Talk:Nuclear program of Iran/Archive 3

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Archive 1

Archive 2

Archive 3

Archive 4

Archive 5

Archive 6

I created the second archive of the discussion as it was greatly needed. N i g h t F a l c o n 9 0 9 0 9' ^{T a l k} 16:34, 6 March 2007 (UTC)

It seems that the title 2000-2006 was no good, because the next section was entitled August 31 2006 - 2007 I believe. In any case, I changed it to 2000-August 2006 However, the first entry there is 2002, so we should change it to 2002-August 2006 perhaps? Why can't we just put everything from 2006 in the same section? that would be cleaner. This is minor, I know, but it is bugging me ;-) N i g h t F a l c o n 9 0 9 0 9' ^{T a l k} 16:26, 6 March 2007 (UTC)

1- ENTEC was set up for the transfer of the FULL NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE and not "to operate Bushehr". If you think it was only meant to "operate Bushehr" then POST YOUR CITATION AS I HAVE POSTED MINE.

2- STOP INSISTING THAT IRAN WAS REQUIRED TO BE REPORTED TO THE UNSC WHEN I HAVE SPELLED OUT VERSE BY VERSE WHAT XII.C and ARTICLE 19 says, I have furhter cited 3 sources that say that "diversion of miltiary use" is required, the now I have a fourth THAT YOU DELETED WITHOUT JUSTIFICATION:

QUOTE"[N]ot all safeguards violations—such as minor discrepancies in accounting for the disposition of thorium—seem to credibly threaten international peace and security. While the fuel-cycle has dangerous proliferation potential, it is nonetheless entirely legal under the NPT to build and operate, which raises the question of how an activity that is otherwise legal can support a legal finding that the activity itself implicates international peace and security. If it could be shown that Iran harbors a subjective intent to use the fuel cycle to build nuclear weapons, a threat to international peace and security would surely exist. But absent the discovery of nuclear weapons, nuclear weapons designs, or an unequivocal statement about pursuing nuclear weapons (such as that made by North Korea when it announced its withdrawal from the NPT), it is very difficult to prove subjective intent solely on the basis of other nuclear activities a country is involved in. Many of these activities are legal under the NPT, and can be used virtually interchangeably for peaceful or weapons purposes.

SOURCE:http://www.asil.org/insights/2004/10/insight041105.htm —Preceding unsigned comment added by 12.26.54.10 (talk) 20:57, 4 February 2008 (UTC)

Unfortunately, the real problem is the person complaining here, who simply refuses to consider other people's arguments on the merits. I am a subject matter expert on safeguards compliance issues. Really. The person who is complaining clearly is not. NPguy (talk) 02:41, 5 February 2008 (UTC)

Don't pull the "I am an expert" nonsense. So am I. Go start your own blog if you want to interject your own opinions instead of facts. Wikipedia is not your personal blog and this isn't the place to resolve "arguments" - it is a place to cite sources. I have provided several sources and cited them - valid, authoritative sources - and you simply delete them and insert a bare sentence without any citations. If you have contrary soures, cite them along with mine and let the readers decide. But in the meantime, here's my fifth source (found at http://www.payvand.com/news/07/dec/1044.html) in support of the contention that Iran's breaches of safeguards did not amount to a violation of the NPT justifying UNSC referral, written by Dr M. Sahimi of USC who has also published Forced to Fuel at the Harvard International Review (http://www.harvardir.org/articles/1294/)

Violating the NPT versus Breaching the Safeguards Agreement

Another widely misunderstood issue is the difference between a NPT Member State violating the NPT itself versus breaching its Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA. As explained below, the former is much more serious than the latter. This established, but subtle, fact has either been not appreciated, or has been ignored by most of the so-called pundits.

According to the Provisions of the NPT, the Treaty is violated if a Member State violates the NPT's three main Articles [27] regarding nuclear weapons, namely, when it

(i) Secretly assists or encourages another Member State to develop nuclear weapons or explosives, or transfers such weapons or explosives, or their control, to any recipient (Article I);

(ii) Secretly develops nuclear weapons and/or explosives, which means that it diverts its declared nuclear materials and facilities to bomb making, or receives such items from another source (Article II), or

(iii) Transfers its nuclear know-how and materials to a non-Member State (Article III).

When does a Member State breach its Safeguards Agreement? Article III.A.5 of the IAEA Statute [16] authorizes the Agency...

To establish and administer safeguards designed to ensure that special fissionable and other materials, services, equipment, facilities and information made available by the Agency or at its request or under its supervision or control are not used in such a way as to further any military purpose; and to apply safeguards, at the request of the Parties, to any bilateral or multilateral arrangement, or at the request of a State, to any of the State's activities in the field of atomic energy.

Thus, in the absence of any action by a Member State to "further any military purpose," a breach happens when a Member State [24]

(i) Receives nuclear materials (not bombs) and/or technology without declaring them to the IAEA;

(ii) Carries out secret experiments with its declared or undeclared nuclear materials that have a military purpose or application, and

(iii) Sets up nuclear facilities without informing the IAEA according to the due process described in the Subsidiary Arrangements of its Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA.

According to such internationally-accepted norms, protocols, and agreements, then, Iran has not violated its NPT obligations (i.e., has not been involved in nuclear bomb making).

Moreover, since the IAEA has never declared that Iran's (minor) breaches of its Safeguards Agreement (see below), and the experiments that it carried out in the past without declaring them to the Agency were aimed "to further any military purpose," Iran has also satisfied its Safeguards obligations, except for the minor breaches described below. In fact, since 2003 Iran has not committed any breaches.

You're free to disagree, but you can't use Wikipedia for your own opinions and you MUST acknowledge contrary facts.

There seems to be an effort by someone to misconstrue the legal application of Iran's safeguards agreement with respect to declared and undeclared nuclear activities.

Iran's basic safeguard agreement with the IAEA only applies to declared nuclear activities. The purpose of the Additional Protocol is to address the potential existence of undeclared nuclear activities. The IAEA has certified, twice, that the declared nuclear material and activities in Iran have been accounted for and none have been diverted to military use. Therefore, as Michael Spies of the Lawyer's Committee for Nuclear Policy has written, Iran is in fact in compliance with its basic safeguards agreement.

The question of the potential existence of undeclared nuclear activities is dealt with by the Additional Protocol. The IAEA only certifies the absence of undeclared nuclear activities in countries which have ratified the Additional Protocol. Iran has not ratified it, and is thus not legally bound by it (though Iran has permitted the expanded inspections anyway for a period of approximately 2 years.) This is not a violation of Iran's safeguard agreement, nor is it a basis for suspicion. According to the last IAEA report, this does indeed put Iran in the same category as 32 other nations. The following paragraphs, which are supported by the analysis by the Lawyer's Committee on Nuclear Policy, accurately reflect these facts and should not be removed:

• Iran asserts that there is no legal basis for Iran's referral to the United Nations Security Council since the IAEA has not proven that previously undeclared activities had a relationship to a weapons program, and that all declared nuclear material in Iran had been accounted for and had not been diverted to military purposes. Article 19 of Iran's safeguards agreement allows a report to the Security Council if the IAEA is unable to verify that nuclear material has not been diverted. Article XII.C of the IAEA Statute requires a report to the UN Security Council for noncompliance with the safeguards provisions, which only apply to declared nuclear material. The IAEA has twice certified that all declared nuclear material in Iran has been accounted for, and none has been diverted to military use. As the Lawyer's Committee for Nuclear Policy has explained^[1], the conclusion that no diversion has occurred certifies that the state in question is in compliance with its basic safeguards agreement to not divert material to non-peaceful purposes. In the case of Iran, the IAEA was able to conclude in its November 2004 report that that all declared nuclear materials had been accounted for and therefore none had been diverted to military purposes. The IAEA reached this same conclusion in September 2005.
• The IAEA has stated that it cannot verify the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran, and as a result cannot certify the peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear program. The IAEA only formally verifies the absence of undeclared nuclear material for countries that have ratified the Additional Protocol. According to the IAEA's own Annual Safeguards Implementation Report of 2004^[2], of the 61 states where both the NPT safeguards and the Additional protocol are implemented, the IAEA has certified the absence of undeclared nuclear activity for only 21 countries, leaving Iran in the same category as 40 other countries including Canada, the Czech Republic, and South Africa.
• Iran agreed to implement the Additional Protocol under the terms of the October 2003 Tehran agreement and its successor, the November 2004 Paris agreement, and did so for 2 years before withdrawing from the Paris agreement in early 2006. Since then, Iran has offered not only to ratify the Additional Protocol, but to implement transparency measures on its nuclear program that exceed the Additional Protocol, as long as its right to operate an enrichment program is recognized. The UN Security Council, however, insists that Iran must suspend all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 12.26.54.10 (talk) 14:53, 27 September 2007 (UTC)

Sorry, but this analysis is essentially incorrrect. Iran's safeguards agreement requires Iran to declare all its nuclear material. That's in Article I of the agreement. As a legal matter, the IAEA considers nuclear material to be diverted if it has been declared and then went missing or if it was never declared at all. After the revelations in 1991 about Iraq's clandestine nuclear weapons program, the IAEA conclouded that the safeguards agreement by itself did not give the Agency the tools it needed to deal effectively with undeclared nuclear activities. The Additional Protocol strengthens the IAEA's capabilities to deal with undeclared activities, but it is not the basis for its responsibility to address undeclared activities or of Iran's responsibility to declare them. NPguy 03:03, 28 September 2007 (UTC)

• Not sure what is incorrect about the analysis since you just repeated what I wrote. The IAEA has said that all declared material has been accounted for - and thus the requirements of Iran's safeguards agreement have been met. THe Additional protoco is indeed "not the basis for its responsibility" to verify the absence of undeclared nuclear material, however the purpose of the additional protocol is in fact to determine the absence of undeclared nuclear material, and unless a state has ratified the AP then the IAEA won't verify the absence of undeclared nuclear material. [anonymous]

I wish you would sign your posts. I never know if this is one person or several, or where your posts begin and end. Here are some specific errors in your argument:

• You state that "Iran's basic safeguard agreement with the IAEA only applies to declared nuclear activities." In fact, Iran's safeguards agreement applies to all nuclear material in Iran.

• Therefore, the claim by Michael Spies (assuming you cite him correctly) that "Iran is in fact in compliance with its basic safeguards agreement" is unfounded.

Ummm... no. You are not qualified to judge what the Lawyer's Committee for Nuclear Policy says is "unfounded" because obviously you don't know what you're talking about. The safeguard agreement applicable to Iran (as with others) requires that there be no diversion of nuclear material to weapons-related activities. The IAEA's certification that all declared nuclear material has been accounted for, and none has been diverted for weapons-related activities, means that Iran was in compliance with its safeguards agreement, just as Michael Spies states. Without the Additional Protocol in force, the IAEA can only state this about declared material in Iran or in any other country. Of course you can speculate that "undeclared" material exists in Iran, but that's speculation. Nothing in Iran's safeguards agreement requires Iran to prove the absense of undeclared activities. In fact, tHat's why we now have the Additional Protocol, which implements more stringent inspections designed to verify the absence of undeclared nuclear material/activities. And Iran implemented the Additional Protocol for 2 years, with still no evidence of undeclared material/activities.

It is annoying that you feel the need to interrupt another persons's argument with an unsigned ad hominem response that completely misses the point. You continue to fail to address the issue on the merits. The word "all" is in the safeguards agreement for a reason, and the IAEA's conclusion of non-diversion of declared material is not the same as a determination of compliance. During the mid-1990s, when the Additional Protocol was being formulated, the IAEA argued that the failure to declare material is a "diversion" of material that should have been declared but wasn't. NPguy (talk) 04:24, 19 January 2008 (UTC)

• The statement that "Article XII.C of the IAEA Statute requires a report to the UN Security Council for noncompliance with the safeguards provisions, which only apply to declared nuclear material" is also wrong, since the provisions of the safeguards agreement apply to all nuclear material in Iran.

• • All nuclear material in Iran has been declared. You can speculate about the existence of undeclared material, but there's no evidence of that according to the IAEA.

How can you possibly know that all nuclear material in Iran has been declared? NPguy (talk) 04:24, 19 January 2008 (UTC)

Once a country violates its safeguards agreement, as Iran did for 18 years, the burden of proof is on that country to demonstrate that it has come back into compliance with its safeguards obligation to provide a complete declaration. One way to do that would be to implement the Additional Protocol. Another would be to cooperate with the IAEA to resolve open questions (see Article 3 of the safeguards agreement) and respond to the IAEA's requests for information (see Article 69).

• • All of which Iran has done, and more, according to the IAEA (See Nov 15 2007 report) Iran has further offered to continue the implementation of the Additional Protocol.

The bulk of the provisions of the safeguards agreement apply to declared material and facilities, and most safeguards implementation is focused on declared material and facilities. But it is incorrect to claim that the safeguards agreement deals only with declared materials and unwarranted to conclude that simply by observing the provisions of its safeguards agreement that deal with declared materials Iran is complying fully with its safeguards obligations. NPguy 04:01, 5 October 2007 (UTC)

What you don't seem to want to understand is this: the point is that the IAEA can ONLY reach conclusions about declared material. WIthout the Additional Protocol in place (in Iran or in any other country) the IAEA does NOT make any determination about undeclared activities.

I understand perfectly well, and I recognize that Iran has taken steps to rectify its safeguards violations. But Iran's "offer" to implement the Additional Protocol is hollow. Why not simply implement it? What does Iran have to hide? And iran still hasn't taken the most important step of suspending its enrichment program as required by the UN Security C'ouncil. Why does Iran refuse the offer by the Council to cooperate with Iran's nuclear energy program if Iran suspends enrichment? NPguy (talk) 04:24, 19 January 2008 (UTC)

These are rhetorical questions not legal ones. Iran is absolutely under no obligation WHATSOEVER to do anything beyond rectify its safeguard breaches which it has done. It was under no obligation WHATSOEVER to allow additional inspections and implement the Additional Protocol, which it did. It has met its burden. If you have suspicions of your own, Wikipedia is not the place to air them. The UNSC's offer to "cooperate" with Iran's nuclear program effectively deprives Iran of the sovereign right to operate its own nuclear fuel cycle. Get your own blog and rant and rave there. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 12.26.54.10 (talk) 18:27, 5 February 2008 (UTC)

Or, similarly, someone from within Iran. I'm tempted to revert this page back to the STONE AGE!

So let me understand this. Iran is building nukes because of "Lack of confidence in the international community"? That sentence right there just screams bias. Where are the wikicops when you need em? —Preceding unsigned comment added by 75.140.22.70 (talk) 19:40, 19 October 2007 (UTC)

I have to say... was this written by the Shah himself? I mean wow. I came here looking for unbiased factual information, and was pretty shocked. I'm not going to touch the article, though.

This article even claims that the furor over their nuclear program is not that they could be developing nuclear weapons, but that they might get the technology to do so vis a vis a civillian program. Are you serious? So no one, right or wrong, believes that they might have a weapons program now? It's not even worth a footnote?

Good luck.

