United Brands Company v Commission of the European Communities
United Brands v Commission | |
---|---|
Submitted 15 March 1976 Decided 14 February 1978 | |
Full case name | United Brands Company and United Brands Continentaal BV v Commission of the European Communities |
Case | 27/76 |
CelexID | 61976J0027 |
ECLI | ECLI:EU:C:1978:22 |
Nationality of parties | Netherlands |
Court composition | |
President Advocate General H. Mayras | |
Instruments cited | |
EEC Treaty | |
Keywords | |
Competition; Abuse of a Dominant Position |
United Brands v Commission (1976) Case 27/76 is an
cartels, collusion and other anti-competitive practices,[1] and to ban abuse of dominant market positions.[2]
Facts
Chiquita brand. UBC forbade its distributors/ripeners to sell bananas that UBC did not supply. Also, UBC fixed pricing each week; charging a higher price in different Member States, and imposed unfair prices upon customers in Belgo-Luxembourg Economic Union, Denmark, The Netherlands and Germany.[3]
The Commission viewed United Brands' action as a breach of Article 86 of the
TFEU).[4] Article 86 prohibits "abuse of a dominant position" of a relevant market. The case was referred for a Preliminary Ruling to the European Court of Justice
under Article 177 (now Art 267).
Judgement
Agreeing with the Commission, the ECJ held that United Brands' behaviour was unlawful:
- The ECJ rejected UBC's claim that the product market was the "fresh-fruit market as a whole". Instead, because of the notion of cross elasticity of demand and product characteristics, the product market was defined as the banana market.
- UBC had about 45% of the EU banana market, and 45% was deemed to amount to a "dominant position".[5]
- Since the "green banana clause" effectively prevented any competing logistics firms from carrying Chiquita bananas, it was anti-competitive and in breach of Art 86.
See also
- EU competition law
- Consten & Grundig v Commission
References
- ^ Art 101 TFEU
- ^ Art 102 TFEU
- ^ Case report
- ^ The relevant articles were originally numbered 85 & 86, then 81 & 82, and finally 101 & 102
- ^ M.A.G. van Meerhaeghe, Protection of competition in Belgium, Economia delle Scelte Pubbliche (Journal of Public Finance and Public Choice), Vol. VIII, 1990-2/3, p. 100.