User:Ling zhu md/Implicit Contracts
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In economics, Implicit Contracts refer to voluntary and self-enforcing long term agreements made between two parties regarding the future exchange of goods or services. The Implicit Contracts Theory was first developed to explain why we see quantity adjustments (
In the context of the
The interpersonal negotiation and agreement in implicit contracts is in contrast to the impersonal and unilateral decision making in a
Implicit Contracts in Labor Market
Layoff Puzzle
In traditional economic theory, a worker takes his wage as given and decides how many hours he works. The firm also takes the wage as given and decides how much labor to buy. Then wage is determined in the market to ensure total labor supply equals to total labor demand. If workers supply more labor than firms demand, then the wage level should fall, so that workers will work fewer hours and firms would demand more labor. Hence, when firms reduce labor demand during a recession, we should expect to see a fall in wage as well. However, in reality, we see firms layoff redundant workers while keeping the wage unchanged for the rest of the workforce[3], and the wage compensation fluctuates considerably less than employment does in a typical business cycle[4]. Therefore, the law of supply and demand is insufficient to explain these phenomena we observe in reality.
Implicit Contract as Insurance
In an effort to explain the layoff puzzle, models with implicit contracts are independently developed by
Decline of Implicit Contract Theory in Labor Economics
Despite its popularity in the 1980s, applications of the implicit contracts theory in labor economics has been in decline since 1990s. The theory has been replaced by search and matching theory to explain labor market imperfections.
Implicit Contracts in Capital Market
The earliest studies to employ implicit contracts models in capital markets see the existence of credit rationing as part of an
Implicit Contracts under Adverse Selection
Some argue that the creditor-debtor long term relationship arises from the valuable "inside information" revealed via repeated bank-firm interactions.
Implicit Contracts under Moral Hazard
The relationship banking approach focuses on adverse selection as the main consequence of the information imperfection between lender and the borrower; however, there is also the problem of moral hazard. In general there are two moral hazard problems related to the capital market. First, borrowers could lie about their financial situation and not repay their debts in full. If the lender could not check whether the borrower is lying, then there might not be any lending in the market at all, especially when the debt is unsecured. Second, when a borrower, for example, a firm makes a bad decision that leads to its bankruptcy, it does not bear the full consequence of her mistake since part of the cost will be born by the bank that helps finance the project. Therefore the firm is likely to make riskier decisions when the investment is financed by a bank than when the investment is financed out of the firm's own pocket. Economists show that these problems could be solved by an implicit contract in which the borrower has to pay some costs when she defaults on the debt. The borrower's cost of default can be the expense of hiring lawyers and accountants to persuade the lender of her financial distress[12], exclusion from capital market and future borrowing [13], or economic sanctions if the borrower is a country [14]. However, since some of these costs will reduce the amount collectible to the lender in the bankruptcy, the expected rate of return is lower than if there were no moral hazard problems. Therefore, the investment level would also be lower, causing credit rationing in the size of loans.
Implicit Contracts in Current Research
Credit rationing in the size of loans is also known as borrowing constraints. In recent years, many macroeconomists become interested in firm level data and firm behaviors. There is wide spread evidence supporting the conjecture that borrowing constraints may be important determinants of firm growth and survival. Thus, despite their declining popularity among labor economists, implicit contracts still play an important role in understanding capital market imperfections.
References
- ^ Azariadis, Costas., and Joseph Stiglitz., "Implicit Contracts and fixed Price Equilibria", The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol.XCVIII 1983 Supplement.
- ^ Okun, Arthur., "Prices and quantities", Wash., DC: The Brookings Institution, 1981.
- ^ Feldstein, Martin., "The Importance of Temporary Layoffs: An Empirical Analysis", Brookings Pap. Econ. Act., 1975, 3, pp725-44.http://www.jstor.org/stable/2534152
- ^ Hall, Robert., "Employment Fluctuations and Wage Rigidity",Brookings Pap. Econ. Act.,1980, 1, pp91-123.
- ^ Azariadis, Costas, "Implicit contracts and underemployment equilibria",Journal of Political Economy, 1975.
- ^ Baily, M., "Wages and employment under uncertain demand", Review of Economic Studies 41, 37-50, 1974.
- ^ Gordon, D.F., "A neoclassical theory of Keynesian unemployment", Economic Inquiry 12, 431-49, 1974.
- ^ Fried, Joel., and Peter Howitt., "Credit rationing and implicit contract theory", JMCB, 1980.http://ideas.repec.org/a/mcb/jmoncb/v12y1980i3p471-87.html
- ^ Sharpe, Steven A., "Asymmetric Information, Bank Lending, and Implicit Contracts: A Stylized Model of Customer Relationships", The Journal of Finance, September 1990.http://ideas.repec.org/a/bla/jfinan/v45y1990i4p1069-87.html
- ^ Bharath, Sreedhar T., Sandeep Dahiya, Anthony Saunders, and Anand Srinivasan., "Lending Relationships and Loan Contract Terms", Review of Financial Studies, first published online October 7, 2009.
- ^ Kanoa., Masaji, Hirofumi Uchidab., Gregory F. Udellc., and Wako Watanabed., "Information verifiability, bank organization, bank competition and bank–borrower relationships", Journal of Banking & Finance, Volume 35, Issue 4, April 2011, pp. 935-954.
- ^ Gale, Douglas., and Martin Hellwig., "Incentive-Compatible Debt Contracts: The One-Period Problem", The Review of Economic Studies, Vol.52. No. 4., 1985. pp.647-663.
- ^ Eaton, Johnathan., and Mark Gersovitz., "Debt with Potential Repudiation", Review of Economic Studies, April 1981, 48, pp.289-309.
- ^ Bulow, Jeremy., and Kenneth Rogoff., "A constant Recontracting Model of Sovereign Debt", The Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 97. No.1, 1989, pp.155-178.
- ^ Fazzari, Steven, Glenn Hubbard, and Bruce Petersen, “Financing Constraints and Corporate Investment,” Brooking Papers on Economic Activity, 1 (1988), 141–206.
- ^ Gilchrist, Simon, and Charles Himmelberg, “Evidence on the Role of Cash Flow for Investment,” Journal of Monetary Economics, XXXVI (1994), 541–572.
- ^ Clementi, Gian L., and Hugo A. Hopenhayn. 2006. “A Theory of Financing Constraints and Firm Dynamics.” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 121(1): 229–65.
- ^ Biais., Bruno., Thomas Mariotti., Jean-Charles Rochet., Stéphane Villeneuve., "Large risks, limited liability, and dynamic moral hazard", Econometrica, Volume 78, Issue 1, January 2010, pp. 73–118.