207.115.84.2 (talk) 23:47, 6 June 2008 (UTC)davepl

Gawdat Bahgat, whose opinions are featured so prominently at the opening paragraphs of this article, is entitled to his view that Iran is seeking a nuclear "capability" but that is only an opinion and so should not be there unless countervailing facts are presented, namely, that any country with a basic nuclear infrastructure including Japan, S Korea, Argentina, and Brazil are similarly theoretically "capable" of making nukes at some indefinite point in the future if they so decide, thus making the charge against Iran a lot of nonsense. Furthermore, the fact should be presented that Iran has offered - repeatedly - to take steps well beyond its legal obligations to minimize the remote possibility that a civilian, IAEA monitored nuclear program could even theoretically be diverted to weapons use by, for example, offering to renounce plutonium reprocessing and by placing significant limits to its uranium program. The insistence on repeatedly editing out these facts and instead relying on vague and essentially meaningless statements about "capabilities" is an indicator of bias.

I am shocked at the heavy pro-Iran bias in this discussion. There is no hint that Iran persistently violated its safeguards agreement with the IAEA for nearly two decadees, as the IAEA reported to the Board of Governors in November 2003 [1], which the Board of Governors recognized as noncompliance in September 2005 [2] and asked that it be reported to the UN Security Council in February 2006 [3]. The nuclear activities that Iran deliberately concealed from the IAEA -- in violation of the safeguards agreement it undertook pursuant to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty -- are those most directly related to the development of a nuclear weapons capability, namely uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing.

It is unfortunately true that IAEA Director General ElBaradei said that there was no "evidence" that Iran had a nuclear weapons program. Such a statement is both ouside the IAEA's responsibility (to detect and report diversions and noncompliance) and was based on a tortured reading of the word "evidence" as tantamount to "proof." There is ample circumstantial evidence that Iran was pursuing the development of a nuclear weapons capability -- perhaps not weapons themselves but the key capability to produce material that can be used in weapons. This evidence comes both from the fact that Iran pursued enrichment and reprocessing capabilities in violation of its NPT safeguards obligations and from the fact that it lacks a plausible economic justification for an enrichment program. In general, a country would need a large number of operating nuclear power plants for investment in an enrichment capability to make economic sense, where Iran lacks even a single operating nuclear power plant.

Indeed, Dr. ElBaradei has noted that Iran's actions have created a "confidence deficit," and that it is up to Iran to take action to restore confidence. Iran has been offered assistance in nuclear power and an assured supply of nuclear fuel, if it takes the but only if Iran suspendes its enrichment program. These offers would provide a much more rapid and reliable means for Iran to meet its future energy needs than its current course. The fact that Iran continues to reject these offers further erodes international confidence in its intent.

Reputable international bodies have judged the "offers" to be merely "empty boxes" - and Iran is under no obligaton whatsoever to allow itself to become reliant on foreign sources of nuclear fuel. Iran has offered to implement limits and restrictions on its nuclear program well beyond any legal obligations and beyond what other countries have allowed, but only if its rights are recognized in return. Thus far, the United States has formally stated that it will not tolerate a "single spiining centrifuge" in Iran.

The UN Security Council is the competent international authority responsible for maintaining international peace and security. Under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the Council has the authority to demand action by a UN Member State if necessary to maintain international peace and security. Acting under that authority, the Council has demanded that Iran suspend its enrichment program [4]. Iran's refusal to do so is a violation of international law and compounds concerns over Iran's intentions. NPguy 02:15, 25 March 2007 (UTC)

"ample circumstantial evidence" - let's hope you never sit on a jury. 172.159.217.202 14:41, 24 July 2007 (UTC)

This misses the point. First or all, I am concerned that the IAEA report used the word "evidence" as if it were synonymous with "proof." The circumstances of Iran's enrichment program are highly suspicious: Iran pursued this program in secret and violated its NPT safeguards obligations. It did not need enrichment for peaceful purposes because it had no nuclear power program. But enrichment is a key step to nuclear weapons. This constitutes "evidence," albeit circumstantial, of a weapons program. Granted, the evidence falls short of "proof," but it is not lightly dismissed.

But my larger concern is that the whole issue is a red herring. The NPT and its verification regime - IAEA safeguards - do not require - or even ask for - "proof" of a weapons program. Safeguards aim to detect telltale signs of cheating - secret activities or the diversion of nuclear materials - to allow the international community to respond promptly and effectively. Demanding "proof" of a weapons program sets too high a threshold.

According to the specific terms of Article 19 of Irans' safeguard agreement, Iran was required to allow inspectors to account for nuclear material to ensure that none has been diverted. The IAEA certified that all nuclear material in Iran has been accounted for and none has been diverted. While it is true that the IAEA has also said that it can't certify the absence of undeclared material, the IAEA only certifies that for nations that have ratified the Additional Protocol - and so iran is among 36 other countries. One can speculate about the existence of undeclared facilities and material, and the purpose of the Additional Protocol is to verify the absence of undeclared material. Iran had voluntarily implemented the Additional Protocol of the course of the Paris Agreement negotiations (which were violated by the EU, incidentally) and no undeclared material turned up after 2 years of inspections. And, Iran has offered to ratify the Additional Protocol once its rights are recognized.

By the time such proof is available, it is likely to be too late to respond.

More nonsense. This is the old "we can't wait for the mushroom cloud" argument put forth to evade the fact that there was no evidence of WMDs in Iraq. The fact is that Iran has been subject to over 2000 man-hours of inspections and no weapons program has turned up - which is precisely why the Bush administration is resorting to arguments about future intentions and "capabilities".

This may seem like a legal technicality, but it goes to the core of the purpose of the NPT. The spread of nuclear weapons poses such a large threat to international security that the international community has decided that it cannot afford to wait for such proof. And Iran, as a party to the NPT, has accepted the threshold set in the NPT. NPguy 03:16, 25 July 2007 (UTC)

More nonsense. The whole purpose of the IAEA and the NPT is to allow the peaceful use of nuclear technology, "to the fullest extent possible" and "without discrimination". It specifically envisages the sharing of nuclear technology without limitation, including the full nuclear fuel cycle. Iran abided by that and was cooperating with the IAEA in a program to develop uranium enrichment technology when the US pressured the IAEA to drop its technical assistance program with Iran in 1983. The US subsequently pressured other nations to drop their contracts with Iran. Iran has every right to use nuclear technology - the same right that the US has.

Sorry but the UNSC does not have the authority to demand that a nation give up rights that are recognized by a treaty such as Iran's inalienable right to nuclear technology as recognized by Article IV of the NonProliferation Treaty.

This assertion ignores two key elements of international law. First, the "peaceful use" rights recognized by the NPT are qualified - they must be "in conformity with" the basic nonproliferation obligations of the Treaty, Articles I and II. At past NPT Review Conferences, NPT Parties have agreed by consensus that these rights must also be exercised in conformity with Article III, the safeguards requirement. But the IAEA Board of Governors has found that Iran violated its safeguards obligations. Furthermore, the fact that that Iran secretely pursued the capability to produce weapons-usable fissile material calls into question whether Iran's program is, in fact, peaceful. The Board of Governors implicitly acknowledged this question when it concluded that Iran's nuclear program raised questions relevant to the role of the UN Security Council in maintaining international peace and security.

But a more basic flaw in this assertion is that Iran, in joining the UN and accepting the UN Charter as a legally binding international obligation, explicitly limited its sovereign rights and subjected them to the purview of the Security Council. This was Iran's free choice, and Iran's claim that the Security Council exceeded its authority is without merit. The fact that Iran later signed the NPT did not in any way qualify or limit its obligations under the UN Charter. NPguy 02:37, 7 July 2007 (UTC)

Sorry but you are not qualified in the field of international law. When there's a conflict between the UN CHarter and basic principles of international law - known as jus cogens - it is the principles of international law that win. UN Sec Council resolutions that are contrary to jus cogens are ultra vires and non-binding. Iran has the sovereign right to use atomic energy - the same right that China and the US and Israel and Pakistan had to develop their nuclear programs.

Regarding limits on the UNSC, ICJ Judge Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice has been quoted to say:

"The Security Council, even when acting genuinely for the preservation or restoration of peace and security, has a scope of action limited by the State's sovereignty and the fundamental rights without which that sovereignty cannot be exercised."

And as ICJ Judge Lauterpacht has written:

"The relief which Article 103 of the Charter may give the Security Council in case of conflict between one of its decisions and an operative treaty obligations cannot - as a simple hierarchy of norms - extend to a conflict between a Security Counsel resolutions and jus cogens"

An interesting suggestion, but I can find nothing in online discussions (including on Wikipedia) of jus cogens (which translates as "compelling law") or peremptory norms to suggest that Iran has a substantial claim. The concept seems to be used to limit state sovereignty mainly in order to protect human rights, e.g. against slavery and torture. I haven't seen any examples where it is used to enshrine state sovereignty and trump a state's treaty obligations. Remember, Iran was caught violating its safeguards agreement systematically for 18 years, while pursuing the most sensitive nuclear technologies. This is precisely the situation the NPT and its safeguards regime were designed to detect and, through reporting to the Security Council, redress. NPguy 03:19, 22 August 2007 (UTC)

Like I said, you're quite obviously not qualified in the area of international law. Jus cogens are peremptory norms of international law that are binding on all nations and the UN. Actions by the UNSC that violate jus cogens are ultra vires.

The International Law Commission recently addressed this very issue:

"The question has sometimes been raised whether also Council resolutions adopted ultra vires prevail by virtue of Article 103. Since obligations for Member States of the United Nations can only derive out of such resolutions that are taken within the limits of its powers, decisions ultra vires do not give rise to any obligations to begin with. Hence no conflict exists...

If United Nations Member States are unable to draw up valid agreements in dissonance with jus cogens, they must also be unable to vest an international organization with the power to go against peremptory norms. Indeed both doctrine and practice unequivocally confirm that conflicts between the United Nations Charter and norms of jus cogens result not in the Charter obligations’ pre-eminence, but their invalidity. In this sense, the United Nations Charter is an international agreement as any other treaty. This is particularly relevant in relation to resolutions of the Security Council, which has more than once been accused of going against peremptory norms."

SOURCE: UN Doc. A/CN.4/L.682, p.176-177

Your suggestions may have some merit but you appear to have gone off track and into the line of soapboxing. This is not the place for soapboxing and if you want corrections to the article, you should try to tone it down a bit since people tend to ignore those who soapbox Nil Einne 13:24, 17 July 2007 (UTC)

SOrry but pointing out your errors is not "soapboxing".

I just corrected several misrepresentations and misinterpretations introduced by recent edits. For example, one anonymous editor asserted without citation:

"Critics also point out that a "capability" to make nuclear weapons in inherent in the possession of civilian nuclear technology, and so any country with such a program could be similarly accused of seeking a nuclear weapons capability."

In fact, many countries have civil nuclear technology, but relatively few have enrichment or reprocessing, which are the key to a nuclear weapons capability. The EU-3 and the UN Security Council do not object to Iran having a civil nuclear program. They have demanded only that Iran suspend its previously clandstine enrichment program.

You are wrong again. First of all, Iran has offered abandon reprocessing. Second, even the ones who don't have enrichment have the "capability" to get the capacity to enrich uranium - and therefore they have the "capability" to make a bomb. The problem is that the word "capability" is intentionally vague - which is why it is being used by the Bush administration. Furthermore, several nations such as Argentina and Brazil do in fact have enrichment technology so it is in fact true that they too have the "capability" to make a bomb. When you resort to using such ambigious language, you are promoting an agenda rather than being accurate. If you are going to resort to talk about "capabilities" then it should be clarified that other countries have the same capabilities, and that the capability is inherent in the technology. Furthermore, it should also be clarified that Iran has put offers on the table to help minimize the capability that the civilian program can be diverted to nuclear weapons use.

Terminology is not infinitely malleable. I do not use the word "capability" to exploit any ambiguity or vagueness. I am using it in a precise sense to mean a demonstrated technical competency. Most civil nuclear technology does not present a signficant "capability" to manufacture nuclear weapons.

Who are you to define what is "significant"?

You can't make a nuclear weapon without fissile material - high-enriched uranium, plutonium, and certain other materials that support a fast fission chain reaction. The processes that produce fissile material are enrichment and reprocessing. That's why enrichment and reprocessing are universally considered to be the most sensitive nuclear technologies. NPguy (talk) 03:58, 19 January 2008 (UTC)

Enrichment is different. By this standard, Argentina and Brazil do have the capability to manufacture nuclear weapons. They are among the relatively few that do.

And Japan and Egypt and S. Korea have demonstrated the ability to reprocess plutonium as well as enrich uranium.

Thus, it is a true statement that Irans' "capability" to potentially make a bomb is shared by several other nations, and so to say that Iran has developed such a capability has no meaning. Its like saying someone who has a butter knife has the "capability" to use it as a murder weapon.

I was simply making a technical distinction between nuclear energy writ large and the most sensitive elements of the nuclear fuel cycle. This is a critical distinction. NPguy 03:19, 22 August 2007 (UTC)

Your personal determination that only the actual possession of an active enrichment program provides the "capability" to make nukes is arbitrary and misleading.

Your are not applying this "critical distinction" clear when you selectively apply it to Iran and repeatedly censor edits that point out that, first, the "capability" to make a bomb is shared by many countries that have a nuclear program, and second, that Iran has offered to place limits on its nuclear program well beyond its legal obligations that would minimize such a theoretical possibility. In short, you're passing off one-sided speculation as fact.

Another edit claimed that:

"The US, however, insists that no nuclear program in Iran is acceptable."

which is also false, since the United States supports the EU-3 proposal to assist Iran's civil nuclear program if Iran suspends enrichment.

If Iran suspend enrichment, there will be no nuclear energy program since there will be no fissile material. Its as if saying car driving is possible without gas. No, its not. Without gas, a car is just a lot of metal.

This is really ridiculous. Many countries have nuclear power programs but not enrichment. Iran could do the same. To use your analogy, most people who drive cars buy fuel at gas stations. They don't produce their own gasoline. NPguy 03:19, 22 August 2007 (UTC)

Iran's contracts for the delivery of nuclear fuel have been repeatedly violated, and anyway Iran is under no obligation whatsoever to give up enrichment and allow itself to become reliant on foreign fuel sources. Furthermore, as BASIC has written, the "offer" to assist Iran's nuclear program was vague and non-binding.

Another claimed:

"Thus, Iran asserts that there is no legal basis for Iran's referral to the United Nations Security Council since the IAEA has certified that previously undeclared activities had a relationship [sic] to a weapons program, and that all declared nuclear material in Iran had been accounted for and had not been diverted to military purposes."

Presubly the author meant that these undeclared activities had NO relationship to a weapons program, but the IAEA has made no such conclusion.

Actually it has. In November 2003, for example, the Agency confirmed that “To date, there is no evidence

that the previously undeclared nuclear material and activities referred to above were related to a nuclear weapons programme.” http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2003/gov2003-75.pdf

First of all, absence of evidence is not evidence of absence. The IAEA said it had no "evidence" of a link to nuclear weapons, but did not "certify" that there were no such links.

First you claimed that the IAEA had not reached such a conclusion, and when I pointed out it did, now you're changing your story and claiming that the IAEA doesn't mean what it saying. Sorry, but if the IAEA has said there's no diversion, then the requirements of Article 19 of Irans' safeguard agreement have been met. Period.

