First Balkan War
First Balkan War | |||||||||
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Part of the Mitrovica; Ottoman troops at the Battle of Kumanovo; Meeting of the Greek king George I and the Bulgarian tsar Ferdinand I in Thessaloniki ; Bulgarian heavy artillery | |||||||||
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Belligerents | |||||||||
Commanders and leaders | |||||||||
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Strength | |||||||||
Casualties and losses | |||||||||
Total: 156,139 killed, wounded, or died of disease |
Ottoman Empire:[9]
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Numerous Albanian and Ottoman civilian casualties (see below...) |
The First Balkan War lasted from October 1912 to May 1913 and involved actions of the
The war was a comprehensive and unmitigated disaster for the Ottomans, who lost 83% of their European territories and 69% of their European population.[10] As a result of the war, the League captured and partitioned almost all of the Ottoman Empire's remaining territories in Europe. Ensuing events also led to the creation of an independent Albania, which dissatisfied the Serbs.[citation needed] Bulgaria, meanwhile, was dissatisfied over the division of the spoils in Macedonia and attacked its former allies, Serbia and Greece, on 16 June 1913, which provoked the start of the Second Balkan War.
During the war, many civilians, overwhelmingly Muslim Turks, were either killed or forced to flee their homes. The highly politicized and disorganized units of the Ottoman army were quite incapable of evacuating the civilians in the war zone. This situation left many civilians in the occupied areas defenseless against the invading armies of the Balkan League. Although there are discussions about the exact amount of civilian casualties, when the war ended great changes occurred in the demographic makeup of the Balkan region.[11]
Background
Tensions among the
Serbia's aspirations to take over
In May 1912, Albanian rebels seeking national autonomy and the re-installment of Sultan Abdul Hamid II to power drove the Young Turkish forces out of Skopje and pressed south towards Manastir (now Bitola), forcing the Young Turks to grant effective autonomy over large regions in June 1912.[12][13] Serbia, which had helped the arming of Catholic Albanians in the Mirditë region and Hamidian rebels and sent secret agents to some of the prominent leaders, took the revolt as a pretext for war.[14] Serbia, Montenegro, Greece, and Bulgaria had all been in talks about possible offensives against the Ottoman Empire before the 1912 Albanian revolt had broken out, and a formal agreement between Serbia and Montenegro had been signed on 7 March.[15] On 18 October 1912, King Peter I of Serbia issued a declaration, 'To the Serbian People,' which appeared to support Albanians as well as Serbs:
The Turkish governments showed no interest in their duties towards their citizens and turned a deaf ear to all complaints and suggestions. Things got so far out of hand that no one was satisfied with the situation in Turkey in Europe. It also became unbearable for the Serbs, the Greeks, and the Albanians. By the grace of God, I have therefore ordered my brave army to join in the Holy War to free our brethren and to wish for a better future. In Old Serbia, my army will meet not only upon Christian Serbs but also upon Muslim Serbs, who are equally dear to us, and in addition to them, upon Christian and Muslim Albanians with whom our people have shared joy and sorrow for thirteen centuries now. To all of them, we bring freedom, brotherhood and equality.
In a search for allies, Serbia was ready to negotiate a treaty with Bulgaria.
After the successful coup d'état for unification with Eastern Rumelia,[18] Bulgaria began to dream that its national unification would be realized. For that purpose, it developed a large army and was identified as the "Prussia of the Balkans."[19] However, Bulgaria could not win a war alone against the Ottomans.
In Greece, Hellenic Army officers had rebelled in the Goudi coup of August 1909 and secured the appointment of a progressive government under Eleftherios Venizelos, which they hoped would resolve the Crete question in Greece's favour. They also wanted to reverse their defeat in the Greco-Turkish War (1897) by the Ottomans. An emergency military reorganization, led by a French military mission, had been started for that purpose, but its work was interrupted by the outbreak of war in the Balkans. In the discussions that led to Greece joining the Balkan League, Bulgaria refused to commit to any agreement on distributing territorial gains, unlike its deal with Serbia over Macedonia. Bulgaria's diplomatic policy was to push Serbia into one that limited its access to Macedonia[20] while simultaneously refusing any such agreement with Greece. Bulgaria believed that its army could occupy the big part of Aegean Macedonia and the port city of Salonica (Thessaloniki) before the Greeks could do so.
In 1911,
The Great Powers, most notably
Order of battle and plans
Due to poor organization, transportation problems and the protracted war with Italy, the Ottoman order of battle only had 12,024 officers, 324,718 other ranks, 47,960 animals, 2,318 artillery pieces and 388 machine guns ready by early October instead of the planned full complement of 750,000 officers and soldiers.[22] A total of 920 officers and 42,607 men of them had been assigned to non-divisional units and services, the remaining 293,206 officers and men were assigned to four armies.[23]
Opposing them and continuing their secret prewar settlements for expansion, the three Slavic allies (Bulgarian, Serbs and Montenegrins) had extensive plans to co-ordinate their war efforts: the Serbs and the Montenegrins in the theatre of Sandžak and the Bulgarians and the Serbs in the Macedonian and the Bulgarians alone in the Thracian theatre.
The bulk of the Bulgarian forces (346,182 men) was to attack Thrace, fighting against the Thracian Ottoman Army of 96,273 men and about 26,000 garrison troops,
The Vardar Army of some 58,000 men was deployed near Kumanovo against the First and Second Serbian Armies of 90,000 Serbian and approx. 50,000 Serbian and Bulgarian men. Approx. 28,000 additional men from the Struma Corps were to protect the right flank of the Vardar Army and prevent Bulgarian encroachment along the Struma.[25][26]
The
Bulgaria
Bulgaria was militarily the most powerful of the four Balkan states, with a large, well-trained, well-equipped army.
Bulgaria was focused on actions in Thrace and Macedonia. It deployed its main force in Thrace by forming three armies. The
Armenian volunteers
Three hundred Armenians from throughout the Ottoman Empire, Europe, and Russia, a small yet significant number, volunteered to fight on the side of the Balkan League's soldiers of more than 850,000. Under the leadership of Andranik Ozanian and Garegin Nzhdeh, the Armenian detachment was commissioned to fight the Ottomans first at Momchilgrad and Komotini and its environs, and then later İpsala, Keşan, and Malkara, and Tekirdağ.[30]
Serbia
Serbia called upon about 255,000 men, out of a population of 2,912,000, with about 228 heavy guns, grouped in ten infantry divisions, two independent brigades and a cavalry division, under the effective command of the former war minister, Radomir Putnik.[3] The Serbian High Command, in its prewar war games,[clarification needed] had concluded that the most likely site for the decisive battle against the Ottoman Vardar Army would be on the Ovče Pole Plateau, ahead of Skopje. Thus, the main forces were formed as three armies for the advance towards Skopje, and a division and an independent brigade were to cooperate with the Montenegrins in the Sanjak of Novi Pazar.
