Barefoot v. Estelle
| Barefoot v. Estelle | |
|---|---|
 | |
| Subsequent | Rehearing denied, 464 U.S. 874 (1983). |
| Holding | |
| There is no merit to petitioner's argument that psychiatrists, individually and as a group, are incompetent to predict with an acceptable degree of reliability that a particular criminal will commit other crimes in the future, and so represent a danger to the community. | |
| Court membership | |
| |
| Case opinions | |
| Majority | White, joined by Burger, Powell, Rehnquist, O'Connor |
| Concurrence | Stevens |
| Dissent | Marshall, joined by Brennan |
| Dissent | Blackmun, joined by Brennan, Marshall (parts I, II, III, IV) |
Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 (1983), is a
In Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454 (1981), the Supreme Court previously ruled on a Texas death penalty case regarding the use of a psychiatric examination to determine the defendant's competency to stand trial to predict future dangerousness. In that case the Court held that the Fifth Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination applied to pretrial psychiatric examinations by a prosecution psychiatrist who later testified regarding the defendant's future dangerousness without warning the defendant that such evidence could be used against him. The Court reasoned that although a defendant has no generalized constitutional right to remain silent at a psychiatric examination limited to the issues of sanity or competency, full Miranda warnings must be given with respect to testimony concerning future dangerousness.[2]
Background
Thomas Barefoot (February 23, 1945 – October 30, 1984) was convicted of the
The Texas death-penalty statute required that the jury consider whether Barefoot would pose "future dangerousness".
The Court ignored amicus briefs arguing that psychiatric evidence cannot be offered on such issues with any reasonable degree of certainty.[2]
Appeals
Barefoot appealed to the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals which rejected his argument that this use of psychiatric testimony during the sentencing phase of his trial was unconstitutional and upheld the conviction and sentence. After denials of a writ of certiorari and of habeas corpus, petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus in Federal District Court raising the same objections to the use of psychiatric testimony. Although the District Court rejected his claims and denied the writ, it did issue a certificate of probable cause. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals denied a second writ of habeas corpus and denied a stay of execution. The Court of Appeals also denied a stay of execution.[1]
The Supreme Court granted certiorari before judgment.
Opinion of the Court
The Supreme Court upheld the denial of a stay of execution by the Court of Appeals, saying that the Court of Appeals followed the procedural guidelines for handling such applications for stays of execution on habeas corpus appeals pursuant to a certificate of probable cause. The Court also upheld the appellate court's finding on the merits of the case, reasoning that that clinical prediction testimony was not in every case wrong and could be refuted by opposing experts, trusting the adversarial system to determine the accuracy of such statements.[6]
There is no merit to petitioner's argument that psychiatrists, individually and as a group, are incompetent to predict with an acceptable degree of reliability that a particular criminal will commit other crimes in the future, and so represent a danger to the community. ...Nor, despite the view of the American Psychiatric Association supporting petitioner's view, is there any convincing evidence that such testimony is almost entirely unreliable, and that the factfinder and the adversary system will not be competent to uncover, recognize, and take due account of its shortcomings.[1]
Subsequent developments
The Court's decision in this death penalty case was very important in influencing the legal opinion regarding psychiatric predictions of dangerousness, a position with which the American Psychiatric Association and other medical ethicists disagree, leading some experts to conclude that a psychiatrist making such statements verges on the brink of being a quack. Nevertheless, courts have been willing to accept such testimony despite the lack of empirical evidence that these predictions of future dangerousness are accurate.[6]
However, forensic experts state that psychiatric testimony on
Barefoot was executed on October 30, 1984, at the age of 39.
See also
Footnotes
- ^ a b c d Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 (1983).
This article incorporates public domain material from this U.S government document.
- ^ a b c "Brief Amicus Curiae - Thomas A. Barefoot, Petitioner v. W. J. Estelle, Jr., Director, Texas Department of Corrections, Respondent" (PDF). American Psychiatric Association. Retrieved January 24, 2008.
- ^ PMID 3998695. Archived from the originalon December 20, 2012. Retrieved January 25, 2008.
- ^ Specifically, the statute required that the jury determine whether the defendant would pose "a continuing threat to society". By law, "society" includes within the prison system; thus, a defendant who could pose a risk to prison staff or other inmates would be eligible for the death penalty.
- ^ Unknown (n.d.). "Barefoot v. Estelle". Harvard.edu. Retrieved January 25, 2008.
- ^ ISBN 1-57230-236-4.
- ISBN 978-0-8377-3025-7. Retrieved January 25, 2008.
External links
- Text of Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 (1983) is available from: CourtListener Findlaw Google Scholar Justia Library of Congress Oyez (oral argument audio)
- Interview with Attorney Douglas Becker on his role in Barefoot v. Estelle
- Hastings - Barefoot v. Estelle