In fact, it continues to say that it cannot conclude that Iran's program is peaceful, and continues to complain that Iran's lack of cooperation makes it impossible to make progress toward making such a conclusion.

That's because, (as you know since you keep deleting this fact) the IAEA only reach such a conclusion for nations that have ratified the Additional Protocol. Iran implemented the Additional Protocol for 2 years and allowed inspections as if it was in force - as certified by the IAEA - and still no evidence of a weapons program turned up. In fact, Iran has offered to not only ratify the Additional Protocol but to go beyond it - as long its its rights are recognozed. Your refusal to acknowledge these facts and insistence on misrepresenting the IAEA's statement is indicative of your bias. The Lawyer's Committee for Nuclear Nonproliferation:

"Only for states that implement the Additional Protocol, the IAEA annually certifies the absence of undeclared nuclear materials or activities.[7] Drawing the conclusion for the first time that there are no undeclared nuclear activities takes a great deal of time in any circumstance, as the IAEA has remarked in its assessments of Iran’s safeguards status.[8] As an example, Japan’s additional protocol entered into force in 1999, yet the IAEA concluded the absence of undeclared nuclear activities in Japan for the first time in 2003.[9] As of the latest annual IAEA Safeguards Report, of the 61 states where both the NPT safeguards and the additional protocol are implemented, in only 21 of these states has the IAEA concluded the absence of undeclared nuclear activity.[10] The IAEA has stated this process will take longer in Iran due to the history of concealed nuclear activities.[11] Therefore, the statement “not yet in a position to conclude that there are no undeclared nuclear materials or activities,” which is presently true for Iran, is also true for 40 other states including Canada, the Czech Republic, and South Africa.[12] These three states in particular are notable because they have had additional protocols in force longer than Iran and also operate nuclear facilities on their territory."

Second, I take issue with the IAEA's statement about a lack of "evidence." The IAEA later clarified that it used the word "evidence" to mean the same thing as "proof," i.e. that there was no "proof" that Iran's secret nuclear activities were linked to a nuclear weapons program. Now most people don't consider the words "evidence" and "proof" to be synonymous. And many (myself included) would consider Iran's systematic concealment of its efforts to develop the most sensitive nuclear technology strong circumstantial evidence of an unsavory purpose. It's not "proof," but it is "evidence." And remember that this is practically the closest thing you can get to proof of a nuclear weapons program. The only ways to get more direct evidence came through open admissions (South Africa and Libya) or through coercion (Iraq in 1991). The NPT is structured largely on the basis of finding and responding to the indirect evidence provided by IAEA safeguards. The fact that it's hard to prove the purpose of undeclared nuclear activities or of nuclear material diversions is the IAEA safeguards aim to detect diversion of nuclear material to nuclear weapons "or for purposes unknown." Finding a diversion of nuclear material or undeclared nuclear activities is the best evidence you can expect to get. NPguy 03:19, 22 August 2007 (UTC)

Finally, there is the claim:

"According to IAEA spokesperson Melissa Fleming, IAEA inspectors visited Iran's uranium mines in 1992, and so Iran's plans and intentions to engage in enrichment, far from being a secret, were known to the IAEA."

There is a huge difference from uranium prospecting and uranium enrichment, and no basis for concluding that Iran planned to engage in enrichment solely because it had a uranium mine. There were grounds for suspicion, since Iran's uranium resources are low grade and expensive to recover. However, if Iran had stated its intention to engage in enrichment, the IAEA would not have waited until August 2002 to raise questions.

Nonsense! There is no other use for uranium other than to be used for enrichment - or as paper weights - and the sentence appeared in the midst of other fact according to which Iran's plans to engage in enrichment was made known by Iran - specifically, that the discovery of uranium was reported on Iranian radio during an interview of officials from Iran's atomic energy agency, and that Iran's plans to engage in enrichment were the subject of an IAEA technical assistance program back in 1983.

Again, not true. Many countries mine uranium without enriching it. Most simply export it. Canada and India use uranium directly in reactors without enrichment.

You're trying so hard to evade the point: Iran specifically stated in the radio interviews with its nuclear officials that Iran has discovered uranium mines that it would use to power its enrichment program - whcih at the time was the subject of an IAEA technical assistance program. In fact, if you knew anything about Iran's nuclear program which you quite obviously do not, you would know that Iran had previously purchased a stake a the uranium mines of Niger, because it had planned to IMPORT uranium rather than export it. Again you are quite obviously not qualified to edit the wikipedia entry on Iran's nuclear program. Sorry.

So what? First of all no one has given Iran the necessary CANDU technology, and second the fact that some countries don't use enrichment doesn't mean that everyone else who does use enrichment technology is necessarily secretly building a bomb. This is a non-sequiter.

So just because a country is interested in uranium mining doesn't mean that it is interested in enrichment.

Again, you're evading the point, which was that Iran's enrichment program was not a secret since the discovery and mining of uranium specifically intended for enrichment was made quite publicly known.

But this misses the key point that it was not up to the IAEA to guess that Iran might be enriching. It was Iran's obligation under its safeguards agreement to report its enrichment activities to the IAEA. And Iran failed to do that, consistently, for over 18 years, in what the IAEA called a "policy of concealment."

Actually, Iran not only informed the IAEA of plans for enrichment, but the IAEA was cooperating with Iran's enrichment program until 1983. And, when the Chinses pulled out of building Iran's uranium conversion facility under US pressure, the Iranians informed the IAEA that they would continue the program and Elbaradei himself came to Iran and saw the construction. Your insistence on removing cites to these facts is telling.

And the same IAEA said quite clearly that the past failures to report were not related to a weapons program, that there was no diversion of material to nuclear weapons. In fact, Iran is hardly unique in its "failure to report" - for example, both S. Korea and Egypt were caught conducting secret nuclear experiments which included plutonium extraction and uranium enrichment to almost weapons-grade concentrations for over 2 decades.

I would take this argument to the opposite conclusion. The fact that Iran was pursuing uranium mining, even though its resources were clearly not economically competitive, and even though it had no nuclear power program in which to use uranium, raises questions about its reasons. It is another piece of circumstantial evidence that Iran is not being honest about its intentions. NPguy 03:19, 22 August 2007 (UTC)

Whether Iran's "resources" are economically competitive is not your call. You are not an energy economist especially since the prices of uranium has increased 10 fold in recent years what is "economical" or not is open to debate. Futhermore, Iran is located right next to countries with massive natural uranium resources and can import what it needs. And, Iran has openly stated that it would rely on its own uranium to make up for shortfalls and price differences in imported uranium, rathre than relying 100% on its own resources. Finally, Iran program to develop nuclear industry is already decades behind where it was supposed to be - Iran doesn't have to wait to first build nuclear power plants and then spend potentially decades more to develop the technology to make fuel for it.

Again, you're making arguments as an advocate, which means that you're biased and not qualified to edit the wiki entry.

What a load of ad hominem attacks! I'm not an energy economist, but sometimes I read what they write. Try this article ^[3]

I've also made a number of edits above to limit the unfortunate interruptions to some of my earlier posts. I haven't deleted anything, but I have moved some mid-paragraph interruptions that messed up the formatting to after the paragraph. Please learn to edit more politely. http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/npr/vol14/141/141wood.pdf

Because this article was too long(102 kb) I moved Timeline which was 32kb to a new article:

) 05:29, 29 March 2007 (UTC)

Substitution of the template

I substitute the template of government of Iran with Nuclear programme of Iran. I think it's more relevant and useful.--Sa.vakilian(t-c) 06:34, 29 March 2007 (UTC)

An anon changed all spellings of "program" to British English in May 2006[5]. Nobody seems to have asked why. It was previously in American English before this. WP:MOS says that you stick with one and don't switch it around much — it should have been reverted at the time, there is no reason to prefer British English here, and up until one unilateral and anonymous change it was in American English. I'm changing it back now. --Fastfission 14:31, 30 March 2007 (UTC)

• Why has this been converted to BRITISH? The aticle was written in American English. Why should this article be converted to BRITISH english. This is something that needs to be discussed and not drive-by converted. Bl4h 22:06, 6 April 2007 (UTC)

Please don't. I don't know about the history of this article, but two wrongs don't make one right. --SLi 23:43, 6 April 2007 (UTC)

Well I wish it would remain one or the other. I watch the article for vandalism. Personally I dont care if its the right way (American) or the wrong way (British). I just hope it stays one way instead of continuing to waste database space and time by converting it back and forth back and forth. Now its half and half, maybe thats fair. Whatever. Bl4h 21:50, 8 April 2007 (UTC)

I agree with other commentators that it is obnoxious for one user to "correct" this article from the original American to British spellings. Someone evidently has a bit too much time on his/her hands, and poor manners as well. I think whoever made the change owes an explanation to the rest of us. As I continue to edit this article, I intend to use American spelling. NPguy 02:49, 15 April 2007 (UTC)

Though, even as a Brit, I'm quite happy for American English to be used, I object to the idea British English is 'wrong', a point which would have been more forcefully made were the person making it to have used apostropes correctly or, indeed, at all. However the point still stands: American English is the more widely used of the two and there is no reason to use British English in this case. Cartoir 17:20, 16 April 2007 (UTC)

To explain my edit to the new section, many countries in the Middle East have expressed interest in nuclear power. Among those that have expressed such interest publicly are Algeria, Libya, Jordan, and the six states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (in Addition to Saudi Arabia, these are Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, Oman, and the United Arab Emirates). Unlike Iran, which is pursuing the full nuclear fuel cycle and claims this is for peaceful purposes, these other countries have only stated an interest in nuclear power.

Your bias is showing. Iran has also "only stated an interest in nuclear power"

You missed my point. I was distinguishing between an interest in nuclear power - i.e. reactors - and the nuclear fuel cycle - i.e. enrichment. These are facts, not bias. NPguy 02:08, 22 August 2007 (UTC)

Your distinction between "nuclear power" and "nuclear enrichment" is arbitrary and meaningless. Nuclear enrichment is part and parcel of the nuclear power industries of many countries. Iran's interest in enrichment reaches back several decades and was hardly a secret. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 12.26.54.11 (talk) 18:24, 15 July 2008 (UTC)

The other inaccuracy was the statement that Israel was the only other country to have "such a program." In fact, no other country in the Middle East currently has a nuclear power program. Israel has a safeguarded (i.e. subject to IAEA inspection and verification) research reactor at Soreq and an unsafeguardeed heavy water reactor and reprocessing plant at Dimona, generally considered to be part of a nuclear weapons program. Several other countries in the region have nuclear research reactors, including Algeria, Morocco, Libya, Egypt, Syria and Turkey. Finally, since the section doesn't express "viewpoints" of any country explicitly, I changed the heading to "responses." NPguy 02:42, 15 April 2007 (UTC)

Since the nuclear programs of Saudi Arabia and Egypt exist independent of Iran's, it is wrong to suggest their nuclear program exists as a "response" to Iran's program.

Granted, "responses" may not be the right word, but it's better than "viewpoints" and it accords with the content of that section. The suggestion of whoever wrote the section (it wasn't me) was that these plans were announced not just after but because of Iran's actions.NPguy 02:08, 22 August 2007 (UTC)

Since I'm the one who posted the complaint about bias in this article, here are my suggestions for needed amendments:

• insert description of how the October 2003 Tehran agreement, including Iran's commitment to suspend its enrichment and reprocessing activities, broke down in mid-2004.
• insert description of the November 2004 Paris agreement, including the more specific suspension commitment by Iran, and how that in turn broke down over the following year. It should also specify how the Paris Agreement obligated the EU-3 to recognize Iran's nuclear rights which include the right to enrichment, and how Iran stated all along that it would NOT accept permanent cessation of enrichment, and how the EU-3 violated that agreement when they demanded that Iran abandon enrichment,.
• insert description of offer made to Iran if it resumed its suspension of enrichment and reprocessing activities.
• insert description of UN Security Council resolutions and Iran's responses, including its decision to limit cooperation with the IAEA.
• modify the description of the U.S. position to focus on criticisms of Iran's nuclear program and not of Iranian policy in general.

With these additions and changes, which I'll work on as time permits, much of the evident bias and selectivity will be corrected. NPguy 03:16, 15 April 2007 (UTC)

An anonymous user deleted a POV paragraph from the article, which I think is useful to keep on the discussion page. This paragraph expresses a POV that is worth acknowledging and responding to.

"The nuclear-power issue is exactly that. When Iranians talk about it, and talk about the United States, they say, 'The United States is trying to repress us; they're trying to keep us down and keep us backward, make us a second-class nation. And we have the ability to develop a nuclear industry, and we're being told we're not good enough, or we can't.' And this makes people furious--not just the clerical establishment, but this makes the person on the street, even 16- and 17-year-olds, absolutely boil with anger. It is such an emotional issue that absolutely no politician could ever back down on this question."

My reaction is that the United States has dramatically changed its position and no longer opposes nuclear power in Iran. In fact, the United States, along with the UN Security Council, is prepared to support expanded nuclear cooperation and other trade with Iran if it gives up certain suspicious and previously hidden nuclear activities. The Security Council and the IAEA Board of Governors oppose Iran's pursuit of nuclear activities unnecessary for a nuclear power program, in particular the enrichment plants at Natanz and the 40 megawatt heavy water "research" reactor under construction at Arak. The former could be used to produce high-enriched uranium but is not needed to produce reactor fuel since Russia has offered a lifetime fuel supply contract for Bushehr. The latter could be used to produce weapon-grade plutonium and is not needed for the stated nuclear research purposes.

It is understandable that the Iranian public would have a different perception, given the unfortunate history between Iran and the United States (the coup against Mossadegh, the hostage crisis, U.S. support for Iraq in its war against Iran). However, it is not just the United States but the responsible international bodies that have presented Iran with this choice. The choice of Iran's government to continue construction of these facilities will deprive Iran of an expanded nuclear power program and other economic and trade benefits. NPguy 02:23, 30 April 2007 (UTC)

Your reaction is wrong and quite obviously you are not qualified to edit anything that has to do with Iran's nuclear program. The US has NOT simply told iran to give up "suspicious and previously hidden nuclear activities" - Iran's enrichment program is neither suspicious nor was it previously "hidden" (in fact Iran invited iAEA inspectors to visit its uranium mines in 1992, Iran discussed openly the discovery of uranium on national radio, Iran tried to cooperate with the IAEA in establishing an enrichment facility in Isfahan in 1983 b ut was thwarted by the US, and Iranian contracts with other countries were thwarted by the US. Giving up enrichment is the equivalent of giving up a nuclear program since then Iran becomes reliant on the whims of foreigners in supplying Iran's nuclear needs. And as the BASIC report noted, the offers that the US and EU made to Iran were just an "empty box"

You are biased and should not be editing this entry in any way.

