Philosophy of science
Part of a series on |
Philosophy |
---|
Part of a series on |
Science |
---|
This is a subseries on philosophy. In order to explore related topics, please visit navigation. |
Philosophy of science is the branch of philosophy concerned with the foundations, methods, and implications of science. Amongst its central questions are the difference between science and non-science, the reliability of scientific theories, and the ultimate purpose and meaning of science as a human endeavour. Philosophy of science focuses on metaphysical, epistemic and semantic aspects of scientific practice, and overlaps with metaphysics, ontology, logic, and epistemology, for example, when it explores the relationship between science and the concept of truth. Philosophy of science is both a theoretical and empirical discipline, relying on philosophical theorising as well as meta-studies of scientific practice. Ethical issues such as bioethics and scientific misconduct are often considered ethics or science studies rather than the philosophy of science.
There is little consensus among philosophers about many of the central problems concerned with the philosophy of science, including whether science can reveal the truth about unobservable things and whether scientific reasoning can be justified at all as leading to definite knowledge. In addition to these general question, philosophers of science consider problems that apply to particular sciences (such as biology, physics and social sciences such as economics and psychology). Some philosophers of science also use contemporary results in science to reach conclusions about philosophy itself.
While philosophical thought pertaining to science dates back at least to the time of
Subsequently, the
Philosophies of the particular sciences range from questions about the nature of
Introduction
Defining science
Distinguishing between science and
Early attempts by the
An area of study or speculation that masquerades as science in an attempt to claim a legitimacy that it would not otherwise be able to achieve is referred to as
Scientific explanation
A closely related question is what counts as a good scientific explanation. In addition to providing predictions about future events, society often takes scientific theories to provide explanations for events that occur regularly or have already occurred. Philosophers have investigated the criteria by which a scientific theory can be said to have successfully explained a phenomenon, as well as what it means to say a scientific theory has explanatory power.
One early and influential account of scientific explanation is the
Justifying science
Although it is often taken for granted, it is not at all clear how one can infer the validity of a general statement from a number of specific instances or infer the truth of a theory from a series of successful tests.[20] For example, a chicken observes that each morning the farmer comes and gives it food, for hundreds of days in a row. The chicken may therefore use inductive reasoning to infer that the farmer will bring food every morning. However, one morning, the farmer comes and kills the chicken. How is scientific reasoning more trustworthy than the chicken's reasoning?
One approach is to acknowledge that induction cannot achieve certainty, but observing more instances of a general statement can at least make the general statement more probable. So the chicken would be right to conclude from all those mornings that it is likely the farmer will come with food again the next morning, even if it cannot be certain. However, there remain difficult questions about the process of interpreting any given evidence into a probability that the general statement is true. One way out of these particular difficulties is to declare that all beliefs about scientific theories are subjective, or personal, and correct reasoning is merely about how evidence should change one's subjective beliefs over time.[20]
Some argue that what scientists do is not inductive reasoning at all but rather
Observation inseparable from theory
When making observations, scientists look through telescopes, study images on electronic screens, record meter readings, and so on. Generally, on a basic level, they can agree on what they see, e.g., the thermometer shows 37.9 degrees C. But, if these scientists have different ideas about the theories that have been developed to explain these basic observations, they may disagree about what they are observing. For example, before
All observation involves both
The purpose of science
Should science aim to determine ultimate truth, or are there questions that science
Realists often point to the success of recent scientific theories as evidence for the truth (or near truth) of current theories.
Real Patterns
The notion of real patterns has been propounded, notably by philosopher Daniel C. Dennett, as an intermediate position between strong realism and eliminative materialism. This concept delves into the investigation of patterns observed in scientific phenomena to ascertain whether they signify underlying truths or are mere constructs of human interpretation. Dennett provides a unique ontological account concerning real patterns, examining the extent to which these recognized patterns have predictive utility and allow for efficient compression of information.[32]
The discourse on real patterns extends beyond philosophical circles, finding relevance in various scientific domains. For example, in biology, inquiries into real patterns seek to elucidate the nature of biological explanations, exploring how recognized patterns contribute to a comprehensive understanding of biological phenomena.[33] Similarly, in chemistry, debates around the reality of chemical bonds as real patterns continue.[34]
Evaluation of real patterns also holds significance in broader scientific inquiries. Researchers, like Tyler Millhouse, propose criteria for evaluating the realness of a pattern, particularly in the context of universal patterns and the human propensity to perceive patterns, even where there might be none.[35] This evaluation is pivotal in advancing research in diverse fields, from climate change to machine learning, where recognition and validation of real patterns in scientific models play a crucial role.[36]
Values and science
Values intersect with science in different ways. There are epistemic values that mainly guide the scientific research. The scientific enterprise is embedded in particular culture and values through individual practitioners. Values emerge from science, both as product and process and can be distributed among several cultures in the society. When it comes to the justification of science in the sense of general public participation by single practitioners, science plays the role of a mediator between evaluating the standards and policies of society and its participating individuals, wherefore science indeed falls victim to vandalism and sabotage adapting the means to the end.[37]