The First Army (132,000 men), the strongest, was commanded by Crown Prince Alexander, and the Chief of Staff was Colonel Petar Bojović. The First Army formed the centre of the drive towards Skopje. The Second Army (74,000 men) was commanded by General Stepa Stepanović and had one Serbian and one Bulgarian (7th Rila) division. It formed the army's left wing and advanced towards Stracin. Though the inclusion of a Bulgarian division was according to a prewar arrangement between Serbian and Bulgarian armies, it ceased to obey the orders of Stepanović as soon as the war began, only following those of the Bulgarian High Command. The Third Army (76,000 men) was commanded by General Božidar Janković, and since it was on the right wing, had the task to invade Kosovo and then move south to join the other armies in the expected battle at Ovče Polje. There were two more concentrations in northwestern Serbia across the borders between Serbia and Austria-Hungary: the Ibar Army (25,000 men), under General Mihailo Živković, and the Javor Brigade (12,000 men), under Lieutenant-Colonel Milovoje Anđelković.
Greece
Greece, whose population was then 2,666,000,
The Greek army was still undergoing reorganization by a
The Greek navy was relatively modern, strengthened by the recent purchase of numerous new units and undergoing reforms under the supervision of a
Nevertheless, at the outbreak of the war, the Greek fleet was far from ready. The Ottoman battlefleet retained a clear advantage in the number of ships, speed of the primary surface units and, most importantly, the number and calibre of the ships' guns.[35] In addition, as the war caught the fleet in the middle of its expansion and reorganization, a full third of the fleet (the six new destroyers and the submarine Delfin) reached Greece only after hostilities had started, forcing the navy to reshuffle crews, who consequently suffered from lacking familiarity and training. Coal stockpiles and other war stores were also in short supply, and the Georgios Averof had arrived with barely any ammunition and remained so until late November.Fotakis 2005, p. 46
Montenegro
Montenegro was the smallest nation in the Balkan Peninsula, but in recent years before the war, it had improved its military skills with support from Russia. Also, it was the only Balkan country never to be fully conquered by the Ottoman Empire. As the smallest member of the League, Montenegro did not have much influence. However, it was advantageous for Montenegro,[clarification needed] since when the Ottoman Empire was trying to counter the actions of Serbia, Bulgaria and Greece, there was enough time for Montenegro to prepare, which helped its successful military campaign.
Ottoman Empire
In 1912, the Ottomans were in a difficult position. They had a large population, 26 million, but just over 6.1 million of them lived in its European part, only 2.3 million being Muslims. The rest were Christians, who were considered unfit for conscription. The poor transport network, especially in the Asian section, dictated that the only reliable way to mass transfer troops to the European theatre was by sea, but that faced the risk of the Greek fleet in the Aegean Sea. In addition, the Ottomans were still engaged in a protracted war against Italy in Libya (and by now in the Dodecanese islands of the Aegean), which had dominated the Ottoman military effort for over a year. The conflict lasted until 15 October, a few days after the outbreak of hostilities in the Balkans. The Ottomans couldn't reinforce their positions in the Balkans meaningfully as their relations with the Balkan states deteriorated over the year.[36]
Forces in Balkans
The Ottomans' military capabilities were hampered by several factors, such as domestic strife caused by the Young Turk Revolution and the
The Ottomans' strategic situation was difficult, as their borders were almost impossible to defend against a coordinated attack by the Balkan states. The Ottoman leadership decided to secure all of their territory. As a result, the available forces, which could not be effortlessly reinforced from Asia because of Greek control of the sea and the inadequacy of the Ottoman railway system, were dispersed too thinly across the region. They failed to stand up to the rapidly-mobilized Balkan armies.[38] The Ottomans had three in Europe (the Macedonian, Vardar and Thracian Armies), with 1,203 pieces of mobile and 1,115 fixed artillery in fortified areas. The Ottoman High Command repeated its error of previous wars by ignoring the established command structure to create new superior commands, the Eastern Army and Western Army, reflecting the division of the operational theatre between the Thracian (against the Bulgarians) and Macedonian (against the Greeks, Serbs and Montenegrins) fronts.[39]
The Western Army fielded at least 200,000 men,
- I Corps with three divisions (2nd Infantry (minus regiment), 3rd Infantry and 1st Provisional divisions).
- II Corps with three divisions (4th (minus regiment) and 5th Infantry and Uşak Redif divisions).
- III Corps with four divisions (7th, 8th and 9th Infantry Divisions, all minus a regiment, and the Afyonkarahisar Redif Division).
- IV Corps with three divisions (12th Infantry Division (minus regiment), İzmit and Bursa Redif divisions).
- XVII Corps with three divisions (Samsun, Ereğli and İzmir Redif divisions).
- Edirne Fortified Area with six-plus divisions (10th and 11th Infantry, Edirne, Babaeski and Gümülcine Redif and the Fortress division, 4th Rifle and 12th Cavalry regiments).
- Kırcaali Detachment with two-plus divisions (Kırcaali Redif, Kırcaali Mustahfız division and 36th Infantry Regiment).
- An independent cavalry division and the 5th Light Cavalry Brigade.
The Western Army (Macedonian and Vardar Army) constituted ten corps with 32 infantry and two cavalry divisions. Against Serbia, the Ottomans deployed the Vardar Army (HQ in Skopje) under
- V Corps with four divisions (13th, 15th, 16th Infantry and the İştip Redif divisions)
- VI Corps with four divisions (17th, 18th Infantry and the Manastır and Drama Redif divisions)
- VII Corps with three division (19th Infantry and Üsküp and Priştine Redif divisions)
- II Corps with three divisions (Uşak, Denizli and İzmir Redif divisions)
- Sandžak Corps[citation needed] with four divisions (20th Infantry (minus regiment), 60th Infantry, Metroviça Redif Division, Taşlıca Redif Regiment, Firzovik and Taslica detachments)
- An independent Cavalry Division and the 7th and 8th Cavalry Brigades.
The Macedonian Army (headquarters in Thessaloniki under Ali Rıza Pasha) had 14 divisions in five corps, deployed against Greece, Bulgaria and Montenegro.
Against Greece, at least seven divisions were deployed:
- VIII Provisional Corps with three divisions (22nd Infantry and Nasliç and Aydın Redif divisions).
- Yanya Corps with three divisions (23rd Infantry, Yanya Redif and Bizani Fortress divisions).
- Selanik Redif division and Karaburun Detachment as independent units.
Against Bulgaria, in southeastern Macedonia, two divisions, the Struma Corps (14th Infantry and Serez Redif divisions, plus the Nevrekop Detachment), were deployed.