If you are so sure that the view you hold is correct, then why don't you sign your posts and stand by your arguments? Simply by reading your reaction to what NPGuy said above I gather that you feel very strongly about this subject and fear that these feelings may influence your ability to edit wikipedia in a NPOV way.71.102.114.12 (talk) 04:57, 4 July 2008 (UTC)

Iran's enrichment was deliberately concealed from the IAEA for 18 years (according to the IAEA itself), in clear violation of its safeguards agreement (according to the IAEA Board of Governors). The facility aqt Natanz was being buried to hide it from view by satellites. If that isn't suspicious I don't know what is. If you still don't understand the difference between uranium mining and enrichment you're beyond reason. And many countries have nuclear power programs without enrichment, relying on foreign suppliers. NPguy (talk) 21:14, 4 July 2008 (UTC)

A series of Anonymous IP editors (all using the same ISP in England) and one named editor (User:DreddMoto) have been changing this article to British spelling and moving the location to Nuclear programme of Iran. The article was originally written using American spelling; please stop changing the spelling to British usage. This issue has already been addressed on this talk page (here), with the consensus appearing to be to keep the American spelling. Horologium t-c 19:23, 14 June 2007 (UTC)

Someone with the time should try and work in stuff such as contained in these comments by Najmedin Meshkati [6] who takes the view that the way things are headed now is dangerous since Iran is relying on outdated and potentially dangerous technology which could lead to another Chernobyl disaster. Nil Einne 13:39, 17 July 2007 (UTC)

N.B. There may be other references for this since it's a common view i.e. that the way things are currently headed is dangerous not so much because of the risk that Iran is developing nuclear weapons but because Iran is being pushed into a corner and feels the need to be so secretive, there is a high risk something bad could occur, either an accident or perhaps the transfer of nuclear material by people involved. After all, one of the ideas behind the NPT is that countries are not only allowed but aided if they wish to pursue nuclear power for civilian purposes Nil Einne 13:39, 17 July 2007 (UTC)

The Chernobyl reactor is fundamentally a different design. However, it should be noed that the US has pressured the IAEA to drop cooperative technical assistance programs with Iran in the area of civilian reactor safety operations.

NPguy left a message at Talk:Peremptory norm, asking for comments about the legal discussions on this page. First of all, can I ask everyone here to (1) please sign all your comments with four tildes and (2) stop adding comments in the middle of discussion threads. The conversation above is virtually impossible to follow — it's not clear who said what, and who's replying to which comment. (For example, Nil Einne's admonition that "This is not the place for soapboxing" is now six paragraphs away from the comment to which it referred.)

Having said that, I did enjoy reading the conversation, and particularly the following unsigned comment:

"Sorry but you are not qualified in the field of international law. When there's a conflict between the UN CHarter and basic principles of international law - known as jus cogens - it is the principles of international law that win. UN Sec Council resolutions that are contrary to jus cogens are ultra vires and non-binding. Iran has the sovereign right to use atomic energy - the same right that China and the US and Israel and Pakistan had to develop their nuclear programs."

Whoever wrote that comment is "not qualified in the field of international law". He or she suggests that the "sovereign right to use atomic energy" is jus cogens. This is absolute nonsense, and you won't find a single reliable source who supports this position.

the fact that the right to build and use nuclear power is a sovereign right is self-evident it the fact that none of the other nuclear states - israel, Pakistan, India, Russia, the US, CHina, Britain, France . . . had to seek anyone else's approval to build their civilian or military nuclear programs. There is no fundamental rule of law that says they're entitled to have nuclear power, but Iran is not.

If you want to discuss the legality of Iran's nuclear programme or the UNSC resolution, please stick to arguments that have been made by reliable sources. Sideshow Bob Roberts 10:49, 22 August 2007 (UTC)

Don't tell people what they're allowed to argue. Some of us are quite well qualified to opine about these issue - more so than you, incidentally.

The fact that using nuclear power is a sovereign right that exceeds and is superior to the NPT (which merely recognizes that right rather than granting it) is proven by the fact that Russia, China, the US, France, the UK and non-NPT signatories all developed their civilian (as well as military) nuclar programs without seeking anyone else's approval. If using your own natural resources to power your own energy facilities is not a sovereign right, then by what right did those countries develop and use the same technology? In this regard, allow me to quote ICJ Judge Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice:

The Security Council, even when acting genuinely for the preservation or restoration of peace and security, has a scope of action limited by the State's sovereignty and the fundamental rights without which that sovereignty cannot be exercised.

Several comments are in order here:

1. I think it's better to say that the right to use nuclear energy precedes the NPT, not that it is "superior to" the NPT. The NPT recognizes and qualifies this right. That is, the right of non-nuclear weapon states to use nuclear energy is unaffected by the NPT so long as it is both "for peaceful purposes" and "in conformity with Articles I and II." Other uses of nuclear energy are limited by the treaty. Thus, non-nuclear weapon states parties lose their right to have a nuclear weapons program when they become parties to the NPT. In that regard the NPT supercedes the sovereign right to use nuclear energy for non-peaceful purposes.
2. Iran was effectively found in violation of NPT Article III, when the IAEA Board of Governors concluded that Iran's actions constituted "noncompliance" with its safeguards agreement. Formally, the Board does not have the authority to draw conclusions regarding compliance with the NPT, but its conclusion is tantamount to a noncompliance finding.
3. The Security Council has not demanded that Iran give up nuclear power. It has demanded that Iran suspend uranium enrichment, the very activity that Iran concealed from the IAEA in violation of its NPT safeguards obligations. In so doing, it explicitly endorsed Iran's right to peaceful use of nuclear energy and the offer by six countries (the five permanent members of the Council plus Germany) to support Iran's nuclear program [[7]]. The suspension would be open to review once the questions raised by Iran's non-compliance were fully resolved.
4. Enrichment is not the same as nuclear power. Iran does not need to enrich in order to have a nuclear power program. So the Security Council's demand that Iran suspend enrichment does not interfere with Iran's right to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

Please sign your comments. NPguy 15:51, 25 August 2007 (UTC)

1. Wrong. The NPT allows parties to withdraw from the treaty, and the countries that do so go BACK to the status quo ante in which they're quite legally allowed to do whatever they want with their nuclear program. Thus, the NPT does not "supersede" anything, and signatories do no "lose" anything by signing the NPT - they merely agree to suspend a right to build nukes, in exchange for explicit recognition of their other nuclear rights including the right of unfettered access to civilian nuclear technology. -- 12.26.54.10 20:28, 17 October 2007
2. Words like "effectively" and "tantamount" are weasel words. Article 19 of Iran's safeguard agreement quite specifically sets "diversion of nuclear material to non-peaceful uses" as a basis for referral. The IAEA specifically said that it found no such diversion. THerefore, Iran was in fact in compliance with its safeguards agreement. As Michael Spies of the Lawyer's Committee on Nuclear Policy has explained: "The conclusion that no diversion has occurred certifies that the state in question is in compliance with its undertaking, under its safeguards agreement and Article III of the NPT, to not divert material to non-peaceful purposes. In the case of Iran, the IAEA was able to conclude in its November 2004 report that that all declared nuclear materials had been accounted for and therefore none had been diverted to military purposes. The IAEA reached this same conclusion in September 2005." -- 12.26.54.10 20:28, 17 October 2007
3. The offer was laughed at out loud as being a farce which actually provided nothing and was non-binding. -- 12.26.54.10 20:28, 17 October 2007
4. Nonsense. Iran has a right to use its own natural resources to power its own economy, and is under no obligation to give that up. Without enrichment, Iran would be forever reliant on outside sources for its nuclear energy - effectively depriving Iran of nuclear power. -- 12.26.54.10 20:28, 17 October 2007

Rearranging the above unsignned comments so they don't interrupt the flow and numbering of my comment.

I want to respond to the second point. Iran was reported to the Security Council not under Article 19 of its safeguards agreement but under Article XII.C of the IAEA Statute, which requires that safeguards non-compliance be reported to the UN Security Council. I use the words "effectively" and "tantamount" to acknowledge that, while the Board of Governors has jurisdiction to determine whether a state has violated its safeguards agrement, only NPT Parties have jurisdiction to determine whether another Party has violated its NPT obligations. In this case, the logic linking Iran's safeguards violation to an NPT violation is straightforward. NPguy (talk) 02:59, 24 November 2007 (UTC)

Again, you obviously don't know the law. Article XII.C applies when there has been a diversion of nuclear material for nonpeaceful uses as defned by Article 19 of the standard INFRIC safeguards agreement applicable to Iran.

Your intentional confusion of a safeguards breach with an NPT violation is false. An NPT violation occurs when there has been diversion for non-peaceful uses. Accordng to the IAEA, there has been no such diversion in Iran. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 67.84.142.221 (talk) 02:15, 19 January 2008 (UTC)

Evidently you are unfamiliar with the intricacies of NPT and IAEA safeguards. Article XII.C of the IAEA Statute refers to "non-compliance," not diversion. There are many obligations under a safeguards agreement, and many forms of noncompliance other than diversion.

The safeguards obligation in the NPT include the obligation "to accept safeguards" and those safeguards must be "applied to all source and special material in all peaceful nuclear activities" of the country. Iran's safeguards violations included failures to declare nuclear material as required under its safeguards agreement. This is equivalent to failing to accept safeguards on all nuclear material - a violation of the NPT. NPguy (talk) 03:52, 19 January 2008 (UTC)

I am quite well familiar with the "intricacies" so let me enlighten you:

Fortunately, the IAEA Statute is available online at http://www.iaea.org/About/statute_text.html. A full reading Article XII.C makes things a bit clearer about what "non-compliance" refers to by setting out three requirements for compliance:

1- The first requirement is "accounting referred to in sub paragraph A-6 of this article"

Paragraph A-6 of Article XII, in turn, states that inspectors are to be sent to account for fissionable materials and ensure none have been diverted for a "military purpose".

The IAEA did send these inspectors to Iran - many many times. El-Baradei confirmed in Paragraph 52 of his November 2003 report that "to date, there is no evidence that the previously undeclared nuclear material and activities referred to above were related to a nuclear weapons programme." And again, after extensive inspections, El-Baradei wrote Paragraph 112 of his November 2004 report that "all the declared nuclear material in Iran has been accounted for, and therefore such material is not diverted to prohibited activities."

In short, inspections happened as required, and no diversion of fissile material to a "military purpose" was found. Thus, Iran did not violate this section of the article - a point that several others including Michael Spies of the Lawyers Committee for Nuclear Policy has made too.

2- The second requirement under Article XII.C of the Statute is "determining whether there is compliance with the undertaking referred to in sub paragraph F-4 of article XI"

A quich check of Article XI shows that it applies to "Agency Projects" meaning the projects in which the the IAEA has provided technical assistance to a requesting country. And, subparagraph F-4 specifically requires that the assistance provided by the IAEA shall not be used for military purposes and shall be subject to safeguards.

Last I checked, the IAEA did not provide any such assistance to Iran which has been used for military purposes - in fact the US killed the IAEA's technical assistance to Iran's enrichment program in 1983, as well as all of Iran's other contracts with other nations to provide the necessary enrichment technology that Iran was quite legally entitled to obtain. Thus, I don't see how this provision applies, let alone how Iran could have violated it.

3- The third requirement is compliance "with the measures referred to in sub-paragraph A-2 of this article"

Subparagraph A-2 of Article XII requires observance of "health and safety" standards. There has been no allegation that Iran's centrifuge program has violated a health and safety law. Again, there hasn't even been an allegation of any violation of this section either.

In short, past breaches of safeguards agreements do not constitute a violation of the statute unless there's been a diversion for militay purposes - which the IAEA has repeatedly said is not to case in Iran.

In fact the IAEA has found discrepancies the accounting of nuclear material in as many as 15 countries at a time (including S. Korea, Taiwan, and Egypt) - a few of which were later caught conducting secret and potentially weapons-related nuclear experiments - and yet they weren't referred to the UNSC for supposedly violating Article III of the NPT.

OK, all clear now? [end of unsigned posting]

You have quoted selectively and incompletely and omitted the key point. The full quotation is "to determine whether there is compliance with the undertaking against use in furtherance of any military purpose referred to in sub- paragraph F-4 of article Xl, with the health and safety measures referred to in sub- paragraph A-2 of this article, "and with all other conditions of the project prescribed in the agreement between the Agency and the State or States concerned."

Thus, the IAEA is to report any non-compliance with safeguards agreements.

Granted, there is a threshold test for non-compliance. Missing a deadline on a required report falls below the threshold. Providing an incomplete initial declaration and refusing a requested special inspection to resolve the question (as North Korea did) falls above it. The mere fact that other countries have had safeguards failures that fall below the threshold is not particularly meaningful to whether Iran's safeguards failures crossed the threshold to non-compliance.

You cite 15 countries, but I am only aware of seven. Five (Iraq, Romania, North Korea, Libya and Iran)) have been found in non-compliance. By the way, I don't believe any was cited for diversion (though the IAEA's inability to verify non-diversion - a different matter - was part of some non-compliance decisions), and only two (Iraq and Libya) involved ""smoking gun" proof of military purposes.

The only other recent cases (since 1990) were Egypt and South Korea. These were safeguards failures that were significant enough to report to the Board of Governors but were not considered by the Board to constitute non-compliance. NPguy (talk) 03:31, 23 January 2008 (UTC)

You refer to some unspecified "other conditions" to jump to this conclusion, but you don't specify what this alleged "other condtions" are and where they can be found. Look, the text of the "agreement between the Agency and State Concerned" is the standard INFRIC safeguards agreement, and there is nothing in there that sets a different threshold for reporting to the IAEA. In fact the Safeguards Agreement with Iran again explicitly restates the "diversion for military use" standard. Iran allowed the required inspections, there was no diversion for military use, so there was no violation of the relevant standard. Period. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 67.83.201.90 (talk) 08:11, 23 January 2008, 19 January 2008 (UTC)

The determination is not so vague as you state it. The threshold, according to both Article XII.C and the terms of Iran's safeguards agreement, is explicitly stated: Diversion for nonpeaceful uses is a violation of XII.C. Not allowing inspections also violates it too. I listed these requirements explicitly and not "selectively"- and I Spelled out why Iran did not violate any of them.

I DID NOT SAY IT WAS VAGUE _ I SAID IT WASN'T AS VAGUE AS YOU MADE IT SOUND. I said that the threshold is quite specific - DIVERSION FOR NONPEACEFUL USES. THere has been no such diversion, as the IAEA itself has said.—Preceding unsigned comment added by 12.26.54.11 (talk) 19:12, 25 January 2008 (UTC)

7 or 15, this is besides the point of what XII.C explicitly requires so I am not gong to bother settng your straight on that point. The IAEA BOG doesn't have authority to willy-nlly decide these matters - it has to apply the IAEA Statute. Again, according to the IAEA Statute, the standard in all of these cases is whether there was diversion of non-peaceful uses, or whether the state prevented the accounting as required by the IAEA statute in the first place. North Korea prevented inspections and diverted material for military purposes, so it was in violation of XII.C and the NPT and that's why it was reported to the UNSC. Egypt did not prevent inspections, and the IAEA did not find evidence of diversion for non-peaceful uses, and that's why it was not reported to the UNSC. But in any case, the threshold is clearly defined, and Iran did not violate that threshold, according to the IAEA itself. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 67.83.201.90 (talk) 08:11, 23 January 2008, 19 January 2008 (UTC)

Look, I've spelled it out for you why Iran did not violate the NPT. Michael Spies did too. The expert who testified before the UK Parliament did so too. The fact is established. Iran's safeguard breached did not violate the NPT, Iran did not violate XII.C. Get used to it and stop with the baloney.—Preceding unsigned comment added by 67.83.201.90 (talk) 08:11, 23 January 2008, 19 January 2008 (UTC)

This is a hard discussion because you seem to be ignoring the substance of my comments and repeating the claims I have just rebutted.

