Nietzschean affirmation

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Nietzschean affirmation (German: Bejahung) is a concept that has been scholarly identified in the philosophy of Friedrich Nietzsche. An example used to describe the concept is a fragment in Nietzsche's The Will to Power:

Suppose that we said yes to a single moment, then we have not only said yes to ourselves, but to the whole of existence. For nothing stands alone, either in ourselves or in things; and if our soul did but once vibrate and resound with a chord of happiness, then all of eternity was necessary to bring forth this one occurrence—and in this single moment when we said yes, all of eternity was embraced, redeemed, justified and affirmed.

— Nietzsche, Friedrich, The Will to Power: Selections from the Notebooks of the 1880s (translated by R. Kevin Hill and Michael A. Scarpitti). Penguin Books, 2017, p. 566[1]

Opposition to Schopenhauer

Walter Kaufmann wrote that Nietzsche "celebrates the Greeks who, facing up to the terrors of nature and history, did not seek refuge in 'a Buddhistic negation of the will,' as Schopenhauer did, but instead created tragedies in which life is affirmed as beautiful in spite of everything."[2][3] Schopenhauer’s negation of the will was a saying "no" to life and to the world, which he judged to be a scene of pain and evil. "[D]irectly against Schopenhauer’s place as the ultimate nay-sayer to life, Nietzsche positioned himself as the ultimate yes-sayer...."[4] Nietzsche's affirmation of life's pain and evil, in opposition to Schopenhauer, resulted from an overflow of life.[5] Schopenhauer's advocacy of self-denial and negation of life was, according to Nietzsche, very harmful.[6] For his entire mature life, Nietzsche was concerned with the damage that he thought resulted from Schopenhauerian disgust with life and turning against the world.

Derridean interpretation

Rousseau's perspective focuses on deciphering the truth and origin of language
and its many signs, an often exhaustive occupation. Derrida's response to Nietzsche, however, offers an active participation with these signs and arrives at, in Derridean philosophy, a more resolute response to language.

In "Structure, Sign, and Play", Derrida articulates Nietzsche's perspective as:

... the joyous affirmation of the play of the world and of the innocence of becoming, the affirmation of a world of signs without fault, without truth, and without origin which is offered to an active interpretation.[7]

Derrida not only fostered Nietzsche's work but evolved it within the sphere of language; in doing so, he acquired and employs Nietzsche's optimism in his conception of the 'play' of language - that is inherent in language - as being far more than just "the substitution of given and existing, present, pieces".[7] Much of this spirit resides in the abandonment of any sort of new humanism; this acceptance of the inevitable allows for considerable relief – evident in the designation of the loss of center as a non-center – as well as the opportunity to affirm and cultivate play, which enables humanity and the humanities "to pass beyond man and humanism".[7]

In Deleuzean ontology

In

Hegelian dialectic.[8]

See also

References

  1. ^ Original German: Gesetzt, wir sagen Ja zu einem einzigen Augenblick, so haben wir damit nicht nur zu uns selbst, sondern zu allem Dasein Ja gesagt. Denn es steht Nichts für sich, weder in uns selbst noch in den Dingen: und wenn nur ein einziges Mal unsre Seele wie eine Saite vor Glück gezittert und getönt hat, so waren alle Ewigkeiten nöthig, um dies Eine Geschehen zu bedingen – und alle Ewigkeit war in diesem einzigen Augenblick unseres Jasagens gutgeheißen, erlöst, gerechtfertigt und bejaht. (Wille zur Macht, fragment §1032.)
  2. Encyclopedia of Philosophy
    , "Friedrich Nietzsche," vol. 5, Macmillan, New York, 1967, p. 507.
  3. Die Geburt der Tragödie aus dem Geiste der Musik, § 7
    ).
  4. ^ A Companion to Schopenhauer, edited by Bart Vandenabeele, Part IV, ch. 19, article by Ken Gemes and Christopher Janaway, "Life-Denial versus Life-Affirmation: Schopenhauer and Nietzsche on Pessimism and Asceticism," Blackwell, New York, 2012, p. 289
  5. Ecce Homo
    , The Birth of Tragedy, § 2)
  6. scepticism which always dug deeper! It was precisely here that I saw the great danger to humanity, its most sublime temptation and seduction." (Nietzsche, Ecce Homo
    , "Why I Write Such Good Books," "The Birth of Tragedy," §2.)
  7. ^ a b c Derrida, Jacques. "Structure, Sign, and Play in the Discourse of the Humanities." Writing and Difference. Trans. Alan Bass. Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1978. 278–293.
  8. ^ Smith, Daniel, John Protevi, and Daniela Voss. "Gilles Deleuze". Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Retrieved 30 April 2023.{{cite web}}: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link)
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