Against Montenegro, four-plus divisions were deployed:
- İşkodra Corps with two-plus divisions (24th Infantry, Elbasan Redif, İşkodra Fortified Area)
- İpek Detachment with two divisions (21st Infantry and Prizren Redif divisions)
According to the organizational plan, though the men of the Western Group were to total 598,000, slow mobilization and the inefficiency of the rail system drastically reduced the number of men available. According to the Western Army Staff, when the war began, it had only 200,000 men available.[28] Although more men would reach their units, war casualties prevented the Western Group from coming near its nominal strength. In wartime, the Ottomans had planned to bring more troops in from Syria, both Nizamiye and Redif.[28] Greek naval supremacy prevented those reinforcements from arriving. Instead, those soldiers had to deploy via the land route, and most never made it to the Balkans.[41]
The Ottoman General Staff, assisted by the German military mission, developed twelve war plans designed to counter various combinations of opponents. Work on Plan No. 5, which was against Bulgaria, Greece, Serbia and Montenegro, was very advanced and had been sent to the army staff for them to develop local plans.[42]
The Ottoman fleet had performed abysmally in the 1897 Greco-Turkish War, forcing the Ottoman government to begin a drastic overhaul. Older ships were retired, and newer ones were acquired, chiefly from France and Germany. In addition, in 1908, the Ottomans called in a British naval mission to update their training and doctrine.[43] The British mission, headed by Admiral Sir Douglas Gamble, would find its task almost impossible. The political upheaval in the aftermath of the Young Turk Revolution prevented it to a large extent. Between 1908 and 1911, the office of the Navy Minister changed hands nine times. Interdepartmental infighting and the entrenched interests of the bloated and averaged officer corps, many of whom occupied their positions as quasi-sinecure, further obstructed drastic reform. In addition, the Ottoman ministers met the British attempts to control the navy's construction programme with suspicion. Consequently, funds for Gamble's ambitious plans for new ships were unavailable.[44]
To counter the Greek acquisition of the Georgios Averof, the Ottomans initially tried to buy the new German armoured cruiser SMS Blücher or the battlecruiser SMS Moltke. Not able to afford the ships' high cost, the Ottomans acquired two old Brandenburg-class pre-dreadnought battleships, which became Barbaros Hayreddin and Turgut Reis.[45] Along with the cruisers Hamidiye and Mecidiye, both ships were to form the relatively modern core of the Ottoman battlefleet.[46] By the summer of 1912, however, they were already in poor condition because of chronic neglect: the rangefinders and ammunition hoists had been removed, the telephones were not working, the pumps were corroded, and most of the watertight doors could no longer be closed.[47]
Albanian volunteers and irregulars in the Ottoman army
During the onset of the First Balkan War, most Albanians, including frequent rebels like Isa Boletin, united to defend the Ottoman Empire in order to safeguard their Albanian territories. Without a centralized national structure, Albanians were compelled to depend on Ottoman establishments, its military, and its administration to shield them from partition. However, all three proved inadequate against the onslaught of four invading Balkan armies. Even following the signing of the armistice in December 1912, Ottoman regular troops, along with Albanian irregular forces, persisted in central and southern Albania.[48][49][50]
Operations
Bulgarian theatre
Montenegro started the First Balkan War by declaring war against the Ottomans on 8 October [
Bulgarian offensive and advance to Çatalca
On the Thracian Front, the Bulgarian army had placed 346,182 men against the Ottoman First Army, with 105,000 men in eastern Thrace and the Kircaali detachment, of 24,000 men, in western Thrace. The Bulgarian forces were divided into the First, Second and Third Bulgarian Armies of 297,002 men in the eastern part and 49,180 (33,180 regulars and 16,000 irregulars) under the 2nd Bulgarian Division (General Stilian Kovachev) in the western part.
As a consequence of the insufficient intelligence of the invading forces, the Ottoman offensive plan failed in the face of Bulgarian superiority. That forced Kölemen Abdullah Pasha to abandon
After the Battle of Kirk Kilisse, the Bulgarian High Command decided to wait a few days, but that allowed the Ottoman forces to occupy a new defensive position on the
Meanwhile, the Bulgarian 2nd Thracian division's forces, 49,180 men divided into the Haskovo and Rhodope detachments, advanced towards the Aegean Sea. The Ottoman Kircaali detachment (Kircaali Redif and Kircaali Mustahfiz Divisions and 36th Regiment, with 24,000 men), tasked with defending a 400 km front across the Thessaloniki-
On 17 November [
Ottoman counteroffensive
On 20 February, Ottoman forces attacked Gallipoli in Çatalca and its south. There, the Ottoman X Corps, with 19,858 men and 48 guns, landed at
Casualties on both sides were light. After the frontal attack in Bulair's failure, the Ottoman forces at Şarköy re-entered their ships on 24 February [O.S. 11 February] and were transported to Gallipoli.
The Ottoman attack at Çatalca, directed against the powerful Bulgarian First and Third Armies, was initially launched only as a diversion from the Gallipoli-Şarköy operation to pin down the Bulgarian forces in situ. Nevertheless, it resulted in unexpected success. The Bulgarians, who were weakened by cholera and concerned that an Ottoman amphibious invasion might endanger their armies, deliberately withdrew about 15 km and to the south over 20 km to their secondary defensive positions, on higher ground to the west. With the end of the attack in Gallipoli, though the Ottomans cancelled the operation since they were reluctant to leave the Çatalca Line, several days passed before the Bulgarians realized that the offensive had ended. By 15 February, the front had again stabilized, but fighting along the static lines continued. The battle, which resulted in heavy Bulgarian casualties, could be characterized as an Ottoman tactical victory but a strategic defeat since it did nothing to prevent the failure of the Gallipoli-Şarköy operation or to relieve the pressure on Edirne.
Fall of Adrianople and Serbo-Bulgarian friction
The failure of the Şarköy-Bulair operation and the deployment of the Second Serbian Army, with its much-needed heavy siege artillery, sealed Adrianople's fate. On 11 March, after a two weeks bombardment, which destroyed many fortified structures around the city, the final assault started, with League forces enjoying a crushing superiority over the Ottoman garrison. The Bulgarian Second Army, with 106,425 men and two Serbian divisions, with 47,275 men, conquered the city, with the Bulgarians suffering 8,093 and the Serbs 1,462 casualties.[63] The Ottoman casualties for the entire Adrianople campaign reached 23,000 dead.[64] The number of prisoners is less clear. The Ottoman Empire began the war with 61,250 men in the fortress.[65] Richard Hall noted that 60,000 men were captured. Adding to the 33,000 killed, the modern "Turkish General Staff History" notes that 28,500-man survived captivity[66] leaving 10,000 men unaccounted for[65] as possibly captured (including the unspecified number of wounded). Bulgarian losses for the entire Adrianople campaign amounted to 7,682.[67] That was the last and decisive battle that was necessary for a quick end to the war[68] even though it is speculated that the fortress would have fallen eventually because of starvation. The most important result was that the Ottoman command had lost all hope of regaining the initiative, which made any more fighting pointless.[69]
The battle had significant results in Serbian-Bulgarian relations, planting the seeds of the two countries' confrontation some months later. The Bulgarian censor rigorously cut any references to Serbian participation in the operation in the telegrams of foreign correspondents. Public opinion in Sofia thus failed to realize the vital services of Serbia in the battle. Accordingly, the Serbs claimed that their troops of the 20th Regiment captured the Ottoman commander of the city and that Colonel Gavrilović was the allied commander who had accepted Shukri's official surrender of the garrison, a statement that the Bulgarians disputed. The Serbs officially protested and pointed out that although they had sent their troops to Adrianople to win for Bulgaria's territory, whose acquisition had never been foreseen by their mutual treaty,[70] the Bulgarians had never fulfilled the clause of the treaty for Bulgaria to send 100,000 men to help the Serbians on their Vardar Front. The Bulgarians answered that their staff had informed the Serbs on 23 August.[clarification needed] The friction escalated some weeks later when the Bulgarian delegates in London bluntly warned the Serbs that they must not expect Bulgarian support for their Adriatic claims. The Serbs angrily replied that it was a blatant withdrawal from the prewar agreement of mutual understanding, according to the Kriva Palanka-Adriatic line of expansion. The Bulgarians insisted that the Vardar Macedonian part of the agreement remained active, and the Serbs were still obliged to surrender the area, as had been agreed.[70] The Serbs answered by accusing the Bulgarians of maximalism and pointed out that if they lost both northern Albania and Vardar Macedonia, their participation in the common war would have been virtually for nothing. The tension soon was expressed in a series of hostile incidents between both armies on their mutual line of occupation across the Vardar valley. The developments essentially ended the Serbian-Bulgarian alliance, making a future war between the two countries inevitable.