If it is unclear what counts as science, how the process of confirming theories works, and what the purpose of science is, there is considerable scope for values and other social influences to shape science. Indeed,
History
Pre-modern
The origins of philosophy of science trace back to
Modern
Logical positivism
Interpreting
Logical positivism is commonly portrayed as taking the extreme position that scientific language should never refer to anything unobservable—even the seemingly core notions of causality, mechanism, and principles—but that is an exaggeration. Talk of such unobservables could be allowed as metaphorical—direct observations viewed in the abstract—or at worst metaphysical or emotional. Theoretical laws would be reduced to empirical laws, while theoretical terms would garner meaning from observational terms via correspondence rules. Mathematics in physics would reduce to
In the late 1930s, logical positivists fled Germany and Austria for Britain and America. By then, many had replaced Mach's phenomenalism with
Thomas Kuhn
In the 1962 book
Kuhn denied that it is ever possible to isolate the hypothesis being tested from the influence of the theory in which the observations are grounded, and he argued that it is not possible to evaluate competing paradigms independently. More than one logically consistent construct can paint a usable likeness of the world, but there is no common ground from which to pit two against each other, theory against theory. Each paradigm has its own distinct questions, aims, and interpretations. Neither provides a standard by which the other can be judged, so there is no clear way to measure
For Kuhn, the choice of paradigm was sustained by rational processes, but not ultimately determined by them. The choice between paradigms involves setting two or more "portraits" against the world and deciding which likeness is most promising. For Kuhn, acceptance or rejection of a paradigm is a social process as much as a logical process. Kuhn's position, however, is not one of relativism.[53] According to Kuhn, a paradigm shift occurs when a significant number of observational anomalies arise in the old paradigm and a new paradigm makes sense of them. That is, the choice of a new paradigm is based on observations, even though those observations are made against the background of the old paradigm.
Current approaches
Naturalism's axiomatic assumptions
According to Robert Priddy, all scientific study inescapably builds on at least some essential assumptions that cannot be tested by scientific processes;[54] that is, that scientists must start with some assumptions as to the ultimate analysis of the facts with which it deals. These assumptions would then be justified partly by their adherence to the types of occurrence of which we are directly conscious, and partly by their success in representing the observed facts with a certain generality, devoid of ad hoc suppositions."[55] Kuhn also claims that all science is based on assumptions about the character of the universe, rather than merely on empirical facts. These assumptions – a paradigm – comprise a collection of beliefs, values and techniques that are held by a given scientific community, which legitimize their systems and set the limitations to their investigation.[56] For naturalists, nature is the only reality, the "correct" paradigm, and there is no such thing as supernatural, i.e. anything above, beyond, or outside of nature. The scientific method is to be used to investigate all reality, including the human spirit.[57]
Some claim that naturalism is the implicit philosophy of working scientists, and that the following basic assumptions are needed to justify the scientific method:[58]
- That there is an objective reality shared by all rational observers.[58][59]
"The basis for rationality is acceptance of an external objective reality."[60] "Objective reality is clearly an essential thing if we are to develop a meaningful perspective of the world. Nevertheless its very existence is assumed."[61] "Our belief that objective reality exist is an assumption that it arises from a real world outside of ourselves. As infants we made this assumption unconsciously. People are happy to make this assumption that adds meaning to our sensations and feelings, than live with solipsism."[62] "Without this assumption, there would be only the thoughts and images in our own mind (which would be the only existing mind) and there would be no need of science, or anything else."[63][self-published source?] - That this objective reality is governed by natural laws;[58][59]
"Science, at least today, assumes that the universe obeys knowable principles that don't depend on time or place, nor on subjective parameters such as what we think, know or how we behave."[60] Hugh Gauch argues that science presupposes that "the physical world is orderly and comprehensible."[64] - That reality can be discovered by means of systematic observation and experimentation.[58][59]
Stanley Sobottka said: "The assumption of external reality is necessary for science to function and to flourish. For the most part, science is the discovering and explaining of the external world."[63][self-published source?] "Science attempts to produce knowledge that is as universal and objective as possible within the realm of human understanding."[60] - That Nature has uniformity of laws and most if not all things in nature must have at least a natural cause.[59]
Biologist Stephen Jay Gould referred to these two closely related propositions as the constancy of nature's laws and the operation of known processes.[65] Simpson agrees that the axiom of uniformity of law, an unprovable postulate, is necessary in order for scientists to extrapolate inductive inference into the unobservable past in order to meaningfully study it.[66] "The assumption of spatial and temporal invariance of natural laws is by no means unique to geology since it amounts to a warrant for inductive inference which, as Bacon showed nearly four hundred years ago, is the basic mode of reasoning in empirical science. Without assuming this spatial and temporal invariance, we have no basis for extrapolating from the known to the unknown and, therefore, no way of reaching general conclusions from a finite number of observations. (Since the assumption is itself vindicated by induction, it can in no way "prove" the validity of induction — an endeavor virtually abandoned after Hume demonstrated its futility two centuries ago)."[67] Gould also notes that natural processes such as Lyell's "uniformity of process" are an assumption: "As such, it is another a priori assumption shared by all scientists and not a statement about the empirical world."[68] According to R. Hooykaas: "The principle of uniformity is not a law, not a rule established after comparison of facts, but a principle, preceding the observation of facts ... It is the logical principle of parsimony of causes and of economy of scientific notions. By explaining past changes by analogy with present phenomena, a limit is set to conjecture, for there is only one way in which two things are equal, but there are an infinity of ways in which they could be supposed different."[69] - That experimental procedures will be done satisfactorily without any deliberate or unintentional mistakes that will influence the results.[59]