First of all, it's not me but the IAEA Statute that refers to "any other conditions" in the safeguards agreement. The term seems self-explanatory. It's a catch-all provision that incorporates by reference all the legal obligations of the safeguards agreement. For example, Article 42 of Iran's safeguards agreement says that Iran shall provide design information "as early as possible before nuclear material is introducedinto a new facility." Article 63 says that "Iran shall provide reports for each material balance area" that include inventory change reports and material balance reports. Iran violated both of these obligations. All told there are 97 operative articles in Iran's safeguards agreements, the majority of which impose "conditions" on Iran.

What I find most baffling is your repeated assertion that the IAEA concluded that Iran did not cross the threshold of violating its safeguards agreement. This assertion is flatly contradicted by the fact that the IAEA Board of Governors found, in September 2005, that Iran's "breaches" and "failures" as reported in November 2003 and thereafter constituted "non-compliance." I use "violation" and "non-compliance" to mean essentially the same thing, and most people understand the terms that way. NPguy (talk) 03:39, 24 January 2008 (UTC)

You're missing the point. There is no question that Iran breached the safeguard as far as "failure of reporting" goes - but the question is whether those breaches met the threshold for reporting to the UNSC under the terms of XII.c. A failure to report alone, in the absence of a military implication, does NOT meet that threshold. That is why other countries which have had similar failures to report were not taken before the UNSC.

This is what the explicit text of Iran's Safeguards Agreement says about when XII.C and be invoked:

"Article 19 If the Board, upon examination of relevant information reported to it by the Director General,finds that the Agency is not able to verify that there has been no diversion of nuclear material required to be safeguarded under this Agreement, to nucle ar weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, it may make the reports provided for in paragraph C of Article XII of the Statute of the Agency".

Funny because I made no such claim. I said that Iran's breaches of safeguards did not amount to a violation of the NPT or the IAEA statute - and the other experts I cited said the same thing too. You see, as I keep repeatign, a violation of the IAEA statute or the NPT requires DIVERSION FOR MILITARY PURPOSES. A safeguards breach -- especially one which is being remedied as in the case of Iran -- does not meet that standard. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 12.26.54.11 (talk) 19:12, 25 January 2008 (UTC)

When you interrupt my posts it makes it hard to see who's saying what. That's why I've put it all together. I wish you would get yourself a login name - it's not hard - so I could tell who I'm responding to. There appear to be several personalities and styles.

To respond to your basic argument, at least now I understand the source of your confusion. You are missing the point that Article XII.C of the Statute and Article 19 of the standard NPT safeguards agreement are independent legal authorities. If Article 19 did not exist, Article XII.C would still require the Board of Governors to report non-compliance findings to the UN. Article 19 provides an additional basis for the Board to report to the UN. The mechanism in Article XII.C is mandatory - the Board shall report; the mechanism in Article 19 is optional - the Board may report. The first applies only in cases of non-compliance; the second in cases where the Agency cannot verity non-diversion - whether or not there is non-compliance. For example, if safeguards equipment at a reprocessing facility fails so inspectors cannot balance the material accounts, Article 19 might apply.

In some cases the Board has cited both Article XII.C and Article 19 as the basis for reporting to the Security Council. An example is North Korea in 1993, where there was noncompliance that resulted in the Agency's inability to verify non-diiversion. In other cases the Board has reported only under Article XII.C. In Libya the Board reported non-compliance for much more limited safeguards failures than occurred in Iran, but the Agency was able to verify non-diversion. In the case of Iran, the Board reported under Article XII.C and (for the first time) Article III.B.4 of the Statute.

It is also incorrect to say that the NPT requires diversion for military purposes. The NPT doesn't actually define safeguards non-compliance. Since the IAEA Statute predated the NPT by 13 years, the compliance standards in the Statute were understood and incorporated by reference through the requirement for a safeguards agreement with the IAEA. The NPT does describe the underlying purpose of safeguards as "with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy' from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices." Those who drafted the model NPT safeguards agreement recognized that it was too high a standard to demand proof that material was diverted to nuclear weapons and defined the standard instead as diversion to nuclear weapons "or for purposes unknown." See paragraphs 19 and 28. NPguy

(talk) 04:09, 26 January 2008 (UTC)

THis is total nonsense. Please provide the cite that shows that Article XIIC and Article 19 are "independend", whatever that means. Note further that both provisions set the threshold of diversion for non-peaceful uses as the standard for referral to the UNSC. Its ironic that you now claim that XIIC has an independent justification for referral of Iran, when previously you claimed that Article 19 of Iran's safeguard agreement was the "other conditions" that justified referral. So which is it?

So again, let me set you straight. As clearly shown above, XII.C. requires Iran to 1-allow inspections for accounting of fissle material to ensure that there was no diversion for non-peaceful uses (which happened), 2-ensure that Agency Projects were not diverted for nuclear weapons (which was met) 3-meet health and safety codes (which it did)

YOu then claimed that Iran also had to meet the "other conditions" of its Safeguards Agreement, and I pointed out that the explicit text of Article 19 of the Safeguards Agreement yet again sets "diversion for non-peaceful uses" as the standard.

There has been no diversion of nuclear material in Iran, according to the IAEA. Thus, whether you want to consider XIIC. and Article 19 as "independent" or whatever, there was no basis for referral of IRan to the UNSC under EITHER provision.

SO what? You're arguing my point. What happened in North Korea was not what happened in Iran. In the case of Iran, the IAEA HAS IN FACT VERIFIED THAT THERE WAS NO DIVERSION. Thanks for proving my piont.

Again, so what? What relevance does this have to Iran? You just don't seem to want to understand that non-compliance with safeguards is not automatically a basis for referral to the UNSC, that there is a threshold, whcih consist BY THE EXPLICIT TERMS of Articl XII.C and Article 19 of "diversion for non-peaceful uses" and that Iran has not met that threshhold.

THIS IS THE BOTTOM LINE.

The NPT doesn't but as repeatedly pointed out above XIIC and Article 19 specify the that non-complaince with safeguards will be reported to the UNSC ONLY when there is diversion for non-peaceful uses. There is nothing in these provisions that mention "for purposes unknown" and you're tyring to make up a new standard of your own.

I have consistently cited Article XII.C of the IAEA Statute as the basis for reporting Iran's non-compliance to the UN Security Council. I have never referred to Article 19 of Iran's safeguards agreement for that purpose. Aside from that, I see nothing in your latest rant that I haven't already thoroughly debunked. I think anyone reading our posts will have little difficulty determining which one of knows what he or she is talking about. NPguy (talk) 03:48, 2 February 2008 (UTC)

Sorry but you did NOT debunk anything, and I was the one who has explained article XIIc. to YOU section by section. When I made it perfectly clear that there was no basis for referral under XII.C. you then claimed that the "other conditions" contained in the safeguards justified referral. And when I again spelled out Article 19 of the safeguards agreement, you first tried to claim some nonsense about them being "independent" and now have decided to simply declare victory. No, sorry, you don't get off the hook so easily. You're going to have to acknowledge the facts. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 67.83.201.90 (talk) 04:35, 3 February 2008 (UTC)

You tried to explain Article XII.C, but left out the crucial portion that referred to violations of any other conditions in the safeguards agreement. I then listed two such violations by Iran - failure to declare facilities and failure to report materials. You went back to the unsupported claim that there has to be diversion. NPguy (talk) 23:33, 3 February 2008 (UTC)

And I pointed out to you that IRan's Safeguards also specifically requires a diversion of non-peaceful uses. We can go around in circles all you want.

I see also that you've deleted the citation to the ASIL article that clearly stated that evidence of nuclear weapons is required for a violation of Article III of the NPT.

Face it, you've lost, your credibility is shot because you're obviously pushing an agenda, and all you can do is try to delete these reference. But I'll just keep putting them back. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 12.26.54.10 (talk) 20:03, 4 February 2008 (UTC)

Iran's safeguards agreement defines legal obligations between Iran and the IAEA. But it's not the only legal instrument that applies. The IAEA Statute defines independent legal obligations on the IAEA. Those obligations include reporting noncompliance to the Security Council. The Board of Governors met that obligation by reporting Iran's non-compliance.

I deleted the reference because it was irrelevant to the point you were making. That reference was discussing to whether it was correct to cite Iran under a different provision of the IAEA Statute, namely Article III.B.4. I don't mind addressing that point somewhere in the article, but it is irrelevant to the question of whether Article XII.C applies. NPguy (talk) 02:36, 5 February 2008 (UTC)

ANd as previously -- repeatedly -- explained to you the IAEA Statute set the threshold of "diversion for non-peaceufl uses" for reporting to the IAEA. I pointed this out to you before, and you then claimed that the "other conditions" in Iran's Safeguard Agreement applies. When I pointed out that the Safeguard Agreement also sets the same threshold, you now came back and say that only the Statute applies. And, I have cited 5 other sources that support the position that absent a "diversion of non-peaceful uses" there is no violation of the IAEA Statute or the NPT. You can keep trying to evade this all you want, but I got you plain and simple. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 12.26.54.10 (talk) 18:38, 5 February 2008 (UTC)

IRON PERUVIA:... is it a coincidence or a predestined factor in all things - that europe's economy is in serious downturn discordant of semantic nuclear iran; ; the fortune that favours my bravery finds that scandavia in opprtunity knocks completion has turner price grand prix jurisdiction; ; revolution suggests that iranian-nuclear-weapons exist in saracen-detainee-paradox, but where iran outweighs europe at this point in semantic-power via superpower, there becomes that this as truist political position has more stone-depth to it than it did in such a mystoconfident first principle; ; iran will never be allowed this saracen-decadance by america because of illijitamate procedure in all counts supremacies-beholder; ; because of this it seems at this disjuncture that korea has semantic-nuclear-power over all supremacies mystoinclusive of staged-economy; ; theoretically because of this, korea is in parisian league with iran & yet the only thing binding them is this naval-opportunity; ; theoretically because of that - they should market such a co-operation-coincidence of means in some large or small way; ; the failure of either to realise this realises that they have been in league for at least 15 years on nuclear-semantic levels regards mysto-deconstuction of superpower in all their ways; ; this merchant navy in scandanavian recline prooves the revolving-opportunity-door in semantic-control on all superlevels; ; in that case should it not realise this league of semi-iranian-korean-nuclear-family, (Sheik Kaliff) and accsess the door controls more opportunistically via regards the UN; ; it is the first nuclear principle of xerox-machine-midas-paraperpetuality that holds iran as part of the mechanism of the revolving door; ; it is the second nuclear-familiar principle of foresightedness (automatic door repsonse) that holds korea into this welcoming; ; that scandanavia sees the door without these principles in glasshouse-unfascinated-circumstance realises a trapezium of a xerox-automatic-kindred that wishes to control the scandanavian embassy via this entire iron peruvia... —Preceding unsigned comment added by 86.156.27.123 (talk) 13:49, 6 October 2008 (UTC)

I've made articles about the nuclear program of a number of nations, and as I'm running out of countries, I wonder if there's something I could do for Iran. It's difficult though, because a

article would clearly conflict with this article, and I see that people have already done so much work on this subject.

Anyway, there is some work that I would like to see done. Firstly, I think that an article on separate facilities (the big ones) could be appropriate. I've also made a map by the same convention I've done for other nations. -Theanphibian ^{(talk • contribs)} 15:02, 2 September 2007 (UTC)

Without vouching for the quality of this article (which I rate as rather low because of the bias toward excusing Iran and blaming the United States), I don't see any value to adding a page on nuclear power in Iran. It might be valuable to add a map to accompany section 5. In my view the only facility in Iran that is unambiguously part of a nuclear power program is the Bushehr reactor. The conversion plant at Isfahan and the enrichment facilities at Natanz are said to be part of a nuclear power program, but that is disputed. NPguy 15:37, 4 September 2007 (UTC)

.

Please go to

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BetacommandBot 05:30, 13 September 2007 (UTC)

Russia-Iran nuclear cooperation

This subject was described very little in this article, although it should be. Just two random references: [8] [9]Biophys 04:13, 18 September 2007 (UTC)

Poorly written, non-native English?

The article is poorly written, in particular preposition usage is as if by a non-native writer. Vocabulary and usage are also often non-native, imprecise or inappropriate. Finally, paragraph organization lacks unity, especially the Overview paragraphs. Made some changes, but much more needs to be done. Points 3 and 4 in Overview are written in an incoherent manner that someone with substantive knowledge would need to fix. (Haberstr 16:04, 20 September 2007 (UTC))

The USA and Israel voted today against making the mid-east a nuke free zone.

Now if that doesn't smack of flip-flopping. The USA and Israel today voted at the U.N. against a resolution to turn the Middle East into a Nuclear Weapon free zone. Arabs push through U.N. watchdog vote against Israel By Mark Heinrich - Thursday, September 20th, 2007 - 3:45 PM ET __ CaribDigita 03:27, 21 September 2007 (UTC)

The bias gets worse

I was planning to post a discussion outlining how the bias on this page might be redressed. Instead I find a busy anonymous poster has gone out of his or her way to exacerbate the bias. The point of this article ought to be to provide basic facts, yet it is filled with selective and unrepresentative citations by analysts who seem to be explaining away Iran's safeguards violations and its refusals to comply with the legally binding demands of the UN Security Council. Most independent analyses of Iran's nuclear program find serious cause for concern that Iran is pursuing a nuclear weapons capability.

The above paragraph complaining is itself very biased. Most poeple who open NPOV are either 100% pro iran or 100% pro israel the only regional power who fears irans nuclear technology be they civilian or not. For a neutral article, I recommend posting the technical realities from IAEA and the history of the program dating to the US friendly Shah. All neutral observers should keep this in mind. To me it seems the whole thing is hyped, becuase if iran started in the 60s and 70s, it is far behind schedule. It is at least 30+ years behind the original schedule paid for by Shah. As of this posting Iran is without a single operational power generating reactor. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 82.44.253.212 (talk) 00:16, 28 November 2007 (UTC)

Unfortunately, the people who are bent on making excuses for Iran have far more time on their hands than I do in trying to fix this article.

If I were to try to fix this article, I would begin by scrubbing to rely on primary sources and less on media or analysts' reporting of those facts. My next step would be to recount the history of Iran's two deals with the EU3 (the Teheran agreement of October 2003 and the Paris agreement of November 2004. In both cases Iran pledged to suspend its enrichment program, but it later failed to carry out its commitments and eventually withdrew from both agreements. Then I would consolidate and scrub the statements of Iran's and other countries' positions to focus on well-sourced official statements that are (unlike much of what's currently there) relevant to the nuclear issue. This would have the advantage of makingthe article shorter and more coherent as well as more balanced

Any chance we can get agreement to revamp this article along these lines? NPguy 03:04, 22 September 2007 (UTC)

That sounds like a pretty spectacularly biased version you have planned there! Why not rely on IAEA findings of no evidence of a breach of the NPT?FelixFelix ^talk 07:14, 22 September 2007 (UTC)

And what of the latest agreement Iran made with the IAEA? Neutral means looking past primary Western sources for other sources as well. For example, if I were an Iranian, I would only want to take the primary sources that came from within the program or those who were administering it. This wouldn't provide full scope either. That's why we have to look at an array of sources, and write it for the reader in an NPOV way. It might have to include global and conflicting points of view. --69.218.58.110 14:54, 22 September 2007 (UTC)

Here's part of what I mean by primary sources: When describing the IAEA investigation, use the IAEA's reports, not interpretations of those reports. When describing Iran's position, provide an official Iranian government source, for example in saying that Iran offered to open Natanz to multilateral control and ratify the Additional Protocol. I think those are correct but they may be out of date, so a dated citation would be helpful. Many statements of Iran's position are available, in English, on the IAEA web site. When describing the U.S. position (or French, Israeil, Russian, etc.) use official sources. On the record media quotes are a good alternative.