Greek theatre
Macedonian front
Ottoman intelligence had also disastrously misread Greek military intentions. In retrospect, the Ottoman staff seemingly believed that the Greek attack would be shared equally between Macedonia and Epirus. That made the Second Army staff evenly balance the combat strength of the seven Ottoman divisions between the Yanya Corps and VIII Corps in Epirus and southern Macedonia, respectively. Though the Greek army also fielded seven divisions, it had the initiative, so it concentrated all seven against VIII Corps, leaving only several independent battalions of scarcely divisional strength on the Epirus front. That had fatal consequences for the Western Group by leading to the early loss of the city at the strategic centre of all three Macedonian fronts (Thessaloniki), sealing their fate.[71] In an unexpectedly brilliant and rapid campaign, the Army of Thessaly seized the city. In the absence of secure sea lines of communications, retaining the Thessaloniki-Constantinople corridor was essential to the overall strategic posture of the Ottomans in the Balkans. Once that was gone, the defeat of the Ottoman army became inevitable, in which the Bulgarians and the Serbs also played a vital role. Their great victories at Kirkkilise, Lüleburgaz, Kumanovo, and Monastir (Bitola) shattered the Eastern and Vardar Armies. However, they were not decisive in ending the war. The Ottoman field armies survived, and in Thrace, they grew stronger every day. Strategically, those victories were enabled partially by the weakened condition of the Ottoman armies, which had occurred by the active presence of the Greek army and navy.[72]
With the declaration of war, the Greek Army of Thessaly, under Crown Prince Constantine, advanced to the north and overcame Ottoman opposition in the fortified mountain passes of Sarantaporo. After another victory at Giannitsa (Yenidje), on 2 November [O.S. 20 October] 1912, the Ottoman commander, Hasan Tahsin Pasha, surrendered Thessaloniki and its garrison of 26,000 men to the Greeks on 9 November [O.S. 27 October] 1912. Two Corps headquarters (Ustruma and VIII), two Nizamiye divisions (14th and 22nd) and four Redif divisions (Salonika, Drama, Naslic and Serez) were thus lost to the Ottoman order of battle. Also, the Ottoman forces lost 70 artillery pieces, 30 machine guns and 70,000 rifles (Thessaloniki was the central arms depot for the Western Armies). The Ottoman forces estimated that 15,000 officers and men had been killed during the campaign in southern Macedonia, bringing their total losses to 41,000 soldiers.[73] Another consequence was that the destruction of the Macedonian army sealed the fate of the Ottoman Vardar Army, which was fighting the Serbs to the north. The fall of Thessaloniki left it strategically isolated, without logistical supply and depth to maneuver, and ensured its destruction.
Upon learning of the outcome of the Battle of Giannitsa (Yenidje), the Bulgarian High Command urgently dispatched the 7th Rila Division from the north towards the city. The division arrived there a day later, after surrendering to the Greeks the day before, who were further away from the city than the Bulgarians. Until 10 November, the Greek-occupied zone had been expanded to the line from
Epirus front
In the Epirus front, the Greek army was initially heavily outnumbered, but the passive attitude of the Ottomans let the Greeks conquer Preveza on 21 October 1912 and push north towards Ioannina. On 5 November, Major Spyros Spyromilios led a revolt in the coastal area of Himarë and expelled the Ottoman garrison without any significant resistance,[74][75] and on 20 November, Greek troops from western Macedonia entered Korçë. However, Greek forces in the Epirote front lacked the numbers to initiate an offensive against the German-designed defensive positions of Bizani, which protected Ioannina and needed to wait for reinforcements from the Macedonian front.[76]
After the campaign in Macedonia was over, a large part of the Army was redeployed to Epirus, where Constantine assumed command. In the
On the outbreak of hostilities on 18 October, the Greek fleet, placed under the newly promoted Rear Admiral
Establishment of Greek control of the Aegean
Lieutenant
By mid-November, Greek naval detachments had seized the islands of
At the same time, with the aid of numerous merchant ships converted to
In the Ionian Sea, the Greek fleet operated without opposition, ferrying supplies for the army units on the Epirus front. Furthermore, the Greeks bombarded and then blockaded the port of Vlorë in Albania on 3 December and Durrës on 27 February. A naval blockade, extending from the pre-war Greek border to Vlorë, was also instituted on 3 December, isolating the newly established Provisional Government of Albania that was based there from any outside support.[88]
Confrontations off the Dardanelles
The main Ottoman fleet remained inside the Dardanelles for the early part of the war, and the Greek destroyers continuously patrolled the straits' exit to report on a possible sortie. Kountouriotis suggested mining them, but that was not taken up out of fear of international opinion.[89] On 7 December, the head of the Ottoman fleet, Tahir Bey, was replaced by Ramiz Naman Bey, the leader of the hawkish faction among the officer corps. A new strategy was agreed with the Ottomans to take advantage of any absence of Georgios Averof to attack the other Greek ships. The Ottoman staff formulated a plan to lure a number of the Greek destroyers on patrol into a trap. The first attempt, on 12 December, failed because of boiler trouble, but a second attempt, two days later, resulted in an indecisive engagement between the Greek destroyers and the cruiser Mecidiye.[90]
The war's first significant fleet action, the Battle of Elli, was fought two days later, on 16 December [O.S. 3 December] 1912. The Ottoman fleet, with four battleships, nine destroyers and six torpedo boats, sailed to the entrance of the straits. The lighter Ottoman vessels remained behind, but the battleship squadron continued north, covered by forts at Kumkale, and engaged the Greek fleet coming from Imbros at 9:40. Leaving the older battleships to follow their original course, Kountouriotis led the Averof into independent action: using her superior speed, she cut across the Ottoman fleet's bow. Under fire from two sides, the Ottomans were quickly forced to withdraw to the Dardanelles.[89][91] The whole engagement lasted less than an hour in which the Ottomans suffered heavy damage to the Barbaros Hayreddin and 18 dead and 41 wounded (most during their disorderly retreat) and the Greeks had one dead and seven wounded.[89][92]
In the aftermath of Elli, on 20 December, the energetic Lieutenant Commander
In preparation for the next attempt to break the Greek blockade, the Ottoman Admiralty sought to create a diversion by sending the light cruiser Hamidiye, captained by Rauf Bey, to raid Greek merchant shipping in the Aegean. It was hoped that the Georgios Averof, the only substantial Greek unit fast enough to catch the Hamidiye, would be drawn into pursuit, weakening the remaining Greek fleet.[89][95] In the event, Hamidiye slipped through the Greek patrols on the night of 14–15 January and bombarded the harbour of the Greek island of Syros, sinking the Greek auxiliary cruiser Makedonia, which lay in anchor there (it was later raised and repaired). The Hamidiye then left the Aegean for the Eastern Mediterranean, making stops at Beirut and Port Said before it entered the Red Sea. Although it provided a significant morale boost for the Ottomans, the operation failed to achieve its primary objective since Kountouriotis refused to leave his post and pursue the Hamidiye.[89][95][96]
Four days later, on 18 January [
General Ivanov, the commander of the Second Bulgarian Army, acknowledged the role of the Greek fleet in the overall Balkan League victory by stating that "the activity of the entire Greek fleet and above all the Averof was the chief factor in the general success of the allies."[96] The Ottomans were also aware of the impact of the Greek naval actions on the conflict; according to navy commander Hasan Sami Bey, without the Greek navy establishing control of the sea lanes, "the allied land operations would have undoubtedly taken another course."[89]
Serbian and Montenegrin theatre
The Serbian forces operated against the primary part of the Ottoman Western Army in Novi Pazar, Kosovo and northern and eastern Macedonia. Strategically, they were divided into four independent armies and groups operating against the Ottomans: the Javor brigade and the Ibar Army in Novi Pazar; the Third Army in Kosovo; the First Army in northern Macedonia; and the Second Army from Bulgaria in eastern Macedonia. The decisive battle was expected to be fought in north Macedonia, in the plains of Ovče Pole, where the Ottoman Vardar Army's main forces were expected to concentrate.