- That experimenters won't be significantly biased by their presumptions.[59]
- That random sampling is representative of the entire population.[59]
A simple random sample (SRS) is the most basic probabilistic option used for creating a sample from a population. The benefit of SRS is that the investigator is guaranteed to choose a sample that represents the population that ensures statistically valid conclusions.[70]
Coherentism
In contrast to the view that science rests on foundational assumptions, coherentism asserts that statements are justified by being a part of a coherent system. Or, rather, individual statements cannot be validated on their own: only coherent systems can be justified.[71] A prediction of a transit of Venus is justified by its being coherent with broader beliefs about celestial mechanics and earlier observations. As explained above, observation is a cognitive act. That is, it relies on a pre-existing understanding, a systematic set of beliefs. An observation of a transit of Venus requires a huge range of auxiliary beliefs, such as those that describe the optics of telescopes, the mechanics of the telescope mount, and an understanding of celestial mechanics. If the prediction fails and a transit is not observed, that is likely to occasion an adjustment in the system, a change in some auxiliary assumption, rather than a rejection of the theoretical system.[citation needed]
In fact, according to the Duhem–Quine thesis, after Pierre Duhem and W.V. Quine, it is impossible to test a theory in isolation.[72] One must always add auxiliary hypotheses in order to make testable predictions. For example, to test Newton's Law of Gravitation in the solar system, one needs information about the masses and positions of the Sun and all the planets. Famously, the failure to predict the orbit of Uranus in the 19th century led not to the rejection of Newton's Law but rather to the rejection of the hypothesis that the solar system comprises only seven planets. The investigations that followed led to the discovery of an eighth planet, Neptune. If a test fails, something is wrong. But there is a problem in figuring out what that something is: a missing planet, badly calibrated test equipment, an unsuspected curvature of space, or something else.[citation needed]
One consequence of the Duhem–Quine thesis is that one can make any theory compatible with any empirical observation by the addition of a sufficient number of suitable ad hoc hypotheses. Karl Popper accepted this thesis, leading him to reject naïve falsification. Instead, he favored a "survival of the fittest" view in which the most falsifiable scientific theories are to be preferred.[73]
Anything goes methodology
Paul Feyerabend (1924–1994) argued that no description of scientific method could possibly be broad enough to include all the approaches and methods used by scientists, and that there are no useful and exception-free methodological rules governing the progress of science. He argued that "the only principle that does not inhibit progress is: anything goes".[74]
Feyerabend said that science started as a liberating movement, but that over time it had become increasingly dogmatic and rigid and had some oppressive features, and thus had become increasingly an
Sociology of scientific knowledge methodology
According to Kuhn, science is an inherently communal activity which can only be done as part of a community.[76] For him, the fundamental difference between science and other disciplines is the way in which the communities function. Others, especially Feyerabend and some post-modernist thinkers, have argued that there is insufficient difference between social practices in science and other disciplines to maintain this distinction. For them, social factors play an important and direct role in scientific method, but they do not serve to differentiate science from other disciplines. On this account, science is socially constructed, though this does not necessarily imply the more radical notion that reality itself is a social construct.
Michel Foucault sought to analyze and uncover how disciplines within the social sciences developed and adopted the methodologies used by their practitioners. In works like The Archaeology of Knowledge, he used the term human sciences. The human sciences do not comprise mainstream academic disciplines; they are rather an interdisciplinary space for the reflection on man who is the subject of more mainstream scientific knowledge, taken now as an object, sitting between these more conventional areas, and of course associating with disciplines such as anthropology, psychology, sociology, and even history.[77] Rejecting the realist view of scientific inquiry, Foucault argued throughout his work that scientific discourse is not simply an objective study of phenomena, as both natural and social scientists like to believe, but is rather the product of systems of power relations struggling to construct scientific disciplines and knowledge within given societies.[78] With the advances of scientific disciplines, such as psychology and anthropology, the need to separate, categorize, normalize and institutionalize populations into constructed social identities became a staple of the sciences. Constructions of what were considered "normal" and "abnormal" stigmatized and ostracized groups of people, like the mentally ill and sexual and gender minorities.[79]
However, some (such as Quine) do maintain that scientific reality is a social construct:
Physical objects are conceptually imported into the situation as convenient intermediaries not by definition in terms of experience, but simply as irreducible posits comparable, epistemologically, to the gods of Homer ... For my part I do, qua lay physicist, believe in physical objects and not in Homer's gods; and I consider it a scientific error to believe otherwise. But in point of epistemological footing, the physical objects and the gods differ only in degree and not in kind. Both sorts of entities enter our conceptions only as cultural posits.[80]
The public backlash of scientists against such views, particularly in the 1990s, became known as the science wars.[81]
A major development in recent decades has been the study of the formation, structure, and evolution of scientific communities by sociologists and anthropologists – including David Bloor, Harry Collins, Bruno Latour, Ian Hacking and Anselm Strauss. Concepts and methods (such as rational choice, social choice or game theory) from economics have also been applied[by whom?] for understanding the efficiency of scientific communities in the production of knowledge. This interdisciplinary field has come to be known as science and technology studies.[82] Here the approach to the philosophy of science is to study how scientific communities actually operate.
