Sabuktakin

Source: Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia.
Not to be confused with the founder of the
Ghaznavid dynasty, Sabuktigin
.

Sabuktakin or Sübüktegin was a

Fatimids
.

Life

Sabuktakin was a

Samanids.[3][4] There he also had to face the revolt of a Daylamite contingent in his army, led by a certain Burarish.[5] Appointed to the post of chamberlain (hajib), Sabuktakin was primarily the commander of his fellow Turkic slave-soldiers (ghilman, sing. ghulam), but in addition he also functioned as commander-in-chief of the entire army (amir al-jaysh).[6] He amassed a huge fortune, and built a large palace in the Mukharrim quarter of Baghdad.[7] At the time of his death, he is reported to have possessed 10,000 camels and 4,000 brocade garments, including 2,000 of fine shushari silk and 500 prized pieces from the state factories of the Byzantine Empire.[8]

Sabuktakin was one of a number of Turkic generals promoted to high office by Mu'izz al-Dawla as part of a policy designed to balance the dominant

Bakhtiyar Izz al-Dawla (r. 967–978), tried to conciliate and balance the two groups, but largely in vain.[12]

Conflict with Bakhtiyar Izz al-Dawla

Map of Iraq in the 9th–10th centuries

As part of the efforts to strike a balance between the two groups, Mu'izz al-Dawla in his testament explicitly recommended to Bakhtiyar to retain Sabuktakin in office.

Hamdanid ruler of Mosul, Abu Taghlib.[13] The Hamdanids abandoned Mosul without a fight, but sent an army to threaten Baghdad, forcing Sabuktakin to return to the capital to confront the Hamdanids there. In the meantime, Bakhtiyar was left with little military strength in Mosul; the contemporary historian Miskawayh assumed that Sabuktakin deliberately delayed coming to his aid, and that he was conspiring with the Hamdanids to depose the Buyids. In the event, Bakhtiyar was forced to come to terms with the Hamdanids, making concessions to them. This deepened the rift between Bakhtiyar and Sabuktakin.[13][15]

In the meantime, Sabuktakin was able to use the widespread calls for

Shi'a Buyids and their supporters.[16] As the contemporary historian Miskawayh commented, "the dispute between the two factions, which had formerly been on religious questions, now became political as well, as the Shi'a adopted the watchword of Bakhtiyar and the Daylamites while the Sunni adopted that of Sabuktakin and the Turks".[16]

Uprising

These events made the breach between Sabuktakin and his ostensible master inevitable: following the advice of

honorific title of Nasr al-Dawla.[23]

As the historian Hugh Kennedy comments, within a few months Sabuktakin had established what amounted to a Turkish emirate in Baghdad.[20] Sabuktakin appears initially to have been content with ruling over Baghdad, and proposed leaving southern Iraq to the Buyids, but this was evidently unacceptable to the Buyids and untenable in the long run, as it would leave the Turks sandwiched between the Hamdanids in the north and the Buyids in the south.[22] Before long, Sabuktakin and his forces marched on Wasit.[20]

Bakhtiyar's position at Wasit was saved by turning to his relatives in Iran for assistance.

Fars, arrived to his aid. In addition, Sabuktakin died on the way to Wasit.[20][24][25]

Aftermath

Sabuktakin was succeeded by another ghulam, Alptakin, who lacked Sabuktakin's ability and was now faced with superior Buyid forces, which were joined by Arab bedouin tribes and the Hamdanids.[26] Defeated in January 975 near the Diyala River, Alptakin moved west to Damascus with about 300 of his followers.[27] Alptakin and his men ruled the city for a while, before they entered the service of the Fatimid Caliphate.[28] Buyid control over Baghdad was restored, but the events had severely shaken the foundation of Buyid power in the area, and Baghdad entered a period of decline that lasted for the rest of the Buyid era.[20][29]

Sabuktakin's utilization of anti-Shi'a sentiment in his conflict with the Buyids was also the first instance that the Turks as a people first became associated with the anti-Shi'a faction, presaging the policies of the

Seljuks and the Sunni Revival of the 11th century.[16]

References

  1. ^ Busse 2004, p. 36.
  2. ^ Donohue 2003, p. 44 (note 146).
  3. ^ Bosworth 1975, p. 258.
  4. ^ Donohue 2003, p. 36 (note 103).
  5. ^ Donohue 2003, p. 40.
  6. ^ Busse 2004, pp. 258–259, 329.
  7. ^ Busse 2004, pp. 195, 259.
  8. ^ Busse 2004, p. 259.
  9. ^ Donohue 2003, pp. 40–44.
  10. ^ Busse 2004, p. 329.
  11. ^ a b Bosworth 1975, p. 265.
  12. ^ Busse 2004, pp. 36, 334–335.
  13. ^ a b c d e Kennedy 2004, p. 223.
  14. ^ Bosworth 1975, pp. 265–266.
  15. ^ Busse 2004, pp. 43.
  16. ^ a b c Kennedy 2004, p. 228.
  17. ^ Kennedy 2004, pp. 223–224.
  18. ^ Busse 2004, p. 198.
  19. ^ Busse 2004, p. 424.
  20. ^ a b c d e Kennedy 2004, p. 224.
  21. ^ Busse 2004, pp. 143–144.
  22. ^ a b Busse 2004, p. 44.
  23. ^ Busse 2004, p. 169.
  24. ^ Busse 2004, pp. 44–45.
  25. ^ Bosworth 1975, pp. 266, 267.
  26. ^ Kennedy 2004, pp. 206, 224.
  27. ^ Kennedy 2004, pp. 205–206, 224.
  28. ^ Kennedy 2004, p. 206.
  29. ^ Busse 2004, pp. 399–400.

Sources

  • ISBN 0-521-20093-8
    .
  • Busse, Heribert (2004) [1969]. Chalif und Grosskönig - Die Buyiden im Irak (945-1055) [Caliph and Great King - The Buyids in Iraq (945-1055)] (in German). Würzburg: Ergon Verlag.
    ISBN 3-89913-005-7
    .
  • Donohue, John J. (2003). The Buwayhid Dynasty in Iraq 334 H./945 to 403 H./1012: Shaping Institutions for the Future. Leiden and Boston: Brill.
    ISBN 90-04-12860-3
    .
  • ISBN 978-0-582-40525-7
    .
Retrieved from "https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Sabuktakin&oldid=1195912380"