The plan of the Serbian Supreme Command had three Serbian armies encircle and destroy the Vardar Army in that area, with the First Army advancing from the north (along the line of Vranje-Kumanovo-Ovče Pole), the Second Army from the east (along the line of Kriva Palanka-Kratovo-Ovče Pole) and the Third Army from the northwest (along the line of Priština-Skopje-Ovče Pole). The prime role was given to the First Army. The Second Army was expected to cut off the Vardar Army's retreat and, if necessary, to attack its rear and right flank. The Third Army was to take Kosovo and, if necessary, to assist the First Army by attacking the Vardar Army's left and rear. The Ibar Army and the Javor brigade had minor roles in the plan and were expected to secure the Sanjak of Novi Pazar and replace the Third Army in Kosovo after it had advanced south.[citation needed]
The Serbian army, under General (later Marshal) Putnik, achieved three decisive victories in Vardar Macedonia, the primary Serbian objective in the war, by effectively destroying the Ottoman forces in the region and conquering northern Macedonia. The Serbs also helped the Montenegrins take the Sandžak and sent two divisions to aid the Bulgarians at the siege of Edirne. The last battle for Macedonia was the Battle of Monastir, in which the remains of the Ottoman Vardar Army were forced to retreat to central Albania. After the battle, Serbian Prime Minister Pasic asked General Putnik to take part in the race for Thessaloniki. Putnik declined and turned his army to the west, towards Albania, since he saw that a war between Greece and Bulgaria over Thessaloniki could greatly help Serbia's plans for Vardar Macedonia.[citation needed]
After pressure from the Great Powers, the Serbs started withdrawing from northern Albania and the Sandžak, yet left behind their heavy artillery park to help the Montenegrins in the continuing Siege of Shkodër. On 23 April 1913, Shkodër's garrison was forced to surrender because of starvation.[citation needed]
Atrocities and migrations
Although it is known that both sides committed various war crimes during the war, what is known about the number of casualties is controversial. The insufficient number of impartial observers in the region throughout the war makes it difficult to conclude civilian casualties.[100] It is estimated that in the years 1912–1914 c. 890,000 civilians of various nationalities crossed the borders of the Balkan countries, including also those of the Ottoman Empire.[101] The intense influx of refugees from the region and the news of the massacres caused a deep shock in the Ottoman mainland. This further increased the hatred of minorities already present in Ottoman society. The situation became a factor that exacerbated the Ottoman genocides in World War I, which took place approximately two years after the end of the First Balkan War.[102]
The heavy and rapid defeat of the Ottoman army prevented the safe evacuation of the Muslim civilians, making them a clear target for the Balkan League forces invading the region. As a result, it is estimated that, in total, up to 632,000[103]-1.5 million[104][105] Ottoman Muslims perished outside of Albania and c. 400,000[106]–813,000[107] became refugees by the end of the Second Balkan War.
There were various instances where Albanian communities were targeted especially by Serbian and Montenegrin forces.
The
Successive Ottoman defeats already from 1911 and territorial losses resulted in the creation of strong nationalist tendencies in Turkish politics.[101] In the spring of 1913, the Ottoman authorities began a systematic campaign of persecution of their Greek subjects in large numbers in towns and villages both in Eastern Thrace and Anatolia.[127] This campaign of extermination by the Ottoman authorities included boycott, expulsions, forcible migrations, focusing on Greeks of the Aegean region and eastern Thrace, whose presence in these areas was deemed a threat to national security.[128] From July 1913 as soon as Eastern Thrace returned to Ottoman control pillaging and act of intimidation and violence against the local Greek communities have been perpetrated.[127]
Reasons for Ottoman defeat
The principal reason for the Ottoman defeat in the autumn of 1912 was the decision on the part of the Ottoman government to respond to the demands from the Balkan League on 15 October 1912 by declaring war at a time when its mobilization, ordered on 1 October, was only partially complete.[129] During the declaration of war, 580,000 Ottoman soldiers in the Balkans faced 912,000 soldiers of the Balkan League.[130] The bad condition of the roads, together with the sparse railroad network, had led to the Ottoman mobilization being grossly behind schedule, and many of the commanders were new to their units, having been appointed only on 1 October 1912.[130] Many Turkish divisions were still involved in a losing war with Italy far away in the Libyan provinces. The stress of fighting on multiple fronts took a massive toll on the Ottoman Empire's finances, morale, casualties and supplies. The Turkish historian Handan Nezir Akmeşe wrote that the best response when they were faced with the Balkan League's ultimatum on 15 October on the part of the Ottomans would have been to try to stall for time via diplomacy while they completed their mobilization, instead of declaring war immediately.[130]
War Minister
- Under the tyrannical and paranoid regime of Sultan Abdul Hamid II, the Ottoman army had been forbidden to engage in war games or maneuvers out of the fear that it might be the cover for a coup d'état.[131] The four years since the Young Turk Revolution of 1908 had not been enough time for the army to learn how to conduct large-scale maneuvers.[131] War games in 1909 and 1910 had shown that many Ottoman officers could not efficiently move large bodies of troops such as divisions and corps, a deficiency that General Baron Colmar von der Goltz stated after watching the 1909 war games would take at least five years of training to address.[132]
- The Ottoman army was divided into two classes; Nizamiye troops (conscripted for five years) and Redif (reservists who served for seven years).[133] Training of the Redif troops had been neglected for decades, and the 50,000 Redif troops in the Balkans in 1912 had received extremely rudimentary training at best.[134] One German officer, Major Otto von Lossow, who served with the Ottomans, complained that some of the Redif troops did not know how to handle or fire a rifle.[135]
- Support services in the Ottoman army, such as logistics and medical services, were poor.[135] There was a massive shortage of doctors, no ambulances and few stretchers, and the few medical faculties were entirely inadequate for treating the large numbers of wounded.[135] This resulted in most of them dying, which damaged morale. In particular, the badly-organized transport corps was so inefficient that it was unable to supply the troops in the field with food, which forced troops to resort to requisitioning food from local villages.[135] Even so, Ottoman soldiers lived below the subsistence level with a daily diet of 90 g of cheese and 150 g of meat but had to march all day long, leaving much of the army sickly and exhausted.[135]
- The heavy rainfall in the fall of 1912 had turned the mud roads of the Balkans into quagmires, making it extremely difficult to supply the army in the field with ammunition, which led to constant shortages at the front.[136]
- After the 1908 revolution, the Ottoman officer corps had become politicized, with many officers devoting themselves to politics at the expense of studying war.[137] Furthermore, the politicization of the army had led it to be divided into factions, most notably between those who were members of the Committee of Union and Progress and its opponents.[137] Additionally, the Ottoman officer corps had been divided between Alayli ("ranker") officers who had been promoted up from NCOs and privates and the Mektepli ("college-trained") officers who had graduated from the War College.[138] After the 1909 counterrevolution attempt, many of the Alayli officers had been purged.[138] The bulk of the army, peasant conscripts from Anatolia, were much more comfortable with the Alayli officers than with the Mektepli officers, who came from a different social milieu.[138] Furthermore, the decision to conscript non-Muslims for the first time meant that jihad, the traditional motivating force for the Ottoman Army, was not used in 1912, something that the officers of the German military mission advising the Ottomans believed was bad for the Muslims' morale.[138]
Aftermath
This section needs expansion. You can help by adding to it. (June 2008) |
The
Great Powers
This section needs additional citations for verification. (December 2022) |
Although the Great Powers noticed the developments that led to the war, they had an official consensus over the
- Russia was a prime mover in the establishment of the Balkan League and saw it as an essential tool in case of a future war against its rival, Austria-Hungary.[139] Russia was unaware of the Bulgarian plans for Thrace and Constantinople, territories for which it had long held ambitions.