Continental philosophy
Philosophers in the continental philosophical tradition are not traditionally categorized[by whom?] as philosophers of science. However, they have much to say about science, some of which has anticipated themes in the analytical tradition. For example, in The Genealogy of Morals (1887) Friedrich Nietzsche advanced the thesis that the motive for the search for truth in sciences is a kind of ascetic ideal.[83]
In general, continental philosophy views science from a world-historical perspective. Philosophers such as Pierre Duhem (1861–1916) and Gaston Bachelard (1884–1962) wrote their works with this world-historical approach to science, predating Kuhn's 1962 work by a generation or more. All of these approaches involve a historical and sociological turn to science, with a priority on lived experience (a kind of Husserlian "life-world"), rather than a progress-based or anti-historical approach as emphasised in the analytic tradition. One can trace this continental strand of thought through the phenomenology of Edmund Husserl (1859–1938), the late works of Merleau-Ponty (Nature: Course Notes from the Collège de France, 1956–1960), and the hermeneutics of Martin Heidegger (1889–1976).[84]
The largest effect on the continental tradition with respect to science came from Martin Heidegger's critique of the
Other topics
Reductionism
Analysis involves breaking an observation or theory down into simpler concepts in order to understand it. Reductionism can refer to one of several philosophical positions related to this approach. One type of reductionism suggests that phenomena are amenable to scientific explanation at lower levels of analysis and inquiry. Perhaps a historical event might be explained in sociological and psychological terms, which in turn might be described in terms of human physiology, which in turn might be described in terms of chemistry and physics.[87] Daniel Dennett distinguishes legitimate reductionism from what he calls greedy reductionism, which denies real complexities and leaps too quickly to sweeping generalizations.[88]
Social accountability
A broad issue affecting the neutrality of science concerns the areas which science chooses to explore—that is, what part of the world and of humankind are studied by science. Philip Kitcher in his Science, Truth, and Democracy[89] argues that scientific studies that attempt to show one segment of the population as being less intelligent, less successful, or emotionally backward compared to others have a political feedback effect which further excludes such groups from access to science. Thus such studies undermine the broad consensus required for good science by excluding certain people, and so proving themselves in the end to be unscientific.
Philosophy of particular sciences
There is no such thing as philosophy-free science; there is only science whose philosophical baggage is taken on board without examination.[90]
— Daniel Dennett, Darwin's Dangerous Idea, 1995
In addition to addressing the general questions regarding science and induction, many philosophers of science are occupied by investigating foundational problems in particular sciences. They also examine the implications of particular sciences for broader philosophical questions. The late 20th and early 21st century has seen a rise in the number of practitioners of philosophy of a particular science.[91]
Philosophy of statistics
The problem of induction discussed above is seen in another form in debates over the
Philosophy of mathematics
Philosophy of mathematics is concerned with the philosophical foundations and implications of
Philosophy of physics
How does the
Philosophy of physics is the study of the fundamental,
Philosophy of chemistry
Philosophy of chemistry is the philosophical study of the
Philosophy of astronomy
The philosophy of astronomy seeks to understand and analyze the methodologies and technologies used by experts in the discipline, focusing on how observations made about space and astrophysical phenomena can be studied. Given that astronomers rely and use theories and formulas from other scientific disciplines, such as chemistry and physics, the pursuit of understanding how knowledge can be obtained about the cosmos, as well as the relation in which our planet and Solar System have within our personal views of our place in the universe, philosophical insights into how facts about space can be scientifically analyzed and configure with other established knowledge is a main point of inquiry.
Philosophy of Earth sciences
The philosophy of Earth science is concerned with how humans obtain and verify knowledge of the workings of the Earth system, including the atmosphere, hydrosphere, and geosphere (solid earth). Earth scientists' ways of knowing and habits of mind share important commonalities with other sciences, but also have distinctive attributes that emerge from the complex, heterogeneous, unique, long-lived, and non-manipulatable nature of the Earth system.
Philosophy of biology
Philosophy of biology deals with
Philosophy of medicine
Beyond
Philosophy of psychiatry
Philosophy of psychiatry explores philosophical questions relating to
Philosophy of psychology
Philosophy of psychology refers to issues at the theoretical foundations of modern psychology. Some of these issues are epistemological concerns about the methodology of psychological investigation. For example, is the best method for studying psychology to focus only on the response of behavior to external stimuli or should psychologists focus on mental perception and thought processes?[112] If the latter, an important question is how the internal experiences of others can be measured. Self-reports of feelings and beliefs may not be reliable because, even in cases in which there is no apparent incentive for subjects to intentionally deceive in their answers, self-deception or selective memory may affect their responses. Then even in the case of accurate self-reports, how can responses be compared across individuals? Even if two individuals respond with the same answer on a Likert scale, they may be experiencing very different things.