As for the latest agreement between Iran and the IAEA, this is a step-by-step approach to resolving the main questions that have arisen regarding Iran's nuclear program. One seeming flaw is that it would only address questions that are already on the table. Should additional questions arise, the agreement would not help resolve those. Inany case, this agreement would not bring Iran into compliance with its obligations under UN Security Council Resolution 1696. And (without an Additional Protocol in force) it would not enable the IAEA to draw a conclusion whether or not Iran's program was peaceful. Given the seriousness of Iran's past safeguards violations, the key question is whether it is good enough simply to return to compliance with safeguards (as Iran argues), or whether other actions are required to correct the underlying problem (as the Security Council has demanded). As revised, the article obscures this basic point. NPguy 22:45, 22 September 2007 (UTC)

"One seeming flaw is that it would only address questions that are already on the table. Should additional questions arise, the agreement would not help resolve those." This seems like a virtual tautology to me, the Agreement is not designed to resolve questions that do not exist, it is designed to address all the questions the IAEA have asked. If they have further questions, then the IAEA has the right to address those too, in the normal manner. By criticising the agreement for not addressing issues not raised by the IAEA, it sounds like you're criticising a man of 6ft 4 for not be being 6ft 5.

Furthermore, according to the IAEA, the new agreement will allow it to "further promote the efficiency of the implementation of safeguards in Iran and its ability to conclude the exclusive peaceful nature of the Iran's nuclear activities."

Regarding this 'key question' -who has posed this and where? The Security Council has made a political demand, for Iran to cease doing something it has a legal right to do but, so far as UNSCR 1696 is concerned, that is entirely pursuant to Iran cooperating with the IAEA to the end of proving that Iran's programme is entirely peaceful. Having read the text ( http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N06/450/22/PDF/N0645022.pdf?OpenElement ), I can see nothing referring to or implying any 'underlying problem'. Dwtray2007 07:27, 23 September 2007 (UTC)

It's frustrating that people don't seem to get the basic argument. Iran cheated on its NPT safeguards obligations for nearly two decades, secretly pursuing an enrichment program that would give it the capability to produce nuclear weapons. What is the right response? Is it simply to allow Iran to continue to pursue that progam in the open, under IAEA safeguards? That implies that the only problem was the secrecy, rather than the significance of the actions being carried out in secret and the suspected reason for that secrecy. Or is the proper response to require Iran to stop what it was doing in secret - developing a nuclear weapons capability? The NPT doesn't actually say. It leaves it to the UN Security Council to address safegaurds violations. The Council has concluded that simply accepting safeguards is not enough - Iran must suspend its enrichment program. Yet Iran refuses to do so.

I find this very worrisome. Iran has lost international confidence and refises to take the one key step necessary to rebuild confidence. Given these facts, I have a hard time understanding why so many are supporting Iran's position. The best I can come up with is that they distrust the U.S. government. U.S. actions in Iraq have certainly earned distrust. But just because the United States says something doesn't mean that it's wrong, and the United States is far from alone in viewing Iran's nuclear program with alarm. NPguy 01:06, 24 September 2007 (UTC)

While you appear to be an expert on the matter, it would be more helpful to other editors if you added more citations to your edits so that we could see where your analysis comes from. This seems especially important when you're removing cited material from the article with your analysis. It might seem like a pain or formality, but verifiability is essential (and may help people see where you are coming from). --68.72.46.34 06:12, 28 September 2007 (UTC)

Good suggestion. Thanks. NPguy 03:03, 29 September 2007 (UTC)

Please do not forget that we are trying to pose an objective view, try to leave opinions on if you find this worrysome or not on the side. Please abstain from posting information that is used to follow a certain tendency or only support particular points of view. Just keep this in mind for the betterment of the articles!! Superdudemx 04:00, 12 October 2007 (UTC)

The Article does come off as apologetic towards the Iranian nuclear program. With that said, although the UN Security Council has been suggesting that Iran must suspend enrichment, these preconditions should not be used as the only POV for the Iranian program. Sarkozy is trying to reestablish a close relationship with the USA, hence the increasingly tougher stance by France. Whereas countries like Germany (The de facto leader of Europe, and by far the largest European market) and Italy have begun to shy away from further punishment. We all already know about China's and Russia's stances. Further, American influence and political pressure are considerable, so we ought to not take the UN Security Council as the end-all be-all. After all, the USA denied Iraqi usage of Chemical Weapons on Iranian forces in a 1986 Security Council resolution, did they not?

The IAEA knows how many centrifuges the Iranian government has to 4 significant figures, and they know the percent of enrichment to a tenth of a percent. Iran's nuclear program has become, whether or not we like to admit it, the most transparant nuclear program in the world, ever since inspectors have entered the country. That shouldn't be ignored in an encyclopedic article. -MadarB 04:46, 22 October 2007 (UTC)

The Additional Protocol requires far greater transparency than Iran has provided under its safeguards agreement. 84 countries have the Additional Protocol in force. Iran has refused to ratify. Until the latest IAEA-Iran agreement, the IAEA complained regularly that Iran was not providing the cooperation needed to resolve open questions. This hardly seems like the most transparent nuclear program in the world. NPguy 02:46, 25 October 2007 (UTC)

The IAEA knows the percentage of Iranian enrichment, which I don't believe even exceeds 5%, and the exact number of centrifuges, which doesn't even surpass 2000 I believe. Even without the safeguards agreement, you cannot possibly convince anyone that Iran's program is more covert than say, the United States. Do you know, with reasonable accuracy, how many gas centrifuges the USA has? I highly doubt it. All of it is classified (as it would be for Britain, France, etc), and if the IAEA wanted to enter an American facility that has been weaponized, they'd have to go through hell. I'm not trying to suggest Iran deserves a nuclear weapon simply because America has one, but let's keep things in perspective. Iran's program is clearly more transparant than any of the programs used by any of the nuclear powers. Iran's been fairly obedient with the IAEA, even if they haven't ratified the safeguards. I don't think bringing up the IAEA works in your favor, considering the IAEA is staunchly against the hawkish American stance, and they have been fairly consistant in that position. Further, the IAEA has still concluded that there is no legitimate way for anyone to claim Iran is developing nuclear weapons, beyond speculation, at this time. The ironic thing about the Iranian nuclear program is that their program is even less developed then they themselves are claiming it is. Iran is essentially inviting conflict by mouthing off. They're 5+ years away at best, and the IAEA would easily be able to alert the UN if a weaponized Iran is imminent (and the program would be able to be attacked immediately). Considering the IAEA is able to determine when or when not Iran has reached industrial capacity, when or when not Iran has reached weapons-grade level, when or when not Iran has surpassed what would be deemed appropriate for a civilian reactor, I would say that is a fairly transparant program. -MadarB 20:40, 25 October 2007 (UTC)

I don't want to respond to all of this, but I want to reiterate two points. First, Iran has a legal obligation under the NPT to report all that information to the IAEA. It shouldn't get special credit for being transparent merely for meeting this treaty obligation, particularly since it kept the program secret - and violated its treaty obligations - for nearly two decades. Second, the IAEA does not know whether Iran has a nuclear weapons program. They have said both that they see no proof of links to a weapons program and that they cannot conclude that Iran's program is peaceful. NPguy 02:53, 26 October 2007 (UTC)

The IAEA also concluded, in what I believe is still there most recent circular (aug 27) that they have "been able to verify the non-diversion of the declared nuclear materials at the enrichment facilities in Iran and [have] therefore concluded that it remains in peaceful use."

They may not yet be able to say with certainty that Iran's entire nuclear program is peaceful but that is a difficult determination to make (elements of proving a negative in fact). What is clear is that they've yet to see serious evidence of of a nuclear weapons program. The IAEA also states that the agreement they now have with Iran will "further promote the efficiency of the implementation of safeguards in Iran and its ability to conclude the exclusive peaceful nature of the Iran's nuclear activities."

It's true that we shouldn't give Iran special credit simply for meeting their treaty obligations, although, in the international arena, that is something of a rarity. Dwtray2007 08:42, 26 October 2007 (UTC)

Another reason we shouldn't give Iran credit merely for meeting its treaty obligations is that it hasn't. Iran was found to have violated those obligations for nearly twenty years, systematically concealing its enrichment program. It is also an overstatement to say that the IAEA has yet to see serious evidence of a nuclear weapons program. The IAEA has yet to label what it has reported as such, but it is not a great leap to see several elements of Iran's reported history as disturbing indications of possible weapons intent, including:

• Pursuing uranium enrichment - a technology that can produce weapons-grade uranium - in secret for nearly two decades, resulting in multiple violations of Iran's safeguards agreements;
• Buying technology for this program on the black market;
• Having military companies involved in producing nuclear equipment;
• Iran's acquisition of documents on manufacture of uranium hemispheres, which has little use outside weapons; and
• Experiments on production of polonium, whose main use is in triggering nuclear weapons.

None of these is conclusive, and plausible explanations have been offered for a few, but taken together they provide serious grounds for suspicion. NPguy 02:22, 27 October 2007 (UTC)

It is not an 'overstatement' to say the IAEA has seen no evidence of Iranian nuclear weaponization: it is to relate almost verbatim what the IAEA's head has himself said, a matter of days ago. You are entitled to your opinion but the purpose of this article is to relate the words and judgements of authoritative sources, not the opinions of its contributors. Therefore, as long as the IAEA says it has seen "no evidence" of Iranian nuclear weaponization, that is what this article should report. If other authoritative sources question the IAEA's judgement then we should also report that but it is not our place to second-guess those sources. Leaps, whether great or small, are not in our remit. Dwtray2007 12:46, 30 October 2007 (UTC)

When I say it was an overstatement, I am criticizing IAEA Director General ElBaradei for what I consider to be an overstatement. In fact, ElBaradei was heavily criticized at the time for saying "no evidence," which he then explained away as being synonymous with "no proof." I don't think they are synonyms, and I think ElBaradei was wrong. NPguy 18:23, 31 October 2007 (UTC)

Fair enough, you're of course entitled to your opinions, just like anyone else. I'm sure you understand though that, when deciding whether to take your opinion or ElBaradei's, wikipedia has to go with the latter. So, as long as he says the IAEA has seen no evidence, the article should reflect that. If you can find authoritative criticism of his assessment, however, that should also go in. Dwtray2007 21:17, 31 October 2007 (UTC)

• No evidence of weapons have been found in Iran
• The Supreme Leader of Iran has explicitly stated they are not seeking nuclear weapons
• Iranian officials have stated they are seeking peaceful nuclear energy
• Those accusing Iran of pursuing weapons offer nothing but speculation.
• Those accusing Iran of pursuing weapons made the same false accusations against Iraq

None of these taken together is conclusive, but taken together they offer serious grounds for suspicion. --69.210.15.210 06:05, 27 October 2007 (UTC)

Let's not forget that the United States was responsible for initiating the Iranian nuclear program in the first place while Iran was still led by an American-sponsored monarch. Dick Cheney, ironically, was one of the biggest pushers for a nuclearized Iran. Iran's program may have been "active" for 18 years, but to pretend as though it was reaching industrial scale level, or that it was an immediate threat to world security, is a joke. If Iran were heavily invested into their nuclear program during the 80s and 90s, then they would have reached weapon-capacity by now, which they haven't. It was clearly on the back burner, regardless of its illicitness. Even so, that would be completely irrelevent to the current state of this conflict. This is a current event, isn't it? As of right now, the IAEA seems fairly content with Iran's compliance. Bringing up the events of the 80s and 90s seems to be a new trend in American foreign policy (see: the invasion of Iraq based on unsubstatiated chemical weapons claims from the 1980s). Speculation should be left out of this article. This is an encyclopedia. Perhaps you could say that Westerners fear Iran may be trying to develop a nuclear weapons program, but it must also be made clear that the IAEA is staunchly against the hawkish stance of the USA and that the IAEA is pleased by Iran's compliance in recent months. Wikipedia shouldn't be used as a war propaganda tool. -MadarB 22:59, 27 October 2007 (UTC)

I'm not sure how it is relevant that the United States supported Iran's nuclear program in the 1970s, so let me respond to the other part of this comment. The hard part in developing an enrichment capability is the research and development to learn the tricks of making the technology work. After that, scaling up to industrial production is a relatively simple matter. So the fact that Iran was working on it for 18 years at a small scale does not mean Iran was not trying, nor does it mean Iran was not making important progress. The reason western countries are alarmed is that Iran is now proceeding unimpeded by efforts to keep the program secrect and is getting closer to overcoming the main technical obstacles to producing bomb-grade uranium. It is important to note that a relatively small scale plant (about 5,000 SWU) is capable of producing a bomb's worth of uranium in a year, where a much larger plant is needed (over 100,000 SWU) to enrich uranium to fuel a power plant. NPguy 18:41, 31 October 2007 (UTC)

Further, Israel, Pakistan(!), and India are all nuclear powers that are not on the NPT. Iran hasn't unprovokingly went to war in centuries. Israel has gone to war frequently, many times aggressively. Pakistan and India are the only two nuclear powers to ever declare war on each other (after a nuclear standoff just one year prior). Pakistan, of course, is a sanctuary for terrorism, and an ally to the Taliban. 68.43.58.4223:29, 27 October 2007

Deleted Reference

In editing the overview section I deleted the claim that Iran had offered to delay its uranium enrichment program for several years. The citation referred to IAEA Director General ElBaradei's hope that Iran would make such an offer, but there is no indication that Iran ever did make such an offer. Had Iran done so it would have have been big news and provided the basis for broader negotiations. NPguy 02:09, 4 November 2007 (UTC)

Sigh. Thankfully some of US however do keep track of the facts. Here, read this: http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/HB07Ak01.html

Note this paragraph about how Iran proposed that: "Iran will continue negotiating with the EU-3 regarding enrichment issues for two years, and after two years, if the negotiations fail, will resume enrichment activities....Certainly, the last item was a novelty and the EU-3 diplomats have some explaining to do as to why they were not interested...there is no evidence that any respected member of the Western media made any attempt to get their hands on Iran's proposal." —Preceding unsigned comment added by 67.85.7.4 (talk) 07:24, 13 July 2008 (UTC)

NPT Rights

Dwtray2007 and I have gone back and forth about a few words about whether Iran has the right to enrich uranium. In general, enrichment is not by itself a violation of the NPT. However, any peaceful activity must be undertaken in conformity with the other articles ofthe NPT, particularly Articles I, II and III. Under Article II, Iran may not undertake enrichment for weapons. Many observers (including me) believe the purpose of Iran's enrichment program is to develop a nuclear weapons capability. The arguments to support this view are circumstantial, and it is practically impossible to produce definitive evidence of Iran's intent.