- France, not feeling ready for a war against Germany in 1912, took a position strongly against the war and firmly informed its ally Russia that it would not take part in a potential conflict between Russia and Austria-Hungary if it resulted from actions of the Balkan League. France, however, failed to achieve British participation in a common intervention to stop the conflict.
- The British Empire, although officially a staunch supporter of the Ottoman Empire's integrity, took secret diplomatic steps encouraging the Greek entry into the League to counteract Russian influence. At the same time, it encouraged Bulgarian aspirations over Thrace since the British preferred Thrace to be Bulgarian to Russian, despite British assurances to Russia on its expansion there.
- Adriatic and seeking ways for expansion in the south at the expense of the Ottoman Empire, was opposed to any other nation expanding in the area. At the same time, Austria-Hungary had internal problems with the significant Slavic populations that campaigned against the German–Hungarian joint control of the multinational state. Serbia, whose aspirations towards Bosnia were no secret, was considered an enemy and the primary tool of Russian machinations, which were behind the agitation of the Slav subjects. However, Austria-Hungary failed to achieve a German backup for a strong reaction. Initially, German Emperor Wilhelm II told Austro-Hungarian Archduke Franz Ferdinand that Germany was ready to support Austria-Hungary in all circumstances, even at the risk of a world war, but the Austro-Hungarians hesitated. Finally, in the German Imperial War Council of 8 December 1912, the consensus was that Germany would not be ready for war until at least mid-1914 and notes about that passed to Austria-Hungary. Thus, no actions could be taken when the Serbs acceded to the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum of 18 October and withdrew from Albania.
- The First World Warbroke out.
List of battles
Bulgarian–Ottoman battles
Battle | Year | Mustafa Kemal Bulgarian Victory | | |
---|---|---|---|---|
Second Battle of Çatalca | 1913 | Vasil Kutinchev | Ahmet Pasha | Indecisive |
Battle of Şarköy | 1913 | Stiliyan Kovachev | Enver Pasha | Bulgarian Victory |
Greek–Ottoman battles
Battle | Year | Greece Commander | Ottoman Empire Commander | Result |
---|---|---|---|---|
Battle of Sarantaporo | 1912 | Constantine I | Hasan Pasha | Greek Victory |
Battle of Yenidje | 1912 | Constantine I | Hasan Pasha | Greek Victory |
Battle of Sorovich | 1912 | Matthaiopoulos | Hasan Pasha | Ottoman Victory |
Battle of Pente Pigadia | 1912 | Sapountzakis | Esat Pasha | Greek Victory |
Battle of Lesbos | 1912 | Kountouriotis | Abdul Ghani | Greek Victory |
Battle of Chios | 1912 | Damianos | Zihne Bey | Greek Victory |
Battle of Driskos | 1912 | Matthaiopoulos | Esad Pasha | Ottoman Victory |
Revolt of Himara | 1912 | Sapountzakis | Esat Pasha | Greek Victory |
Battle of Elli | 1912 | Kountouriotis | Remzi Bey | Greek Victory |
Capture of Korytsa | 1912 | Damianos | Davit Pasha | Greek Victory |
Battle of Lemnos | 1913 | Kountouriotis | Remzi Bey | Greek Victory |
Battle of Bizani | 1913 | Constantine I | Esat Pasha | Greek Victory |
Serbian–Ottoman battles
Battle | Year | Serbia Commander | Ottoman Empire Commander | Result |
---|---|---|---|---|
Battle of Kumanovo | 1912 | Radomir Putnik | Zeki Pasha | Serbian Victory |
Battle of Prilep | 1912 | Petar Bojović | Zeki Pasha | Serbian Victory |
Battle of Monastir | 1912 | Petar Bojović | Zeki Pasha | Serbian Victory |
Battle of Lumë | 1912 | Božidar Jankovic | Bajram Curri | Serbian Defeat |
Stepa Stepanovic | Gazi Pasha | Serbian victory |
See also
- List of places burned during the Balkan Wars
- List of Serbian–Turkish conflicts
- List of wars between democracies
- Journalists of the Balkan Wars 1913 Ottoman coup d'état
Citations
- ^ a b c Hall 2000, p. 16
- S2CID 202282745.
- ^ a b c d Hall 2000, p. 18
- ^ a b c Erickson 2003, p. 70
- ^ Erickson 2003, p. 69.
- ^ Erickson 2003, p. 52.
- ^ a b c Hall 2000, p. 135
- ^ Βιβλίο εργασίας 3, Οι Βαλκανικοί Πόλεμοι, ΒΑΛΕΡΙ ΚΟΛΕΦ and ΧΡΙΣΤΙΝΑ ΚΟΥΛΟΥΡΗ, translation by ΙΟΥΛΙΑ ΠΕΝΤΑΖΟΥ, CDRSEE, Thessaloniki 2005, p. 120, (Greek). Retrieved from http://www.cdsee.org
- ^ a b Erickson 2003, p. 329
- ^ Balkan Savaşları ve Balkan Savaşları'nda Bulgaristan, Süleyman Uslu
- ^ "1.1. The ethnography and national aspirations of the Balkans". macedonia.kroraina.com.
- ^ Noel Malcolm, A Short History of Kosovo, pp. 246–247
- ^ Olsi Jazexhi, Ottomans into Illyrians: passages to nationhood in 20th century Albania, pp. 86–89
- ^ Noel Malcolm, A Short History of Kosovo pp. 250–251.
- ^ Hall 2000, pp. 10–13.
- ^ The Ear Correspondence of Leon Trotsky: Hall, The Balkan Wars, 1912–13, 1980, p. 221
- ^ Hall 2000, p. 11.
- ^ Joseph Vincent Fulle, Bismarck's Diplomacy at Its Zenith, 2005, p. 22
- ^ Dr. E.J. Dillon. "The Project Gutenberg eBook of The Inside Story of the Peace Conference". Mirrorservice.org. Retrieved 1 March 2022.
- ^ Hugh Seton-Watson & Christopher Seton-Watson, The Making of a New Europe, 1981, p. 116
- ^ "Correspondants de guerre", Le Petit Journal Illustré (Paris), 3 Novembre 1912.