Other issues in philosophy of psychology are philosophical questions about the nature of mind, brain, and cognition, and are perhaps more commonly thought of as part of cognitive science, or philosophy of mind. For example, are humans rational creatures?[112] Is there any sense in which they have free will, and how does that relate to the experience of making choices? Philosophy of psychology also closely monitors contemporary work conducted in cognitive neuroscience, psycholinguistics, and artificial intelligence, questioning what they can and cannot explain in psychology.
Philosophy of psychology is a relatively young field, because psychology only became a discipline of its own in the late 1800s. In particular,
Philosophy of social science
The philosophy of social science is the study of the logic and method of the
The French philosopher,
Comte's positivism established the initial philosophical foundations for formal sociology and
The positivist perspective has been associated with '
Philosophy of technology
The philosophy of technology is a sub-field of philosophy that studies the nature of technology. Specific research topics include study of the role of tacit and explicit knowledge in creating and using technology, the nature of functions in technological artifacts, the role of values in design, and ethics related to technology. Technology and engineering can both involve the application of scientific knowledge. The philosophy of engineering is an emerging sub-field of the broader philosophy of technology.
See also
References
- ^ "Thomas S. Kuhn". Encyclopædia Britannica. Archived from the original on 2015-04-17.
Instead, he argued that the paradigm determines the kinds of experiments scientists perform, the types of questions they ask, and the problems they consider important.
- ^ Thornton, Stephen (2006). "Karl Popper". Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Archived from the original on 2007-06-27. Retrieved 2007-12-01.
- ^ "Science and Pseudo-science". Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 2008. Archived from the original on 2015-09-05.
- ISBN 978-90-277-1533-3.
- ISBN 978-0-226-30442-7.
- ^ Uebel, Thomas (2006). "Vienna Circle". Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Archived from the original on 2007-06-26. Retrieved 2007-12-01.
- ISBN 978-0-415-27844-7First published 1959 by Hutchinson & Co.)
{{cite book}}
: CS1 maint: postscript (link - ^ "Pseudoscientific – pretending to be scientific, falsely represented as being scientific". Oxford American Dictionary. Oxford English Dictionary.
- ^ Hansson, Sven Ove (1996). "Defining Pseudoscience". Philosophia Naturalis. 33: 169–176., as cited in "Science and Pseudo-science". Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 2008. Archived from the original on 2015-09-05.. The Stanford article states: "Many writers on pseudoscience have emphasized that pseudoscience is non-science posing as science. The foremost modern classic on the subject (Gardner 1957) bears the title Fads and Fallacies in the Name of Science. According to Brian Baigrie (1988, 438), "[w]hat is objectionable about these beliefs is that they masquerade as genuinely scientific ones." These and many other authors assume that to be pseudoscientific, an activity or a teaching has to satisfy the following two criteria (Hansson 1996): (1) it is not scientific, and (2) its major proponents try to create the impression that it is scientific".
- ISBN 0-321-05173-4.
- ISBN 0-8053-8738-2.
- ^ Gauch HG Jr. Scientific Method in Practice (2003).
- ISBN 978-0-7167-3090-3. as cited by National Science Foundation; Division of Science Resources Statistics (2006). "Science and Technology: Public Attitudes and Understanding". Science and engineering indicators 2006.
- ^ "A pretended or spurious science; a collection of related beliefs about the world mistakenly regarded as being based on scientific method or as having the status that scientific truths now have," from the Oxford English Dictionary, second edition 1989.
- ^ Feynman, Richard. "Cargo Cult Science" (PDF). Archived from the original (PDF) on 2013-12-01. Retrieved 2015-10-25.
- S2CID 16924146.
- ISBN 978-0-13-663345-7.
- ISBN 9780822974116.
- ^ a b Woodward, James (2003). "Scientific Explanation". Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Archived from the original on 2007-07-06. Retrieved 2007-12-07.
- ^ a b Vickers, John (2013). "The Problem of Induction". Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Archived from the original on 2014-04-07. Retrieved 2014-02-25.
- ^ Baker, Alan (2013). "Simplicity". Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Archived from the original on 2014-03-26. Retrieved 2014-02-25.
- ^ Nicholas Maxwell (1998) The Comprehensibility of the Universe Archived 2018-02-27 at the Wayback Machine Clarendon Press; (2017) Understanding Scientific Progress: Aim-Oriented Empiricism Archived 2018-02-20 at the Wayback Machine, Paragon House, St. Paul
- ^ a b Bogen, Jim (2013). "Theory and Observation in Science". Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Archived from the original on 2014-02-27. Retrieved 2014-02-25.
- ISBN 978-0-520-05155-3.
- ^ a b Boyd, Richard (2002). "Scientific Realism". Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Archived from the original on 2007-07-06. Retrieved 2007-12-01.
- ^ Specific examples include:
- ISBN 978-0-415-28594-0First published 1963 by Routledge and Kegan Paul)
{{cite book}}
: CS1 maint: postscript (link
- Smart, J.J.C. (1968). Between Science and Philosophy. New York: Random House.
- Putnam, Hilary (1975). Mathematics, Matter and Method (Philosophical Papers, Vol. I). London: Cambridge University Press.
