-evidence, or are not reacted to in the way one would expect given their content.^[26]

epistemic irrationality of delusions, i.e., the fact that they are not supported by evidence. This can also not be used to challenge the status of delusions as beliefs, she argues, as many widespread ordinary beliefs are also epistemically irrational. She next addresses the idea that delusions are not beliefs as, first, they are not acted upon in the appropriate way, and, second, people with delusions cannot provide good reasons for their holding the content of the delusion. Though allowing that these characterisations of people with delusions can be correct, she argues that these failures of so-called agential rationality can also be found in people who do not have delusions. Bortolotti holds that the status of thoughts which subjects do not endorse (such as inserted thoughts) as beliefs is in question, but that beliefs that are both endorsed and self-ascribed contribute to one's conception of self as part of a self-narrative.^[26]

Bloomsbury's Science, Ethics & Innovation series. She has served on the editorial board of a number of journals, as well as acting as the review editor for Frontiers in Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology, associate editor for Ethical Theory and Moral Practice and e-letter's editor for the Journal of Medical Ethics.^[1] She has guest-edited or co-guest-edited several journal special issues, including issues of the European Journal of Analytic Philosophy,^[39] the Journal of Consciousness Studies,^[40] and Consciousness and Cognition.^[41]