- ^ Erickson 2003, pp. 78–84
- ^ Balkan Harbi (1912–1913) (1993). Harbin Sebepleri, Askeri Hazirliklar ve Osmani Devletinin Harbi Girisi. Genelkurmay Basimevi. p. 100.
{{cite book}}
: CS1 maint: numeric names: authors list (link) - ^ The War between Bulgaria and Turkey, Volume II, pp. 659–663
- ^ a b The War between Bulgaria and Turkey, Volume I, pp. 511
- ^ Erickson 2003, p. 173
- ^ Erickson 2003, pp. 214–216
- ^ a b c d Erickson 2003, p. 170
- ^ a b Hall 2000, p. 17
- S2CID 202282745.
- ^ a b Fotakis 2005, p. 42
- ^ Fotakis 2005, p. 44.
- ^ a b Fotakis 2005, pp. 25–35
- ^ Fotakis 2005, p. 45.
- ^ Fotakis 2005, pp. 45–46.
- ^ Hall 2000, p. 19.
- ^ Uyar & Erickson 2009, pp. 225–226.
- ^ Uyar & Erickson 2009, pp. 226–227.
- ^ Uyar & Erickson 2009, pp. 227–228.
- ^ a b Hall 2000, p. 22
- ^ Uyar & Erickson 2009, p. 227.
- ^ Erickson 2003, p. 62.
- ^ Langensiepen & Güleryüz 1995, pp. 9–14.
- ^ Langensiepen & Güleryüz 1995, pp. 14–15.
- ^ Langensiepen & Güleryüz 1995, pp. 16–17.
- ^ a b Erickson 2003, p. 131
- ^ a b Langensiepen & Güleryüz 1995, p. 20
- ISBN 978-1-84511-287-5.
When the First Balkan War broke out, a majority of Albanians, even habitual rebels such as Isa Boletin, rallied in defence of the din ve devlet ve vatan to preserve intact their Albanian lands. Lacking a national organization, Albanians had no choice but to rely on Ottoman institutions, its army, and its government for protection from partition. Both failed them miserably in the face of four invading Balkan armies. As a result, foreign invasion and occupation severed that link between the Albanian Eagle and the Ottoman Crescent.
- ISBN 979-8-8409-4908-5.
The Albanian forces fought on the side of Turkey not because they desired a continuance of Turkish rule but because they believed that together with the Turks, they would be able to defend their territory and prevent the partition of "Greater Albania
- ISBN 978-1-134-58363-8. Retrieved 19 April 2022.
Ottoman regulars supported by Albanian irregulars continued in central and southern Albania even after the signing of the armistice in December 1912
- ^ Erickson 2003, p. 85.
- ^ Erickson 2003, p. 86.
- ^ a b Hall 2000, pp. 22–24
- ^ The war between Bulgaria and Turkey 1912–1913, Volume II Ministry of War 1928, p. 660
- ^ a b c Erickson 2003, p. 82
- ^ Seton-Watson 2009, p. 238.
- ^ a b Erickson 2003, p. 333
- ^ Seton-Watson 2009, p. 202.
- ^ a b Erickson 2003, p. 102
- ^ Hall 2000, p. 32.
- ^ Dimitrova, Snezhana (1 September 2013). "Of Other Balkan Wars: Affective Worlds of Modern and Traditional (The Bulgarian Example)". Perceptions: Journal of Foreign Affairs. 18 (2): 29–55. Retrieved 1 March 2022.
- ^ Erickson 2003, p. 262
- ^ The war between Bulgaria and Turkey 1912–1913, Volume V, Ministry of War 1930, p. 1057
- ISBN 954-528-752-7, Zafirov p. 444
- ^ a b Erickson 2003, p. 281
- ^ Turkish General Staff, Edirne Kalesi Etrafindaki Muharebeler, p. 286
- ISBN 954-528-752-7, p. 482
- ISBN 954-528-752-7> Zafirov – p. 383
- ^ The war between Bulgaria and Turkey 1912–1913, Volume V, Ministry of War 1930, p. 1053
- ^ a b Seton-Watson 2009, pp. 210–238
- ^ Erickson 2003, p. 215.
- ^ Erickson 2003, p. 334.
- ^ Erickson 2003, p. 226.
- ISBN 979-8-8409-4908-5.
- ISBN 978-960-213-371-2, p. 367.
- ^ Albania's captives. Pyrros Ruches, Argonaut 1965, p. 65.
- ISBN 0-8160-1854-5, p. 61.
- ^ Fotakis 2005, pp. 47–48.
- ^ a b c Hall 2000, p. 64
- ^ Fotakis 2005, pp. 46–48.
- ^ Langensiepen & Güleryüz 1995, pp. 19–20, 156.
- ^ Erickson 2003, pp. 157–158.
- ^ Erickson 2003, pp. 158–159.
- ^ Fotakis 2005, pp. 48–49.
- ^ Langensiepen & Güleryüz 1995, p. 19.
- ^ Fotakis 2005, p. 49.
- ^ Erickson 2003, pp. 170, 334.
- ^ Hall 2000, pp. 65, 74.
- ^ a b c d e f g Fotakis 2005, p. 50
- ^ Langensiepen & Güleryüz 1995, pp. 21–22.
- ^ a b Langensiepen & Güleryüz 1995, p. 22
- ^ Langensiepen & Güleryüz 1995, pp. 22, 196.
- ^ Langensiepen & Güleryüz 1995, pp. 22–23.
- ^ Langensiepen & Güleryüz 1995, p. 23.
- ^ a b Langensiepen & Güleryüz 1995, p. 26
- ^ a b Hall 2000, p. 65
- ^ Langensiepen & Güleryüz 1995, pp. 23–24.
- ^ "History: Balkan Wars". Hellenic Air Force. Archived from the original on 18 July 2009. Retrieved 3 May 2010.
- ISBN 978-1-57607-345-2.
- ISBN 978-1-4422-0664-9.
- ^ ISSN 2241-1674. Retrieved 7 November 2023.
- ISBN 978-0-75560-909-3.
- ISBN 9780340706572.
- ^ Hupchick, Dennis P., The Balkans: From Constantinople to Communism. p. 321.
- ^ Pekesen, Berna (2012). "Expulsion and Emigration of the Muslims from the Balkans". European History Online.
- ^ Hupchick, Dennis P., The Balkans: From Constantinople to Communism p. 321.
- ISBN 9780340706572.
- ^ United States Department of State (1943). Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States. U.S. Government Printing Office. p. 115. Retrieved 2 January 2020.
- ^ International Commission to Inquire into the Causes and Conduct of the Balkan Wars; Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Division of Intercourse and Education (1 January 1914). "Report of the International Commission to Inquire into the Causes and Conduct of the Balkan War". Washington, D.C. : The Endowment. Retrieved 6 September 2016 – via Internet Archive.
- ^ Leo Freundlich: Albania's Golgotha Archived 31 May 2012 at the Wayback Machine
- ^ Leo Freundlich: Albania's Golgotha Archived 31 May 2012 at the Wayback Machine
- ISBN 978-0-203-87935-1.
- ISBN 978-0-30009-725-2.
- ^ Archbishop Lazër Mjeda: Report on the Serb Invasion of Kosova and Macedonia Archived 3 March 2016 at the Wayback Machine
- ^ McCarthy, Justin. "1912–1913 Balkan Wars Death and Forced Exile of Ottoman Muslims" (PDF). tc-america.org.
not including an estimated 100,000 dead in Albania
- doi:10.51331/A004.