- Putnam, Hilary (1978). Meaning and the Moral Sciences. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
- Boyd, Richard (1984). "The Current Status of Scientific Realism". In Jarrett Leplin (ed.). Scientific Realism. Berkeley: University of California Press. pp. 41–82. ISBN 978-0-520-05155-3.
- ISBN 978-0-19-517408-3.
- S2CID 108290084.
- ^ a b
ISBN 978-0-19-824424-0.
- S2CID 18275928.
- S2CID 35878807.
- ^ Dennett, D. (1991). Real Patterns. The Journal of Philosophy.
- ^ Burnston, D. C. (2017). Real Patterns in Biological Explanation. Philosophy of Science.
- ^ Seifert, V. A. (2022). The Chemical Bond is a Real Pattern. Philosophy of Science.
- ^ Millhouse, T. (2020). Really real patterns. Australasian Journal of Philosophy.
- ^ Santa Fe Institute. (2022). Real patterns in science & cognition. https://www.santafe.edu/news-center/news/real-patterns-science-cognition
- PMID 11772749.
- ^ Longino, Helen (2013). "The Social Dimensions of Scientific Knowledge". Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Archived from the original on 2014-03-26. Retrieved 2014-03-06.
- ^ Douglas Allchin, "Values in Science and in Science Education," in International Handbook of Science Education, B.J. Fraser and K.G. Tobin (eds.), 2:1083–1092, Kluwer Academic Publishers (1988).
- ^ Aristotle, "Prior Analytics", Hugh Tredennick (trans.), pp. 181–531 in Aristotle, Volume 1, Loeb Classical Library, William Heinemann, London, 1938.
- ISBN 978-0-226-48233-0.
- ISBN 978-0786713585.
- Bacon, Francis Novum Organum (The New Organon), 1620. Bacon's work described many of the accepted principles, underscoring the importance of empirical results, data gathering and experiment. Encyclopædia Britannica (1911), "Bacon, Francis" states: [In Novum Organum, we ] "proceed to apply what is perhaps the most valuable part of the Baconian method, the process of exclusion or rejection. This elimination of the non-essential, ..., is the most important of Bacon's contributions to the logic of induction, and that in which, as he repeatedly says, his method differs from all previous philosophies."
- ^ a b McMullin, Ernan. "The Impact of Newton's Principia on the Philosophy of Science". paricenter.com. Pari Center for New Learning. Archived from the original on 24 October 2015. Retrieved 29 October 2015.
- ^ "John Stuart Mill (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)". plato.stanford.edu. Archived from the original on 2010-01-06. Retrieved 2009-07-31.
- ^ Michael Friedman, Reconsidering Logical Positivism (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. xiv Archived 2016-06-28 at the Wayback Machine.
- ^ See "Vienna Circle" Archived 2015-08-10 at the Wayback Machine in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
- LCCN 85030366. Retrieved 2016-01-27.
The secondary and historical literature on logical positivism affords substantial grounds for concluding that logical positivism failed to solve many of the central problems it generated for itself. Prominent among the unsolved problems was the failure to find an acceptable statement of the verifiability (later confirmability) criterion of meaningfulness. Until a competing tradition emerged (about the late 1950s), the problems of logical positivism continued to be attacked from within that tradition. But as the new tradition in the philosophy of science began to demonstrate its effectiveness—by dissolving and rephrasing old problems as well as by generating new ones—philosophers began to shift allegiances to the new tradition, even though that tradition has yet to receive a canonical formulation.
- neo-Thomism, neo-Kantianism, intuitionism, dialectical materialism, phenomenology, and existentialism. However, neo-positivism failed dismally to give a faithful account of science, whether natural or social. It failed because it remained anchored to sense-data and to a phenomenalist metaphysics, overrated the power of induction and underrated that of hypothesis, and denounced realism and materialism as metaphysical nonsense. Although it has never been practiced consistently in the advanced natural sciences and has been criticized by many philosophers, notably Popper (1959 [1935], 1963), logical positivism remains the tacit philosophy of many scientists. Regrettably, the anti-positivism fashionable in the metatheory of social science is often nothing but an excuse for sloppiness and wild speculation.
- ^ "Popper, Falsifiability, and the Failure of Positivism". 7 August 2000. Archived from the original on January 7, 2014. Retrieved 7 January 2014.
The upshot is that the positivists seem caught between insisting on the V.C. [Verifiability Criterion]—but for no defensible reason—or admitting that the V.C. requires a background language, etc., which opens the door to relativism, etc. In light of this dilemma, many folk—especially following Popper's "last-ditch" effort to "save" empiricism/positivism/realism with the falsifiability criterion—have agreed that positivism is a dead-end.
- ^ Friedman, Reconsidering Logical Positivism (Cambridge U P, 1999), p. xii Archived 2016-06-28 at the Wayback Machine.
- ^ Bird, Alexander (2013). Zalta, Edward N. (ed.). "Thomas Kuhn". Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Archived from the original on 2017-07-13. Retrieved 2015-10-26.
- ISBN 0-226-45804-0
- ^ Priddy, Robert (1998). "Chapter Five, Scientific Objectivity in Question". Science Limited.
- ^ Whitehead 1997, p. 135.
- ^ Boldman, Lee (2007). "Chapter 6, The Privileged Status of Science" (PDF).