However, Iran clearly violated Article III of the NPT by keeping that program secret from the IAEA. In response, the UN Security Council took a decision that limits Iran's right to enrich uranium. Iran does not have the "right" to enrich uranium in violation of a binding decision of the Security Council.

This is the main reason I have been deleting shorthand references to Iran's "right" to enrich uranium. The issue is too complicated to address in that shorthand. NPguy (talk) 03:16, 24 November 2007 (UTC)

Iran's enrichment program was openly discussed on Iranian national radio, and in 1992 IAEA inspectors visited Iran's uranium mines, and in 1997 El-Baradei himself visited the construction site of Iran's uranium conversion. Your repeated claim that Iran's enrichment program was "hidden" is therefore wrong. Iran "hid" the importation of some enrichment-related technology that it was perfectly legally entitled to have, and had been wrongly prevented from acquiring. The enrichment program itself was not a secret

Furthermore, your claim that Iran does not have a "right" to enrichment and that the UNSC resolution is "binding" is open to debate and not God's word.

If it is too complicated then by what right do you simply delete it as if it doesn't exist, and by what right do you announce that Iran' doesn't have the right?

First, it is rude and confusing to insert your comments in the middle of another comment. It's hard to tell who said what before the signature line.

Second, none of the citations about Iran's radio broadcasts talk about uranium enrichment. They talk about uranium mining, which is completely different.

Third, the question of secrecy is not whether Iran described its enrichment program in public (a claim your sources do not support), but whether it met its legal obligation to declare its enrichment activities and facilities to the IAEA, including design information, operating reports and and material inventory reports. Iran failed to do so, for eighteen years.

Finally, the argument about rights is unfortunate and beside the point. The Security Council is not trying to deny Iran's right to peaceful use of nuclear energy, but trying to encourage Iran to take an alternative approach to exercising those rights. Instead, Iran has insisted on maintaining its current course. NPguy (talk) 03:42, 19 January 2008 (UTC)

Resolution 1696 does not state that Iran has breached the NPT. Some people, including you, may believe that Iran is developing nuclear weapons but the IAEA has found no "concrete evidence" that this is so.

While the SC has required Iran to cease uranium enrichment, there is debate about whether it is entitled to do so as the right to enrich can be seen as a sovereign right and, therefore, part of jus cogens. The SC, in fact the Charter itself, even bearing in mind article 103, cannot override jus cogens. So the argument goes, the right to enrich is a sovereign right, as demonstrated by the fact that the US and USSR began enriching before the NPT and UN came into existence. As a result of this, a respectable argument can be made that, by asking Iran to cease enrichment, the SC has acted ultra vires. Therefore, while the SC can insist on inspections, Iranian disclosure or even limited military strikes against known weapons, it cannot call on Iran to cease its "inalienable" right to enrichment in defense of international peace and security and certainly not in order to uphold the NPT (since the demand itself violates Article IV).

Anyway, I'm willing for my parenthetical remark in the article to be removed but I think there should be a section discussing the legal conflict (as perceived by some) between the NPT and the SC. Dwtray2007 (talk) 08:54, 24 November 2007 (UTC)

First of all, the way you have changed the text is fine. But . . .

I am unaware of any serious doubt that Iran violated its obligations under Article III of the NPT. That Article requires Iran to "accept safeguards" on "all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within [its territory], under its jurisdiction, or carried out under its control anywhere." The IAEA reported that Iran undertook a deliberate pattern of undeclared nuclear activities using undeclared nuclear materials at undeclared nuclear facilities over a period of 18 years, thus failing to "accept" safeguards on "all" peaceful nuclear activities.

And most observers believe Iran is pursuing at least a latent nuclear weapons capability - the enrichment program really makes no sense otherwise. But although I believe Iran is pursuing a weapons program, I don't believe the evidence of a violation of Article II is compelling. In fact, I think the issue is a distraction. The NPT was set up so that safeguards violations would trigger international action. The Council's actions seem perfectly in line with that intent. You don't have to prove the purpose of the safeguards violation; that is much too high a standard.

Sorry, but all Iran has committed was a safeguards breach due to a "failure to report" which is quite common (Egypt, S, Korea, etc. all have done worse) and a safeguards breach does not automatically amount to a violation of the NPT nor is it the basis of UNSC involvment.

As far as I can tell, there is nothing to the claim that "jus cogens" has anything to do with Iran's proclaimed right to enrichment. No one has produced a citation of any expert making this legal claim, and my attempt to get a response from the international legal community produced a rather dismissive reply. The claim that enrichment is a "sovereign right" seems to be based not on "jus cogens" but on the more prosaic principle that sovereign entities have rights to act autonomously unless they agree voluntarily to limit those through agreements with other sovereign entities. "Jus cogens" seems to serve the opposite purpose - to define inherent limits to the autonomy of states even if they do not explicitly agree to those limits. Human rights is the usual example.

I suggest you read the legal literature of the limits applicable to the UNSC. The UNSC can only involve itself if there's a threat to international security, and even then it is bound by the principle of jus cogens. The fact that nuclear power is a sovereign right not "granted" and not capable of being "taken away" is evidenced by the fact that countries like the US and China and Israel and Russia all developed their nuclear programs without getting anyone's prior approval.

But Iran ratified the NPT and the UN Charter, so it accepted limits on its sovereign rights. Let's work with rights and obligations as stated in the foundational legal documents (the NPT, the IAEA Statute and the UN Charter). If there's a case that the UN Security Council exceeded its authority in demanding that Iran suspend enrichment, let's discuss it in terms of those documents. NPguy (talk) 04:09, 27 November 2007 (UTC)

Yes, and the NPT only requires the suspension of the right to build nuclear weapons. It does not require a country to get anyone's prior approval to develop nuclear technology, it does not give the UNSC the authority to demand that a country give up enrichment, and quite the contrary it explicitly recognizes the fullest possible extent of nuclear technlogy as an inalienable right.

Again, your lack of qualifications in international law is showing. Documents are not the sole authority of international law, and the interpretation of documents are subject to all sorts of other norms and principles such as jus cogens.

Recent intelligence reports in America

Recent intelligence reports in the United States now suggest that Iran has in fact been correct and that their nuclear weapons program was terminated in 2003 (4 years ago). Shouldn't this be included?[10][11], just a news link... it is essentially a current event. The American intelligence community is now in agreement with Russia and China that Iran poses no immediate nuclear weapons threat and that even if Iran were to reinitiate research on nuclear weapons and the development of bombs, they wouldn't even possess enough enriched uranium for a single weapon until 2010-2015. - 68.43.58.42 20:15, 4 December 2007 (UTC)

I added a reference yesterday, in the lead paragraph. NPTGuy has also worked on it. Dwtray2007 (talk) 23:48, 4 December 2007 (UTC)

And I took it out. It isn't relevant to nuclear power, it belongs in the nuclear weapons article. I tried to put into the article the connection between nuclear power and nuclear weapons, but it was rightly removed. Just having a link at the top to the other article is sufficient. 199.125.109.108 (talk) 20:10, 21 December 2007 (UTC)

And I put it back. There remains a question over whether Iran's claims of the peaceful purpose of its nuclear program are correct. In particular, Iran's enrichment program and heavy water reactor have been called into question. The NIE is relevant to that question. NPguy (talk) 17:47, 22 December 2007 (UTC)

It doesn't need to be in the article twice. It is already in the article in the section US viewpoints. It definitely doesn't belong in the lead. 199.125.109.108 (talk) 00:50, 23 December 2007 (UTC)

Something needs to be in the introduction to make clear that there are questions about whether Iran's enrichment and heavy water programs are peaceful. NPguy (talk) 04:00, 28 December 2007 (UTC)

Irans heavy water reactor at Arak is subject to IAEA safeguards. If you want to speculate about "peaceful" do it elsewhere. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 67.84.142.221 (talk) 02:32, 19 January 2008 (UTC)

I said there were questions about whether Iran's heavy water reactor program is peaceful. There are. Heavy water reactors are good for producing weapons-grade plutonium and have often been used for that purpose. They can also be used for research, so it is impossible to prove the intent. But given Iran's record of systematically violating its safeguards agreement, there is reason to doubt that its intentions are purely peaceful. NPguy (talk) 03:21, 19 January 2008 (UTC)

No one is interested in your opinions on the matter. The fact remains that the reactor is fully under IAEA safeguards. If you want to speculate about why Iran shouldn't be trusted, start your own blog.

NPOV removed

If anyone thinks the article is POV state your concerns here. Drive by tagging is not appropriate. The last time NPOV was mentioned was two months ago and has long ago been addressed. 199.125.109.108 (talk) 00:54, 23 December 2007 (UTC)

The bias in some sections has been removed, but the history (2000 to present) remains selective in a way that favors the Iranian position. NPguy (talk) 03:58, 28 December 2007 (UTC)

Nuclear facilities in Iran

As it currently stands, this article is extremely long -- and it will undoubtedly continue to grow even longer as more time passes. Therefore I would like to split of the section "Nuclear facilities in Iran" as a separate article under the same heading. If there are no serious objections, I will do this in the coming week. Cgingold (talk) 04:04, 6 January 2008 (UTC)

I moved it.--Seyyed(t-c) 06:21, 16 January 2008 (UTC)

Annoying reversion war

Regarding the latest, it is hardly "original research" to observe in reading the previous paragraph that there is a logical gap between public statement about mining and conversion and the underlying claim that Iran's enrichment program was well-known. Mining and conversion are not the same as enrichment.

More generally, better to discuss here than in the titles of our edits.

And why do you insist on remaining anonymous? NPguy (talk) 04:27, 23 January 2008 (UTC)

This is a ridiculous claim. Iran's uranium mining operation was part and parcel of its program to obtain the full nuclear fuel cycle, which was widely known to be the case and which was reported repeatedly. It wasn'nt mininng uranium just for the fun of it. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 12.26.54.11 (talk) 23:23, 1 February 2008 (UTC)

I tagged the statement to refer others to the talk page. The statement in question:

However, Iran's claims ignore the fact that all the cited public statements referred to activities other than enrichment (mining and conversion), and the fact that Iran failed to meet its obligations to report its enrichment activities to the IAEA as required by its safeguards agreement.

is not supported by the citation you have provided. Wikipedia's

no original research policy states Wikipedia does not publish "unpublished facts, arguments, speculation, and ideas; and any unpublished analysis or synthesis of published material that serves to advance a position" and further recommends "Citing sources

and avoiding original research are inextricably linked: to demonstrate that you are not presenting original research, you must cite reliable sources that provide information directly related to the topic of the article, and that directly support the information as it is presented."

The statement you have provided cannot be found in the citation you have provided and I am interested in capturing the information contained within the document. I welcome discussion on why you think the citation covers what you are saying (though I am skeptical since it seems indirect and hard to follow). I would rather encourage you to find a quote which you find represenative (and would also note that if the issue is later resolved in the document, Wikipedia should also note this).. --68.72.38.42 (talk) 04:45, 23 January 2008 (UTC)

The statement you are complaining about has two parts. The first, "Iran's claims ignore the fact that all the cited public statements referred to activities other than enrichment (mining and conversion," is simply an observation about the previous sentences. It doesn't need a citation. The second part, "the fact that Iran failed to meet its obligations to report its enrichment activities to the IAEA as required by its safeguards agreement," is one of the main conclusions of the cited document. I have a hard time seeing why you have a propblem with this. NPguy (talk) 03:13, 24 January 2008 (UTC)

For the first part: If the public statements cited aren't relevant to what is being discussed, then maybe the paragraph should be reworded or the material should be removed as irrelevant to Iranian assertions; however, the Wikipedia text shouldn't be adding analysis or interpretation without a source.

For the second part: I feel the IAEA document speaks more towards failure to report a number of items (enrichment being one) and that the document also states Iran is engaged in corrective actions to compensate for the previously undeclared items.

On both counts, I feel that citing material directly from the document will resolve the issue and I encourage you to find quotes which you find represenative of the document; and if the document details Iranian corrective actions, then these would also be listed. --68.72.38.42 (talk) 03:56, 24 January 2008 (UTC)

I think we could work with partially quoting some of these:

"It is clear that Iran has failed in a number of instances over an extended period of time to meet its obligations under its Safeguards Agreement with respect to the reporting of nuclear material and its processing and use, as well as the declaration of facilities where such material has been processed and stored."

"Iran failed to report "the import of natural uranium metal in 1994 and its subsequent transfer for use in laser enrichment experiments, including the production of enriched uranium, the loss of nuclear material during these operations, and the production and transfer of resulting waste."

"As corrective actions, Iran has undertaken to submit ICRs relevant to all of these activities, to provide design information with respect to the facilities where those activities took place, to present all nuclear material for Agency verification during its forthcoming inspections and to implement a policy of co-operation and full transparency."

--68.72.38.42 (talk) 04:07, 24 January 2008 (UTC)

Those are good quotes, but they don't convey the whole picture. As the report as a whole makes clear, Iran made none of the required declarations for its enrichment activities, neither the laser nor the centrifuge enrichment activities. Thus my short summary is more complete than these extended quotes.

The problem with this particular point is that Iran is making an argument that is essentially without merit. Therefore simply citing the argument without a rebuttal is misleading. As for the suggestion of removing everything in the preceding point that does not support the claim Iran is making, that would leave only the first sentence. I'm not sure the claim in this sentence is correct because it refers to a document that is not available online.

Whether you agree with that assessment or not, the larger problem is with the whole section titled "Iran." It is entirely out of place and seems to exist primarily to record Iranian arguments on its own behalf. Such arguments belong in the section "Iranian viewpoint." Where this section presents facts and actions, those probably should be embedded in the chronological history above. NPguy (talk) 02:59, 25 January 2008 (UTC)

My problem is with the one sentence and you supporting it with the IAEA paper. I have a different reading or interpretation of the document than you. The article should not use either of our interpretations or analyses (expert or not as they may be) without proper attribution and citation. The only compromise I see is using represenative quotes, but I may be open to another paraphrase if you can point to the exact passage(s) which you are using to support it.

Apart from this, I'd encourage you to work out the other problems with other editors as I don't have too many feelings one way or the other about them. I'd be happy to participate in any other resulting discussions though. --68.72.38.42 (talk) 04:05, 25 January 2008 (UTC)

Saying that you can't summarize a document strikes me as pedantic. If I had to pick a quote from the November 2003 IAEA report, it would be the following:

50. The recent disclosures by Iran about its nuclear programme clearly show that, in the past, Iran had concealed many aspects of its nuclear activities, with resultant breaches of its obligation to comply with the provisions of the Safeguards Agreement. Iran’s policy of concealment continued until last month, with co-operation being limited and reactive, and information being slow in coming, changing and contradictory. While most of the breaches identified to date have involved limited quantities of nuclear material, they have dealt with the most sensitive aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle, including enrichment and reprocessing. And although the materials would require further processing before being suitable for weapons purposes, the number of failures by Iran to report in a timely manner the material, facilities and activities in question as it is obliged to do pursuant to its Safeguards Agreement has given rise to serious concerns.

