Mere evidence rule
In the law of the United States, the mere evidence rule was a historical doctrine that defined the scope of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
Origins
![](http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/4/47/Joseph_Philo_Bradley_-_Brady-Handy.jpg/150px-Joseph_Philo_Bradley_-_Brady-Handy.jpg)
The mere evidence rule was drawn from the opinion of the
The mere evidence rule was solidified in the case Gouled v. United States. In Gouled, the Court found a Fourth Amendment violation when a warrant was used to obtain the defendant's documents that were later used at trial. Gouled also suggested that more than just papers were categorically protected by the Fourth Amendment.[3] This led to the classic articulation of the mere evidence rule, which stated that the Fourth Amendment allowed only search and seizure of instrumentalities, fruits of the crime, and contraband, and that mere evidence could not be searched or seized.[4]
The mere evidence rule has been praised as a valuable protection of individual privacy. For instance, in United States v. Poller, Judge Learned Hand observed that "limitations upon the fruit to be gathered tend to limit the quest itself."[5]
Demise
By the beginning of the twentieth century the mere evidence rule was facing criticism. Approval of government regulation of property was eroding the traditional sanctity of property rights, the conception of the Fourth Amendment as a right to privacy was gaining support, and the government was becoming dissatisfied with the obstruction of criminal investigations that strict adherence to the rule engendered.[6] In Hale v. Henkel, the Supreme Court held that the mere evidence rule did not apply to corporations.[7] In Shapiro v. United States, the Court held that the mere evidence rule did not prohibit searches, seizures, or admission of records that the individual was legally required to keep.[8] In Marron v. United States, the Court expanded the definition of "instrumentalities" to broadly reach property used in the commission of a crime.[9]
The real dismantling of the mere evidence rule began with
The abandonment of the mere evidence rule has been criticized. Professor Russell W. Galloway argued that the rule was a rational limitation on searches, and that its rejection paved the way for more intrusive paper searches and less protection for third parties.[12]
References
- ^ Stanton D. Krauss, The Life and Times of Boyd v. United States (1886-1976), 76 Mich. L. Rev. 184, 212 (1977)
- ^ Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886)
- ^ Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298 (1921)
- ^ Warden, Maryland Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967)
- ^ United States v. Poller, 43 F.2d 911, 914 (2nd Cir. 1930)
- ^ Krauss at 191-195
- ^ Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906)
- ^ Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1 (1948)
- ^ Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192 (1927)
- ^ Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966)
- ^ Warden, Maryland Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 309 (1967)
- ^ Russell W. Galloway, Jr., The Intruding Eye: A Status Report on the Constitutional Ban against Paper Searches, 25 How. L.J. 367, 382-385 (1982)