- ^ Papineau, David "Naturalism", in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, quote, "The great majority of contemporary philosophers would happily... reject 'supernatural' entities, and allow that science is a possible route (if not necessarily the only one) to important truths about the 'human spirit'."
- ^ a b c d Heilbron 2003, p. vii.
- ^ a b c d e f g Chen 2009, pp. 1–2.
- ^ a b c Durak 2008.
- ^ Vaccaro, Joan. "Reality". Retrieved 22 December 2017.
- ^
Vaccaro, Joan. "Objectiveism". Retrieved 22 December 2017.
Objective reality exists beyond or outside our self. Any belief that it arises from a real world outside us is actually an assumption. It seems more beneficial to assume that an objective reality exists than to live with solipsism, and so people are quite happy to make this assumption. In fact we made this assumption unconsciously when we began to learn about the world as infants. The world outside ourselves appears to respond in ways which are consistent with it being real. The assumption of objectivism is essential if we are to attach the contemporary meanings to our sensations and feelings and make more sense of them.
- ^ a b Sobottka 2005, p. 11.
- ^ Gauch 2002, p. 154, "Expressed as a single grand statement, science presupposes that the physical world is orderly and comprehensible. The most obvious components of this comprehensive presupposition are that the physical world exists and that our sense perceptions are generally reliable."
- ^ Gould 1987, p. 120, "You cannot go to a rocky outcrop and observe either the constancy of nature's laws or the working of known processes. It works the other way around." You first assume these propositions and "then you go to the outcrop of rock."
- ^ Simpson 1963, pp. 24–48, "Uniformity is an unprovable postulate justified, or indeed required, on two grounds. First, nothing in our incomplete but extensive knowledge of history disagrees with it. Second, only with this postulate is a rational interpretation of history possible and we are justified in seeking—as scientists we must seek—such a rational interpretation."
- ^ Gould 1965, pp. 223–228.
- ^ Gould 1984, p. 11.
- ^ Hooykaas 1963, p. 38.
- ^ "Simple Random Sampling". Archived from the original on 2018-01-02. Retrieved 2018-01-06.
A simple random sample (SRS) is the most basic probabilistic option used for creating a sample from a population. Each SRS is made of individuals drawn from a larger population, completely at random. As a result, said individuals have an equal chance of being selected throughout the sampling process. The benefit of SRS is that as a result, the investigator is guaranteed to choose a sample which is representative of the population, which ensures statistically valid conclusions.
- ^ Olsson, Erik (2014). Zalta, Edward N. (ed.). "Coherentist Theories of Epistemic Justification". Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Archived from the original on 2018-09-14. Retrieved 2015-10-26.
- ISBN 978-90-277-0630-0. Archivedfrom the original on 2016-06-28. Retrieved 2016-01-27.
- ISBN 978-0-203-99462-7.
- ^
- ^ Preston, John (2007-02-15). "Paul Feyerabend". In Zalta, Edward N. (ed.). Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
- ISBN 978-0-226-45808-3.
A paradigm is what the members of a community of scientists share, and, conversely, a scientific community consists of men who share a paradigm.
- ^ "Foucault, Michel". Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Retrieved 29 August 2022.
- ^ Morrison, Thomas (2018). "Foucault's Elephant". Philosophy Now. No. 127. Retrieved 29 August 2022.
- (PDF) from the original on 2022-10-09.
- ISBN 978-0-674-32351-3.
- ISBN 978-0-415-21209-0. Retrieved 29 October 2015.
The 'war' is between scientists who believe that science and its methods are objective, and an increasing number of social scientists, historians, philosophers, and others gathered under the umbrella of Science Studies.
- ^ Woodhouse, Edward. Science Technology and Society. Spring 2015 ed. n.p.: U Readers, 2014. Print.
- from the original on 2016-03-04. Retrieved 2019-10-22.
- ^ Gutting, Gary (2004), Continental Philosophy of Science, Blackwell Publishers, Cambridge, MA.
- ^ Wheeler, Michael (2015). "Martin Heidegger". Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Archived from the original on 2015-10-16. Retrieved 2015-10-29.
- ISBN 9781134473809. Archivedfrom the original on 15 July 2019. Retrieved 3 Mar 2019.
- ^ Cat, Jordi (2013). "The Unity of Science". Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Archived from the original on 2014-04-07. Retrieved 2014-03-01.
- ISBN 978-0-691-13639-4. Retrieved 28 October 2015.
- ^
ISBN 9780198033356. Retrieved 26 September 2020.
- ISBN 978-1-4391-2629-5.
- ^ a b Bickle, John; Mandik, Peter; Landreth, Anthony (2010). Zalta, Edward N. (ed.). "The Philosophy of Neuroscience". Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Archived from the original on 2013-12-02. Retrieved 2015-12-28(Summer 2010 Edition)
{{cite web}}
: CS1 maint: postscript (link) - ^ Romeijn, Jan-Willem (2014). Zalta, Edward N. (ed.). "Philosophy of Statistics". Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Archived from the original on 2018-09-14. Retrieved 2015-10-29.
- ^ Horsten, Leon (2015). Zalta, Edward N. (ed.). "Philosophy of Mathematics". Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Retrieved 2015-10-29.