NPguy (talk) 04:15, 26 January 2008 (UTC)

I'm not unable to summarize the document, I just find your summarization ill-supported by the document that you are citing. For example, the document makes no reference to any public statements, so this is your own independent research or analysis. Further, the paragraph directly after the one you cited reads:

51. Following the Board’s adoption of resolution GOV/2003/69, the Government of Iran informed the Director General that it had now adopted a policy of full disclosure and had decided to provide the Agency with a full picture of all of its nuclear activities. Since that time, Iran has shown active co-operation and openness. This is evidenced, in particular, by Iran’s granting to the Agency unrestricted access to all locations the Agency requested to visit; by the provision of information and clarifications in relation to the origin of imported equipment and components; and by making individuals available for interviews. This is a welcome development.

Any summarization of this source would require actually using material found within the document, including the positive as well as the negative, and establishing a consensus view. Citing and attributing a reliable summarization of the document may be another option. It would also be worth looking in to more recent information as well.--68.72.38.42 (talk) 05:54, 26 January 2008 (UTC)

Rather than cite the document itself, we could state decisions which have taken place in an objective matter. The text would provide positives and negatives from a time to the present. I think one version of this could look like:

In 2005, the IAEA Board of Governors concluded, in a rare non-consensus decision with 12 abstentions, that Iran's past safeguards "breaches" and "failures" constituted "non-compliance" with its Safeguards Agreement. In 2008, the IAEA worked to resolve many of these outstanding issues addressed in an August 2007 workplan.

The wording might need a little work and it would obviously have all the references in the actual article. If there was a particular point left out that you felt was important, we could add it in as long as it is attributed and cited (perhaps the IAEA or Board of Governors list particularly important 'breaches' or 'failures' which should be included). A brief Iranian response might also be necessary, if there is any.. --68.72.38.42 (talk) 15:25, 26 January 2008 (UTC)

I continue to see no problem with the statement that Iran hid its enrichment program, citing the document in question. To wit:

46. Iran has now acknowledged that it has been developing, for 18 years, a uranium centrifuge enrichment programme, and, for 12 years, a laser enrichment programme. In that context, Iran has admitted that it produced small amounts of LEU using both centrifuge and laser enrichment processes, and that it had failed to report a large number of conversion, fabrication and irradiation activities involving nuclear material, including the separation of a small amount of plutonium.

I'm not trying to summarize the entire document, simply to use it as the source for this one fact. NPguy (talk) 02:38, 27 January 2008 (UTC)

The problem was where it was using the source to support a statement 'disproving' the previous Iranian claims on national radio, etc. I have since removed this portion. I think it is fine to use the document cited to show that Iran hid aspects of its nuclear program for 18 years, and think we should add in information about the most recent four years as well. --68.72.38.42 (talk) 06:02, 27 January 2008 (UTC)

Iran's claim to have declared its enrichment program

(No one said that Iran had fully declared its enrichment program -- only that its program was not a secret, so don't mischaracterize the assertions by creating strawmen)

I didn't notice that someone had changed ths subject line. The article cited claims by Iran that it had declared its enrichment program to the IAEA. That is why I started this discussion. If no one is making that claim we can remove it from the article, but we shouldn't rewrite the discussion. NPguy (talk) 03:41, 14 February 2008 (UTC)

I removed most of the claims because they do not refer to enrichment but to mining or conversion. I left one which refers to enrichment (though it was not a declaration), but marked it dubious because I cannot find the cited source online. The claim is that France agreed to help Iran with Iran's enrichment program. If this is a reference to Iran's investment in Eurodif, that would not support the claim.

Could the person who posted this please provide a relevant quote from that source that supports the claim? NPguy (talk) 02:12, 28 January 2008 (UTC)

I'm not sure where it originated or what exactly it is talking about, I will try to look over it sometime in the next few days if I have time. Reading the sentence, it is referring to when the Shah was in power, so it atleast seems plausible to me. Here's one article I found related to this, but I won't have time to read this or others for awhile. --68.72.38.42 (talk) 05:44, 28 January 2008 (UTC)

The point as now drafted is a complete non sequitur. It says Iran claimed its enrichment plans were public but has no supporting evidence. At least there should be a quote of an Iranian saying this or else the point should be deleted. —Preceding unsigned comment added by NPguy (talk • contribs) 23:07, 28 January 2008 (UTC)

I think this as well, but would like to wait awhile to let other editors have a chance at it. Supporting evidence should be worked in, the point should be reworded to a cited Iranian assertion, or it should be removed. Before deleting the entire paragraph, just wait a bit to see if any of the other editors do anything. If no one can make this relevant or provide a citation, then delete away. --68.72.38.42 (talk) 00:04, 29 January 2008 (UTC)

IRan may have failed to declare ELEMENTS of its enrichment program such as the importation of centrifuge parts, but the Enrichment program itself was long known to exist, and was started before the 1979 Islamic revolution. Iran's repeated efforts to obtain enrichment-related technology from other countries, including CHina and Argentina, were also public knowledge. You are artificially making a distinction between enrichment and mining/conversion which does not stand scrutiny. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 12.26.54.11 (talk) 23:25, 1 February 2008 (UTC)

This is not true. Iran's safeguards agreemenbt required it to make certain specific reports to the IAEA. Public statements, even if they describe the activity in question, are not a substitute. Before 2003, Iran had not made any of the required reports to the IAEA. The entire program was, for the purposes of the safeguards agreement, undeclared.

As far as I can tell from the various revisions to this article, no one has yet produced a public statement by Iran referring to an enrichment program before 2003. All the cited statements referred to things other than enrichment. NPguy (talk) 03:39, 2 February 2008 (UTC)

I'm sorry but you display a distinct lack of familiarity with the relevant literature and are making some very arbitrary claims. Not only was Iran's enrichment program known to the IAEA but the US had offered the technology to Iran (http://goliath.ecnext.com/coms2/gi_0199-2374263/LEAD-U-S-offered-uranium.html) and furthermore, the IAEA itself was cooperating with Iran on Iran's enrichment program (until 1983 when the US ended the assistance.) Herman Vera Ruiz, an IAEA official tasked by IAEA Deputy Director General Maurizio Zifferero to conduct a mission to Iran, visited Entec in October 1983. In November, he recommended to Zifferero and to Director General Hans Blix that the IAEA provide assistance to move Iran's nuclear research program forward. Ruiz's report to Blix and Zifferero make clear that Entec had spelled out to the IAEA that it was established with the main objective of acting as the center for the transfer and development of nuclear technology, as well as contribute to the formation of local expertise and manpower needed to sustain a very ambitious program in the field of nuclear power reactor technology and fuel cycle technology. (See: U.S. in 1983 stopped IAEA from helping Iran make UF6 by Mark Hibbs, Nuclear Fuel August 4, 2003 Vol. 28, No. 16; Pg. 12)

Iran's actual disclosures to the IAEA are not public records however based on open sources we know that Iran was known to be working on the nuclear fuel cycle before the revolution (since the US and EU were actively involved) and after the revolution we know that Iran continued to search for uranium deposits since it was announced on national radio, that Iran had attempted to enter into contracts with the Argentinians to obtain enrichment technology in 1992, that IAEA was aware of Iran's program for mining uranium (since according to news reports IAEA inspectors had visited the mines in 1992) as well as conversion (since Iran informed the IAEA of plans to build a conversion facility in 1996 when the Chinese pulled out) and enrichment (since the IAEA was a participant in the program in 1983). In short, while Iran's importation of centrifuges and experiments with them were kept a secret, Iran's program for developing the full nuclear fuel cycle, which includes enrichment, was neither secret nor hidden.

This is frustrating because you claim to know certain facts but fail to produce them. I have asked for quotes because your citations are not readily available and because your summaries of facts have often been misleading. For example, if the United States offered assistance with enrichment it would have been before 1979, which is irrelevant in discussing a program reconstituted in 1986. Your citation regarding Argentina is unsourced. All the other facts refer to the fuel cycle but not specifically to enrichment. They are not equivalent.

By the way, it is public record that Iran failed to declare its enrichment program to the IAEA. The IAEA reports are on its web site. NPguy (talk) 23:33, 3 February 2008 (UTC)

I just got done citing the relevant source and you dare come here and say that I din't produce the relevant sources? LOL! Look, not everything is on GOogle and I'm not going to post the entire article here because you don't have a subscription to the Nuclear Fuel journal or other relevant nuclear industry literature.

As for the 1992 Argentina deal, I suggest you read 1 “INVAP Fears Bankruptcy after Shipment Is Halted,” Nuclear Engineering International 37 (June 1992), p. 12. which reports on Iran's attempts to obtain a pilot-scale uranium mill and a pilot-scale fuel fabrication plant from Argentina.

US assistance if very relevant because it proves that Iran's nuclear fuel cycle program (which includes enrichment) was known. Iran failed to declare ELEMENTS of its enrichment program - such as importing centrifuges and testing them but its enrichment program as well as its ful nuclear fuel cycle program was openly known. Iran's nuclear program was not "reconstituted" in 1986, it was simply continued from the Shah's time and Iran was cooperating with the IAEA as early as 1983, as the Nuclear Fuel article stated (SEE See: U.S. in 1983 stopped IAEA from helping Iran make UF6 by Mark Hibbs, Nuclear Fuel August 4, 2003 Vol. 28, No. 16; Pg. 12)

Once more, if you're not familiar with the literature, it is not my fault. You're pushing an agenda and are not qualified to edit this wikipedia entry.

Your summary confirms my suspicion that the arrangement with Argentina was not about enrichment. You refer to milling and fuel fabrication. These are not enrichment. Production of UF6 is not enrichment either. As for actual enrichment, the IAEA has reported publicly that Iran did not make any declarations of enrichment activities until confronted in 2002 with public statements by a third party.

So in short you didn't actually read the cited source and still insist on your own agenda. And, UF6 is the chemical form of uranium that is used during the uranium enrichment process. What exactly do you assume the Iranians were OPENLY out to mill and grind uranium and make UF6 for - to feed a "hidden" enrichment program? to bake a cake? Step by step they were OPENLY pursuing the steps to acquire the FULL nuclear fuel cycle, as they had OPENLY announced they were doing - and that includes enrichment.

You may be trying to make the point that the activities Iran was pursuing implied that it was also pursuing enrichment. If that is your point, I actually agree with you. But unlike you I interpret it as cause for concern - why was Iran pursuing the fuel cycle if not for enrichment? If it was for enrichment, why did Iran not declare any enrichment activities to the IAEA? Iran's uranium reserves are too small and to support an independent nuclear power program, but they are large enough to support a weapons program. These reserves ar low grade and far more expensive than uranium readily available on the international market. But cost is less of an object for a nuclear weapons program. It all fits together. NPguy (talk) 03:04, 5 February 2008 (UTC)

"why was Iran pursuing the fuel cycle if not for enrichment"?? What kind of sentence is that? Enrichment is part of the fuel cycle. Do you know what you're talking about?

Anyway, IRAN INVITED THE IAEA TO VISIT ITS SITE AT ENTEC AND THE IAEA WROTE A REPORT ABOUT PROSPECTS FOR PARTICIPATING IN DEVELOPING THE FULL NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE WHICH INCLUDES ENRICHMENT. You're being DELIBERATELY obtuse.

You apparently don't know the technology either. Enrichment is part and parcel of the fuel cycle. Un-enriched uranium is not useful for anything: not an LEU reactor, not a bomb either. The article from Nuclear Fuel that I cited (and which you apparently are unaware of, whilst claiming to be an 'expert') makes it clear:

The IAEA also was informed about Entec's largest department, for materials testing, which was responsible for fuel fabrication. "Currently experimental work is being carried out on UO2 pellet fabrication (sintering and grinding), cladding welding, and quality control," the memo stated. According to sources, France had provided the basic know-how upon which the UO2 program was then based. When Iran's nuclear program was restarted, this department had 23 scientists, specialized in physical chemistry, metallurgy, and other fields. Ruiz described its laboratory equipment as "impressive," and containing much equipment for materials testing. Entec also set up a chemistry department. "Its main duty is to perform experiments for the conversion of (U3O8) to nuclear grade UO2...Ruiz's report to Blix and Zifferero 10 years before makes clear that Entec had spelled out to the IAEA that it was established with the main objective of acting as the center for the transfer and development of nuclear technology, as well as contribute to the formation of local expertise and manpower needed to sustain a very ambitious program in the field of nuclear power reactor technology and fuel cycle technology...The former U.S. official said that Entec had been set up on the basis of a bilateral cooperation deal between Iran and France. As a part of that cooperation, he said, France had agreed to aid Iran in the fuel cycle including uranium enrichment." (interestingly, France stopped aid to enrichment under pressure from Carter, but the Iranians continued their quest for the full nuclear cycle)

Your resort to the claim that "Iran's uranium resources are too small" claim yet again betrays your agenda because it is innuendo. Your are interjecting your own opinions. Iran has never said it would be totally reliant on domestic uranium -- which is why Iran is importing fuel from Russia -- only that it would also diversify its energy resources to INCLUDE domestic uranium (not exclusively) Similarly, the US exploits its own oil resources, but also imports oil. Just because Alaskan oil is not enough to run the country, doesn't mean you ignore the resouces.

Again, if you want to include such speculation about secret intentions of Iran and pass along innuendo and hypothetical scenarios, you're free to do so ON YOUR OWN SITE and not Wikipedia. BUT if you want to posit your own speculations about secret Iranian intentions, then you have to acknowledge the contrary views. You rhetorically ask why didn't the Iranian declare their FULL enrichment program - and the main article at Wikipedia says because of US obstructionism.(source cited too) Others say this too:

The Iranian response is one of bewilderment and even anger. When Iran openly sought to develop the fuel cycle and the IAEA was willing to help it, the U.S. intervened to stop this. Whenever Tehran signed a public agreement with an international partner, Washington worked overtime to kill it.Given this reality, the only way to build a fuel cycle programme — even if one's aims were purely peaceful — would have been to go about it with stealth." (22 August 2006 The Hindu - http://svaradarajan.blogspot.com/2006/08/iran-little-chance-of-nuclear.html)

AND

Between 1982 and 1995, Iran attempted openly to restart its nuclear power program, but was prevented by the US at every step from achieving its goal. The US also convinced Russia in the early 1990s not to sell Iran a centrifuge plant. All of these taught Iran a lesson: it could not set up the UE facilities with full transparency, because the US would stop the effort at its inception. Thus, beginning in 1987, while it was pursuing its nuclear power program openly, Iran was also trying quietly to develop an indigenous UE program based on whatever design it could obtain. So, if Iran's UE program went "underground," it was driven there by the US and its allies. At the same time, the US and the West knew about this, but they simply did not believe that Iran could do it.(http://www.payvand.com/news/07/dec/1044.html)

I put a verify source tag up to note the concern, and it should stay until another editor can independently verify the citation. If it can't be confirmed after a given amount of time, or a reasonable amount of counter-evidence is provided, then it would make sense to remove the statement(s). The ideal thing would be a consensus of what happened, but I guess that can't always be achieved.. --68.23.10.26 (talk) 04:27, 5 February 2008 (UTC)

1. ^ Undeclared Nuclear Activities and Outstanding Issues: Clean Bill of Health? Michael Spies, Lawyers’ Committee on Nuclear Policy, May 2006
2. ^ IAEA Annual Safeguards Implementation Report of 2004
3. ^ [12]