According to Serbian Social Democrat politician Kosta Novakovic, from October 1912 to the end of 1913, the Serbo-Montenegrin regime exterminated more than 120,000 Albanians of all ages, and forcibly expelled more than 50,000 Albanians to the Ottoman Empire and Albania.
- ISBN 9789389812466.
During the Balkan wars, in total '120,000 Albanians were exterminated', hundreds of villages' were shelled by artillery and 'a large number of them were burned down' across Kosova and Macedonia. The figures do not include people killed in present-day Albania and the devastated houses, villages and towns that Serbian and Montenegrin soldiers left behind when they were eventually forced to retreat.'
- ^ Novakovic, Kosta. "Colonisation and Serbianisation of Kosova". The Institute of History, Prishtina. Archived from the original on 25 December 2013.
- ^ Ademi, Haxhi (2019). "THE CASE OF THE "DISPLACEMENT" OF SERBS FROM KOSOVO DURING WORLD WAR TWO" (PDF). Analele UniversităŃii din Craiova. Istorie: 32.
- ^ Zhitia, Skender (2021). "The Anti-Albanian Policy of the Serbian State, Programs and Methods (XIX–XX)". Journal of History & Future.
- ^ Geshov, Ivan Evstratiev (1919). La genèse de la guerre mondiale: la débâcle de l'alliance balkanique (in French) (as for example that of the Serbian deputy Triša Kaclerovićh, who, in an article published in 1917 by the International Bulletin, affirms that in 1912–1913 120,000 Albanians were massacred by the Serbian army ed.). P. Haupt. p. 64. Retrieved 9 August 2023.
- ^ Pirraku, Muhamet. MASAKRA NË BURGUN E DUBRAVËS 19 –24 MAJ 1999 (PDF). Biblioteka Kombëtare dhe Universitare e Kosovës. p. 162.
'there were some 150 thousand Albanians killed by Serbs in 1912–13'
- ^ Štěpánek, Václav (2010). Problem of colonization of Kosovo and Metohija in 1918–1945 (PDF). p. 88.
- ISBN 9789389812466.
- ISBN 9780822981572.
- S2CID 236314658.
The Albanian declaration of independence further instigated violence, as Albanian villagers in northeast Ioannina formed çeta bands to fight against Ottoman troops. These paramilitary groups also swept the countryside desecrating churches and targeted Greek-speaking Christian villages, killing women and children. The violence was so severe that many villagers sought refuge in mountain caves where they died from cold and starvation while huddled together.
- ^ ISSN 2241-1674. Retrieved 7 November 2023.
- ^ Akçam, Tanner (2004). From Empire to Republic: Turkish Nationalism and the Armenian Genocide. Zed Books. pp. 69, 84.
- ^ Akmeşe 2015, pp. 124–127.
- ^ a b c d e Akmeşe 2015, p. 127
- ^ a b Akmeşe 2015, p. 128
- ^ Akmeşe 2015, pp. 120–121.
- ^ Akmeşe 2015, p. 5.
- ^ Akmeşe 2015, pp. 128–129.
- ^ a b c d e Akmeşe 2015, p. 129
- ^ Akmeşe 2015, p. 130.
- ^ a b Akmeşe 2015, pp. 130–131
- ^ a b c d Akmeşe 2015, p. 132
- ISBN 978-1-104-48758-4.
- ^ Vŭchkov 2005, pp. 99–103.
- ^ Somel, Selçuk Akşin. Historical dictionary of the Ottoman Empire. Scarecrow Press Inc. 2003. lxvi.
Sources
- Erickson, Edward J. (2003). Defeat in Detail: The Ottoman Army in the Balkans, 1912–1913. Westport, CT: Greenwood. ISBN 0-275-97888-5.
- Fotakis, Zisis (2005). Greek Naval Strategy and Policy, 1910–1919. London: Routledge. ISBN 978-0-415-35014-3.
- Hall, Richard C. (2000). The Balkan Wars, 1912–1913: Prelude to the First World War. London: Routledge. ISBN 0-415-22946-4.
- Hooton, Edward R. (2014). Prelude to the First World War: The Balkan Wars 1912–1913. Fonthill Media. ISBN 978-1-78155-180-6.
- Langensiepen, Bernd; Güleryüz, Ahmet (1995). The Ottoman Steam Navy, 1828–1923. London: Conway Maritime Press/Bloomsbury. ISBN 0-85177-610-8.
- Michail, Eugene. "The Balkan Wars in Western Historiography, 1912–2012." in Katrin Boeckh and Sabine Rutar, eds. The Balkan Wars from Contemporary Perception to Historic Memory (Palgrave Macmillan, Cham, 2016) pp. 319–340. online[dead link]
- Murray, Nicholas (2013). The Rocky Road to the Great War: the Evolution of Trench Warfare to 1914. Dulles, Virginia, Potomac Books ISBN 978-1-59797-553-7
- Pettifer, James. War in the Balkans: Conflict and Diplomacy Before World War I (IB Tauris, 2015).
- Akmeşe, Handan Nezir (2015). The Birth of Modern Turkey: The Ottoman Military and the March to World I. I.B. Tauris.
- Schurman, Jacob Gould (2004). The Balkan Wars, 1912 to 1913. Whitefish, MT: Kessinger. ISBN 1-4191-5345-5.
- Seton-Watson, R. W. (2009) [1917]. The Rise of Nationality in the Balkans. Charleston, SC: BiblioBazaar. ISBN 978-1-113-88264-6.
- Trix, Frances. "Peace-mongering in 1913: the Carnegie International Commission of Inquiry and its Report on the Balkan Wars." First World War Studies 5.2 (2014): 147–162.
- Uyar, Mesut; Erickson, Edward (2009). A Military History of the Ottomans: From Osman to Atatürk. Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger Security International. ISBN 978-0-275-98876-0.
- Stojančević, Vladimir. Prvi balkanski rat: okrugli sto povodom 75. godišnjice 1912–1987, 28. i 29. oktobar 1987.
- Vŭchkov, Aleksandŭr (2005). The Balkan War 1912–1913. Angela. ISBN 978-954-90587-2-7.
- Ratković, Borislav (1975). Prvi balkanski rat 1912–1913: Operacije srpskih snaga [First Balkan War 1912–1913: Operations of Serbian Forces]. Istorijski institut JNA. Belgrade: Vojnoistorijski Institut.
- The Bulgarian Ministry of War (1928). Войната между България и Турция през 1912–1913 г. [The War between Bulgaria and Turkey, 1912–1913]. Vol. I, II, VI, VII. State Printing House.
Further reading
- ISBN 978-2-8251-1958-7.
- ISBN 978-1-4051-4291-5.
- ISBN 978-0-521-27459-3.
External links
- Hall, Richard C.: Balkan Wars 1912–1913 , in: 1914–1918-online. International Encyclopedia of the First World War.
- Map of Europe during First Balkan War at omniatlas.com Archived 14 April 2012 at the Wayback Machine
- Films about the Balkan War at europeanfilmgateway.eu
- Clemmesen, M. H. Not Just a Prelude: The First Balkan War Crisis as the Catalyst of Final European War Preparations (2012)
- Anderson, D. S. The Apple of Discord: The Balkan League and the Military Topography of the First Balkan War (1993) Archived 20 September 2018 at the Wayback Machine
- Major 1914 primary sources from BYU