- ^ Ismael, Jenann (2015). Zalta, Edward N. (ed.). "Quantum Mechanics". Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Archived from the original on 2015-11-06. Retrieved 2015-10-29.
- ^ Weisberg, Michael; Needham, Paul; Hendry, Robin (2011). "Philosophy of Chemistry". Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Archived from the original on 2014-04-07. Retrieved 2014-02-14.
- ^ "Philosophy, Logic and Scientific Method". Archived from the original on 2012-08-02. Retrieved 2018-07-03.
- ^ Gewertz, Ken (February 8, 2007). "The philosophy of evolution: Godfrey-Smith takes an ingenious evolutionary approach to how the mind works". Harvard University Gazette. Archived from the original on October 11, 2008. Retrieved July 3, 2018..
- ^ Darwinian Populations and Natural Selection. Oxford University Press. 2010.
- ^ Hull D. (1969), What philosophy of biology is not, Journal of the History of Biology, 2, pp. 241–268.
- ^ Recent examples include Okasha S. (2006), Evolution and the Levels of Selection. Oxford: Oxford University Press, and Godfrey-Smith P. (2009), Darwinian Populations and Natural Selection. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- S2CID 123314067.
- S2CID 55078796.
- S2CID 16964968.
- ^ Lee, K., 2012. The Philosophical Foundations of Modern Medicine, London/New York, Palgrave/Macmillan.
- PMID 7271692.
- S2CID 33650340.
- ^ Nunn, R., 2009. It's time to put the placebo out of our misery" British Medical Journal 338, b1568.
- from the original on 2018-12-29. Retrieved 2018-12-29.
- PMID 21888926.
- (PDF) from the original on 2018-07-24. Retrieved 2019-09-01.
- The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, edited by Edward N. Zalta. Accessed 18 August 2016.
- ^ a b Mason, Kelby; Sripada, Chandra Sekhar; Stich, Stephen (2010). "Philosophy of Psychology" (PDF). In Moral, Dermot (ed.). Routledge Companion to Twentieth-Century Philosophy. London: Routledge. Archived from the original (PDF) on 2017-05-17. Retrieved 2014-02-20.
- ISBN 978-0-521-44780-5.
- ^ "Stanford Encyclopaedia: Auguste Comte". Archived from the original on 2017-10-11. Retrieved 2010-01-10.
- ISBN 978-0435823405.
- ^ Schunk, Learning Theories: An Educational Perspective, 5th, 315
- ISBN 978-0-7456-4328-1p. 68
Sources
- Chen, Christina S. (2009). Larson, Thomas (ed.). "Atheism and the Assumptions of Science and Religion". Lyceum. X (2): 1–10.
- Durak, Antoine Berke (6 June 2008). "The nature of reality and knowledge".
- Gauch, Hugh G. (2002). Scientific Method in Practice. Cambridge University Press.
- Gould, Stephen J (1965). "Is uniformitarianism necessary?". American Journal of Science. 263 (3): 223–228. .
- Gould, Stephen J (1984). "Toward the vindication of punctuational change in catastrophes and earth history". Catastrophes and Earth History. Princeton University Press. p. 9–34.
- Gould, Stephen J (1987). Time's Arrow, Time's Cycle: Myth and Metaphor in the Discovery of Geological Time. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. p. 120. ISBN 978-0-674-89199-9.
You first assume.
- Heilbron, J.L., ed. (2003). The Oxford Companion to the History of Modern Science. New York: Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-511229-0.
- Hooykaas, R (1963). The principle of uniformity in geology, biology, and theology, 2nd impression. London: E.J. Brill.
- Simpson, G.G. (1963). "Historical science". In Albritton, Jr., C.C. (ed.). Fabric of geology. Stanford, California: Freeman, Cooper, and Company. pp. 24–48.
- Sobottka, Stanley (2005). "Consciousness" (PDF). p. 11.
- Whitehead, A.N. (1997) [1920]. Science and the Modern World. Lowell Lectures. New York: Free Press. p. 135. LCCN 67002244.
Further reading
- Bovens, L. and Hartmann, S. (2003), Bayesian Epistemology, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
- Gutting, Gary (2004), Continental Philosophy of Science, Blackwell Publishers, Cambridge, MA.
- Godfrey-Smith, Peter (2003), Theory and Reality: An Introduction the Philosophy of Science, University of Chicago Press.
- ISBN 978-0-226-45804-5.
- Losee, J. (1998), A Historical Introduction to the Philosophy of Science, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
- Papineau, David (2005) Problems of the Philosophy of Science. Oxford Companion to Philosophy, Oxford.
- Salmon, Merrilee H.; Science, University of Pittsburgh. Department of the History and Philosophy of (1992). Introduction to the Philosophy of Science. Upper Saddle River, N.J: Prentice Hall. ISBN 978-0-13-663345-7.
- Popper, Karl, (1963) ISBN 0-415-04318-2.
- ISBN 978-0-19-824424-0.
- Ziman, John (2000). Real Science: what it is, and what it means. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
External links
- Philosophy of science at PhilPapers
- Philosophy of science at the Indiana Philosophy Ontology Project
- "Philosophy of science". Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.