Definist fallacy
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The definist fallacy (sometimes called the Socratic fallacy, after Socrates)[1] is a logical fallacy, identified by William Frankena in 1939, that involves the definition of one property in terms of another.[2]
Overview
The philosopher William Frankena first used the term definist fallacy in a paper published in the British analytic philosophy journal Mind in 1939.[3] In this article he generalized and critiqued G. E. Moore's naturalistic fallacy, which argued that good cannot be defined by natural properties, as a broader confusion caused by attempting to define a term using non-synonymous properties.[4] Frankena argued that naturalistic fallacy is a complete misnomer because it is neither limited to naturalistic properties nor necessarily a fallacy. On the first word (naturalistic), he noted that Moore rejected defining good in non-natural as well as natural terms.[5]
Frankena rejected the idea that the second word (fallacy) represented an error in
See also
References
- ^ William J. Prior, "Plato and the 'Socratic Fallacy'", Phronesis 43(2) (1998), pp. 97–113.
- ISBN 978-0-470-99721-5
- JSTOR 2250706.
- ^ Preston, Aaron (December 30, 2005). "Moore, George Edward". Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Retrieved March 31, 2011.
- ISBN 978-81-7099-174-8.
- ^ a b Ridge, Michael (June 26, 2008). "Moral Non-Naturalism". In Edward N. Zalta (ed.). Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Retrieved March 31, 2011.
- ISBN 978-0-312-20923-0.