Research program
A research program (
normative model of science offered by Karl Popper's The Logic of Scientific Discovery (with its idea of falsifiability) and the descriptive model of science offered by Thomas Kuhn's The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (with its ideas of normal science and paradigm shifts).[1] Lakatos found falsificationism impractical and often not practiced, and found normal science—where a paradigm of science, mimicking an exemplar, extinguishes differing perspectives—more monopolistic
than actual.
Lakatos found that many research programs coexisted. Each had a hard core of theories immune to revision, surrounded by a protective belt of malleable theories.[2] A research programme vies against others to be most progressive.[2] Extending the research program's theories into new domains is theoretical progress, and experimentally corroborating such is empirical progress, always refusing falsification of the research program's hard core.[2] A research program might degenerate—lose progressiveness—but later return to progressiveness.[2]
References
- ^ Imre Lakatos, auth, John Worrall & Gregory Currie, eds, The Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes: Volume 1: Philosophical Papers (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980)
- ^ OCLC 875311964., ch 4 "Post-positivist philosophy of science", subch "Lakatosian research programmes", pp 60-63
Examples
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